Higher Education Governance:

Lessons

Washington State Senate

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Synopsis

The "system" of education in Washington exists as a combination of several loosely coordinated entities. Early learning consists of private and publically funded providers, which are licensed and monitored by the state Department of Early Learning. Kindergarten through secondary education is administered through 295 locally elected school boards and elected or appointed state agencies that perform overlapping policy and administrative activities (Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Board of Education, and the Professional Educator Standards Board). Post secondary education has two separate, but interrelated mechanisms – the Higher Education Coordinating Board (HECB – a coordinating board) and the State Board for Community and Technical Colleges (SBCTC – a governing board). In addition, the Workforce Education and Coordinating Board influences how post-secondary education is focused. Finally, the Council of Presidents is a quasi-state agency that exercises significant policy-making influence.

At various times, there have been efforts to further divide these entities and, conversely, efforts to combine them or encourage them to coordinate their efforts to a greater extent to enhance the educational pipeline from early learning through graduate school for the benefit of students, the state, and the economy.

Historically, the HECB has been at the center of some of these changes. The HECB can trace its heritage to 1969 when the Legislature established the Council on Higher Education (CHE). That enabling legislation was in response to recommendations of the Temporary Advisory Committee on Public Higher Education (TACPHE), a blue ribbon committee composed of the governor, legislators, educators, and members of the general public convened from 1965-1969.

The TACPHE choose a *coordinating board* with *recommending influence* as opposed to approval authority. The idea of a single higher education governing board was seen as an undesirable choice to the legislature that wanted more control over the new entity. During the six years of CHE's existence it took most of its cues from the legislature. Though the legislature only gave the board limited statutory authority, the board was widely viewed as one of the strongest in the country during that time given its legislative backing.

The CHE became the Council for Postsecondary Education (CPE) in 1975 when federal legislation required states to establish or designate single state postsecondary education planning agencies in order to qualify for federal planning and other funds. There were several notable changes: (1) the membership of the CPE was reorganized; (2) its administrative responsibilities with respect to such programs as financial aid increased progressively; and (3) the board's capacity to consider and debate higher education matters was affected directly. Between these changes and outside influences like the difficult financial climate in the 1980's, the CPE steadily lost influence and credibility because it had to focus on program management and administrative oversight to the detriment of other duties such as rulemaking and policy making.

In 1983, the legislature along with others, were again looking at higher education governance. One group retained outside consultants who found that Washington's System of higher education was out of balance because while the state recognized its need for coordination, the legislature was unwilling to delegate power sufficient to achieve greater cohesiveness, efficiency, and accountability in the system. The experts concluded that while the state should retain its present governance system of separate boards for each institution; it should reconstitute its coordinating board to give it more power.

Major functions of the HECB include: (a) Developing a statewide strategic master plan for higher education; (b) Recommending policies to enhance the availability, quality, efficiency, and accountability of public higher education in Washington; (c) Administering student financial assistance programs; (d) Serving as an advocate on behalf of students and the overall system of higher education; (e) Coordinating with other governing boards and institutions to create a seamless system of public education for the citizens of Washington; and (f) Helping families save for college.

The general consensus is that the HECB performs administrative functions (such as administering financial aid programs) well. However, some stakeholders do not feel the HECB is accomplishing all of its policy roles, including comprehensive planning and providing policy recommendations to the governor and the legislature. In this way, the HECB has more statutory duties, yet its functional authority to accomplish these duties is still vague.

History shows that the legislature has been continually reluctant to form a state-wide governing board and experts have agreed that this might not be the best route. However, efforts to strengthen on one hand or further decentralize the HECB on the other have each resulted in the HECB taking on more administrative duties at the expense of policy making functions.

Other states have been successful in bringing about governance reform in a number of ways that may or may not include changing governance structures through the use of P-16/P-20 councils. The P-16 / P-20 mechanism is generally overlaid on existing governance structures over which it holds no authority.

In some cases, P-16/P-20 councils have served as a mechanism to leverage existing strengths and weakness of present governance systems by providing a forum to discuss ideas and collaborate. In other cases, P-16/P-20 councils have been a part of substantive reforms – where systems are complete dismantled and built back up again.

Washington's P-20 council did not flourish, but by looking at the reasons Washington's council was not entirely successful and comparing it to other state's councils, several lessons about how, when, and where to reform governance structures emerge.

1. **State history and political culture can support or undermine relationships and reforms among educational systems:** Creating incentives for systems to work together – whether through financial structures, accountability mechanisms, or other means – is essential.

   In Rhode Island, the state's political culture between the governor and the legislature has hindered their P-16 effort. Owing to a complex and heated struggle between the legislative and executive branches (a struggle that also reflects a partisan divide), the council has no legislative support. The council suffered from legislative hostility that pronounces any would-be policy initiative of the council "dead on arrival." The governor established the council as a management tool for his administration—in effect as an education cabinet—and it is not clear whether this was a cause or a consequence of the struggle between the branches. The implied theory of change is that a top-down model by which the governor coordinates executive branch offices that influence the education and workforce policy agendas will improve statewide coordination and results. Since the council operates largely as a management structure, it has little formal communication *per se* with outside stakeholders. Absent legislative buy-in, the governor and his lieutenants are limited to working within existing policy constraints. To the extent that the Legislature pursues policy reforms, it does so on its own track, with little regard for the council's agenda.

2. **Any organizational structure can support P-16/P-20 reform provided that: (a) there is a strong reform advocate directed toward collaborative reform; and (b) there is legislative buy-in:** Strong leadership can create opportunities for reform; set parameters; and embed policies in statute. Many successful reform efforts were led by one strong leader, usually the governor, convening and setting the agenda for key stakeholders with some legislative presence. One reason Washington's P-20 council struggled was because the governor was only able to attend the first meeting and no executive staff were selected to serve in her place. What remained was a room full of peers who had a difficult time setting an agenda and staying on task with no unifying force.

3. **State-wide councils have better ability to institute reforms than local and or regional councils:** Regional councils do not have much potential to influence policy because they generally do not have the resources necessary to do so.

   In Kentucky, the council operates outside of the formal legislative and executive branches of government and has no representatives from either branch among its members. It is a voluntary association of state agencies brought together under the auspices of the Council for Postsecondary Education to inform one another's work. The council does not take policy positions or work as a body to implement policies. The Kentucky model in part depends on a network of 22 regional councils. The absence of authority, funding, and staffing for the state-level council is not perceived

as a major barrier to progress since the regional councils have been created to accomplish the local work of P–16 reform. However, few regional councils have acquired the resources to attain the capacity to accomplish much. Even more importantly, the independent actions of the regions have not produced statewide consensus on policy priorities or a statewide policy agenda.

4. **The business sector can be a significant resource for creativity and funding:** For example, the business community in Arizona encouraged the development of a council model that brings many stakeholders together to influence an education bureaucracy known for its ability to resist reform. This expanded stakeholder group was granted legitimacy by the governor, who issued an executive order and allocated staffing and resources from her office. The result is a council that has a better chance of sustaining a coordinated policy agenda and for which there is a high degree of public accountability, since there are large, open meetings, published agendas, and expectations for follow-up by participants.

Question

What lessons can be learned from educational governance systems in other states and applied to Washington in our effort to create a seamless early learning through graduate educational system?

Brief Answer

While different governance models do have an impact on the range of available options, structure alone does not have a strong relationship to a state's ability to institutionalize reforms. That is to say, that governance structures by themselves cannot carry the day. Instead, other factors such as state context and history, strong leadership, and availability of incentives and or venue encouraging collaboration are much more important factors when creating institutional reform.

Introduction

Policymakers in all states are increasingly looking for ways to raise student achievement in kindergarten through high school, and improve college access and success. To do this, states and local communities are trying to create an integrated system of education in which all levels of education – pre-kindergarten through college – coordinate, communicate, and educate as one system instead of several. These efforts have been named most commonly K-16, P-16, and P-20.[i]

In Washington, the P-20 council was a component of reform and was one of Washington Learns' specific recommendations in their final report. The council was created by Executive Order in 2007. The P-20 council was intended to evaluate early learning, K-12, higher education, and workforce preparation with the goal of increasing accountability[ii] and providing a venue for cross-sector discussion and collaboration.[iii] By looking at data from many sources within the education system, the P-20 Council was tasked with determining whether Washington is getting the expected return on its investment and where and how it needs to make improvements.[iv] Additionally, the P-20 council was supposed to track the progress made on Washington Learns long-term goals and on specific investments made by the legislature during the 2007 session. The council's primary goal was to increase access to postsecondary education, to improve economic opportunities in the state, and to align early learning and kindergarten.[v] However, it only met a few times before being disbanded by the governor in early 2009.

Because the P-16 / P-20 mechanism is generally overlaid on existing governance structures over which it holds no authority, several lessons can be learned about how, when, and where to reform governance structures.

First, state history and political culture can support or undermine relationships and reforms among educational systems. Second, any organizational structure can support P-16/P-20 reform provided that: (a) there is a strong reform advocate directed toward collaborative

reform; and (b) there is legislative buy-in. Third, state-wide councils have better ability to institute reforms than local and or regional councils. Finally, the business sector is a resource for creativity and funding.

Given the central role of the Higher Education Coordinating Board (HECB), there has been movement to further decentralize Washington's system of education governance and limit or reassign the HECB's authority on one hand, alongside movement to strengthen the role that the HECB plays on the other.

In deciding what the best course of action is, it is important to acknowledge that state organizational structures and the people within them (for example, governors, legislators, state agencies, and state committees) affect the decision-making procedures, rules, and norms of state governance. These procedures and rules, in turn, influence state policy levers, such as finance mechanisms, education standards, curricula and assessments, data systems, and accountability—each of which is considered a component of state governance.

In an effort to provide context, suggest options, and identify potential pitfalls of reforming Washington's education governance system it is first necessary to understand the history of the HECB and how Washington's current system of education governance developed. Next, this report will provide an analysis of the strengths and weakness of the present system. Then, this report will explore education governance systems in other states, where educational governance systems differ, and identify the effects of those differences on state governance functions. Finally, this report will offer some observations and a list of options to consider when thinking about Washington's next move.

Ultimately, while different governance models do have an impact on the range of available options, structure alone does not have a strong relationship to a state's ability to institutionalize reforms. Instead, other factors such as state context and history, strong leadership, and availability of incentives and or venue encouraging collaboration are much more important factors when creating institutional reform.[vi]

I. Washington State Context: The HECB board – past and present, reasoning behind the development of the current system

The HECB can trace its heritage to 1969 when the Legislature established the Council on Higher Education (CHE). That enabling legislation was in response to recommendations of the Temporary Advisory Committee on Public Higher Education (TACPHE), a blue ribbon committee composed of the governor, legislators, educators, and members of the general public convened from 1965-1969.[vii]

The coordinating board was a compromise between the alternatives considered by TACPHE as it related to the governance issue. The range of options before it were a single higher education governing board for all public colleges and universities, on the one hand, and continuation of the then present arrangement of decentralized and voluntary institutional relationships, on the other. A statewide coordinating board, somewhere in the middle, was the compromise.[viii]

A second series of compromises revolved around the authority of the new coordinating board, whether it should have advisory weight or regulatory power. The difference between the two was signified by the difference between *recommending influence* and *approval authority*. The Legislature chose the former.[ix]

The CHE had only the power to review and recommend and remained confined to this role for the 17 years of its existence. It could examine proposals for new degree programs, and it did so, but it could only recommend for or against their establishment. It could engage in comprehensive higher education planning, but it could only recommend policies. It could review institutional budget requests, but it could only recommend levels and programs on the basis of their alignment with the statewide plan.[x] The early days of the CHE proved especially interesting in terms of the interpretation of this role. During this period, the new agency largely took its cues from the legislature.[xi]

In 1975, the CHE delivered the state's first comprehensive six-year plan. During this period, the organization was evaluated several times by outside experts brought in by the board members. The CHE was widely regarded as one of the strongest statewide boards in the country. In contrast to this perception of strength, the CHE's statutory authority was among the weakest.[xii] This suggests that legislative support is a more important attribute of having a powerful board than structure.

These years constituted a distinct phase, but times, events, and conditions were changing. In 1972, Congress enacted the *Higher Education Amendments of 1972*. Section XII of those amendments required states to establish or designate single state postsecondary education planning agencies in order to qualify for federal planning and other funds. Congress obliged these agencies to represent a wide spectrum of postsecondary interests. This requirement led to changes in the CHE's membership structure during the 1975 legislative session.[xiii]

a. 1975 Change: The Council for Postsecondary Education

Previously, the CHE was composed of nine citizen members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate; these were the voting members. The six public four year institution presidents, a private college president, a representative of the governor's office, the head of Office of Office of Financial Management (OFM), four legislators (two from each chamber), the director of the State Board of Community and Technical Colleges (SBCTC), and the Office of the Superintendant of Public Instruction (OSPI) served as *ex officio* members of the board with advisory authority according to statute, they had voice but no voting power. (RCW 28B.80.050).[xiv]

The 1975 revisions replaced the six public institution presidents with the chair of the Council of Presidents, to represent these institutions, added the director of the then Commission on Vocational Education, and placed a representative of postsecondary proprietary education on the board. The four legislators were removed. The other advisory members OSPI, the SBCCE

director, etc. remained on the board. In addition, one of the nine public members had to be a full-time undergraduate student.[xv]

The legislature changed the CHE's name to Council for *Postsecondary* Education (CPE), designated it as the state agency for federal higher education planning purposes, and authorized all members now numbering 16 to have voting authority on matters involving federal postsecondary planning functions.[xvi] This new structure, in practice, resulted in the board taking on more administrative duties at the expense of policy analysis.

The CPE's administrative responsibilities with respect to such matters as student financial aid program management both the number of programs and the funds involved increased progressively. Baccalaureate institution registration (licensing) and institution approval and monitoring for the Veteran's Administration were among the new administrative tasks, in addition to others.[xvii] Some programs provided funds for staff to perform the required tasks, but others did not. In any case, internal program management cut more and more into the time of supervisory staff and rule making; and administrative oversight cut more and more into the time of board members and into the time available for policy discussions at board meetings.[xviii]

The board's capacity to consider and debate higher education policy matters was affected directly, and members began to realize such capacity was a commodity in decreasing supply. Implementation of the CPE's own planning and policy decisions also had spiraling effects on its capacity. In creating institutional service areas, for example, the organization then had to define, implement, enforce, and evaluate them. As a result, more and more staff effort was redirected from policy analysis to oversight, monitoring, and committee staffing.[xix]

Probably less noticed but certainly of some effect was the expansion of legislative staffing capacity during these years. This expansion was a national phenomenon, as legislatures throughout the country increased their policy research capability. Simply put, while the legislature continued to look to the CPE for data and policy recommendations in the postsecondary realm, it was developing its own policy research capacity.[xx]

b. Establishment of the HECB

As the CPE approached the end of its second phase, the postsecondary education phase, it was increasingly clear that it was falling on hard times. The recession of the early 1980s and the difficult fiscal climate contributed to uncertainty. By 1983, the legislature, its Joint Legislative Committee on Higher Education Governance, and its second blue ribbon committee on education, the Temporary Committee on Education Policies, Structure, and Management (the 3609 Committee) were again looking at higher education governance.

For its part, the 3609 Committee, directed by its statute to consider higher education governance, retained outside consultants Dr. Lyman Glenny and Frank M. Bowen. In their report to the Committee, *Toward A New Beginning: Balancing Local Control With State Coordination and Governance* (August 31, 1984) they concluded that Washington's system of

higher education was out of balance because while the state recognized its need for coordination, the legislature was unwilling to delegate power sufficient to achieve greater cohesiveness, efficiency, and accountability in the system.[xxi]

Glenny and Bowen concluded that while the state should retain its present governance system of separate boards for each institution; it should reconstitute its coordinating board to give it more power. For instance, they recommended that the board should have approval rather than recommending authority, specifically in the area of approval of programs, off- campus centers, and new physical facilities. These changes were supposed to clarify the legislature's expectations of the new board and give it the authority to fulfill its role.[xxii]

c. A New Board in 1985: The HECB

The statutory predicate for the HECB is similar to the CHE's. The purpose of the board is to provide planning, coordination, monitoring, and policy analysis for higher education in the state of Washington in cooperation and consultation with the institutions, autonomous governing boards and with all other segments of postsecondary education, including but not limited to the SBCTC. The legislature intended that the board represent the broad public interest above the interests of the individual colleges and universities.[xxiii]

Several aspects of this purpose statement are noteworthy. The first is the assignment: to provide planning, coordination, monitoring, and policy analysis for higher education. The second is that this be done in cooperation and consultation with the other higher education boards and segments, thus offering a clue to the definition of coordination. The words *autonomous* governing boards appear in this version as they did in the initial CHE version. The third is the statement of intent that the board represent the broad public interest above the interests of the institutions. This component of the statute denotes a clear legislative expectation that the HECB be an instrument of government rather than a representative of higher education.[xxiv]

Expectations concerning the specific duties, and to some extent the approach, of the HECB also are found in comparatively explicit detail in Washington statutes. The board has been assigned central functions with respect to planning. It is required to establish role and mission statements for the public four-year institutions and the community and technical college system. It is obliged to identify the state's higher education goals, objectives, and priorities. It must prepare a comprehensive master plan that addresses state needs (in specified categories); demographic, social, and economic trends; and attendance, retention, and dropout rates. In considering the needs of state residents for higher education services, it must apply its initial priorities to heavily populated areas underserved by public institutions. The plan also must contain recommendations on enrollment policies to meet the identified needs and guidelines for continuing education, adult education, public service, and other higher education programs. The plan must also specify mechanisms through which the system can meet the hiring needs of specific employers.[xxv]

The statutes called for submission of the initial master plan by December 1987 and for updates every four years and required the legislature to hold hearings on the plan and, unless legislation is enacted to the contrary, to adopt it as state higher education policy by concurrent resolution. (1985 version of RCW 28B.80.320).[xxvi]

Other mandated HECB responsibilities include reviewing, evaluating, and making recommendations on operating and capital budget requests, including supplemental budget requests, from the public institutions and the community colleges with respect to their congruence with the master plan and with guidelines on board fiscal policies. The HECB must recommend legislation affecting higher education. It also must recommend tuition and fee levels and policies based on peer institution comparisons and establish financial aid policies, also based on peer institution comparisons. The HECB prepares recommendations on merging or closing institutions and develops criteria identifying the need for new baccalaureate institutions. It has new degree program approval authority with respect to the public four-year institutions, and it has review and recommending authority with respect to existing on-campus and off-campus programs. The HECB is required to approve and develop guidelines for higher education consortia and centers and approve the purchase or lease of off-campus facilities for all types of public institutions. It establishes service areas and approve contracts for off-campus programs.[xxvii]

The HECB's enabling statute also provides direct reference to coordination. The section on coordination (RCW 28B.80.350) was included in the 1985 statute reconstituting the board (i.e., replacing the CPE with the HECB). The original 1969 enabling act, which established a coordinating board, but aside from an indirect reference in the purpose clause, did not mention coordination.[xxviii]

Coordination includes: promoting inter-institutional cooperation, establishing minimum admission standards for the four-year institutions, establish transfer policies, adopt rules implementing statutory residency requirements, administer reciprocity agreements with bordering states and British Columbia, review and recommend compensation policies for administrators and faculty using peer institution data, monitor higher education activities for compliance with state policy, arbitrate disputes among institutions (in which cases the decision of the board is binding), establish a state data system, make recommendations to increase minority participation, etc.[xxix]

Institutional responsibilities in this context are defined in a section added to the board's statute (RCW 28B.80.610) in 1993. In this case, the institutions are obligated to develop strategic plans under the board's guidelines (in the case of the four-year institutions), provide information in a timely manner, provide student financial aid programs in concert with state policy, and operate as efficiently as feasible within their missions and goals. The HECB is responsible for delineating and coordinating the institutional plans, preparing reports to the governor, legislature, and public, administering state student financial aid programs, and assisting institutions in improving operational efficiency. This section also states that the SBCTC shall be the

coordinator of institutional plans for the community and technical college system and the entity responsible for providing information about the system to the HECB.[xxx]

The board has a number of administrative functions and duties, most of which pertain to student financial assistance programs and various federal programs. The HECB is statutorily expected to perform its policy and planning duties in consultation with independent higher education institutions, when appropriate. (RCW 28B.80.330). Its principal relationships with these institutions, however, have centered on its responsibilities to administer the student financial assistance programs.[xxxi]

II. Analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the present system

Ultimately, from 1987-2002, the HECB was characterized by vigor and activity, followed by the acquisition of additional administrative responsibilities and program oversight, then followed by diminishing of the policy role.[xxxii] Given this pattern, the general consensus is that the HECB performs administrative functions well such as administering financial aid programs. However, some stakeholders do not feel the HECB is accomplishing all of its policy roles, including comprehensive planning and providing policy recommendations to the governor and the legislature. Furthermore, regulatory tasks, such as program review and approval, are largely questioned as to whether there is a need for such controls and how well the HECB is performing this function.[xxxiii] Some may argue that this is because the legislature has not given the HECB true authority and thereby undermined its legitimacy with stakeholders.

Those thinking about reforming the HECB have at least one structural strength to build on: the fact that state statutes require a linkage between planning and policy. RCW 28B.80.320(c). As discussed below, legislative buy-in is a key way to strengthen an otherwise statutorily challenged board. For instance, in 1975 the CHE was widely regarded as one of the strongest statewide boards in the country despite the fact that the CHE's statutory authority was among the weakest. Though the council was only given *recommending influence* by the legislature, functionally the board had *approval authority* given its consistent legislative support.

The counterweight to strong legislative support is that the HECB might be viewed as too inclined to ask for permission from the legislature rather than merely act under the authority they already have. In this way, some may feel that the HECB may be too likely to adopt expedient, political solutions rather than do what's best for higher education in the state.

Conversely, according to one Washington State Institute for Public Policy study[xxxiv], the HECB has several structural challenges:

1. **Legislative branch and executive branch leadership**: The HECB lacks an education reform champion. One study found that nearly a third of respondents felt that the state's leaders are unwilling to make "tough decisions" or to stand up and say, "This is what we need to do" regarding higher education.[xxxv]

2. **The HECB's statutory role lacks authority**: Though state statutes assign a number of planning and coordination duties to the HECB, one study found almost half of respondents argued that there was confusion about, and lack of confidence in the HECB's planning role.[xxxvi] Many felt that the HECB's challenge was too broad, too multifaceted, and sometimes conflicting and overlapping.

3. **Unclear influence in a budget driven policy process**: This same study found that many stakeholders questioned the value of the HECB's budget review process because neither the timing nor the position of the HECB allows it to have much influence.[xxxvii]

4. **Dissatisfaction or lack of support from the legislature, institutions, and the executive branch undermines the HECB's ability to influence policy**: The study suggested that many respondents felt that the HECB was limited in this role because it is reluctant to make strong policy recommendations due to their perceived lack of support from the legislature or institutions when they do. In this way, the legislature may be undermining the HECB's ability to develop and recommend policy while also diminishing its credibility before the institutions it is supposed to coordinate.

With these strengths and weaknesses in mind, it is worthwhile to learn from what other states are doing and revisit the range governance of options when thinking about reform. However, despite attempts to classify state governance systems into a few types, every state's governance model is unique. None is perfect, all must deal with changing environments and fluctuating confidence levels, and none is transplantable.[xxxviii] This means that Washington will ultimately have to develop its own unique solution to governance problems.

III. Educational Governance Systems in Other States

Power and control over institutions of higher education varies widely throughout the country, and it is difficult to impose a single set of expectations. Patterns of governance range from extensive administrative, program, and budget controls, in the states with the strongest statewide agencies, to providing occasional advice on policy matters in others.[xxxix] (For a chart of how each of the 48 states divide *see* Higher Education Coordination in Washington State, Appendix D page 84-85).

a. Key governance levels, types, and issues

The generally accepted taxonomy of governing boards includes three main types of statewide agencies: *consolidated governing boards*, *coordinating boards*, and *state higher education planning agencies*, the last of which is distinguished by the general absence of any clear, formal governing or coordinating authority. One problem with these distinctions is that some states could be classified into more than one. Depending on how one counts them, two states fit rather clearly into the last category (Michigan, Delaware), although a few others (e.g., Minnesota, which has a planning agency but which is classified as a multiple system governing board state here) come close. The remaining 48 divide into "governing board" and "coordinating board" states.[xl]

Governing boards have all the rights and responsibilities of a corporate board as conveyed by law. Some are constitutionally based (as are some coordinating boards): they have authority to hire, compensate, and fire chief executives of the institutions that comprise the system; prepare a budget and allocate resources; establish faculty and other personnel policies; manage assets; award degrees; etc. Some also serve as the *de facto* state higher education planning agency, although few really do this well.[xli]

Coordinating boards typically do not manage institutions. They hire, compensate, and can fire their own chief executive and staff but not those of the institutions. They do not have corporate status in the governing board sense. They are supposed to focus on state needs and priorities rather than those of the institutions. They may or may not have budget review authority, program approval authority, etc., and it is usually how they align in this regard that determines whether they are regulatory or recommending boards.[xlii]

Planning agency types can be organized into subtypes. In the interest of simplicity, Governing Board states, of which there are 23, generally operate under one or two state-level governing boards, and none of these except for Alaska has a strong statewide coordinating agency (e.g., a coordinating board with authoritative academic policy or budgetary authority). Ten Governing Board states have a single governing board for all of higher education; thirteen have two or more boards, usually one of which is responsible for coordinating or governing the community and technical colleges.[xliii]

About 30 states have coordinating boards, including Washington, although not all are "coordinating board states," *per se*, since some also have statewide governing boards. These are divided into those states wherein the board has program approval and an authoritative budget role and those in which the boards have recommending authority.[xliv]

It is important to note that these differences are somewhat artificial. Depending on how one might categorize different systems, there might be as few as two or as many as 20 different classifications.

b. Washington's System Revisited

The Washington legislature has delegated by statute considerable budgetary, administrative, and procedural authority to the HECB. Regional differences within the state are great. Private higher education in Washington comprises an important but separate policy domain with a strong and generally unchallenged tradition of independence. Public colleges and universities sometimes are treated more as public agencies than as quasi-independent corporations, although some of this seems to be changing. Finally, individual leadership styles make a great difference in Washington, as its history with statewide agencies demonstrates; this also is evident in patterns of institutional leadership.[xlv]

In this way, Washington has consistently backed away from efforts to consolidate higher education under one governing board, preferring instead a board that loosely coordinates each autonomous entity. Though most agree that the HECB is not currently performing its coordinating or policy function as well as it could be, it appears that this might be cured by strengthening the HECB's credibility among stakeholders.

III. Using P-16/P-20 Councils as The Mechanism of Reform: Kentucky, Rhode Island, Arizona, New York, Florida, Georgia and Oregon's approach

Many states have developed P-16 / P-20 councils to start a dialogue and create policy around college readiness. The P-16 / P-20 mechanism is generally overlaid on existing governance structures over which it holds no authority. Though it is true that this just provides another governance layer, several lessons about how, when, and where to reform governance structures emerge:

5. **State history and political culture can support or undermine relationships and reforms among educational systems:** Creating incentives for systems to work together – whether through finance structures, accountability mechanisms, or other means – is essential.

6. **Any organizational structure can support P-16/P-20 reform provided that: (a) there is a strong reform advocate directed toward collaborative reform; and (b) there is legislative buy-in:** Strong leadership can create opportunities for reform; set parameters; embed policies in statute.[xlvi] For example, if the governor and the legislature are not on the same page about which direction to go, reform most likely will remain at a standstill.

7. **State-wide councils have better ability to institute reforms than local and or regional councils:** Regional councils do not have much potential to influence policy because they generally do not have the resources necessary to accomplish much. Even more importantly, the independent actions of the regions have not produced statewide consensus on policy priorities or a statewide policy agenda.

8. **The business sector is a resource for creativity and funding:** Getting the business community involved provides inertia and accountability.

Although each of the seven councils described below are quite different in historical context, structure, and operation, they all lack authority to implement educational policy. In this way, they share a common theme among one another and with Washington.

First, one study compared the Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Arizona demonstrating three approaches to dealing with a governing board that has limited authority: (1) decentralized voluntary association with local implementation; (2) top down management tool for the governor; and (3) a stakeholder model. These approaches can be characterized as theories of

change for how state policy might be affected in the absence of direct policymaking authority.[xlvii]

Second, another study compared Arizona, New York, Florida, Georgia and Oregon's approaches to governance reform: (1) No change – centuries old governance; (2) recent and drastic reform; (3) a project-based model; and (4) a decentralized entrepreneurial model.[xlviii]

The following chart shows some of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach followed by a narrative explanation.

State	Goal of education reform	Governance System	Leadership	Value added by the Council / Progress
Kentucky: start date 1999 *Example of a lower income state trying to raise educational achievement and engineer a transformation to a post-industrial economy	Align curricula and requirements between high schools and colleges Raise the quality of teachers Increase the number and diversity of students attending college	[*Decentralized – believes in local implementation*] Voluntary effort among state agencies – 18 members[xlix] • No statute • No authority • No general fund money • No policy positions • No organized lobbying • Depends on constituent agencies to act	No formal role for the Governor No legislators sit on the board but some are engaged in council activities (unlike Rhode Island) The council has no specified mandate to report to the governor	• Enhanced communication among agencies, cross agency learning, and sharing of information • Through communication the council has influenced agency agendas (e.g. smaller agencies can benefit from using the council as leverage) • Council influenced local approaches to P-16 alignment particularly by communicating with the business community
Rhode Island: start date 2005 *Example of a strongly performing but diversifying state.	Increase economic competitiveness of the state through better educated citizenry	P-16 council 9 members all of whom are under Executive Control[l] [*Management tool for Executive model rather than stakeholder model*] • No budget • No formal	Top-down model of gubernatorial leadership instead of legislative buy-in Characterized by legislative hostility Model does not seem very	• Has ability to influence the work of existing agencies and organizations • Has provided a venue for collaboration • Has helped agencies see the

State	Goal of education reform	Governance System	Leadership	Value added by the Council / Progress
		powers • No legislators on council • Recommend policies to the appropriate agency or Board	sustainable Very clear idea of reform priorities e.g. no ambiguities about what "success" would mean for the council	"big picture" • Council helped set and "raise the profile" of priorities • Helped agencies do a better job in their own area because they understood how they fit into the larger picture (eliminated duplication) • More efficient management for the Governor (one conversation versus five with different stakeholders) • Increase accountability through the public record and follow up
Arizona: start date 2005 *Example of one of the fastest growing states without enough colleges and with a high population of immigrants Council created by executive order	Accommodate a population that is growing at twice the national average Increase college-going rate and bachelor's degree production Increase alignment and rigor across the educational spectrum Achieve a more efficient and equitable education	[*Stakeholder model*] Council is large and highly structured Consists of 40 members all appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor[li] In addition, in 2009, there were six standing and two ad hoc committees mirroring the council priority areas[lii] NOTE: with the exception of the ad hoc committees, the structure is more thematic than	Strong and consistent support from Governor Each committee has a designated chair and receives staff support from the governor's office There is also a steering committee consisting of the chairs of each of the eight committees charged with making recommendations to the P-20 council regarding priorities and strategies to improve education in AZ	• Has brought, largely, the right people to the table • Council has raised public expectations which has made it more powerful • Council fostered the development of common agendas showing that collaboration is happening • Agency lobbying has been more effective • Elimination of conflicting

State	Goal of education reform	Governance System	Leadership	Value added by the Council / Progress
	pipeline	institutional signaling a commitment to avoid recreating the silos that the council is intended to connect.	Council staff consists of one executive director and a second staff person that is nearly full time. In addition to the governor's two chief advisors for K-12 and higher education	messages • Council enhances the impact of its members such as using philanthropy to reach its goals
New York: started 1997 *Fixed historical legitimacy and tradition unique to New York. Agency initiated	Improve college graduation rates for disadvantaged students Close achievement gaps for students in need of intervention services to meet the Regents graduation requirements	[*Centuries old governance*] structure dating back to 1784 Over 100 years ago, the State Superintendent's Office merged with the Board of Regents, and the Department of Education became the administrative arm for both sectors; it is all one system and little has changed since its inception. The main umbrella entity that oversees every segment of education in the state, and many cultural entities as well, is the University of the State of New York (USNY). USNY includes all pre-K, K–12, and postsecondary institutions and systems, as well as libraries, museums, public radio and television, and other organizations. Within USNY, the Department of Education serves as the administrative unit for the regents, and the	There are 16 regents—one from each judicial district and four at-large—and they each have five-year terms. There is no requirement for an even-party split. The governor does not participate in the selection or confirmation of appointments. The partisan nature of education is deeply embedded in the structure and long historical traditions of New York's education systems. For several administrations, the governor has been Republican, and relationships between the governor and the regents, the governor and the commissioner, and the governor and the Department of Education have been contentious. The governor	• Collaborative relationships between 80 institutions of higher education and 300 community and business groups have been established. The Office also offers support services to at-risk youth at over 500 elementary, middle and secondary schools in the state. • CUNY's best-known K–16 project is College Now, a 20-year collaborative with the New York Public Schools geared toward improving high school students' academic achievement and ensuring that they graduate ready to do college-level academic work. There are

State	Goal of education reform	Governance System	Leadership	Value added by the Council / Progress
		commissioner is chosen by the regents to implement its policies. The commissioner is both the president of USNY and commissioner of education. Traditionally, the commissioner focuses more time and energy on K–12 than on postsecondary education. The regents set education policy for New York and serve as the Board of Directors for USNY. The Legislature appoints the regents, and all members have one vote—meaning that the much larger and Democratic controlled Assembly carries more weight than does the Republican-controlled Senate. In practice, the regents have typically been appointed by the Democratic majority of the Assembly.[liii]	appoints the board of the State University of New York (SUNY). Consequently, SUNY and the regents are often at odds. In New York, politics often seem to derail many opportunities for significant change.	three main components of College Now: dual enrollment, curriculum development, and workshops and related activities with postsecondary staff. Seventeen CUNY institutions and over 200 public schools participate.
Florida : started 1994 Articulation Coordination Committee (ACC) Agency initiated	Raise student achievement Smooth transitions between various levels of education Improve postsecondary completion rates Priorities: Close achievement	[*Recent and substantive governance reform*] - 1994: Republicans in the state gained control of the Senate - 1996: Republicans gain control of the House - 2001: Governor Jeb Bush abolished the Board of	The governor appoints all members of the Board of Education, in addition to the university boards, community college boards, the Council for Educational Policy Research and Improvement (CEPRI), and the BOG.	• Has highly evolved inter-level initiatives such as its K–20 accountability plan, its performance funding model, and its K–20 data warehouse. • The DOE is investigating the level of alignment between the Florida

State	Goal of education reform	Governance System	Leadership	Value added by the Council / Progress
	gaps and increase access Reform teacher education[liv]	Regents Currently - The Florida Board of Education oversees kindergarten through graduate school education, including state colleges and community colleges. The Commissioner of Education[lv] reports to the State Board of Education, which in turn reports to the Governor.[lvi] The department was restructured to reflect that new K-20 focus and the staff wrote a new school code.		Comprehensive Assessment Test (the FCAT) and the statewide postsecondary placement exam. • In conjunction with the College Board and the U.S. Department of Education, the state is also piloting a program to increase the rigor of high school coursework.
Georgia: started 1995 Seen as a leader in P-16 reform P-16 council established by executive order; voluntary agency participation includes multiple business, education, and community groups.	Improve student academic achievement and college preparation Keep the best college students in state.	[*Extensive Project-based model*] E.g. Cross-sector Projects - Proficiency-based learning across systems - Instituted teacher education reform Strong gubernatorial support and *regional* P-16 councils. State governance of education is divided between K–12 and postsecondary education. For K–12 schools, the Department of Education is governed by the State Board of Education, headed by the state superintendent of schools, an elected official. There are 13 board members—one	P–16 efforts have the support of state legislation; staff dedicated to P–16 issues has an official office within the USG. Gubernatorial support has lent the P–16 issue momentum, a degree of institutionalization, and visibility. The beginning of the P–16 efforts in Georgia traces back to when the Regents' Office (under then-Chancellor Stephen Portch), Governor Miller, and other education entities began to have informal talks about connecting the systems.	• 2-year and 4-year colleges, all have common core curricula, and automatic transfer of core credits. • Developing P-16 "data marts" to monitor student progress from high school to college and into the workforce. • Increased the number of and diversity of teachers in the state through numerous programs. • Instituted major student-centered projects such as Proficiency-based admission standards systems

State	Goal of education reform	Governance System	Leadership	Value added by the Council / Progress
		from each congressional district—appointed by the governor. In terms of four-year universities, the Board of Regents governs the University System of Georgia (USG); it is a constitutional board comprised of members who are appointed to seven-year terms by the governor. The board elects a chancellor, who serves as its chief executive officer and the chief administrative officer of the USG. The Department of Technical and Adult Education (DTAE) oversees the state's system of technical colleges, the adult literacy program, and many economic and workforce development programs. The department is governed by the State Board for Technical and Adult Education.[lvii]		
Oregon: started 1995/2005 Agency initiated	Align high school and postsecondary standards and assessments Create a K-20 budget system and performance measures	[*Decentralized entrepreneurial model*] The Oregon Department of Education (ODE) and its higher education counterpart, the Oregon University System (OUS), have each led and collaborated on several major reforms. The State Board of Education, whose members are appointed by the governor and	The Governor's Office does not usually play a direct role in education reform; however, the current governor[lix] appears to be more active than most. The Joint Boards (Oregon's voluntary K-16 governance entity), which represent the boards of education	Specific Reforms include: • Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century (1991, amended 1995) authorized the development of benchmarks for all students; assessments in grades 3, 5, 8, 10 and 12; the CIM – Certificate of Initial Mastery

State	Goal of education reform	Governance System	Leadership	Value added by the Council / Progress
		confirmed by the Legislature, oversees the ODE. The board is comprised of seven members who are appointed by the governor for up to two four-year terms. The state superintendent of schools is a nonpartisan elected official. Governance for the state's 17 community colleges is also under the auspices of the State Board of Education. The community colleges are currently and historically a decentralized group; there is no community college system in Oregon. The community colleges have never had much policymaking clout in Oregon, and are often not at the table, or considered, when K–16-related policies are made. The University System is governed by the Oregon State Board of Higher Education, whose 9 members are appointed by the governor.[lviii]	and higher education, provide a forum for K–12, community college, and University System representatives to meet and talk about common issues and concerns. The main initiative the Joint Boards have overseen is the Articulation Commission. The Joint Boards monitored the implementation and revision of the Associate of Arts Oregon Transfer degree policy and common course numbering for lower-division courses.	(issued after grade 10); and the CAM - Certificate of Advanced Mastery (issued after grade 12). • Developed proficiency based admission standards (PASS) • Significant alignment of PASS requirements with the CIM and CAM high school assessment tests. • Ongoing development of an integrated data system, dual enrollment, GEAR-UP, and teacher education reforms.

a. Procedural Challenges: Theories of Change in the Absence Of Authority

In **Kentucky**, the council operates outside of the formal legislative and executive branches of government and has no representatives from either branch among its members. It is a voluntary association of state agencies brought together under the auspices of the Council for Postsecondary Education to inform one another's work. The council does not take policy positions or work as a body to implement policies. Its implicit theory of change has two parts. First, it is assumed that the council will produce a whole greater than the sum of its parts by

providing a forum for state agencies to gain a broader perspective about statewide goals and modify their independent agendas accordingly, for the better. Second, the Kentucky model depends on a network of 22 regional councils. The absence of authority, funding, and staffing for the state-level council is not perceived as a major barrier to progress since the regional councils have been created to accomplish the local work of P–16 reform. The first part of the theory appears sound, as most observers have seen evidence that cooperation among the constituent agencies has influenced their policy priorities. The regional approach, however, does not appear to have much potential to influence policy. Few regional councils have acquired the resources to attain the capacity to accomplish much. Even more importantly, the independent actions of the regions have not produced statewide consensus on policy priorities or anything resembling a statewide policy agenda.[lx]

The **Rhode Island** PK–16 Council enjoys a basis in law, as it was set up by an executive order of the governor. But owing to a struggle between the legislative and executive branches, the council has no legislative support. The council suffers from legislative hostility that pronounces any would-be policy initiative of the council "dead on arrival." The governor established the council as a management tool for his administration—in effect as an education cabinet—and it is not clear whether this was a cause or a consequence of the struggle between the branches. The implied theory of change is that a top-down model by which the governor coordinates executive branch offices that influence the education and workforce policy agendas will improve statewide coordination and results. Since the council operates largely as a management structure, it has little formal communication *per se* with outside stakeholders. This model encounters greater barriers to policy development than the Kentucky model because, absent legislative buy-in, the governor is limited to working within existing policy constraints. To the extent that the Legislature pursues policy reforms, it does so on its own track, with little regard for the council's agenda.[lxi]

Of the three, the **Arizona** P–20 Council seems to have the most potential to influence state policy. The structure and functioning of the council is based on the idea that an expanded conversation about educational performance and needs among a broad set of stakeholders can yield policy change. Two points are critical to understanding the policy potential of this council. First, while in Kentucky and Rhode Island the driving force behind the formation of the council was (and is) the higher education bureaucracy and the governor, respectively, in Arizona it was unquestionably the business community. The business community in Arizona encouraged the development of a council model that brings many stakeholders together to influence an education bureaucracy known for its ability to resist reform. Second, this expanded stakeholder group was granted legitimacy by the governor, who issued an executive order and allocated staffing and resources from her office that far outpace the resources available to the other two councils described above. The result is a council that has a better chance of sustaining a coordinated policy agenda and for which there is a high degree of public accountability, since there are large, open meetings, published agendas, and expectations for follow-up by participants.[lxii]

Florida, Georgia, New York, and **Oregon** demonstrate that reform efforts must be comprehensive – in order to be truly effective, reform cannot be instituted by simply grafting in new programs onto existing policies that already divide the levels. Instead, effective reform occurs when there is a strong reform advocate, whether that be a council that transcends the existing educational sectors or a single person in leadership.

New York demonstrates that if there is no high-level K–16 advocate, there will be no real state-level K–16 agenda to pursue. Oregon was able to create much positive change behind the scenes, but respondents to the study stated that they would have been more successful in institutionalizing the Proficiency-Based Admission Standards System (PASS) if a governor or legislative leader had encouraged public support and promoted efforts to create changes in statute.[lxiii]

Much of Georgia's success in the P–16 arena appears to be due to extensive groundwork laid by former governors, in addition to the dedicated follow through and innovation of the regents' P–16 staff. The now-dormant statutory K–16 structure, the Education Coordinating Council, does not appear to be able to transcend the state's political and educational cultures, but there appears to be enough ongoing momentum to continue the P–16 agenda.[lxiv] One downside to the governor being the strong education advocate is that reforms are vulnerable to politics.

When the referenced study was conducted, Florida was in the process of connecting its new education governance structure with existing policies. Florida created enormous fragmentation by establishing local postsecondary boards; this structure will complicate the development and implementation of a state-level K–20 agenda. Respondents in the state indicated that there are now too many committees and too much governance clutter. The inconsistencies between centralized and decentralized education governance will need to be resolved if the K–20 agenda is to be successful.[lxv] This shows that a complete overhaul of a state's governance system might cause more pain and disruption than it is worth.

b. Where educational governance system differs with Washington and what can be Learned

In Washington, the P-20 council was created by Executive Order in 2007 much like Rhode Island, Arizona, and Georgia. Though the membership was voluntary, 14 members largely from agencies were named in the Executive Order.[lxvi] Unique to Washington, the council was one of Washington Learns' specific recommendations in their final report. The P-20 council was intended to evaluate early learning, K-12, higher education, and workforce preparation with the goal of increasing accountability[lxvii] and providing a venue for cross-sector discussion and collaboration.[lxviii] By looking at data from many sources within the education system, the P-20 Council was tasked with determining whether Washington is getting the expected return on its investment and where and how it needs to make improvements.[lxix] Additionally, the P-20 council was supposed to track the progress made on Washington Learns long-term goals and on specific investments made by the legislature during the 2007 session.

The council met three or four times and then disbanded. Though many in the group felt that there was a lot of potential, others felt that the group as an entity lacked a concrete sense of direction.[lxx] Like Kentucky, which believed that the whole council would be greater than the sum of its parts, Washington's P-20 council was viewed as potentially being able to do something better together than done individually by each separate agency. However, when comparing the cost to the benefit, keeping Washington's council going was not appealing because the council felt that what it could and should be doing - such as achieving college readiness - could also be accomplished without the council.[lxxi] This attitude also reflects similarities to the second component of Kentucky's model: that a decentralized regional approach could overcome the absence of authority, funding, and staffing because local groups would be responsible for implementing reform. While Washington was not employing a regional approach per se, it was trying to implement a decentralized approach.

The council did not function as a whole; rather, it provided a space for the participants to talk about how their individual sectors could do better.[lxxii] This is somewhat similar to Oregon's decentralized entrepreneurial approach because they too lacked a strong leader to encourage public support and promote efforts to create changes in statute. However, the difference is that Oregon's council's priorities were narrower than Washington's – namely to institutionalize a Proficiency-Based Admission Standards System which it was able to accomplish behind the scenes. States like Arizona and Florida, with more ambitious priorities like Washington, were arguably successful because they had strong gubernatorial support.

Washington's council never got far enough to take policy positions or work as a body to implement those policies.

Strengths: The council did provide a forum for cross sector discussion. In fact, Ann Daily, former director of the HECB board commented during the first meeting of the P-20 council how pleased she was to have a venue for conversation. In fact, she traced the alignment of math assessments back to conversations like this.[lxxiii] Every state's council provided a similar venue for collaboration and conversation. Additionally, the council brought all of the key stakeholders together in one room with a dedicated staff from the governor's office. Both Georgia and Arizona's experience show that having a dedicated staff is very valuable in terms of accountability, follow-up, and establishing momentum for future meetings.

Weaknesses: The general consensus in Washington was there was a leadership void that complicated and ultimately made the structure of the group unworkable. The governor was only able to attend the first meeting and no executive staff was selected to serve in her place. What was left was a room full of peers who had a difficult time setting an agenda and staying on task with no unifying force.[lxxiv] Only councils that were agency initiated in the first place seemed to overcome this hurdle such as Kentucky, New York (though hampered by politics), and Oregon.

Conversely, Florida is an example of how a leadership void can go really wrong. Florida created enormous fragmentation by establishing local postsecondary boards. Respondents in the state indicated that there are now too many committees and too much governance clutter. The

inconsistencies between centralized and decentralized education governance will need to be resolved if the K–20 agenda is to be successful.

Since Washington's P-20 council was dismantled in February of 2009 at least two groups have emerged, yet none has filled the void left by the council. First, there is an informal, ad hoc group that meets for breakfast once a month to connect and attempt to collaborate. However, it is unclear which organizations are regular members.

Second, the governor, in partnership with the senior vice president of Microsoft, is in the process of developing a Higher Education Funding Task Force to develop a long-term, strategic approach to funding and maximizing the impact and effectiveness of Washington's investment in public four year institutions.

The business sector can be a resource for creativity and funding as seen in Arizona; therefore, this task force may be promising. However, though the council appears to have strong leadership from the governor, without legislative buy-in (no legislators have been invited to the group), it is yet to be determined if anything in view of governance reform may be accomplished.

Following recommendations made by the Washington Learns Report, the task force has three goals, one of which is considering whether the higher education system's current governance model should be modified to improve system-wide performance and accountability. It appears that the task force will compile a report for the governor and then is encouraged to seek support from the legislature and other critical stakeholders. The Arizona model incorporated all stakeholders from the start along with a high degree of public accountability with large, open meetings, published agendas, and expectations for follow-up by participants. So far, there are no such plans for Washington's task force.

IV. Conclusion and Future Considerations

P-16/ P-20 councils in other states have been successful in bringing about governance reform in a number of ways that may or may not include changing governance structures. In some cases, P-16/P-20 councils have served as a mechanism to leverage existing strengths and weakness of present governance systems by providing a forum to discuss ideas and collaborate. In other cases, P-16/P-20 councils have been a part of drastic reforms – where systems are complete dismantled and built back up again. Either way, common lessons emerge for those thinking about governance reform regardless if a P-16/P-20 council is used as the whole or part of the vehicle for change.

Any organizational structure can support P-16/P-20 reform provided that: (a) there is a strong reform advocate directed toward collaborative reform; and (b) there is legislative buy-in. In the states discussed here, the governor is most often the strong reform advocate. Many councils were formed by an executive order creating the opportunity for reform both in terms of

membership, parameters, and priorities. However, some states were also able to achieve reform through agency led collaboration.

Because state history and political culture can support or undermine relationships and reforms among educational systems, Washington's circumstances make agency led reform unlikely. The primary reason the P-20 council failed was because peers could not seem to work together without the governor or another leader setting an agenda and keeping participants on task.

The governor's new task force may be a good place to influence state policy because the conversation about educational performance needs among a different set of stakeholders will potentially be expanded. However, unlike Arizona's council, the stakeholder group in Washington's new task force does not include all of the key players, such as representatives from Early Learning, K-12, etc. nor does it have the same broad policy agenda (which may explain why these stakeholders were not invited). Therefore, it cannot be expected to reach the same results.

Ultimately, there is still a need for the type of work that the P-20 council in Washington was supposed to do whether it comes through the council or another group.

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[i] Carl Kruger, P-16 Collaboration in the States 1 (June 2006).
[ii] Exec. Order 07-03 No. (June 14, 2007).
[iii] Interview with Heather Moss, Former Executive Policy Analyst, Office of Financial Management, in Olympia, WA (July 9, 2010).
[iv] Executive Order 07-03, *supra note 2*.
[v] Kruger, *supra note 2*, at 17.
[vi] Andrea Venezia et al, The Governance Divide: A Report on Improving College Readiness and Success 38-40 (September 2005).
[vii] Jim Mayfield et al, Higher Education Coordination in Washington State, Washington Institute for Public Policy 41 (2002).
[viii] *Id.*
[ix] *Id.*
[x] *Id.*
[xi] *Id.*
[xii] *Id.* at 42.
[xiii] *Id.*
[xiv] *Id.*
[xv] *Id.*
[xvi] *Id.*
[xvii] *Id.*
[xviii] *Id.* at 42-43.
[xix] *Id.* at 43.
[xx] *Id.*
[xxi] *Id.* at 43-44.
[xxii] *Id.* at 44.
[xxiii] *Id.* at 45.
[xxiv] *Id.*
[xxv] *Id.*
[xxvi] *Id.*

[xxvii] *Id.* at 46.
[xxviii] *Id.*
[xxix] *Id.*
[xxx] *Id.*
[xxxi] *Id.*
[xxxii] *Id.* at 67.
[xxxiii] *Id.* at 35.
[xxxiv] *Id.*
[xxxv] *Id.* at 25.
[xxxvi] *Id.* at 16.
[xxxvii] *Id.* at 19.
[xxxviii] *Id.* at 35.
[xxxix] *Id.* at 48.
[xl] *Id.* at 83; For a chart of how each of the 48 states divide see Appendix D to this report page 84-85.
[xli] *Id.* at 84.
[xlii] *Id.*
[xliii] *Id.*
[xliv] *Id.*
[xlv] *Id.* at 87.
[xlvi] Venezia, *supra note* 6, at 38.
[xlvii] States, Schools, and Colleges THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND HIGHER EDUCATION 136 (November 2009).
[xlviii] Venezia, *supra note* 6, at 23.
[xlix] Kentucky's P-16 council membership includes: Kentucky Board of Education (3 members); Kentucky Council on Postsecondary Education (3 members); State Commissioner of Education; President of the Council on Postsecondary Education; Educational Professional Standards Board (2 members); Kentucky Department of Education Director of Early Childhood Development; CPE Vice President for Adult Education; Executive Director of Technical Education; Commissioner of Workforce Investment; Executive Director of the Kentucky Higher Education Assistance Authority; a business representative; a labor representative designated by the Kentucky Workforce Investment Board; and the Secretary of the Education Cabinet.
[l] Rhode Island's P-16 council membership includes the: Governor; chair of the Board of Governors; chair of the Board of Regents; Commissioner of Higher Education; Commissioner of K-12; Director of the Department of Labor; Executive Director Rhode Island's Economic development corporation; Rhode Island economic policy council chair; and Workforce Board chair.
[li] Arizona's P-20 council membership includes: elected superintendent of public instruction; one member of the Board of Regents; the presidents of the three public universities; four community college representatives; four K–12 education representatives; four ex-officio members of the Arizona Legislature; a tribal representative; and representatives of parent and community organizations; workforce and economic development; early education; career technical education; youth; the business community; and philanthropy.
[lii] Education and Workforce Pathways; Data and Graduation; Teachers; Education Alignment and Assessment; Literacy; Communications; Early Education (ad hoc); Higher Education (ad hoc).
[liii] Venezia, *supra note 6*, at 17-18.
[liv] Kruger, *supra note 6*, at 5.
[lv] The Commissioner has a cabinet consisting of: 3 chancellors, each of whom oversees one of the major areas within the department: K–12 schools, community colleges, and colleges and universities. The chancellors are also members of the commissioner's K–20 policy council.
[lvi] Venezia, *supra note 6*, at 13.
[lvii] *Id.* at 15.
[lviii] The chancellor of the University System serves as CEO and is appointed by the State Board of Higher Education. The president of each campus reports through the chancellor to the board.
[lix] Ted Kulongoski (2003-present).
[lx] States, Schools, and Colleges, *supra note 46*, at 136.

[lxi] *Id.* at 137.
[lxii] *Id.*
[lxiii] Venezia, *supra note 6*, at 23.
[lxiv] *Id.*
[lxv] *Id.* at 24.
[lxvi] Members include: 1. The Governor; 2. The Superintendent of Public Instruction; 3. The Chair of the Washington Learns Early Learning Council; 4. The Chair of the Washington Learns Higher Education Advisory Committee; 5. The Director of the Department of Early Learning; 6. The Chair of the State Board of Education; 7. The Chair of the Professional Educator Standards Board; 8. The Chair of the Higher Education Coordinating Board; 9. The Chair of the Workforce Training and Education Coordinating Board; 10. The Chair of the State Board for Community and Technical Colleges; 11. The Chair of the Council of Presidents; 12. The Chair of the Independent Colleges of Washington; 13. One representative of tribal education programs from a federally recognized tribe, appointed by the Governor; and 14. The President of the Washington Association of Community and Technical Colleges.
[lxvii] Exec. Order 07-03 No. (June 14, 2007).
[lxviii] Interview with Heather Moss, Former Executive Policy Analyst, Office of Financial Management, in Olympia, WA (July 9, 2010).
[lxix] Executive Order 07-03 (June 14, 2007).
[lxx] Interview with Christopher Thompson, Director of Governmental Relations, Higher Education Coordinating Board, in Olympia, WA (July 8, 2010).
[lxxi] *Id.*
[lxxii] *Id.*
[lxxiii] *Inaugural Meeting of the WA State P-20* Council (TVW, Sept. 13, 2007).
[lxxiv] Interview with Heather Moss, Former Executive Policy Analyst, Office of Financial Management, in Olympia, WA (July 9, 2010).