

Title 9A

WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE

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Chapter 9A.04 RCW PRELIMINARY ARTICLE

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9A.04.010 Title, effective date, application, severability, captions. (1) This title shall be known and may be cited

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as the Washington Criminal Code and shall become effective on July 1, 1976.

(2) The provisions of this title shall apply to any offense committed on or after July 1, 1976, which is defined in this title or the general statutes, unless otherwise expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires, and shall also apply to any defense to prosecution for such an offense.

(3) The provisions of this title do not apply to or govern the construction of and punishment for any offense committed prior to July 1, 1976, or to the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense. Such an offense must be construed and punished according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same manner as if this title had not been enacted.

(4) If any provision of this title, or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the title, or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected, and to this end the provisions of this title are declared to be severable.

(5) Chapter, section, and subsection captions are for organizational purposes only and shall not be construed as part of this title. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.010.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.04.020 Purposes—Principles of construction. (1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are:

(a) To forbid and prevent conduct that inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests;

(b) To safeguard conduct that is without culpability from condemnation as criminal;

(c) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense;

(d) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses, and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each.

(2) The provisions of this title shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this title. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.020.]

9A.04.030 State criminal jurisdiction. The following persons are liable to punishment:

(1) A person who commits in the state any crime, in whole or in part.

(2) A person who commits out of the state any act which, if committed within it, would be theft and is afterward found in the state with any of the stolen property.

(3) A person who being out of the state, counsels, causes, procures, aids, or abets another to commit a crime in this state.

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(4) A person who, being out of the state, abducts or kidnaps by force or fraud, any person, contrary to the laws of the place where the act is committed, and brings, sends, or conveys such person into this state.

(5) A person who commits an act without the state which affects persons or property within the state, which, if committed within the state, would be a crime.

(6) A person who, being out of the state, makes a statement, declaration, verification, or certificate under chapter 5.50 RCW which, if made within the state, would be perjury.

(7) A person who commits an act onboard a conveyance within the state of Washington, including the airspace over the state of Washington, that subsequently lands, docks, or stops within the state which, if committed within the state, would be a crime. [2019 c 232 § 9; 1999 c 349 § 1; 1981 c 187 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.030.]

9A.04.040 Classes of crimes. (1) An offense defined by this title or by any other statute of this state, for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized, constitutes a crime. Crimes are classified as felonies, gross misdemeanors, or misdemeanors.

(2) A crime is a felony if it is so designated in this title or by any other statute of this state or if persons convicted thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term in excess of one year. A crime is a misdemeanor if it is so designated in this title or by any other statute of this state or if persons convicted thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for no more than ninety days. Every other crime is a gross misdemeanor. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.040.]

9A.04.050 People capable of committing crimes—Capability of children. Children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime. Children of eight and under twelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing crime, but this presumption may be removed by proof that they have sufficient capacity to understand the act or neglect, and to know that it was wrong. Whenever in legal proceedings it becomes necessary to determine the age of a child, he or she may be produced for inspection, to enable the court or jury to determine the age thereby; and the court may also direct his or her examination by one or more physicians, whose opinion shall be competent evidence upon the question of his or her age. [2011 c 336 § 347; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.050.]

9A.04.060 Common law to supplement statute. The provisions of the common law relating to the commission of crime and the punishment thereof, insofar as not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes of this state, shall supplement all penal statutes of this state and all persons offending against the same shall be tried in the courts of this state having jurisdiction of the offense. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.060.]

9A.04.070 Who amenable to criminal statutes. Every person, regardless of whether or not he or she is an inhabitant of this state, may be tried and punished under the laws of this state for an offense committed by him or her therein, except when such offense is cognizable exclusively in the courts of

the United States. [2011 c 336 § 348; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.070.]

9A.04.080 Limitation of actions. (1) Prosecutions for criminal offenses shall not be commenced after the periods prescribed in this section.

(a) The following offenses may be prosecuted at any time after their commission:

- (i) Murder;
- (ii) Homicide by abuse;
- (iii) Arson if a death results;
- (iv) Vehicular homicide;
- (v) Vehicular assault if a death results;
- (vi) Hit-and-run injury-accident if a death results (RCW 46.52.020(4));

(vii) Rape in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.040) if the victim is under the age of sixteen;

(viii) Rape in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.050) if the victim is under the age of sixteen;

(ix) Rape of a child in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.073);

(x) Rape of a child in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.076);

(xi) Rape of a child in the third degree (RCW 9A.44.079);

(xii) Sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.093);

(xiii) Custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.160);

(xiv) Child molestation in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.083);

(xv) Child molestation in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.086);

(xvi) Child molestation in the third degree (RCW 9A.44.089); and

(xvii) Sexual exploitation of a minor (RCW 9.68A.040).

(b) Except as provided in (a) of this subsection, the following offenses may not be prosecuted more than twenty years after its commission:

- (i) Rape in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.040);
- (ii) Rape in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.050); or
- (iii) Indecent liberties (RCW 9A.44.100).

(c) The following offenses may not be prosecuted more than ten years after its commission:

(i) Any felony committed by a public officer if the commission is in connection with the duties of his or her office or constitutes a breach of his or her public duty or a violation of the oath of office;

- (ii) Arson if no death results;
- (iii) Rape in the third degree (RCW 9A.44.060);
- (iv) Attempted murder; or
- (v) Trafficking under RCW 9A.40.100.

(d) A violation of any offense listed in this subsection (1)(d) may be prosecuted up to ten years after its commission or, if committed against a victim under the age of eighteen, up to the victim's thirtieth birthday, whichever is later:

- (i) RCW 9.68A.100 (commercial sexual abuse of a minor);
- (ii) RCW 9.68A.101 (promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor);
- (iii) RCW 9.68A.102 (promoting travel for commercial sexual abuse of a minor); or

(iv) RCW 9A.64.020 (incest).

(e) The following offenses may not be prosecuted more than six years after its commission or discovery, whichever occurs later:

(i) Violations of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080;

(ii) Any felony violation of chapter 9A.83 RCW;

(iii) Any felony violation of chapter 9.35 RCW;

(iv) Theft in the first or second degree under chapter 9A.56 RCW when accomplished by color or aid of deception;

(v) Theft from a vulnerable adult under RCW 9A.56.400;

(vi) Trafficking in stolen property in the first or second degree under chapter 9A.82 RCW in which the stolen property is a motor vehicle or major component part of a motor vehicle as defined in RCW 46.80.010; or

(vii) Violations of RCW 82.32.290 (2)(a)(iii) or (4).

(f) The following offenses may not be prosecuted more than five years after its commission: Any class C felony under chapter 74.09, *82.36, or 82.38 RCW.

(g) Bigamy may not be prosecuted more than three years after the time specified in RCW 9A.64.010.

(h) A violation of RCW 9A.56.030 may not be prosecuted more than three years after the discovery of the offense when the victim is a tax exempt corporation under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 501(c)(3).

(i) No other felony may be prosecuted more than three years after its commission; except that in a prosecution under RCW 9A.44.115, if the person who was viewed, photographed, or filmed did not realize at the time that he or she was being viewed, photographed, or filmed, the prosecution must be commenced within two years of the time the person who was viewed or in the photograph or film first learns that he or she was viewed, photographed, or filmed.

(j) No gross misdemeanor may be prosecuted more than two years after its commission.

(k) No misdemeanor may be prosecuted more than one year after its commission.

(2) The periods of limitation prescribed in subsection (1) of this section do not run during any time when the person charged is not usually and publicly resident within this state.

(3) In any prosecution for a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, the periods of limitation prescribed in subsection (1) of this section run from the date of commission or two years from the date on which the identity of the suspect is conclusively established by deoxyribonucleic acid testing or by photograph as defined in RCW 9.68A.011, whichever is later.

(4) If, before the end of a period of limitation prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, an indictment has been found or a complaint or an information has been filed, and the indictment, complaint, or information is set aside, then the period of limitation is extended by a period equal to the length of time from the finding or filing to the setting aside. [2022 c 282 § 4. Prior: 2019 c 93 § 2; 2019 c 87 § 2; prior: 2017 c 266 § 9; 2017 c 231 § 2; 2017 c 125 § 1; 2013 c 17 § 1; 2012 c 105 § 1; prior: 2009 c 61 § 1; 2009 c 53 § 1; 2006 c 132 § 1; 1998 c 221 § 2; prior: 1997 c 174 § 1; 1997 c 97 § 1; prior: 1995 c 287 § 5; 1995 c 17 § 1; 1993 c 214 § 1; 1989 c 317 § 3; 1988 c 145 § 14; prior: 1986 c 257 § 13; 1986 c 85 § 1; prior: 1985 c 455 § 19; 1985 c 186 § 1; 1984 c 270 § 18;

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1982 c 129 § 1; 1981 c 203 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.080.]

*Reviser's note: Chapter 82.36 RCW was repealed in its entirety by 2013 c 225 § 501.

Effective date—2019 c 93 §§ 1, 2, and 8: "Sections 1, 2, and 8 of this act are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and take effect immediately [April 23, 2019]." [2019 c 93 § 11.]

Declaration—2019 c 87: "Social service agencies providing support to victims of sexual assault have long known that sexual assault crimes are among the most underreported of all types of crime. According to the department of justice, only two hundred thirty out of every one thousand sexual assaults are reported to police. In the wake of the recent #MeToo movement, this fact has become clear to the broader public.

The statute of limitations restricts a prosecutor's ability to hold perpetrators accountable when reports of crime are delayed. There are many different reasons why victims of sexual assault delay or even choose to never report the crime that has been committed against them. Advances in the field of neurobiology have demonstrated how sexual assault trauma and trauma responses may contribute to delayed victim reporting. Sometimes the victim is in a relationship with the perpetrator - an employer, parent, teacher, or some other person with supervisory power over the victim - causing the victim to believe that further harm will come to them if they report the crime. Further, technological and scientific advances in investigation, collection, documentation, and preservation of evidence have advanced law enforcement and prosecutorial abilities to investigate and prosecute these older cases. Realizing this, policymakers across the country have reevaluated and amended statutes of limitation to extend the allowable time to prosecute sexual assault crimes.

It is generally true that the longer a victim waits to report a crime, the more difficult it will be for the case to be successfully prosecuted. However, the statute of limitations should not prohibit prosecution for these heinous offenses when there is adequate evidence. Extending or eliminating the statute of limitations in these cases is imperative to provide access to justice for victims, hold perpetrators accountable, and enhance community protection." [2019 c 87 § 1.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: See note following RCW 9A.42.020.

Finding—2017 c 231: "(1) Because of the serious nature of human trafficking related offenses, and the power, control, and exploitation exerted over victims, the legislature finds the statute of limitations on these offenses should be extended. Victims are often under the control of their trafficker for significant periods of time and may not be willing or able to report their perpetrator until they are free from their control.

(2) The legislature finds that statutes governing commercial sexual abuse of a minor, promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor, and promoting prostitution should be consistent with all human trafficking related statutes, and reflect the practical reality of the crimes, which often involve an exchange of drugs or gifts for the commercial sex act." [2017 c 231 § 1.]

Effective date—2017 c 125: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [April 25, 2017]." [2017 c 125 § 2.]

Intent—1989 c 317: See note following RCW 4.16.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.04.090 Application of general provisions of the code. The provisions of chapters 9A.04 through 9A.28 RCW of this title are applicable to offenses defined by this title or another statute, unless this title or such other statute specifically provides otherwise. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.090.]

9A.04.100 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (1) Every person charged with the commission of a crime is presumed innocent unless proved guilty. No person may be convicted of a crime unless each element of such crime is proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

(2) When a crime has been proven against a person, and there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he or she is guilty, he or she shall be convicted only

of the lowest degree. [2011 c 336 § 349; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.100.]

9A.04.110 Definitions. In this title unless a different meaning plainly is required:

- (1) "Acted" includes, where relevant, omitted to act;
- (2) "Actor" includes, where relevant, a person failing to act;
- (3) "Benefit" is any gain or advantage to the beneficiary, including any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary;
- (4)(a) "Bodily injury," "physical injury," or "bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition;
 - (b) "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily part;
 - (c) "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a probability of death, or which causes significant serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ;
- (5) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale, or deposit of goods; each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately secured or occupied is a separate building;
- (6) "Deadly weapon" means any explosive or loaded or unloaded firearm, and shall include any other weapon, device, instrument, article, or substance, including a "vehicle" as defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm;
- (7) "Dwelling" means any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof, which is used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging;
- (8) "Government" includes any branch, subdivision, or agency of the government of this state and any county, city, district, or other local governmental unit;
- (9) "Governmental function" includes any activity which a public servant is legally authorized or permitted to undertake on behalf of a government;
- (10) "Indicted" and "indictment" include "informed against" and "information", and "informed against" and "information" include "indicted" and "indictment";
- (11) "Judge" includes every judicial officer authorized alone or with others, to hold or preside over a court;
- (12) "Malice" and "maliciously" shall import an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person. Malice may be inferred from an act done in willful disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a willful disregard of social duty;
- (13) "Officer" and "public officer" means a person holding office under a city, county, or state government, or the federal government who performs a public function and in so

doing is vested with the exercise of some sovereign power of government, and includes all assistants, deputies, clerks, and employees of any public officer and all persons lawfully exercising or assuming to exercise any of the powers or functions of a public officer;

- (14) "Omission" means a failure to act;
- (15) "Peace officer" means a duly appointed city, county, or state law enforcement officer;
- (16) "Pecuniary benefit" means any gain or advantage in the form of money, property, commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic gain;
- (17) "Person," "he or she," and "actor" include any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation, joint stock association, or an unincorporated association;
- (18) "Place of work" includes but is not limited to all the lands and other real property of a farm or ranch in the case of an actor who owns, operates, or is employed to work on such a farm or ranch;
- (19) "Prison" means any place designated by law for the keeping of persons held in custody under process of law, or under lawful arrest, including but not limited to any state correctional institution or any county or city jail;
- (20) "Prisoner" includes any person held in custody under process of law, or under lawful arrest;
- (21) "Projectile stun gun" means an electronic device that projects wired probes attached to the device that emit an electrical charge and that is designed and primarily employed to incapacitate a person or animal;
- (22) "Property" means anything of value, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal;
- (23) "Public servant" means any person other than a witness who presently occupies the position of or has been elected, appointed, or designated to become any officer or employee of government, including a legislator, judge, judicial officer, juror, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, or otherwise in performing a governmental function;
- (24) "Signature" includes any memorandum, mark, or sign made with intent to authenticate any instrument or writing, or the subscription of any person thereto;
- (25) "Statute" means the Constitution or an act of the legislature or initiative or referendum of this state;
- (26) "Strangulation" means to compress a person's neck, thereby obstructing the person's blood flow or ability to breathe, or doing so with the intent to obstruct the person's blood flow or ability to breathe;
- (27) "Suffocation" means to block or impair a person's intake of air at the nose and mouth, whether by smothering or other means, with the intent to obstruct the person's ability to breathe;
- (28) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:
 - (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
 - (b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or
 - (c) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or
 - (d) To accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against any person; or

(e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or

(f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; or

(g) To testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

(h) To take wrongful action as an official against anyone or anything, or wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or

(i) To bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other similar collective action to obtain property which is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group which the actor purports to represent; or

(j) To do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or another with respect to his or her health, safety, business, financial condition, or personal relationships;

(29) "Vehicle" means a "motor vehicle" as defined in the vehicle and traffic laws, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail;

(30) Words in the present tense shall include the future tense; and in the masculine shall include the feminine and neuter genders; and in the singular shall include the plural; and in the plural shall include the singular. [2011 c 336 § 350; 2011 c 166 § 2; 2007 c 79 § 3; 2005 c 458 § 3; 1988 c 158 § 1; 1987 c 324 § 1; 1986 c 257 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.04.110.]

Reviser's note: This section was amended by 2011 c 166 § 2 and by 2011 c 336 § 350, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).

Finding—2007 c 79: See note following RCW 9A.36.021.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

Chapter 9A.08 RCW PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY

Sections

9A.08.010	General requirements of culpability.
9A.08.020	Liability for conduct of another—Complicity.
9A.08.030	Entity and personal liability.
9A.08.040	Diminished capacity—Victim identity.

9A.08.010 General requirements of culpability. (1) Kinds of Culpability Defined.

(a) **INTENT.** A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime.

(b) **KNOWLEDGE.** A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:

(i) He or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or

(ii) He or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense.

(c) **RECKLESSNESS.** A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.

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(d) **CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.** A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.

(2) **Substitutes for Criminal Negligence, Recklessness, and Knowledge.** When a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

(3) **Culpability as Determinant of Grade of Offense.** When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.

(4) **Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly.** A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears. [2009 c 549 § 1002; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.08.010.]

9A.08.020 Liability for conduct of another—Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he or she is legally accountable.

(2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:

(a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the crime, he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or

(b) He or she is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or by the law defining the crime; or

(c) He or she is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime.

(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:

(a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she:

(i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or

(ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or

(b) His or her conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his or her complicity.

(4) A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular crime himself or herself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he or she is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his or her incapacity.

(5) Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the crime, a person is not an accomplice in a crime committed by another person if:

(a) He or she is a victim of that crime; or

(b) He or she terminates his or her complicity prior to the commission of the crime, and either gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes a good faith effort to prevent the commission of the crime.

(6) A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on proof of the commission of the crime and of his or her complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. [2011 c 336 § 351; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.08.020.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.08.030 Entity and personal liability. (1) As used in this section:

(a) "Agent" means any director, officer, or employee of an entity, or any other person who is authorized to act on behalf of the entity;

(b) "Entity" includes any domestic entity formed under or governed as to its internal affairs by Title 23, 23B, 24, or 25 RCW or any foreign business entity formed under or governed as to its internal affairs by the laws of a jurisdiction other than this state;

(c) "Governor" has the same meaning as provided in RCW 23.95.105.

(d) "High managerial agent" means a governor or person in a position of comparable authority in an entity not governed by chapter 23.95 RCW, and any other agent who manages subordinate employees.

(2) An entity is guilty of an offense when:

(a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of performance imposed on entities by law; or

(b) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or tolerated by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his or her duties and on behalf of the entity; or

(c) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the entity, other than a high managerial agent, while acting within the scope of his or her duties and on behalf of the entity and (i) the offense is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, or (ii) the offense is one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability on an entity.

(3) A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he or she performs or causes to be performed in the name of or on behalf of an entity to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his or her own name or behalf.

(4) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon an entity, any agent of the entity who knows he or she has or shares primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is criminally liable for a reckless omission or, if a high managerial agent, criminally negligent omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were by law imposed directly upon such agent.

(5) Every entity, whether foreign or domestic, which shall violate any provision of RCW 9A.28.040, shall forfeit every right and franchise to do business in this state. The

attorney general shall begin and conduct all actions and proceedings necessary to enforce the provisions of this subsection. [2019 c 211 § 2; 2011 c 336 § 352; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.08.030.]

Short title—2019 c 211: See note following RCW 10.01.090.

9A.08.040 Diminished capacity—Victim identity. A defendant does not suffer from diminished capacity based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or in which the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship. [2020 c 3 § 1.]

Short title—2020 c 3: "This act may be known and cited as the Nikki Kuhnhausen act." [2020 c 3 § 3.]

Chapter 9A.12 RCW INSANITY

Sections

9A.12.010 Insanity.

9A.12.010 Insanity. To establish the defense of insanity, it must be shown that:

(1) At the time of the commission of the offense, as a result of mental disease or defect, the mind of the actor was affected to such an extent that:

(a) He or she was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act with which he or she is charged; or

(b) He or she was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular act charged.

(2) The defense of insanity must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. [2011 c 336 § 353; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.12.010.]

Chapter 9A.16 RCW DEFENSES

Sections

9A.16.010 Definitions.

9A.16.020 Use of force—When lawful.

9A.16.025 Use of force—When unjustified—Victim identity.

9A.16.030 Homicide—When excusable.

9A.16.040 Justifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, person aiding—Good faith standard.

9A.16.046 Justifiable homicide or use of deadly force by peace officer—Reimbursement of defendant for costs—Special verdict.

9A.16.050 Homicide—By other person—When justifiable.

9A.16.060 Duress.

9A.16.070 Entrapment.

9A.16.080 Action for being detained on mercantile establishment premises for investigation—"Reasonable grounds" as defense.

9A.16.090 Intoxication.

9A.16.100 Use of force on children—Policy—Actions presumed unreasonable.

9A.16.110 Defending against violent crime—Reimbursement.

9A.16.120 Outdoor music festival, campground—Detention.

9A.16.900 Construction—Chapter applicable to state registered domestic partnerships—2009 c 521.

9A.16.010 Definitions. In this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly required:

(1) "Necessary" means that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist and that the

amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended.

(2) "Deadly force" means the intentional application of force through the use of firearms or any other means reasonably likely to cause death or serious physical injury. [1986 c 209 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.010.]

9A.16.020 Use of force—When lawful. The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:

(1) Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction;

(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him or her to a public officer competent to receive him or her into custody;

(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary;

(4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the possession of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public;

(5) Whenever used by a carrier of passengers or the carrier's authorized agent or servant, or other person assisting them at their request in expelling from a carriage, railway car, vessel, or other vehicle, a passenger who refuses to obey a lawful and reasonable regulation prescribed for the conduct of passengers, if such vehicle has first been stopped and the force used is not more than is necessary to expel the offender with reasonable regard to the offender's personal safety;

(6) Whenever used by any person to prevent a mentally ill, mentally incompetent, or mentally disabled person from committing an act dangerous to any person, or in enforcing necessary restraint for the protection or restoration to health of the person, during such period only as is necessary to obtain legal authority for the restraint or custody of the person. [1986 c 149 § 2; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 7; 1977 ex.s. c 80 § 13; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.020.]

Purpose—Intent—Severability—1977 ex.s. c 80: See notes following RCW 4.16.190.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.16.025 Use of force—When unjustified—Victim identity. A person is not justified in using force against another based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or in which the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship. [2020 c 3 § 2.]

Short title—2020 c 3: See note following RCW 9A.08.040.

(2022 Ed.)

9A.16.030 Homicide—When excusable. Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. [1979 ex.s. c 244 § 8; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.030.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.16.040 Justifiable homicide or use of deadly force by public officer, peace officer, person aiding—Good faith standard. (1) Homicide or the use of deadly force is justifiable in the following cases:

(a) When a public officer applies deadly force in obedience to the judgment of a competent court; or

(b) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty; or

(c) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid:

(i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony;

(ii) To prevent the escape of a person from a federal or state correctional facility or in retaking a person who escapes from such a facility;

(iii) To prevent the escape of a person from a county or city jail or holding facility if the person has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony; or

(iv) To lawfully suppress a riot if the actor or another participant is armed with a deadly weapon.

(2) In considering whether to use deadly force under subsection (1)(c) of this section, to arrest or apprehend any person for the commission of any crime, the peace officer must have probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or a threat of serious physical harm to others. Among the circumstances which may be considered by peace officers as a "threat of serious physical harm" are the following:

(a) The suspect threatens a peace officer with a weapon or displays a weapon in a manner that could reasonably be construed as threatening; or

(b) There is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed any crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.

Under these circumstances deadly force may also be used if necessary to prevent escape from the officer, where, if feasible, some warning is given, provided the officer meets the good faith standard of this section.

(3) A public officer covered by subsection (1)(a) of this section shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is justifiable pursuant to this section.

(4) A peace officer shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force in good faith, where "good faith" is an objective standard which shall consider all the facts, circumstances, and information known to the officer at the time to determine whether a similarly situated reasonable officer would have believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious physical harm to the officer or another individual.

[Title 9A RCW—page 7]

(5) This section shall not be construed as:

(a) Affecting the permissible use of force by a person acting under the authority of RCW 9A.16.020 or 9A.16.050; or

(b) Preventing a law enforcement agency from adopting standards pertaining to its use of deadly force that are more restrictive than this section. [2019 c 4 § 3. Prior: 2019 c 1 § 7 (Initiative Measure No. 940); (2018 c 11 § 7 (Initiative Measure No. 940) repealed by 2019 c 4 § 8); (2018 c 10 § 3 repealed by 2019 c 4 § 8); 1986 c 209 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.040.]

Effective date—2019 c 4: See note following RCW 43.101.455.

Short title—Intent—Liberal construction—Subject—2019 c 1 (Initiative Measure No. 940): See notes following RCW 43.101.450.

Rule making—2019 c 4; 2019 c 1 (Initiative Measure No. 940): See note following RCW 43.101.455.

Legislative recognition: "The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens' permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200, 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers." [1986 c 209 § 3.]

9A.16.046 Justifiable homicide or use of deadly force by peace officer—Reimbursement of defendant for costs—Special verdict. (1) When a peace officer who is charged with a crime is found not guilty or charges are dismissed by reason of justifiable homicide or use of deadly force under RCW 9A.16.040, or by reason of self-defense, for actions taken while on duty or otherwise within the scope of his or her authority as a peace officer, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense. This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action.

(2) If the trier of fact makes a determination of justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense, the judge shall determine the amount of the award.

(3) Whenever the issue of justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense under this section is decided by a judge, or whenever charges against a peace officer are dismissed based on the merits, the judge shall consider the same questions as must be answered in the special verdict under subsection (4) of this section.

(4) Whenever the issue of justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense under this section has been submitted to a jury, and the jury has found the defendant not guilty, the court shall instruct the jury to return a special verdict in substantially the following form:

answer
yes or no

1. Was the defendant on duty or otherwise acting within the scope of his or her authority as a peace officer?
2. Was the finding of not guilty based upon justifiable homicide, justifiable use of deadly force, or self-defense?

(5) Nothing in this section precludes the legislature from using the sundry claims process to grant an award where none was granted under this section or otherwise where the charge

was dismissed prior to trial, or to grant a higher award than one granted under this section. [2019 c 4 § 7.]

Effective date—2019 c 4: See note following RCW 43.101.455.

9A.16.050 Homicide—By other person—When justifiable. Homicide is also justifiable when committed either:

(1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or

(2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is. [2011 c 336 § 354; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.050.]

9A.16.060 Duress. (1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:

(a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he or she or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and

(b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and

(c) That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved.

(2) The defense of duress is not available if the crime charged is murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse.

(3) The defense of duress is not available if the actor intentionally or recklessly places himself or herself in a situation in which it is probable that he or she will be subject to duress.

(4) The defense of duress is not established solely by a showing that a married person acted on the command of his or her spouse. [1999 c 60 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.060.]

9A.16.070 Entrapment. (1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:

(a) The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement officials, or any person acting under their direction, and

(b) The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise intended to commit.

(2) The defense of entrapment is not established by a showing only that law enforcement officials merely afforded the actor an opportunity to commit a crime. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.070.]

9A.16.080 Action for being detained on mercantile establishment premises for investigation—"Reasonable grounds" as defense. In any criminal action brought by reason of any person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense of such action that the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit such investigation

or questioning by a peace officer, by the owner of the mercantile establishment, or by the owner's authorized employee or agent, and that such peace officer, owner, employee, or agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was committing or attempting to commit theft or shoplifting on such premises of such merchandise. As used in this section, "reasonable grounds" shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed possession of unpurchased merchandise of a mercantile establishment, and a "reasonable time" shall mean the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to examine employees and records of the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchandise. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.080.]

9A.16.090 Intoxication. No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his or her intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state. [2011 c 336 § 355; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.16.090.]

9A.16.100 Use of force on children—Policy—Actions presumed unreasonable. It is the policy of this state to protect children from assault and abuse and to encourage parents, teachers, and their authorized agents to use methods of correction and restraint of children that are not dangerous to the children. However, the physical discipline of a child is not unlawful when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent, teacher, or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. Any use of force on a child by any other person is unlawful unless it is reasonable and moderate and is authorized in advance by the child's parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child.

The following actions are presumed unreasonable when used to correct or restrain a child: (1) Throwing, kicking, burning, or cutting a child; (2) striking a child with a closed fist; (3) shaking a child under age three; (4) interfering with a child's breathing; (5) threatening a child with a deadly weapon; or (6) doing any other act that is likely to cause and which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks. The age, size, and condition of the child and the location of the injury shall be considered when determining whether the bodily harm is reasonable or moderate. This list is illustrative of unreasonable actions and is not intended to be exclusive. [1986 c 149 § 1.]

9A.16.110 Defending against violent crime—Reimbursement. (1) No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030.

(2) When a person charged with a crime listed in subsection (1) of this section is found not guilty by reason of self-defense, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defen-

dant for all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense. This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action. To award these reasonable costs the trier of fact must find that the defendant's claim of self-defense was sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact makes a determination of self-defense, the judge shall determine the amount of the award.

(3) Notwithstanding a finding that a defendant's actions were justified by self-defense, if the trier of fact also determines that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct substantially related to the events giving rise to the charges filed against the defendant the judge may deny or reduce the amount of the award. In determining the amount of the award, the judge shall also consider the seriousness of the initial criminal conduct.

Nothing in this section precludes the legislature from using the sundry claims process to grant an award where none was granted under this section or to grant a higher award than one granted under this section.

(4) Whenever the issue of self-defense under this section is decided by a judge, the judge shall consider the same questions as must be answered in the special verdict under subsection (4) [(5)] of this section.

(5) Whenever the issue of self-defense under this section has been submitted to a jury, and the jury has found the defendant not guilty, the court shall instruct the jury to return a special verdict in substantially the following form:

	answer yes or no
1. Was the finding of not guilty based upon self-defense?
2. If your answer to question 1 is no, do not answer the remaining question.	
3. If your answer to question 1 is yes, was the defendant:	
a. Protecting himself or herself?
b. Protecting his or her family?
c. Protecting his or her property?
d. Coming to the aid of another who was in imminent danger of a heinous crime?
e. Coming to the aid of another who was the victim of a heinous crime?
f. Engaged in criminal conduct substantially related to the events giving rise to the crime with which the defendant is charged?

[1995 c 44 § 1; 1989 c 94 § 1; 1977 ex.s. c 206 § 8. Formerly RCW 9.01.200.]

Use of deadly force—Legislative recognition: See note following RCW 9A.16.040.

9A.16.120 Outdoor music festival, campground—Detention. (1) In a criminal action brought against the detainer by reason of a person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of an outdoor music festival or related campground for the purpose of pursuing an

investigation or questioning by a law enforcement officer as to the lawfulness of the consumption or possession of alcohol or illegal drugs, it is a defense that the detained person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit the investigation or questioning by a law enforcement officer, and that a peace officer, owner, operator, employee, or agent of the outdoor music festival had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was unlawfully consuming or attempting to unlawfully consume or possess, alcohol or illegal drugs on the premises.

(2) For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Illegal drug" means a controlled substance under chapter 69.50 RCW for which the person detained does not have a valid prescription or that is not being consumed in accordance with the prescription directions and warnings, or a legend drug under chapter 69.41 RCW for which the person does not have a valid prescription or that is not being consumed in accordance with the prescription directions and warnings.

(b) "Outdoor music festival" has the same meaning as in RCW 70.108.020, except that no minimum time limit is required.

(c) "Reasonable grounds" include, but are not limited to:

(i) Exhibiting the effects of having consumed liquor, which means that a person has the odor of liquor on his or her breath, or that by speech, manner, appearance, behavior, lack of coordination, or otherwise exhibits that he or she has consumed liquor, and either:

(A) Is in possession of or in close proximity to a container that has or recently had liquor in it; or

(B) Is shown by other evidence to have recently consumed liquor; or

(ii) Exhibiting the effects of having consumed an illegal drug, which means that a person by speech, manner, appearance, behavior, lack of coordination, or otherwise exhibits that he or she has consumed an illegal drug, and either:

(A) Is in possession of an illegal drug; or

(B) Is shown by other evidence to have recently consumed an illegal drug.

(d) "Reasonable time" means the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to allow a law enforcement officer to determine the lawfulness of the consumption or possession of alcohol or illegal drugs. "Reasonable time" may not exceed one hour. [2003 c 219 § 1.]

9A.16.900 Construction—Chapter applicable to state registered domestic partnerships—2009 c 521. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms spouse, marriage, marital, husband, wife, widow, widower, next of kin, and family shall be interpreted as applying equally to state registered domestic partnerships or individuals in state registered domestic partnerships as well as to marital relationships and married persons, and references to dissolution of marriage shall apply equally to state registered domestic partnerships that have been terminated, dissolved, or invalidated, to the extent that such interpretation does not conflict with federal law. Where necessary to implement chapter 521, Laws of 2009, gender-specific terms such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law shall be construed to be gender

neutral, and applicable to individuals in state registered domestic partnerships. [2009 c 521 § 22.]

Chapter 9A.20 RCW CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES

Sections

9A.20.010	Classification and designation of crimes.
9A.20.020	Authorized sentences for crimes committed before July 1, 1984.
9A.20.021	Maximum sentences for crimes committed July 1, 1984, and after.
9A.20.030	Alternative to a fine—Restitution.
9A.20.040	Prosecutions related to felonies defined outside Title 9A RCW.

Assessments required of convicted persons, probationers: RCW 10.64.120.

9A.20.010 Classification and designation of crimes.

(1) Classified Felonies. (a) The particular classification of each felony defined in Title 9A RCW is expressly designated in the section defining it.

(b) For purposes of sentencing, classified felonies are designated as one of three classes, as follows:

- (i) Class A felony; or
- (ii) Class B felony; or
- (iii) Class C felony.

(2) Misdemeanors and Gross Misdemeanors. (a) Any crime punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment is a misdemeanor. Whenever the performance of any act is prohibited by any statute, and no penalty for the violation of such statute is imposed, the committing of such act shall be a misdemeanor.

(b) All crimes other than felonies and misdemeanors are gross misdemeanors. [1984 c 258 § 808; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.20.010.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.20.020 Authorized sentences for crimes committed before July 1, 1984. (1) Felony. Every person convicted of a classified felony shall be punished as follows:

(a) For a class A felony, by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term fixed by the court of not less than twenty years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine;

(b) For a class B felony, by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term of not more than ten years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than twenty thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine;

(c) For a class C felony, by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum term of not more than five years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

(2) Gross Misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of up to three hundred sixty-four days, or

by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

(3) Misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of not more than ninety days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

(4) This section applies to only those crimes committed prior to July 1, 1984. [2011 c 96 § 12; 1982 c 192 § 9; 1981 c 137 § 37; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.20.020.]

Findings—Intent—2011 c 96: See note following RCW 9A.20.021.

Penalty assessments in addition to fine or bail forfeiture—Crime victim and witness programs in county: RCW 7.68.035.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.20.021 Maximum sentences for crimes committed July 1, 1984, and after. (1) Felony. Unless a different maximum sentence for a classified felony is specifically established by a statute of this state, no person convicted of a classified felony shall be punished by confinement or fine exceeding the following:

(a) For a class A felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for a term of life imprisonment, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of fifty thousand dollars, or by both such confinement and fine;

(b) For a class B felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for a term of ten years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of twenty thousand dollars, or by both such confinement and fine;

(c) For a class C felony, by confinement in a state correctional institution for five years, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of ten thousand dollars, or by both such confinement and fine.

(2) Gross misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of up to three hundred sixty-four days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

(3) Misdemeanor. Every person convicted of a misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term fixed by the court of not more than ninety days, or by a fine in an amount fixed by the court of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine.

(4) This section applies to only those crimes committed on or after July 1, 1984.

(5) The fines in this section apply to adult offenders only. [2015 c 265 § 16; 2011 c 96 § 13. Prior: 2003 c 288 § 7; 2003 c 53 § 63; 1982 c 192 § 10.]

Finding—Intent—2015 c 265: See note following RCW 13.50.010.

Findings—Intent—2011 c 96: "The legislature finds that a maximum sentence by a court in the state of Washington for a gross misdemeanor can, under federal law, result in the automatic deportation of a person who has lawfully immigrated to the United States, is a victim of domestic violence or a political refugee, even when all or part of the sentence to total confinement is suspended. The legislature further finds that this is a disproportionate outcome, when compared to a person who has been convicted of certain felonies which, under the state's determinate sentencing law, must be sentenced to less than one year and, hence, either have no impact on that person's resi-

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dency status or will provide that person an opportunity to be heard in immigration proceedings where the court will determine whether deportation is appropriate. Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to cure this inequity by reducing the maximum sentence for a gross misdemeanor by one day." [2011 c 96 § 1.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Penalty assessments in addition to fine or bail forfeiture—Crime victim and witness programs in county: RCW 7.68.035.

9A.20.030 Alternative to a fine—Restitution. (1) If a person has gained money or property or caused a victim to lose money or property through the commission of a crime, upon conviction thereof or when the offender pleads guilty to a lesser offense or fewer offenses and agrees with the prosecutor's recommendation that the offender be required to pay restitution to a victim of an offense or offenses which are not prosecuted pursuant to a plea agreement, the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under RCW 9A.20.020, may order the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not to exceed double the amount of the defendant's gain or victim's loss from the commission of a crime. Such amount may be used to provide restitution to the victim at the order of the court. It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to investigate the alternative of restitution, and to recommend it to the court, when the prosecuting attorney believes that restitution is appropriate and feasible. If the court orders restitution, the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain or victim's loss from the crime, and if the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such finding the court may conduct a hearing upon the issue. For purposes of this section, the terms "gain" or "loss" refer to the amount of money or the value of property or services gained or lost.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section also applies to any corporation or joint stock association found guilty of any crime. [1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 12; 1979 c 29 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.20.030.]

Restitution

condition of probation: RCW 9.95.210.

condition to suspending sentence: RCW 9.92.060.

disposition when victim dead or not found: RCW 7.68.290.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.20.040 Prosecutions related to felonies defined outside Title 9A RCW. In any prosecution under this title where the grade or degree of a crime is determined by reference to the degree of a felony for which the defendant or another previously had been sought, arrested, charged, convicted, or sentenced, if such felony is defined by a statute of this state which is not in Title 9A RCW, unless otherwise provided:

(1) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is twenty years or more, such felony shall be treated as a class A felony for purposes of this title;

(2) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is eight years or more, but less than twenty years, such felony shall be treated as a class B felony for purposes of this title;

(3) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is less than eight

years, such felony shall be treated as a class C felony for purposes of this title. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.20.040.]

Chapter 9A.28 RCW ANTICIPATORY OFFENSES

Sections

9A.28.010	Prosecutions based on felonies defined outside Title 9A RCW.
9A.28.020	Criminal attempt.
9A.28.030	Criminal solicitation.
9A.28.040	Criminal conspiracy.

9A.28.010 Prosecutions based on felonies defined outside Title 9A RCW. In any prosecution under this title for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a felony defined by a statute of this state which is not in this title, unless otherwise provided:

(1) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is twenty years or more, such felony shall be treated as a class A felony for purposes of this title;

(2) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is eight years or more but less than twenty years, such felony shall be treated as a class B felony for purposes of this title;

(3) If the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law upon conviction of such felony is less than eight years, such felony shall be treated as a class C felony for purposes of this title. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.28.010.]

9A.28.020 Criminal attempt. (1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.

(2) If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime, it is no defense to a prosecution of such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission.

(3) An attempt to commit a crime is a:

(a) Class A felony when the crime attempted is murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, arson in the first degree, child molestation in the first degree, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, rape of a child in the first degree, or rape of a child in the second degree;

(b) Class B felony when the crime attempted is a class A felony other than an offense listed in (a) of this subsection;

(c) Class C felony when the crime attempted is a class B felony;

(d) Gross misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a class C felony;

(e) Misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor. [2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 354; 1994 c 271 § 101; 1981 c 203 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.28.020.]

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Purpose—1994 c 271: "The purpose of chapter 271, Laws of 1994 is to make certain technical corrections and correct oversights discovered only after unanticipated circumstances have arisen. These changes are necessary

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to give full expression to the original intent of the legislature." [1994 c 271 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.28.030 Criminal solicitation. (1) A person is guilty of criminal solicitation when, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she offers to give or gives money or other thing of value to another to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or which would establish complicity of such other person in its commission or attempted commission had such crime been attempted or committed.

(2) Criminal solicitation shall be punished in the same manner as criminal attempt under RCW 9A.28.020. [2011 c 336 § 356; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.28.030.]

9A.28.040 Criminal conspiracy. (1) A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he or she agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them takes a substantial step in pursuance of such agreement.

(2) It shall not be a defense to criminal conspiracy that the person or persons with whom the accused is alleged to have conspired:

(a) Has not been prosecuted or convicted; or

(b) Has been convicted of a different offense; or

(c) Is not amenable to justice; or

(d) Has been acquitted; or

(e) Lacked the capacity to commit an offense; or

(f) Is a law enforcement officer or other government agent who did not intend that a crime be committed.

(3) Criminal conspiracy is a:

(a) Class A felony when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is murder in the first degree;

(b) Class B felony when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a class A felony other than murder in the first degree;

(c) Class C felony when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a class B felony;

(d) Gross misdemeanor when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a class C felony;

(e) Misdemeanor when an object of the conspiratorial agreement is a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor. [1997 c 17 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.28.040.]

Chapter 9A.32 RCW HOMICIDE

Sections

9A.32.010	Homicide defined.
9A.32.020	Premeditation—Limitations.
9A.32.030	Murder in the first degree.
9A.32.040	Murder in the first degree—Sentence.
9A.32.050	Murder in the second degree.
9A.32.055	Homicide by abuse.
9A.32.060	Manslaughter in the first degree.
9A.32.070	Manslaughter in the second degree.

Capital punishment—Aggravated first degree murder: Chapter 10.95 RCW.

Controlled substances homicide: RCW 69.50.415.

9A.32.010 Homicide defined. Homicide is the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or omission of

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another, death occurring at any time, and is either (1) murder, (2) homicide by abuse, (3) manslaughter, (4) excusable homicide, or (5) justifiable homicide. [1997 c 196 § 3; 1987 c 187 § 2; 1983 c 10 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.32.010.]

Excusable homicide: RCW 9A.16.030.

Justifiable homicide: RCW 9A.16.040 and 9A.16.050.

9A.32.020 Premeditation—Limitations. (1) As used in this chapter, the premeditation required in order to support a conviction of the crime of murder in the first degree must involve more than a moment in point of time.

(2) Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect RCW 46.61.520. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.32.020.]

9A.32.030 Murder in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:

(a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or

(b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person; or

(c) He or she commits or attempts to commit the crime of either (1) robbery in the first or second degree, (2) rape in the first or second degree, (3) burglary in the first degree, (4) arson in the first or second degree, or (5) kidnapping in the first or second degree, and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants: Except that in any prosecution under this subdivision (1)(c) in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant:

(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and

(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and

(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and

(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

(2) Murder in the first degree is a class A felony. [1990 c 200 § 1; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.32.030.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.32.040 Murder in the first degree—Sentence. Notwithstanding RCW 9A.32.030(2), any person convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. [1982 c 10 § 2. Prior: (1) 1981 c 138 § 21; 1977 ex.s. c 206 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.32.040. (2) 1981 c 136 § 55 repealed by 1982 c 10 § 18.]

Capital punishment—Aggravated first degree murder: Chapter 10.95 RCW.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

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9A.32.050 Murder in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:

(a) With intent to cause the death of another person but without premeditation, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or

(b) He or she commits or attempts to commit any felony, including assault, other than those enumerated in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision (1)(b) in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant:

(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and

(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and

(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and

(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

(2) Murder in the second degree is a class A felony. [2003 c 3 § 2; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 4; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.32.050.]

Findings—Intent—2003 c 3: "The legislature finds that the 1975 legislature clearly and unambiguously stated that any felony, including assault, can be a predicate offense for felony murder. The intent was evident: Punish, under the applicable murder statutes, those who commit a homicide in the course and in furtherance of a felony. This legislature reaffirms that original intent and further intends to honor and reinforce the court's decisions over the past twenty-eight years interpreting "in furtherance of" as requiring the death to be sufficiently close in time and proximity to the predicate felony. The legislature does not agree with or accept the court's findings of legislative intent in *State v. Address*, Docket No. 71170-4 (October 24, 2002), and reasserts that assault has always been and still remains a predicate offense for felony murder in the second degree.

To prevent a miscarriage of the legislature's original intent, the legislature finds in light of *State v. Address*, Docket No. 71170-4 (October 24, 2002), that it is necessary to amend RCW 9A.32.050. This amendment is intended to be curative in nature. The legislature urges the supreme court to apply this interpretation retroactively to July 1, 1976." [2003 c 3 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.32.055 Homicide by abuse. (1) A person is guilty of homicide by abuse if, under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person.

(2) As used in this section, "dependent adult" means a person who, because of physical or mental disability, or because of extreme advanced age, is dependent upon another person to provide the basic necessities of life.

(3) Homicide by abuse is a class A felony. [1987 c 187 § 1.]

9A.32.060 Manslaughter in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:

(a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or

(b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child.

(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class A felony. [2011 c 336 § 357; 1997 c 365 § 5; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.32.060.]

9A.32.070 Manslaughter in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person.

(2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 358; 1997 c 365 § 6; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.32.070.]

Chapter 9A.36 RCW ASSAULT—PHYSICAL HARM

Sections

9A.36.011	Assault in the first degree.
9A.36.021	Assault in the second degree.
9A.36.031	Assault in the third degree.
9A.36.041	Assault in the fourth degree.
9A.36.045	Drive-by shooting.
9A.36.050	Reckless endangerment.
9A.36.060	Promoting a suicide attempt.
9A.36.070	Coercion.
9A.36.078	Hate crime offenses—Finding.
9A.36.080	Hate crime offense—Definition and criminal penalty.
9A.36.083	Hate crime offense—Civil action.
9A.36.090	Threats against governor or family.
9A.36.100	Custodial assault.
9A.36.120	Assault of a child in the first degree.
9A.36.130	Assault of a child in the second degree.
9A.36.140	Assault of a child in the third degree.
9A.36.150	Interfering with the reporting of domestic violence.
9A.36.160	Failing to summon assistance.
9A.36.161	Failing to summon assistance—Penalty.

9A.36.011 Assault in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree if he or she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm:

(a) Assaults another with a firearm or any deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death; or

(b) Transmits HIV to a child or vulnerable adult; or

(c) Administers, exposes, or transmits to or causes to be taken by another, poison or any other destructive or noxious substance; or

(d) Assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm.

(2) Assault in the first degree is a class A felony. [2020 c 76 § 16; 1997 c 196 § 1; 1986 c 257 § 4.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.021 Assault in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree:

(a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; or

(b) Intentionally and unlawfully causes substantial bodily harm to an unborn quick child by intentionally and

unlawfully inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child; or

(c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or

(d) With intent to inflict bodily harm, administers to or causes to be taken by another, poison or any other destructive or noxious substance; or

(e) With intent to commit a felony, assaults another; or

(f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by design causes such pain or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture; or

(g) Assaults another by strangulation or suffocation.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, assault in the second degree is a class B felony.

(b) Assault in the second degree with a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 9.94A.835 or 13.40.135 is a class A felony. [2011 c 166 § 1; 2007 c 79 § 2; 2003 c 53 § 64; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 355; 1997 c 196 § 2. Prior: 1988 c 266 § 2; 1988 c 206 § 916; 1988 c 158 § 2; 1987 c 324 § 2; 1986 c 257 § 5.]

Finding—2007 c 79: "The legislature finds that assault by strangulation may result in immobilization of a victim, may cause a loss of consciousness, injury, or even death, and has been a factor in a significant number of domestic violence related assaults and fatalities. While not limited to acts of assault against an intimate partner, assault by strangulation is often knowingly inflicted upon an intimate partner with the intent to commit physical injury, or substantial or great bodily harm. Strangulation is one of the most lethal forms of domestic violence. The particular cruelty of this offense and its potential effects upon a victim both physically and psychologically, merit its categorization as a ranked felony offense under chapter 9A.36 RCW." [2007 c 79 § 1.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.031 Assault in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second degree:

(a) With intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or the lawful apprehension or detention of himself, herself, or another person, assaults another; or

(b) Assaults a person employed as a transit operator or driver, the immediate supervisor of a transit operator or driver, a mechanic, or a security officer, by a public or private transit company or a contracted transit service provider, while that person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or

(c) Assaults a school bus driver, the immediate supervisor of a driver, a mechanic, or a security officer, employed by a school district transportation service or a private company under contract for transportation services with a school district, while the person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or

(d) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm; or

(e) Assaults a firefighter or other employee of a fire department, county fire marshal's office, county fire prevention bureau, or fire protection district who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or

(f) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extends for a period sufficient to cause considerable suffering; or

(g) Assaults a law enforcement officer or other employee of a law enforcement agency who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault; or

(h) Assaults a peace officer with a projectile stun gun; or

(i) Assaults a nurse, physician, or health care provider who was performing his or her nursing or health care duties at the time of the assault. For purposes of this subsection: "Nurse" means a person licensed under chapter 18.79 RCW; "physician" means a person licensed under chapter 18.57 or 18.71 RCW; and "health care provider" means a person certified under chapter 18.71 or 18.73 RCW who performs emergency medical services or a person regulated under Title 18 RCW and employed by, or contracting with, a hospital licensed under chapter 70.41 RCW; or

(j) Assaults a judicial officer, court-related employee, county clerk, or county clerk's employee, while that person is performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault or as a result of that person's employment within the judicial system. For purposes of this subsection, "court-related employee" includes bailiffs, court reporters, judicial assistants, court managers, court managers' employees, and any other employee, regardless of title, who is engaged in equivalent functions; or

(k) Assaults a person located in a courtroom, jury room, judge's chamber, or any waiting area or corridor immediately adjacent to a courtroom, jury room, or judge's chamber. This section shall apply only: (i) During the times when a courtroom, jury room, or judge's chamber is being used for judicial purposes during court proceedings; and (ii) if signage was posted in compliance with RCW 2.28.200 at the time of the assault.

(2) Assault in the third degree is a class C felony. [2013 c 256 § 1. Prior: 2011 c 336 § 359; 2011 c 238 § 1; 2005 c 458 § 1; 1999 c 328 § 1; 1998 c 94 § 1; 1997 c 172 § 1; 1996 c 266 § 1; 1990 c 236 § 1; 1989 c 169 § 1; 1988 c 158 § 3; 1986 c 257 § 6.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.041 Assault in the fourth degree. (1) A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree if, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, he or she assaults another.

(2) Assault in the fourth degree is a gross misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.

(3)(a) Assault in the fourth degree occurring after July 23, 2017, and before March 18, 2020, where domestic violence is pleaded and proven, is a class C felony if the person has two or more prior adult convictions within ten years for any of the following offenses occurring after July 23, 2017, where domestic violence was pleaded and proven:

(i) Repetitive domestic violence offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;

(ii) Crime of harassment as defined by RCW 9A.46.060;

(iii) Assault in the third degree;

(iv) Assault in the second degree;

(v) Assault in the first degree; or

(vi) A municipal, tribal, federal, or out-of-state offense comparable to any offense under (a)(i) through (v) of this subsection.

For purposes of this subsection (3)(a), "family or household members" for purposes of the definition of "domestic violence" means spouses, domestic partners, former spouses, former domestic partners, persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time, persons sixteen years of age or older who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past and who have or have had a dating relationship, and persons sixteen years of age or older with whom a person sixteen years of age or older has or has had a dating relationship. "Family or household member" also includes an "intimate partner" as defined in RCW 10.99.020.

(b) Assault in the fourth degree occurring on or after March 18, 2020, where domestic violence against an "intimate partner" as defined in RCW 10.99.020 is pleaded and proven, is a class C felony if the person has two or more prior adult convictions within ten years for any of the following offenses occurring after July 23, 2017, where domestic violence against an "intimate partner" as defined in RCW 10.99.020 or domestic violence against a "family or household member" as defined in (a) of this subsection was pleaded and proven:

(i) Repetitive domestic violence offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;

(ii) Crime of harassment as defined by RCW 9A.46.060;

(iii) Assault in the third degree;

(iv) Assault in the second degree;

(v) Assault in the first degree; or

(vi) A municipal, tribal, federal, or out-of-state offense comparable to any offense under (b)(i) through (v) of this subsection. [2021 c 215 § 106; 2020 c 29 § 7; 2017 c 272 § 1; 1987 c 188 § 2; 1986 c 257 § 7.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

Effective date—2020 c 29: See note following RCW 7.77.060.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.045 Drive-by shooting. (1) A person is guilty of drive-by shooting when he or she recklessly discharges a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 in a manner which creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person and the discharge is either from a motor vehicle or from the immediate area of a motor vehicle that was used to transport the shooter or the firearm, or both, to the scene of the discharge.

(2) A person who unlawfully discharges a firearm from a moving motor vehicle may be inferred to have engaged in reckless conduct, unless the discharge is shown by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such recklessness.

(3) Drive-by shooting is a class B felony. [1997 c 338 § 44; 1995 c 129 § 8 (Initiative Measure No. 159); (1994 sp.s. c 7 § 511 repealed by 1995 c 129 § 19 (Initiative Measure No. 159)); 1989 c 271 § 109.]

Finding—Evaluation—Report—1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

Finding—Intent—Severability—Effective dates—Contingent expiration date—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.

Finding—Intent—1989 c 271 §§ 102, 109, and 110: See note following RCW 9A.36.050.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.050 Reckless endangerment. (1) A person is guilty of reckless endangerment when he or she recklessly engages in conduct not amounting to drive-by shooting but that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.

(2) Reckless endangerment is a gross misdemeanor. [1997 c 338 § 45; 1989 c 271 § 110; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.36.050.]

Finding—Evaluation—Report—1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.

Finding—Intent—1989 c 271 §§ 102, 109, and 110: "The legislature finds that increased trafficking in illegal drugs has increased the likelihood of "drive-by shootings." It is the intent of the legislature in sections 102, 109, and 110 of this act to categorize such reckless and criminal activity into a separate crime and to provide for an appropriate punishment." [1989 c 271 § 108.]

Criminal history and driving record: RCW 46.61.513.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.060 Promoting a suicide attempt. (1) A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.

(2) Promoting a suicide attempt is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 360; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.36.060.]

9A.36.070 Coercion. (1) A person is guilty of coercion if by use of a threat he or she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from, or to abstain from conduct which he or she has a legal right to engage in.

(2) "Threat" as used in this section means:

(a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or

(b) Threats as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(27) (a), (b), or (c).

(3) Coercion is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 361; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.36.070.]

***Reviser's note:** RCW 9A.04.110 was amended by 2011 c 166 § 2, changing subsection (27) to subsection (28).

9A.36.078 Hate crime offenses—Finding. The legislature finds that crimes and threats against persons because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disabilities are serious and increasing. The legislature also finds that crimes and threats are often directed against interracial couples and their children or couples of mixed religions, colors, ancestries, or national origins because of bias and bigotry against the race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin of one person in the couple or family. The legislature finds that the state interest in preventing crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias goes beyond the state interest in preventing other felonies or misdemeanors such as criminal trespass, malicious mischief, assault, or other crimes that are not motivated by hatred, big-

otry, and bias, and that prosecution of those other crimes inadequately protects citizens from crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias. Therefore, the legislature finds that protection of those citizens from threats of harm due to bias and bigotry is a compelling state interest.

The legislature also finds that in many cases, certain discrete words or symbols are used to threaten the victims. Those discrete words or symbols have historically or traditionally been used to connote hatred or threats towards members of the class of which the victim or a member of the victim's family or household is a member. In particular, the legislature finds that cross burnings historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass African Americans and their families. Cross burnings often preceded lynchings, murders, burning of homes, and other acts of terror. Further, Nazi swastikas historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass Jewish people and their families. Swastikas symbolize the massive destruction of the Jewish population, commonly known as the holocaust. Therefore, the legislature finds that any person who burns or attempts to burn a cross or displays a swastika on the property of the victim or burns a cross or displays a swastika as part of a series of acts directed towards a particular person, the person's family or household members, or a particular group, knows or reasonably should know that the cross burning or swastika may create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind of the person, the person's family and household members, or the group.

The legislature also finds that attacks on religious places of worship and threatening defacement of religious texts have increased, as have assaults and attacks on those who visibly self-identify as members of a religious minority, such as by wearing religious head covering or other visible articles of faith. The legislature finds that any person who defaces religious real property with derogatory words, symbols, or items, who places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim, or who attacks or attempts to remove the religious garb or faith-based attire of a victim, knows or reasonably should know that such actions create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind of the victim.

The legislature also finds that a hate crime committed against a victim because of the victim's gender may be identified in the same manner that a hate crime committed against a victim of another protected group is identified. Affirmative indications of hatred towards gender as a class is the predominant factor to consider. Other factors to consider include the perpetrator's use of language, slurs, or symbols expressing hatred towards the victim's gender as a class; the severity of the attack including mutilation of the victim's sexual organs; a history of similar attacks against victims of the same gender by the perpetrator or a history of similar incidents in the same area; a lack of provocation; an absence of any other apparent motivation; and common sense.

The legislature recognizes that, since 2015, Washington state has experienced a sharp increase in malicious harassment offenses, and, in response, the legislature intends to rename the offense to its more commonly understood title of "hate crime offense" and create a multidisciplinary working group to establish recommendations for best practices for identifying and responding to hate crimes. [2019 c 271 § 1; 1993 c 127 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.080 Hate crime offense—Definition and criminal penalty. (1) A person is guilty of a hate crime offense if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability:

(a) Causes physical injury to the victim or another person;

(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or

(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or property. The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a "reasonable person" is a reasonable person who is a member of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same gender expression or identity, or the same mental, physical, or sensory disability as the victim. Words alone do not constitute a hate crime offense unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute a hate crime offense if it is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the threat.

(2) In any prosecution for a hate crime offense, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression or identity, or mental, physical, or sensory disability if the person commits one of the following acts:

(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of African American heritage;

(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a swastika;

(c) Defaces religious real property with words, symbols, or items that are derogatory to persons of the faith associated with the property;

(d) Places a vandalized or defaced religious item or scripture on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of the faith with which that item or scripture is associated;

(e) Damages, destroys, or defaces religious garb or other faith-based attire belonging to the victim or attempts to or successfully removes religious garb or other faith-based attire from the victim's person without the victim's authorization; or

(f) Places a noose on the property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of a racial or ethnic minority group.

This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) through (f) of this subsection.

(2022 Ed.)

(3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, had a particular gender expression or identity, or had a mental, physical, or sensory disability.

(4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness.

(5) Every person who commits another crime during the commission of a crime under this section may be punished and prosecuted for the other crime separately.

(6) For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Gender expression or identity" means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.

(b) "Sexual orientation" means heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.

(c) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to:

(i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or

(ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person.

(7) Commission of a hate crime offense is a class C felony.

(8) The penalties provided in this section for hate crime offenses do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law.

(9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington. [2019 c 271 § 2; 2010 c 119 § 1; 2009 c 180 § 1; 1993 c 127 § 2; 1989 c 95 § 1; 1984 c 268 § 1; 1981 c 267 § 1.]

Harassment: Chapter 9A.46 RCW.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.083 Hate crime offense—Civil action. In addition to the criminal penalty provided in RCW 9A.36.080 for committing a hate crime offense, the victim may bring a civil cause of action for the hate crime offense against the person who committed the offense. A person may be liable to the victim of the hate crime offense for actual damages, punitive damages of up to one hundred thousand dollars, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing the action. [2019 c 271 § 3; 1993 c 127 § 3.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.090 Threats against governor or family. (1) Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the governor of the state or his or her immediate

family, the governor-elect, the lieutenant governor, other officer next in the order of succession to the office of governor of the state, or the lieutenant governor-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the governor, governor-elect, lieutenant governor, other officer next in the order of succession to the office of governor, or lieutenant governor-elect, shall be guilty of a class C felony.

(2) As used in this section, the term "governor-elect" and "lieutenant governor-elect" means such persons as are the successful candidates for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, as ascertained from the results of the general election. As used in this section, the phrase "other officer next in the order of succession to the office of governor" means the person other than the lieutenant governor next in order of succession to the office of governor under Article 3, section 10 of the state Constitution.

(3) The Washington state patrol may investigate for violations of this section. [2011 c 336 § 362; 1982 c 185 § 1.]

9A.36.100 Custodial assault. (1) A person is guilty of custodial assault if that person is not guilty of an assault in the first or second degree and where the person:

(a) Assaults a full or part-time staff member or volunteer, any educational personnel, any personal service provider, or any vendor or agent thereof at any juvenile corrections institution or local juvenile detention facilities who was performing official duties at the time of the assault;

(b) Assaults a full or part-time staff member or volunteer, any educational personnel, any personal service provider, or any vendor or agent thereof at any adult corrections institution or local adult detention facilities who was performing official duties at the time of the assault;

(c)(i) Assaults a full or part-time community correction officer while the officer is performing official duties; or

(ii) Assaults any other full or part-time employee who is employed in a community corrections office while the employee is performing official duties; or

(d) Assaults any volunteer who was assisting a person described in (c) of this subsection at the time of the assault.

(2) Custodial assault is a class C felony. [1988 c 151 § 1; 1987 c 188 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.36.120 Assault of a child in the first degree. (1) A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the first degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person:

(a) Commits the crime of assault in the first degree, as defined in RCW 9A.36.011, against the child; or

(b) Intentionally assaults the child and either:

(i) Recklessly inflicts great bodily harm; or

(ii) Causes substantial bodily harm, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice either of (A) assaulting the child which has resulted in bodily harm that is greater than transient physical pain or minor temporary marks, or (B) causing the child physical pain or agony that is equivalent to that produced by torture.

(2) Assault of a child in the first degree is a class A felony. [1992 c 145 § 1.]

9A.36.130 Assault of a child in the second degree. (1)

A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the second degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person:

(a) Commits the crime of assault in the second degree, as defined in RCW 9A.36.021, against a child; or

(b) Intentionally assaults the child and causes bodily harm that is greater than transient physical pain or minor temporary marks, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice either of (i) assaulting the child which has resulted in bodily harm that is greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks, or (ii) causing the child physical pain or agony that is equivalent to that produced by torture.

(2) Assault of a child in the second degree is a class B felony. [1992 c 145 § 2.]

9A.36.140 Assault of a child in the third degree. (1)

A person eighteen years of age or older is guilty of the crime of assault of a child in the third degree if the child is under the age of thirteen and the person commits the crime of assault in the third degree as defined in RCW 9A.36.031(1) (d) or (f) against the child.

(2) Assault of a child in the third degree is a class C felony. [1992 c 145 § 3.]

9A.36.150 Interfering with the reporting of domestic violence. (1) A person commits the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence if the person:

(a) Commits a crime of domestic violence, as defined in RCW 10.99.020; and

(b) Prevents or attempts to prevent the victim of or a witness to that domestic violence crime from calling a 911 emergency communication system, obtaining medical assistance, or making a report to any law enforcement official.

(2) Commission of a crime of domestic violence under subsection (1) of this section is a necessary element of the crime of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence.

(3) Interference with the reporting of domestic violence is a gross misdemeanor. [1996 c 248 § 3.]

9A.36.160 Failing to summon assistance. A person is guilty of the crime of failing to summon assistance if:

(1) He or she was present when a crime was committed against another person; and

(2) He or she knows that the other person has suffered substantial bodily harm as a result of the crime committed against the other person and that the other person is in need of assistance; and

(3) He or she could reasonably summon assistance for the person in need without danger to himself or herself and without interference with an important duty owed to a third party; and

(4) He or she fails to summon assistance for the person in need; and

(5) Another person is not summoning or has not summoned assistance for the person in need of such assistance. [2005 c 209 § 1.]

9A.36.161 Failing to summon assistance—Penalty. A violation of RCW 9A.36.160 is a misdemeanor. [2005 c 209 § 2.]

Chapter 9A.40 RCW
KIDNAPPING, UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT,
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE, LURING,
TRAFFICKING, AND COERCION OF
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

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9A.40.010 Definitions. The following definitions apply in this chapter:

(1) "Abduct" means to restrain a person by either (a) secreting or holding him or her in a place where he or she is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly force.

(2) "Commercial sex act" means any act of sexual contact or sexual intercourse for which something of value is given or received.

(3) "Forced labor" means knowingly providing or obtaining labor or services of a person by: (a) Threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person; or (b) means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.

(4) "Involuntary servitude" means a condition of servitude in which the victim was forced to work by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, by the use of threat of coercion through law or legal process, or as set forth in RCW 9A.40.110. For the purposes of this subsection, "coercion" has the same meaning as provided in RCW 9A.36.070.

(5) "Relative" means an ancestor, descendant, or sibling, including a relative of the same degree through marriage or adoption, or a spouse.

(6) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially with his or her liberty. Restraint is "without consent" if it is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation, or deception, or (b) any means including acquiescence of the victim, if he or she is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and if the parent, guardian, or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him or her has not acquiesced.

(2022 Ed.)

(7) "Serious harm" means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor, services, or a commercial sex act in order to avoid incurring that harm. [2014 c 52 § 2. Prior: 2011 c 336 § 363; 2011 c 111 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.40.010.]

9A.40.020 Kidnapping in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree if he or she intentionally abducts another person with intent:

(a) To hold him or her for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or

(b) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or

(c) To inflict bodily injury on him or her; or

(d) To inflict extreme mental distress on him, her, or a third person; or

(e) To interfere with the performance of any governmental function.

(2) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony. [2011 c 336 § 364; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.40.020.]

9A.40.030 Kidnapping in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree if he or she intentionally abducts another person under circumstances not amounting to kidnapping in the first degree.

(2) In any prosecution for kidnapping in the second degree, it is a defense if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) the abduction does not include the use of or intent to use or threat to use deadly force, and (b) the actor is a relative of the person abducted, and (c) the actor's sole intent is to assume custody of that person. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, any other crime.

(3)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony.

(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 9.94A.835 or 13.40.135 is a class A felony. [2003 c 53 § 65; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 356; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.40.030.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.40.040 Unlawful imprisonment. (1) A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment if he or she knowingly restrains another person.

(2) Unlawful imprisonment is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 365; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.40.040.]

9A.40.060 Custodial interference in the first degree. (1) A relative of a child under the age of eighteen or of an incompetent person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if, with the intent to deny access to the child or incompetent person by a parent, guardian, institution, agency,

or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person, the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child or incompetent person from a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person and:

(a) Intends to hold the child or incompetent person permanently or for a protracted period; or

(b) Exposes the child or incompetent person to a substantial risk of illness or physical injury; or

(c) Causes the child or incompetent person to be removed from the state of usual residence; or

(d) Retains, detains, or conceals the child or incompetent person in another state after expiration of any authorized visitation period with intent to intimidate or harass a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having lawful right to physical custody or to prevent a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person with lawful right to physical custody from regaining custody.

(2) A parent of a child is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if the parent takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child, with the intent to deny access, from the other parent having the lawful right to time with the child pursuant to a court order making residential provisions for the child, and:

(a) Intends to hold the child permanently or for a protracted period; or

(b) Exposes the child to a substantial risk of illness or physical injury; or

(c) Causes the child to be removed from the state of usual residence.

(3) A parent or other person acting under the directions of the parent is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if the parent or other person intentionally takes, entices, retains, or conceals a child, under the age of eighteen years and for whom no lawful custody order or order making residential provisions for the child has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, from the other parent with intent to deprive the other parent from access to the child permanently or for a protracted period.

(4) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class C felony. [2015 c 38 § 2; 1998 c 55 § 1; 1994 c 162 § 1; 1984 c 95 § 1.]

Intent—2015 c 38: "It is the intent of the legislature to address the Washington supreme court's decision in *State v. Veliz*, 176 Wn.2d 849 (2013). The court held that a parent cannot be charged with custodial interference under RCW 9A.40.060(2) if a parent withholds the other parent from having access to the child in violation of residential provisions of a domestic violence protection order. The legislature intends that the provisions of RCW 9A.40.060(2) and 9A.40.070(2) be applicable in cases in which a court has entered any order making residential provisions for a child including, but not limited to, domestic violence protection orders that include such residential provisions." [2015 c 38 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.40.070 Custodial interference in the second degree. (1) A relative of a person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree if, with the intent to deny access to such person by a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person, the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the person from a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such

person. This subsection shall not apply to a parent's noncompliance with a court order making residential provisions for the child.

(2) A parent of a child is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree if: (a) The parent takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child, with the intent to deny access, from the other parent having the lawful right to time with the child pursuant to a court order making residential provisions for the child; or (b) the parent has not complied with the residential provisions of a court-ordered parenting plan after a finding of contempt under RCW 26.09.160(3); or (c) if the court finds that the parent has engaged in a pattern of willful violations of a court order making residential provisions for the child.

(3) Nothing in subsection (2)(b) of this section prohibits conviction of custodial interference in the second degree under subsection (2)(a) or (c) of this section in absence of findings of contempt.

(4)(a) The first conviction of custodial interference in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor.

(b) The second or subsequent conviction of custodial interference in the second degree is a class C felony. [2015 c 38 § 3; 2003 c 53 § 66; 1989 c 318 § 2; 1984 c 95 § 2.]

Intent—2015 c 38: See note following RCW 9A.40.060.

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.40.080 Custodial interference—Assessment of costs—Defense—Consent defense, restricted. (1) Any reasonable expenses incurred in locating or returning a child or incompetent person shall be assessed against a defendant convicted under RCW 9A.40.060 or 9A.40.070.

(2) In any prosecution of custodial interference in the first or second degree, it is a complete defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

(a) The defendant's purpose was to protect the child, incompetent person, or himself or herself from imminent physical harm, that the belief in the existence of the imminent physical harm was reasonable, and that the defendant sought the assistance of the police, sheriff's office, protective agencies, or the court of any state before committing the acts giving rise to the charges or within a reasonable time thereafter;

(b) The complainant had, prior to the defendant committing the acts giving rise to the crime, for a protracted period of time, failed to exercise his or her rights to physical custody or access to the child under a court-ordered parenting plan or order granting visitation rights, provided that such failure was not the direct result of the defendant's denial of access to such person;

(c) The acts giving rise to the charges were consented to by the complainant; or

(d) The offender, after providing or making a good faith effort to provide notice to the person entitled to access to the child, failed to provide access to the child due to reasons that a reasonable person would believe were directly related to the welfare of the child, and allowed access to the child in accordance with the court order within a reasonable period of time. The burden of proof that the denial of access was reasonable is upon the person denying access to the child.

(3) Consent of a child less than sixteen years of age or of an incompetent person does not constitute a defense to an action under RCW 9A.40.060 or 9A.40.070. [1989 c 318 § 5; 1984 c 95 § 3.]

Child custody, action by relative: RCW 26.09.255.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.40.090 Luring. (1) A person commits the crime of luring if the person, with the intent to harm the health, safety, or welfare of the minor or person with a developmental disability or with the intent to facilitate the commission of any crime:

(a) Orders, lures, or attempts to lure a minor or a person with a developmental disability into any area or structure that is obscured from or inaccessible to the public, or away from any area or structure constituting a bus terminal, airport terminal, or other transportation terminal, or into a motor vehicle;

(b) Does not have the consent of the minor's parent or guardian or of the guardian of the person with a developmental disability; and

(c) Is unknown to the child or developmentally disabled person.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(a) "Minor" means a person under the age of sixteen;

(b) "Person with a developmental disability" means a person with a developmental disability as defined in RCW 71A.10.020.

(3) Luring is a class C felony. [2016 c 11 § 1; 2012 c 145 § 1; 1995 c 156 § 1; 1993 c 509 § 1.]

Effective date—2012 c 145: "This act takes effect January 1, 2013." [2012 c 145 § 2.]

9A.40.100 Trafficking. (1) A person is guilty of trafficking in the first degree when:

(a) Such person:

(i) Recruits, harbors, transports, transfers, provides, obtains, buys, purchases, or receives by any means another person knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, (A) that force, fraud, or coercion as defined in RCW 9A.36.070 will be used to cause the person to engage in:

(I) Forced labor;

(II) Involuntary servitude;

(III) A sexually explicit act; or

(IV) A commercial sex act, or (B) that the person has not attained the age of eighteen years and is caused to engage in a sexually explicit act or a commercial sex act; or

(ii) Benefits financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture that has engaged in acts set forth in (a)(i) of this subsection; and

(b) The acts or venture set forth in (a) of this subsection:

(i) Involve committing or attempting to commit kidnapping;

(ii) Involve a finding of sexual motivation under RCW 9.94A.835;

(iii) Involve the illegal harvesting or sale of human organs; or

(iv) Result in a death.

(2) Trafficking in the first degree is a class A felony.

(3)(a) A person is guilty of trafficking in the second degree when such person:

(i) Recruits, harbors, transports, transfers, provides, obtains, buys, purchases, or receives by any means another person knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that force, fraud, or coercion as defined in RCW 9A.36.070 will be used to cause the person to engage in forced labor, involuntary servitude, a sexually explicit act, or a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of eighteen years and is caused to engage in a sexually explicit act or a commercial sex act; or

(ii) Benefits financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture that has engaged in acts set forth in (a)(i) of this subsection.

(b) Trafficking in the second degree is a class A felony.

(4)(a) In any prosecution under this chapter in which the offense or degree of the offense depends on the victim's age, it is not a defense that the perpetrator did not know the victim's age, or that the perpetrator believed the victim to be older, as the case may be.

(b) A person who is either convicted or given a deferred sentence or a deferred prosecution or who has entered into a statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement as a result of an arrest for a violation of a trafficking crime shall be assessed a ten thousand dollar fee.

(c) The court shall not reduce, waive, or suspend payment of all or part of the fee assessed in this section unless it finds, on the record, that the offender does not have the ability to pay the fee in which case it may reduce the fee by an amount up to two-thirds of the maximum allowable fee.

(d) Fees assessed under this section shall be collected by the clerk of the court and remitted to the treasurer of the county where the offense occurred for deposit in the county general fund, except in cases in which the offense occurred in a city or town that provides for its own law enforcement, in which case these amounts shall be remitted to the treasurer of the city or town for deposit in the general fund of the city or town. Revenue from the fees must be used for local efforts to reduce the commercial sale of sex including, but not limited to, increasing enforcement of commercial sex laws.

(i) At least fifty percent of the revenue from fees imposed under this section must be spent on prevention, including education programs for offenders, such as john school, and rehabilitative services, such as mental health and substance abuse counseling, parenting skills, training, housing relief, education, vocational training, drop-in centers, and employment counseling.

(ii) Revenues from these fees are not subject to the distribution requirements under RCW 3.50.100, 3.62.020, 3.62.040, 10.82.070, or 35.20.220.

(5) If the victim of any offense identified in this section is a minor, force, fraud, or coercion are not necessary elements of an offense and consent to the sexually explicit act or commercial sex act does not constitute a defense.

(6) For purposes of this section:

(a) "Commercial sex act" means any act of sexual contact or sexual intercourse, both as defined in chapter 9A.44 RCW, for which something of value is given or received by any person; and

(b) "Sexually explicit act" means a public, private, or live photographed, recorded, or videotaped act or show intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interests of patrons for which something of value

is given or received. [2017 c 126 § 1; 2014 c 188 § 1; 2013 c 302 § 6. Prior: 2012 c 144 § 2; 2012 c 134 § 1; 2011 c 111 § 1; 2003 c 267 § 1.]

Effective date—2013 c 302: See note following RCW 9.68A.090.

9A.40.102 Trafficking—Court appearance—No-contact orders—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system. (1) A defendant who is charged by citation, complaint, or information with an offense involving trafficking, as described in RCW 9A.40.100, and is not arrested, shall appear in court for arraignment or initial appearance in person as soon as practicable, but in no event later than fourteen days after the defendant is served with the citation, complaint, or information. At that appearance, the court shall determine the necessity of imposing or extending a no-contact order, and consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800 or other conditions of pretrial release according to the procedures established by court rule for preliminary appearance or an arraignment.

(2) Whenever a no-contact order is issued under this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2017 c 230 § 1.]

9A.40.104 Trafficking—Court may prohibit defendant's contact with victim—No-contact orders—Issuance, termination, modification—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system. (1) Because of the likelihood of repeated harassment and intimidation directed at those who have been victims of trafficking as described in RCW 9A.40.100, before any defendant charged with or arrested, for a crime involving trafficking, is released from custody, or at any time the case remains unresolved, the court may prohibit that person from having any contact with the victim whether directly or through third parties.

At the initial preliminary appearance, the court shall determine whether to extend any existing prohibition on the defendant's contact with the victim. If there is no outstanding restraining or protective order prohibiting that person from having contact with the victim, the court may issue, by telephone, a no-contact order prohibiting the person charged or arrested from having contact with the victim or from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location. The court may also consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800 or other conditions of pretrial release according to the procedures established by court rule for preliminary appearance or an arraignment.

(2) At the time of arraignment the court shall determine whether a no-contact order shall be issued or extended. So long as the court finds probable cause, the court may issue or extend a no-contact order. The no-contact order shall terminate if the defendant is acquitted or the charges are dismissed.

(3)(a) Willful violation of a court order issued under this section is punishable under RCW 7.105.450.

(b) The written order shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 7.105 RCW and the violator is subject to arrest; any assault, drive-by shooting, or reckless endangerment that is a violation of this order is a felony.

(4) Upon a motion with notice to all parties and after a hearing, the court may terminate or modify the terms of an existing no-contact order, including terms entered pursuant to RCW 9.41.800 related to firearms or other dangerous weapons or to concealed pistol licenses.

(5)(a) A defendant's motion to terminate or modify a no-contact order must include a declaration setting forth facts supporting the requested order for termination or modification. The court shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the declarations. If the court finds that the defendant established adequate cause, the court shall set a date for hearing the defendant's motion.

(b) The court may terminate or modify the terms of a no-contact order, including terms entered pursuant to RCW 9.41.800 related to firearms or other dangerous weapons or to concealed pistol licenses, if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a material change in circumstances such that the defendant is not likely to engage in or attempt to engage in physical or nonphysical contact with the victim if the order is terminated or modified. The victim bears no burden of proving that he or she has a current reasonable fear of harm by the defendant.

(c) A defendant may file a motion to terminate or modify pursuant to this section no more than once in every twelve-month period that the order is in effect, starting from the date of the order and continuing through any renewal.

(6) Whenever a no-contact order is issued, modified, or terminated under this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2021 c 215 § 107; 2017 c 230 § 3.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

9A.40.106 Trafficking—Condition of sentence restricting contact—No-contact orders—Entry of order

into computer-based criminal intelligence information system. (1) If a defendant is found guilty of the crime of trafficking under RCW 9A.40.100 and a condition of the sentence restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim, the condition must be recorded and a written certified copy of that order must be provided to the victim by the clerk of the court. Willful violation of a court order issued under this section is punishable under *RCW 26.50.110. The written order must contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: Violation of this order is a criminal offense under *chapter 26.50 RCW and the violator is subject to arrest; any assault, drive-by shooting, or reckless endangerment that is a violation of this order is a felony.

(2) Whenever a no-contact order is issued under this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2017 c 230 § 4.]

*Reviser's note: Chapter 26.50 RCW was repealed in its entirety by 2021 c 215 § 170, effective July 1, 2022.

9A.40.110 Coercion of involuntary servitude. (1) A person is guilty of coercion of involuntary servitude if he or she coerces, as defined in RCW 9A.36.070, another person to perform labor or services by:

- (a) Withholding or threatening to withhold or destroy documents relating to a person's immigration status; or
- (b) Threatening to notify law enforcement officials that a person is present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.

(2) Coercion does not include reports to law enforcement that a person is present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.

(3) A person may commit coercion of involuntary servitude regardless of whether the person provides any sort of compensation or benefits to the person who is coerced.

(4) Coercion of involuntary servitude is a class C felony. [2014 c 52 § 1.]

9A.40.120 Enforcement of orders restricting contact. Any general authority Washington peace officer as defined in RCW 10.93.020 in this state may enforce this chapter as it relates to orders restricting the defendants' ability to have contact with the victim or others. [2017 c 230 § 2.]

9A.40.900 Construction—Chapter applicable to state registered domestic partnerships—2009 c 521. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms spouse, marriage, marital, husband, wife, widow, widower, next of kin, and family shall be interpreted as applying equally to state registered

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domestic partnerships or individuals in state registered domestic partnerships as well as to marital relationships and married persons, and references to dissolution of marriage shall apply equally to state registered domestic partnerships that have been terminated, dissolved, or invalidated, to the extent that such interpretation does not conflict with federal law. Where necessary to implement chapter 521, Laws of 2009, gender-specific terms such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law shall be construed to be gender neutral, and applicable to individuals in state registered domestic partnerships. [2009 c 521 § 23.]

Chapter 9A.42 RCW CRIMINAL MISTREATMENT

Sections

9A.42.005	Findings and intent—Christian Science treatment—Rules of evidence.
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9A.42.090	Abandonment of a dependent person—Defense.
9A.42.100	Endangerment with a controlled substance.
9A.42.110	Leaving a child in the care of a sex offender.

9A.42.005 Findings and intent—Christian Science treatment—Rules of evidence. The legislature finds that there is a significant need to protect children and dependent persons, including frail elder and vulnerable adults, from abuse and neglect by their parents, by persons entrusted with their physical custody, or by persons employed to provide them with the basic necessities of life. The legislature further finds that such abuse and neglect often takes the forms of either withholding from them the basic necessities of life, including food, water, shelter, clothing, and health care, or abandoning them, or both. Therefore, it is the intent of the legislature that criminal penalties be imposed on those guilty of such abuse or neglect. It is the intent of the legislature that a person who, in good faith, is furnished Christian Science treatment by a duly accredited Christian Science practitioner in lieu of medical care is not considered deprived of medically necessary health care or abandoned. Prosecutions under this chapter shall be consistent with the rules of evidence, including hearsay, under law. [1997 c 392 § 507.]

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

9A.42.010 Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abandons" means leaving a child or other dependent person without the means or ability to obtain one or more of the basic necessities of life.

(2) "Basic necessities of life" means food, water, shelter, clothing, and medically necessary health care, including but

not limited to health-related treatment or activities, hygiene, oxygen, and medication.

(3)(a) "Bodily injury" means physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition;

(b) "Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily part;

(c) "Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily part or organ.

(4) "Child" means a person under eighteen years of age.

(5) "Dependent person" means a person who, because of physical or mental disability, or because of extreme advanced age, is dependent upon another person to provide the basic necessities of life. A resident of a nursing home, as defined in RCW 18.51.010, a resident of an adult family home, as defined in RCW 70.128.010, and a frail elder or vulnerable adult, as defined in *RCW 74.34.020(22), is presumed to be a dependent person for purposes of this chapter.

(6) "Employed" means hired by a dependent person, another person acting on behalf of a dependent person, or by an organization or governmental entity, to provide to a dependent person any of the basic necessities of life. A person may be "employed" regardless of whether the person is paid for the services or, if paid, regardless of who pays for the person's services.

(7) "Good samaritan" means any individual or group of individuals who: (a) Is not related to the dependent person; (b) voluntarily provides assistance or services of any type to the dependent person; (c) is not paid, given gifts, or made a beneficiary of any assets valued at five hundred dollars or more, for any reason, by the dependent person, the dependent person's family, or the dependent person's estate; and (d) does not commit or attempt to commit any other crime against the dependent person or the dependent person's estate.

(8) "Parent" has its ordinary meaning and also includes a guardian and the authorized agent of a parent or guardian. [2020 c 18 § 7; 2006 c 228 § 1; 1997 c 392 § 508; 1996 c 302 § 1; 1986 c 250 § 1.]

Reviser's note: *(1) RCW 74.34.020 was amended by 2020 c 312 § 735, changing subsection (22) to subsection (21).

(2) The definitions in this section have been alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.08.015(2)(k).

Explanatory statement—2020 c 18: See note following RCW 43.79A.040.

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.42.020 Criminal mistreatment in the first degree.

(1) A parent of a child, the person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or dependent person, a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life, or a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person the basic necessities of life is guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if he or she with criminal negligence, as defined in RCW 9A.08.010,

causes great bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life.

(2) Criminal mistreatment in the first degree is a class B felony. [2017 c 266 § 2; 2006 c 228 § 2; 1997 c 392 § 510; 1986 c 250 § 2.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: "The legislature finds that seniors and people with disabilities face a growing threat of financial exploitation and physical neglect. The legislature intends with this act to hold accountable those perpetrators who commit theft and physical neglect of seniors and people with disabilities by increasing penalties, reducing barriers to prosecution, and expanding the scope of protection for vulnerable persons." [2017 c 266 § 1.]

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

9A.42.030 Criminal mistreatment in the second degree.

(1) A parent of a child, the person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or dependent person, a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life, or a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person the basic necessities of life is guilty of criminal mistreatment in the second degree if he or she with criminal negligence, as defined in RCW 9A.08.010, either (a) creates an imminent and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm by withholding any of the basic necessities of life, or (b) causes substantial bodily harm by withholding any of the basic necessities of life.

(2) Criminal mistreatment in the second degree is a class C felony. [2017 c 266 § 3; 2006 c 228 § 3; 1997 c 392 § 511; 1986 c 250 § 3.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: See note following RCW 9A.42.020.

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

9A.42.035 Criminal mistreatment in the third degree.

(1) A person is guilty of the crime of criminal mistreatment in the third degree if the person is the parent of a child, is a person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or other dependent person, is a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life, or is a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person the basic necessities of life and, with criminal negligence, creates an imminent and substantial risk of substantial bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life.

(2) For purposes of this section, "a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life" means a person other than: (a) A government agency that regularly provides assistance or services to dependent persons, including but not limited to the department of social and health services; or (b) a good samaritan as defined in RCW 9A.42.010.

(3) Criminal mistreatment in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2017 c 266 § 4; 2006 c 228 § 4; 2000 c 76 § 1.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: See note following RCW 9A.42.020.

9A.42.037 Criminal mistreatment in the fourth degree.

(1) A person is guilty of the crime of criminal mistreatment in the fourth degree if the person is the parent of a

child, is a person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or other dependent person, is a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life, or is a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person the basic necessities of life, and either:

(a) With criminal negligence, creates an imminent and substantial risk of bodily injury to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life; or

(b) With criminal negligence, causes bodily injury or extreme emotional distress manifested by more than transient physical symptoms to a child or dependent person by withholding the basic necessities of life.

(2) For purposes of this section, "a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life" means a person other than: (a) A government agency that regularly provides assistance or services to dependent persons, including but not limited to the department of social and health services; or (b) a good samaritan as defined in RCW 9A.42.010.

(3) Criminal mistreatment in the fourth degree is a misdemeanor. [2006 c 228 § 5; 2002 c 219 § 2.]

Intent—Finding—2002 c 219: "The legislature recognizes that responses by the department of social and health services and public safety agencies have varied between jurisdictions when allegations of withholding of the basic necessities of life are made. The legislature intends to improve the capacity of the department of social and health services and public safety agencies to respond to situations where the basic necessities of life are withheld by allowing an earlier intervention in such cases. The legislature finds that improved coordination between the department of social and health services and public safety agencies at an earlier point will lead to better treatment of children and families and will reduce the likelihood of serious harm." [2002 c 219 § 1.]

9A.42.039 Arresting officer, notification by. (1) When a law enforcement officer arrests a person for criminal mistreatment of a child, the officer must notify child protective services.

(2) When a law enforcement officer arrests a person for criminal mistreatment of a dependent person other than a child, the officer must notify adult protective services. [2002 c 219 § 5.]

Intent—Finding—2002 c 219: See note following RCW 9A.42.037.

9A.42.040 Withdrawal of life support systems. RCW 9A.42.020, 9A.42.030, 9A.42.035, and 9A.42.037 do not apply to decisions to withdraw life support systems made in accordance with chapter 7.70 or 70.122 RCW by the dependent person, his or her legal surrogate, or others with a legal duty to care for the dependent person. [2002 c 219 § 3; 2000 c 76 § 2; 1986 c 250 § 4.]

Intent—Finding—2002 c 219: See note following RCW 9A.42.037.

9A.42.045 Palliative care. RCW 9A.42.020, 9A.42.030, 9A.42.035, and 9A.42.037 do not apply when a terminally ill or permanently unconscious person or his or her legal surrogate, as set forth in chapter 7.70 RCW, requests, and the person receives, palliative care from a licensed home health agency, hospice agency, nursing home, or hospital providing care under the medical direction of a physician. As used in this section, the terms "terminally ill" and "permanently unconscious" have the same meaning as "terminal condition" and "permanent unconscious condition" in chapter

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70.122 RCW. [2002 c 219 § 4; 2000 c 76 § 3; 1997 c 392 § 512.]

Intent—Finding—2002 c 219: See note following RCW 9A.42.037.

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

9A.42.050 Defense of financial inability. In any prosecution for criminal mistreatment, it shall be a defense that the withholding of the basic necessities of life is due to financial inability only if the person charged has made a reasonable effort to obtain adequate assistance. This defense is available to a person employed to provide the basic necessities of life only when the agreed-upon payment has not been made. [1997 c 392 § 509; 1986 c 250 § 5.]

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

9A.42.060 Abandonment of a dependent person in the first degree—Exception. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a person is guilty of the crime of abandonment of a dependent person in the first degree if:

(a) The person is the parent of a child, a person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or other dependent person, a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life, or a person employed to provide to the child or other dependent person any of the basic necessities of life;

(b) The person recklessly abandons the child or other dependent person; and

(c) As a result of being abandoned, the child or other dependent person suffers great bodily harm.

(2) A parent of a newborn who transfers the newborn to a qualified person at an appropriate location pursuant to RCW 13.34.360 is not subject to criminal liability under this section.

(3) Abandonment of a dependent person in the first degree is a class B felony. [2006 c 228 § 6; 2002 c 331 § 3; 1996 c 302 § 2.]

Intent—Effective date—2002 c 331: See notes following RCW 13.34.360.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.42.070 Abandonment of a dependent person in the second degree—Exception. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a person is guilty of the crime of abandonment of a dependent person in the second degree if:

(a) The person is the parent of a child, a person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or other dependent person, a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life, or a person employed to provide to the child or other dependent person any of the basic necessities of life; and

(b) The person recklessly abandons the child or other dependent person; and:

(i) As a result of being abandoned, the child or other dependent person suffers substantial bodily harm; or

(ii) Abandoning the child or other dependent person creates an imminent and substantial risk that the child or other dependent person will die or suffer great bodily harm.

(2) A parent of a newborn who transfers the newborn to a qualified person at an appropriate location pursuant to RCW 13.34.360 is not subject to criminal liability under this section.

(3) Abandonment of a dependent person in the second degree is a class C felony. [2006 c 228 § 7; 2002 c 331 § 4; 1996 c 302 § 3.]

Intent—Effective date—2002 c 331: See notes following RCW 13.34.360.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.42.080 Abandonment of a dependent person in the third degree—Exception. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a person is guilty of the crime of abandonment of a dependent person in the third degree if:

(a) The person is the parent of a child, a person entrusted with the physical custody of a child or other dependent person, a person who has assumed the responsibility to provide to a dependent person the basic necessities of life, or a person employed to provide to the child or dependent person any of the basic necessities of life; and

(b) The person recklessly abandons the child or other dependent person; and:

(i) As a result of being abandoned, the child or other dependent person suffers bodily harm; or

(ii) Abandoning the child or other dependent person creates an imminent and substantial risk that the child or other person will suffer substantial bodily harm.

(2) A parent of a newborn who transfers the newborn to a qualified person at an appropriate location pursuant to RCW 13.34.360 is not subject to criminal liability under this section.

(3) Abandonment of a dependent person in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2006 c 228 § 8; 2002 c 331 § 5; 1996 c 302 § 4.]

Intent—Effective date—2002 c 331: See notes following RCW 13.34.360.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.42.090 Abandonment of a dependent person—Defense. It is an affirmative defense to the charge of abandonment of a dependent person, that the person employed to provide any of the basic necessities of life to the child or other dependent person, gave reasonable notice of termination of services and the services were not terminated until after the termination date specified in the notice. The notice must be given to the child or dependent person, and to other persons or organizations that have requested notice of termination of services furnished to the child or other dependent person.

The department of social and health services and the department of health shall adopt rules establishing procedures for termination of services to children and other dependent persons. [1996 c 302 § 5.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.42.100 Endangerment with a controlled substance. A person is guilty of the crime of endangerment with a controlled substance if the person knowingly or intention-

ally permits a dependent child or dependent adult to be exposed to, ingest, inhale, or have contact with methamphetamine or ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or anhydrous ammonia, including their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, that are being used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. Endangerment with a controlled substance is a class B felony. [2005 c 218 § 4; 2002 c 229 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.42.110 Leaving a child in the care of a sex offender. (1) A person is guilty of the crime of leaving a child in the care of a sex offender if the person is (a) the parent of a child; (b) entrusted with the physical custody of a child; or (c) employed to provide to the child the basic necessities of life, and leaves the child in the care or custody of another person who is not a parent, guardian, or lawful custodian of the child, knowing that the person is registered or required to register as a sex offender under the laws of this state, or a law or ordinance in another jurisdiction with similar requirements, because of a sex offense against a child.

(2) It is an affirmative defense to the charge of leaving a child in the care of a sex offender under this section, that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that a court has entered an order allowing the offender to have unsupervised contact with children, or that the offender is allowed to have unsupervised contact with the child in question under a family reunification plan, which has been approved by a court, the department of corrections, or the department of social and health services in accordance with department policies.

(3) Leaving a child in the care of a sex offender is a misdemeanor. [2002 c 170 § 1.]

Chapter 9A.44 RCW SEX OFFENSES

Sections

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9A.44.030	Defenses to prosecution under this chapter.
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9A.44.045	First degree rape—Penalties.
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9A.44.093	Sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree.
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9A.44.100	Indecent liberties.
9A.44.105	Sexually violating human remains.
9A.44.115	Voyeurism.
9A.44.120	Admissibility of child's statement—Conditions.
9A.44.128	Definitions applicable to RCW 9A.44.130 through 9A.44.145, 10.01.200, 43.43.540, 70.48.470, and 72.09.330.
9A.44.130	Registration of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders—Procedures—Definition—Penalties.
9A.44.132	Failure to register as sex offender or kidnapping offender.
9A.44.135	Address verification.
9A.44.138	Attendance, employment of registered sex offenders and kidnapping offenders at schools and institutions of higher education—Notice to designated recipients—Information exempt from disclosure.
9A.44.140	Registration of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders—Duty to register.

- 9A.44.141 Investigation—End of duty to register—Removal from registry—Civil liability.
- 9A.44.142 Relief from duty to register—Petition—Exceptions.
- 9A.44.143 Relief from duty to register for sex offense or kidnapping offense committed when offender was a juvenile and who has not been determined to be a sexually violent predator—Petition—Exception.
- 9A.44.145 Notification to offenders of changed requirements and ability to petition for relief from registration.
- 9A.44.148 Application of RCW 9A.44.128 through 9A.44.145—Duty to register under law as it existed prior to July 28, 1991.
- 9A.44.150 Testimony of child by closed-circuit television.
- 9A.44.160 Custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree.
- 9A.44.170 Custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree.
- 9A.44.180 Custodial sexual misconduct—Defense.
- 9A.44.190 Criminal trespass against children—Definitions.
- 9A.44.193 Criminal trespass against children—Covered entities.
- 9A.44.196 Criminal trespass against children.
- 9A.44.210 Court initiated issuance of sexual assault no-contact orders—Terms, conditions, requirements, etc.
- 9A.44.900 Decodifications and additions to this chapter.
- 9A.44.901 Construction—Sections decodified and added to this chapter.
- 9A.44.902 Effective date—1979 ex.s. c 244.
- 9A.44.903 Section captions—1988 c 145.
- 9A.44.904 Construction—Chapter applicable to state registered domestic partnerships—2009 c 521.

Council for children and families: Chapter 43.121 RCW.

Witnesses: Rules of court: ER 601 through 615.

9A.44.010 Definitions. As used in this chapter:

- (1) "Abuse of a supervisory position" means:
 - (a) To use a direct or indirect threat or promise to exercise authority to the detriment or benefit of a minor; or
 - (b) To exploit a significant relationship in order to obtain the consent of a minor.
- (2) "Consent" means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.
- (3) "Forcible compulsion" means physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped.
- (4) "Frail elder or vulnerable adult" means a person sixty years of age or older who has the functional, mental, or physical inability to care for himself or herself. "Frail elder or vulnerable adult" also includes a person who has been placed under a guardianship under RCW 11.130.265 or a conservatorship under RCW 11.130.360, a person over eighteen years of age who has a developmental disability under chapter 71A.10 RCW, a person admitted to a long-term care facility that is licensed or required to be licensed under chapter 18.20, 18.51, 72.36, or 70.128 RCW, and a person receiving services from a home health, hospice, or home care agency licensed or required to be licensed under chapter 70.127 RCW.
- (5) "Health care provider" for purposes of RCW 9A.44.050 and 9A.44.100 means a person who is, holds himself or herself out to be, or provides services as if he or she were: (a) A member of a health care profession under chapter 18.130 RCW; or (b) registered under chapter 18.19 RCW or licensed under chapter 18.225 RCW, regardless of whether the health care provider is licensed, certified, or registered by the state.
- (6) "Married" means one who is legally married to another, but does not include a person who is living separate and apart from his or her spouse and who has filed in an

appropriate court for legal separation or for dissolution of his or her marriage.

(7) "Mental incapacity" is that condition existing at the time of the offense which prevents a person from understanding the nature or consequences of the act of sexual intercourse whether that condition is produced by illness, defect, the influence of a substance or from some other cause.

(8) "Person with a chemical dependency" for purposes of RCW 9A.44.050(1)(e) and 9A.44.100(1)(e) means a person who is "chemically dependent" as defined in *RCW 70.96A.020.

(9) "Person with a developmental disability," for purposes of RCW 9A.44.050(1)(c) and 9A.44.100(1)(c), means a person with a developmental disability as defined in RCW 71A.10.020.

(10) "Person with a mental disorder" for the purposes of RCW 9A.44.050(1)(e) and 9A.44.100(1)(e) means a person with a "mental disorder" as defined in RCW 71.05.020.

(11) "Person with supervisory authority," for purposes of RCW 9A.44.050(1)(c) or (e) and 9A.44.100(1)(c) or (e), means any proprietor or employee of any public or private care or treatment facility who directly supervises developmentally disabled, mentally disordered, or chemically dependent persons at the facility.

(12) "Physically helpless" means a person who is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.

(13) "Sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party or a third party.

(14) "Sexual intercourse" (a) has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight, and

(b) Also means any penetration of the vagina or anus however slight, by an object, when committed on one person by another, whether such persons are of the same or opposite sex, except when such penetration is accomplished for medically recognized treatment or diagnostic purposes, and

(c) Also means any act of sexual contact between persons involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another whether such persons are of the same or opposite sex.

(15) "Significant relationship" means a situation in which the perpetrator is:

(a) A person who undertakes the responsibility, professionally or voluntarily, to provide education, health, welfare, or organized recreational activities principally for minors;

(b) A person who in the course of his or her employment supervises minors; or

(c) A person who provides welfare, health or residential assistance, personal care, or organized recreational activities to frail elders or vulnerable adults, including a provider, employee, temporary employee, volunteer, or independent contractor who supplies services to long-term care facilities licensed or required to be licensed under chapter 18.20, 18.51, 72.36, or 70.128 RCW, and home health, hospice, or home care agencies licensed or required to be licensed under chapter 70.127 RCW, but not including a consensual sexual partner.

(16) "Treatment" for purposes of RCW 9A.44.050 and 9A.44.100 means the active delivery of professional services by a health care provider which the health care provider holds

himself or herself out to be qualified to provide. [2020 c 312 § 707; 2007 c 20 § 3; 2005 c 262 § 1; 2001 c 251 § 28. Prior: 1997 c 392 § 513; 1997 c 112 § 37; 1994 c 271 § 302; 1993 c 477 § 1; 1988 c 146 § 3; 1988 c 145 § 1; 1981 c 123 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 14 § 1. Formerly RCW 9.79.140.]

Reviser's note: *(1) RCW 70.96A.020 was repealed by 2016 sp.s. c 29 § 301.

(2) The definitions in this section have been alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.08.015(2)(k).

Effective dates—2020 c 312: See note following RCW 11.130.915.

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

Intent—1994 c 271: "The legislature hereby reaffirms its desire to protect the children of Washington from sexual abuse and further reaffirms its condemnation of child sexual abuse that takes the form of causing one child to engage in sexual contact with another child for the sexual gratification of the one causing such activities to take place." [1994 c 271 § 301.]

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.020 Testimony—Evidence—Written motion—Admissibility. (1) In order to convict a person of any crime defined in this chapter it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated.

(2) Evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior including but not limited to the victim's marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards is inadmissible on the issue of credibility and is inadmissible to prove the victim's consent except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but when the perpetrator and the victim have engaged in sexual intercourse with each other in the past, and when the past behavior is material to the issue of consent, evidence concerning the past behavior between the perpetrator and the victim may be admissible on the issue of consent to the offense.

(3) In any prosecution for the crime of rape, trafficking pursuant to RCW 9A.40.100, or any of the offenses in chapter 9.68A RCW, or for an attempt to commit, or an assault with an intent to commit any such crime evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior including but not limited to the victim's marital behavior, divorce history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or sexual mores contrary to community standards is not admissible if offered to attack the credibility of the victim and is admissible on the issue of consent, except where prohibited in the underlying criminal offense, only pursuant to the following procedure:

(a) A written pretrial motion shall be made by the defendant to the court and prosecutor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of the past sexual behavior of the victim proposed to be presented and its relevancy on the issue of the consent of the victim.

(b) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits in which the offer of proof shall be stated.

(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury, if any, and the hearing shall be closed except to the necessary witnesses, the defendant, counsel, and those who have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.

(d) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the evidence proposed to be offered by the defendant regarding the past sexual behavior of the victim is relevant to the issue of the victim's consent; is not inadmissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice; and that its exclusion would result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant; the court shall make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, which order may include the nature of the questions to be permitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the court.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit cross-examination of the victim on the issue of past sexual behavior when the prosecution presents evidence in its case in chief tending to prove the nature of the victim's past sexual behavior, but the court may require a hearing pursuant to subsection (3) of this section concerning such evidence. [2013 c 302 § 7; 1975 1st ex.s. c 14 § 2. Formerly RCW 9.79.150.]

Effective date—2013 c 302: See note following RCW 9.68A.090.

9A.44.030 Defenses to prosecution under this chapter. (1) In any prosecution under this chapter in which lack of consent is based solely upon the victim's mental incapacity or upon the victim's being physically helpless, it is a defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the offense the defendant reasonably believed that the victim was not mentally incapacitated and/or physically helpless.

(2) In any prosecution under this chapter in which the offense or degree of the offense depends on the victim's age, it is no defense that the perpetrator did not know the victim's age, or that the perpetrator believed the victim to be older, as the case may be: PROVIDED, That it is a defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the offense the defendant reasonably believed the alleged victim to be the age identified in subsection (3) of this section based upon declarations as to age by the alleged victim.

(3) The defense afforded by subsection (2) of this section requires that for the following defendants, the reasonable belief be as indicated:

(a) For a defendant charged with rape of a child in the first degree, that the victim was at least twelve, or was less than twenty-four months younger than the defendant;

(b) For a defendant charged with rape of a child in the second degree, that the victim was at least fourteen, or was less than thirty-six months younger than the defendant;

(c) For a defendant charged with rape of a child in the third degree, that the victim was at least sixteen, or was less than forty-eight months younger than the defendant;

(d) For a defendant charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree, that the victim was at least eighteen, or was less than sixty months younger than the defendant;

(e) For a defendant charged with child molestation in the first degree, that the victim was at least twelve, or was less than thirty-six months younger than the defendant;

(f) For a defendant charged with child molestation in the second degree, that the victim was at least fourteen, or was less than thirty-six months younger than the defendant;

(g) For a defendant charged with child molestation in the third degree, that the victim was at least sixteen, or was less than thirty-six months younger than the defendant;

(h) For a defendant charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree, that the victim was at least eighteen, or was less than sixty months younger than the defendant. [1988 c 145 § 20; 1975 1st ex.s. c 14 § 3. Formerly RCW 9.79.160.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.040 Rape in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion where the perpetrator or an accessory:

- (a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or what appears to be a deadly weapon; or
- (b) Kidnaps the victim; or
- (c) Inflicts serious physical injury, including but not limited to physical injury which renders the victim unconscious; or
- (d) Feloniously enters into the building or vehicle where the victim is situated.

(2) Rape in the first degree is a class A felony. [1998 c 242 § 1. Prior: 1983 c 118 § 1; 1983 c 73 § 1; 1982 c 192 § 11; 1982 c 10 § 3; prior: (1) 1981 c 137 § 36; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 247 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 14 § 4. (2) 1981 c 136 § 57 repealed by 1982 c 10 § 18. Formerly RCW 9.79.170.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.045 First degree rape—Penalties. No person convicted of rape in the first degree shall be granted a deferred or suspended sentence except for the purpose of commitment to an inpatient treatment facility: PROVIDED, That every person convicted of rape in the first degree shall be confined for a minimum of three years: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the *board of prison terms and paroles shall have authority to set a period of confinement greater than three years but shall never reduce the minimum three-year period of confinement; nor shall the board release the convicted person during the first three years of confinement as a result of any type of good time calculation; nor shall the department of corrections permit the convicted person to participate in any work release program or furlough program during the first three years of confinement. This section applies only to offenses committed prior to July 1, 1984. [1982 c 192 § 12.]

*Reviser's note: The "board of prison terms and paroles" was redesignated the "indeterminate sentence review board" by 1986 c 224, effective July 1, 1986.

9A.44.050 Rape in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, under circumstances not constituting rape in the first degree, the person engages in sexual intercourse with another person:

- (a) By forcible compulsion;
- (b) When the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated;
- (c) When the victim is a person with a developmental disability and the perpetrator is a person who:
 - (i) Has supervisory authority over the victim; or

(2022 Ed.)

(ii) Was providing transportation, within the course of his or her employment, to the victim at the time of the offense;

(d) When the perpetrator is a health care provider, the victim is a client or patient, and the sexual intercourse occurs during a treatment session, consultation, interview, or examination. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the client or patient consented to the sexual intercourse with the knowledge that the sexual intercourse was not for the purpose of treatment;

(e) When the victim is a resident of a facility for persons with a mental disorder or chemical dependency and the perpetrator is a person who has supervisory authority over the victim; or

(f) When the victim is a frail elder or vulnerable adult and the perpetrator is a person who:

- (i) Has a significant relationship with the victim; or
- (ii) Was providing transportation, within the course of his or her employment, to the victim at the time of the offense.

(2) Rape in the second degree is a class A felony. [2021 c 142 § 1; 2007 c 20 § 1; 1997 c 392 § 514; 1993 c 477 § 2; 1990 c 3 § 901; 1988 c 146 § 1; 1983 c 118 § 2; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 14 § 5. Formerly RCW 9.79.180.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: "This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and takes effect immediately [April 26, 2021]." [2021 c 142 § 11.]

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.060 Rape in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when, under circumstances not constituting rape in the first or second degrees, such person engages in sexual intercourse with another person:

(a) Where the victim did not consent as defined in *RCW 9A.44.010(7), to sexual intercourse with the perpetrator; or

(b) Where there is threat of substantial unlawful harm to property rights of the victim.

(2) Rape in the third degree is a class C felony. [2019 c 87 § 3; 2013 c 94 § 1; 1999 c 143 § 34; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 14 § 6. Formerly RCW 9.79.190.]

*Reviser's note: RCW 9A.44.010 was alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.08.015(2)(k), changing subsection (7) to subsection (2), effective January 1, 2022.

Declaration—2019 c 87: See note following RCW 9A.04.080.

9A.44.073 Rape of a child in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the first degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is less than twelve years old and the perpetrator is at least twenty-four months older than the victim.

(2) Rape of a child in the first degree is a class A felony. [2021 c 142 § 2; 1988 c 145 § 2.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.076 Rape of a child in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the second degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least twelve years old but less than fourteen years old and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the victim.

(2) Rape of a child in the second degree is a class A felony. [2021 c 142 § 3; 1990 c 3 § 903; 1988 c 145 § 3.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.079 Rape of a child in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of rape of a child in the third degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the victim.

(2) Rape of a child in the third degree is a class C felony. [2021 c 142 § 4; 1988 c 145 § 4.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.083 Child molestation in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of child molestation in the first degree when the person has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with another who is less than twelve years old and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the victim.

(2) Child molestation in the first degree is a class A felony. [2021 c 142 § 5; 1994 c 271 § 303; 1990 c 3 § 902; 1988 c 145 § 5.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Intent—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.44.010.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.086 Child molestation in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of child molestation in the second degree when the person has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with another who is at least twelve years old but less than fourteen years old and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the victim.

(2) Child molestation in the second degree is a class B felony. [2021 c 142 § 6; 1994 c 271 § 304; 1988 c 145 § 6.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Intent—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.44.010.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.089 Child molestation in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of child molestation in the third degree when the person has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with another who is at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and the perpetrator is at least forty-eight months older than the victim.

(2) Child molestation in the third degree is a class C felony. [2021 c 142 § 7; 1994 c 271 § 305; 1988 c 145 § 7.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Intent—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.44.010.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.093 Sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree when: (a) The person has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with another person who is at least sixteen years old but less than eighteen years old, if the perpetrator is at least sixty months older than the victim, is in a significant relationship to the victim, and abuses a supervisory position within that relationship in order to engage in or cause another person under the age of eighteen to engage in sexual intercourse with the victim; (b) the person is a school employee who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with an enrolled student of the school who is at least sixteen years old and not more than twenty-one years old, if the employee is at least sixty months older than the student; or (c) the person is a foster parent who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with his or her foster child who is at least sixteen.

(2) Sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree is a class C felony.

(3) For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Enrolled student" means any student enrolled at or attending a program hosted or sponsored by a common school as defined in RCW 28A.150.020, or a student enrolled at or attending a program hosted or sponsored by a private school under chapter 28A.195 RCW, or any person who receives home-based instruction under chapter 28A.200 RCW.

(b) "School employee" means an employee of a common school defined in RCW 28A.150.020, or a grade kindergarten through twelve employee of a private school under chapter 28A.195 RCW, who is not enrolled as a student of the common school or private school. [2021 c 142 § 8; 2009 c 324 § 1; 2005 c 262 § 2; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 357; 1994 c 271 § 306; 1988 c 145 § 8.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Intent—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.44.010.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.096 Sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree when: (a) The person has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with another person who is at least sixteen years old but less than eighteen years old, if the perpetrator is at least sixty months older than the victim, is in a significant relationship to the victim, and abuses a supervisory position within that relationship in order to engage in or cause another person under the age of eighteen to engage in sexual contact with the victim; (b) the person is a school employee who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with an enrolled student of

the school who is at least sixteen years old and not more than twenty-one years old, if the employee is at least sixty months older than the student; or (c) the person is a foster parent who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual contact with his or her foster child who is at least sixteen.

(2) Sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor.

(3) For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Enrolled student" means any student enrolled at or attending a program hosted or sponsored by a common school as defined in RCW 28A.150.020, or a student enrolled at or attending a program hosted or sponsored by a private school under chapter 28A.195 RCW, or any person who receives home-based instruction under chapter 28A.200 RCW.

(b) "School employee" means an employee of a common school defined in RCW 28A.150.020, or a grade kindergarten through twelve employee of a private school under chapter 28A.195 RCW, who is not enrolled as a student of the common school or private school. [2021 c 142 § 9; 2009 c 324 § 2; 2005 c 262 § 3; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 358; 1994 c 271 § 307; 1988 c 145 § 9.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Intent—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.44.010.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.100 Indecent liberties. (1) A person is guilty of indecent liberties when he or she knowingly causes another person to have sexual contact with him or her or another:

(a) By forcible compulsion;

(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless;

(c) When the victim is a person with a developmental disability and the perpetrator is a person who:

(i) Has supervisory authority over the victim; or

(ii) Was providing transportation, within the course of his or her employment, to the victim at the time of the offense;

(d) When the perpetrator is a health care provider, the victim is a client or patient, and the sexual contact occurs during a treatment session, consultation, interview, or examination. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the client or patient consented to the sexual contact with the knowledge that the sexual contact was not for the purpose of treatment;

(e) When the victim is a resident of a facility for persons with a mental disorder or chemical dependency and the perpetrator is a person who has supervisory authority over the victim; or

(f) When the victim is a frail elder or vulnerable adult and the perpetrator is a person who:

(i) Has a significant relationship with the victim; or

(ii) Was providing transportation, within the course of his or her employment, to the victim at the time of the offense.

(2022 Ed.)

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, indecent liberties is a class B felony.

(b) Indecent liberties by forcible compulsion is a class A felony. [2021 c 142 § 10; 2013 c 94 § 2; 2007 c 20 § 2; 2003 c 53 § 67; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 359; 1997 c 392 § 515; 1993 c 477 § 3; 1988 c 146 § 2; 1988 c 145 § 10; 1986 c 131 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.100. Formerly RCW 9A.88.100.]

Effective date—2021 c 142: See note following RCW 9A.44.050.

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Short title—Findings—Construction—Conflict with federal requirements—Part headings and captions not law—1997 c 392: See notes following RCW 74.39A.009.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.105 Sexually violating human remains. (1) Any person who has sexual intercourse or sexual contact with a dead human body is guilty of a class C felony.

(2) As used in this section:

(a) "Sexual intercourse" (i) has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight; and (ii) also means any penetration of the vagina or anus however slight, by an object, when committed on a dead human body, except when such penetration is accomplished as part of a procedure authorized or required under chapter 68.50 RCW or other law; and (iii) also means any act of sexual contact between the sex organs of a person and the mouth or anus of a dead human body.

(b) "Sexual contact" means any touching by a person of the sexual or other intimate parts of a dead human body done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of the person. [1994 c 53 § 1.]

9A.44.115 Voyeurism. (1) As used in this section:

(a) "Intimate areas" means any portion of a person's body or undergarments that is covered by clothing and intended to be protected from public view;

(b) "Photographs" or "films" means the making of a photograph, motion picture film, videotape, digital image, or any other recording or transmission of the image of a person;

(c) "Place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy" means:

(i) A place where a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that his or her undressing was being photographed or filmed by another; or

(ii) A place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance;

(d) "Surveillance" means secret observation of the activities of another person for the purpose of spying upon and invading the privacy of the person;

(e) "Views" means the intentional looking upon of another person for more than a brief period of time, in other than a casual or cursory manner, with the unaided eye or with a device designed or intended to improve visual acuity.

(2)(a) A person commits the crime of voyeurism in the first degree if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the

sexual desire of any person, he or she knowingly views, photographs, or films:

(i) Another person without that person's knowledge and consent while the person being viewed, photographed, or filmed is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy; or

(ii) The intimate areas of another person without that person's knowledge and consent and under circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether in a public or private place.

(b) Voyeurism in the first degree is a class C felony.

(3)(a) A person commits the crime of voyeurism in the second degree if he or she intentionally photographs or films another person for the purpose of photographing or filming the intimate areas of that person with the intent to distribute or disseminate the photograph or film, without that person's knowledge and consent, and under circumstances where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether in a public or private place.

(b) Voyeurism in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor.

(c) Voyeurism in the second degree is not a sex offense for the purposes of sentencing or sex offender registration requirements under this chapter.

(4) This section does not apply to viewing, photographing, or filming by personnel of the department of corrections or of a local jail or correctional facility for security purposes or during investigation of alleged misconduct by a person in the custody of the department of corrections or the local jail or correctional facility.

(5) If a person is convicted of a violation of this section, the court may order the destruction of any photograph, motion picture film, digital image, videotape, or any other recording of an image that was made by the person in violation of this section. [2017 c 292 § 1; 2003 c 213 § 1; 1998 c 221 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.120 Admissibility of child's statement—Conditions. (1) A statement not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in dependency proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings, including juvenile offense adjudications, in the courts of the state of Washington if:

(a)(i) It is made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, describing any attempted act of sexual contact with or on the child by another, or describing any act of physical abuse of the child by another that results in substantial bodily harm as defined by RCW 9A.04.110; or

(ii) It is made by a child when under the age of sixteen describing any of the following acts or attempted acts performed with or on the child: Trafficking under RCW 9A.40.100; commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.100; promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.101; or promoting travel for commercial sexual abuse of a minor under RCW 9.68A.102;

(b) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and

(c) The child either:

(i) Testifies at the proceedings; or

(ii) Is unavailable as a witness, except that when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act.

(2) A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party his or her intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement. [2019 c 90 § 1; 1995 c 76 § 1; 1991 c 169 § 1; 1985 c 404 § 1; 1982 c 129 § 2.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.128 Definitions applicable to RCW 9A.44.130 through 9A.44.145, 10.01.200, 43.43.540, 70.48.470, and 72.09.330. For the purposes of RCW 9A.44.130 through 9A.44.145, 10.01.200, 43.43.540, 70.48.470, and 72.09.330, the following definitions apply:

(1) "Business day" means any day other than Saturday, Sunday, or a legal local, state, or federal holiday.

(2) "Conviction" means any adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a sex offense or kidnapping offense.

(3) "Disqualifying offense" means a conviction for: Any offense that is a felony; a sex offense as defined in this section; a crime against children or persons as defined in RCW 43.43.830(7) and 9.94A.411(2)(a); an offense with a domestic violence designation as provided in RCW 10.99.020; permitting the commercial sexual abuse of a minor as defined in RCW 9.68A.103; or any violation of chapter 9A.88 RCW.

(4) "Employed" or "carries on a vocation" means employment that is full time or part time for a period of time exceeding fourteen days, or for an aggregate period of time exceeding thirty days during any calendar year. A person is employed or carries on a vocation whether the person's employment is financially compensated, volunteered, or for the purpose of government or educational benefit.

(5) "Fixed residence" means a building that a person lawfully and habitually uses as living quarters a majority of the week. Uses as living quarters means to conduct activities consistent with the common understanding of residing, such as sleeping; eating; keeping personal belongings; receiving mail; and paying utilities, rent, or mortgage. A nonpermanent structure including, but not limited to, a motor home, travel trailer, camper, or boat may qualify as a residence provided it is lawfully and habitually used as living quarters a majority of the week, primarily kept at one location with a physical address, and the location it is kept at is either owned or rented by the person or used by the person with the permission of the owner or renter. A shelter program may qualify as a residence provided it is a shelter program designed to provide temporary living accommodations for the homeless, provides an offender with a personally assigned living space, and the offender is permitted to store belongings in the living space.

(6) "In the community" means residing outside of confinement or incarceration for a disqualifying offense.

(7) "Institution of higher education" means any public or private institution dedicated to postsecondary education, including any college, university, community college, trade, or professional school.

(8) "Kidnapping offense" means:

(a) The crimes of kidnapping in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonment, as defined in chapter 9A.40 RCW, where the victim is a minor and the offender is not the minor's parent;

(b) Any offense that is, under chapter 9A.28 RCW, a criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit an offense that is classified as a kidnapping offense under this subsection;

(c) Any federal or out-of-state conviction for: An offense for which the person would be required to register as a kidnapping offender if residing in the state of conviction; or, if not required to register in the state of conviction, an offense that under the laws of this state would be classified as a kidnapping offense under this subsection; and

(d) Any tribal conviction for an offense for which the person would be required to register as a kidnapping offender while residing in the reservation of conviction; or, if not required to register in the reservation of conviction, an offense that under the laws of this state would be classified as a kidnapping offense under this subsection.

(9) "Lacks a fixed residence" means the person does not have a living situation that meets the definition of a fixed residence and includes, but is not limited to, a shelter program designed to provide temporary living accommodations for the homeless, an outdoor sleeping location, or locations where the person does not have permission to stay.

(10) "Sex offense" means:

(a) Any offense defined as a sex offense by RCW 9.94A.030;

(b) Any violation under RCW 9A.44.096 (sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree);

(c) Any violation under RCW 9A.40.100(1)(b)(ii) (trafficking);

(d) Any violation under RCW 9.68A.090 (communication with a minor for immoral purposes);

(e) A violation under RCW 9A.88.070 (promoting prostitution in the first degree) or RCW 9A.88.080 (promoting prostitution in the second degree) if the person has a prior conviction for one of these offenses;

(f) Any violation under RCW 9A.40.100(1)(a)(i)(A) (III) or (IV) or (a)(i)(B);

(g) Any gross misdemeanor that is, under chapter 9A.28 RCW, a criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit an offense that is classified as a sex offense under RCW 9.94A.030 or this subsection;

(h) Any out-of-state conviction for an offense for which the person would be required to register as a sex offender while residing in the state of conviction; or, if not required to register in the state of conviction, an offense that under the laws of this state would be classified as a sex offense under this subsection;

(i) Any federal conviction classified as a sex offense under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 16911 (SORNA);

(j) Any military conviction for a sex offense. This includes sex offenses under the uniform code of military justice, as specified by the United States secretary of defense;

(k) Any conviction in a foreign country for a sex offense if it was obtained with sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness and due process for the accused under guidelines or regulations established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 16912;

(l) Any tribal conviction for an offense for which the person would be required to register as a sex offender while residing in the reservation of conviction; or, if not required to register in the reservation of conviction, an offense that under the laws of this state would be classified as a sex offense under this subsection.

(11) "School" means a public or private school regulated under Title 28A RCW or chapter 72.40 RCW.

(12) "Student" means a person who is enrolled, on a full-time or part-time basis, in any school or institution of higher education. [2015 c 261 § 2; 2014 c 188 § 2; 2013 c 302 § 8; 2012 c 134 § 2; 2011 c 337 § 2; 2010 c 267 § 1.]

Effective date—2013 c 302: See note following RCW 9.68A.090.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.130 Registration of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders—Procedures—Definition—Penalties.

(1)(a) Any adult or juvenile residing whether or not the person has a fixed residence, or who is a student, is employed, or carries on a vocation in this state who has been found to have committed or has been convicted of any sex offense or kidnapping offense, or who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity under chapter 10.77 RCW of committing any sex offense or kidnapping offense, shall register with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence, or if the person is not a resident of Washington, the county of the person's school, or place of employment or vocation, or as otherwise specified in this section. When a person required to register under this section is in custody of the state department of corrections, the state department of social and health services, a local division of youth services, or a local jail or juvenile detention facility as a result of a sex offense or kidnapping offense, the person shall also register at the time of release from custody with an official designated by the agency that has jurisdiction over the person.

(b) Any adult or juvenile who is required to register under (a) of this subsection must give notice to the county sheriff of the county with whom the person is registered within three business days:

(i) Prior to arriving at a school or institution of higher education to attend classes;

(ii) Prior to starting work at an institution of higher education; or

(iii) After any termination of enrollment or employment at a school or institution of higher education.

(2)(a) A person required to register under this section must provide the following information when registering: (i) Name and any aliases used; (ii) complete and accurate residential address or, if the person lacks a fixed residence, where he or she plans to stay; (iii) date and place of birth; (iv) place of employment; (v) crime for which convicted; (vi) date and place of conviction; (vii) social security number; (viii) photograph; and (ix) fingerprints.

(b) A person may be required to update any of the information required in this subsection in conjunction with any address verification conducted by the county sheriff or as part of any notice required by this section.

(c) A photograph or copy of an individual's fingerprints, which may include palmprints may be taken at any time to update an individual's file.

(3) Any person required to register under this section who intends to travel outside the United States must provide, by certified mail, with return receipt requested, or in person, signed written notice of the plan to travel outside the country to the county sheriff of the county with whom the person is registered at least twenty-one days prior to travel. The notice shall include the following information: (a) Name; (b) passport number and country; (c) destination; (d) itinerary details including departure and return dates; (e) means of travel; and (f) purpose of travel. If the offender subsequently cancels or postpones travel outside the United States, the offender must notify the county sheriff not later than three days after cancellation or postponement of the intended travel outside the United States or on the departure date provided in the notification, whichever is earlier. The county sheriff shall notify the United States marshals service as soon as practicable after receipt of the notification. In cases of unexpected travel due to family or work emergencies, or for offenders who travel routinely across international borders for work-related purposes, the notice must be submitted in person at least twenty-four hours prior to travel to the sheriff of the county where such offenders are registered with a written explanation of the circumstances that make compliance with this subsection (3) impracticable.

(4)(a) Offenders shall register with the county sheriff within the following deadlines:

(i) **OFFENDERS IN CUSTODY.** Sex offenders or kidnapping offenders who are in custody of the state department of corrections, the state department of social and health services, a local division of youth services, or a local jail or juvenile detention facility, must register at the time of release from custody with an official designated by the agency that has jurisdiction over the offender. The agency shall within three days forward the registration information to the county sheriff for the county of the offender's anticipated residence. The offender must also register within three business days from the time of release with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence, or if the person is not a resident of Washington, the county of the person's school, or place of employment or vocation. The agency that has jurisdiction over the offender shall provide notice to the offender of the duty to register.

When the agency with jurisdiction intends to release an offender with a duty to register under this section, and the agency has knowledge that the offender is eligible for developmental disability services from the department of social and health services, the agency shall notify the division of developmental disabilities of the release. Notice shall occur not more than thirty days before the offender is to be released. The agency and the division shall assist the offender in meeting the initial registration requirement under this section. Failure to provide such assistance shall not constitute a defense for any violation of this section.

When a person required to register under this section is in the custody of the state department of corrections or a local corrections or probations agency and has been approved for partial confinement as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, the person must register at the time of transfer to partial confinement with the official designated by the agency that has jurisdiction over the offender. The agency shall within three days forward the registration information to the county sheriff for

the county in which the offender is in partial confinement. The offender must also register within three business days from the time of the termination of partial confinement or release from confinement with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence. The agency that has jurisdiction over the offender shall provide notice to the offender of the duty to register.

(ii) **OFFENDERS UNDER FEDERAL JURISDICTION.** Sex offenders or kidnapping offenders who are in the custody of the United States bureau of prisons or other federal or military correctional agency must register within three business days from the time of release with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence, or if the person is not a resident of Washington, the county of the person's school, or place of employment or vocation.

(iii) **OFFENDERS WHO ARE CONVICTED BUT NOT CONFINED.** Sex offenders who are convicted of a sex offense and kidnapping offenders who are convicted for a kidnapping offense but who are not sentenced to serve a term of confinement immediately upon sentencing shall report to the county sheriff to register within three business days of being sentenced.

(iv) **OFFENDERS WHO ARE NEW RESIDENTS, TEMPORARY RESIDENTS, OR RETURNING WASHINGTON RESIDENTS.** Sex offenders and kidnapping offenders who move to Washington state from another state or a foreign country must register within three business days of establishing residence or reestablishing residence if the person is a former Washington resident. If the offender is under the jurisdiction of an agency of this state when the offender moves to Washington, the agency shall provide notice to the offender of the duty to register.

Sex offenders and kidnapping offenders who are visiting Washington state and intend to reside or be present in the state for ten days or more shall register his or her temporary address or where he or she plans to stay with the county sheriff of each county where the offender will be staying within three business days of arrival. Registration for temporary residents shall include the information required by subsection (2)(a) of this section, except the photograph and fingerprints.

(v) **OFFENDERS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY.** Any adult or juvenile who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity under chapter 10.77 RCW of committing a sex offense or a kidnapping offense and who is in custody, as a result of that finding, of the state department of social and health services, must register within three business days from the time of release with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence. The state department of social and health services shall provide notice to the adult or juvenile in its custody of the duty to register.

(vi) **OFFENDERS WHO LACK A FIXED RESIDENCE.** Any person who lacks a fixed residence and leaves the county in which he or she is registered and enters and remains within a new county for twenty-four hours is required to register with the county sheriff not more than three business days after entering the county and provide the information required in subsection (2)(a) of this section.

(vii) **OFFENDERS WHO LACK A FIXED RESIDENCE AND WHO ARE UNDER SUPERVISION.** Offenders who lack a fixed residence and who are under the

supervision of the department shall register in the county of their supervision.

(viii) OFFENDERS WHO MOVE TO, WORK, CARRY ON A VOCATION, OR ATTEND SCHOOL IN ANOTHER STATE. Offenders required to register in Washington, who move to another state, or who work, carry on a vocation, or attend school in another state shall register a new address, fingerprints, and photograph with the new state within three business days after establishing residence, or after beginning to work, carry on a vocation, or attend school in the new state. The person must also send written notice within three business days of moving to the new state or to a foreign country to the county sheriff with whom the person last registered in Washington state. The county sheriff shall promptly forward this information to the Washington state patrol.

(b) The county sheriff shall not be required to determine whether the person is living within the county.

(c) An arrest on charges of failure to register, service of an information, or a complaint for a violation of RCW 9A.44.132, or arraignment on charges for a violation of RCW 9A.44.132, constitutes actual notice of the duty to register. Any person charged with the crime of failure to register under RCW 9A.44.132 who asserts as a defense the lack of notice of the duty to register shall register within three business days following actual notice of the duty through arrest, service, or arraignment. Failure to register as required under this subsection (4)(c) constitutes grounds for filing another charge of failing to register. Registering following arrest, service, or arraignment on charges shall not relieve the offender from criminal liability for failure to register prior to the filing of the original charge.

(5)(a) If any person required to register pursuant to this section changes his or her residence address within the same county, the person must provide, by certified mail, with return receipt requested or in person, signed written notice of the change of address to the county sheriff within three business days of moving.

(b) If any person required to register pursuant to this section moves to a new county, within three business days of moving the person must register with the county sheriff of the county into which the person has moved and provide, by certified mail, with return receipt requested or in person, signed written notice of the change of address to the county sheriff with whom the person last registered. The county sheriff with whom the person last registered is responsible for address verification pursuant to RCW 9A.44.135 until the person completes registration of his or her new residence address.

(6)(a) Any person required to register under this section who lacks a fixed residence shall provide signed written notice to the sheriff of the county where he or she last registered within three business days after ceasing to have a fixed residence. The notice shall include the information required by subsection (2)(a) of this section, except the photograph, fingerprints, and palmprints. The county sheriff may, for reasonable cause, require the offender to provide a photograph and fingerprints. The sheriff shall forward this information to the sheriff of the county in which the person intends to reside, if the person intends to reside in another county.

(b) A person who lacks a fixed residence must report weekly, in person, to the sheriff of the county where he or she

is registered. The weekly report shall be on a day specified by the county sheriff's office, and shall occur during normal business hours. The person must keep an accurate accounting of where he or she stays during the week and provide it to the county sheriff upon request. The lack of a fixed residence is a factor that may be considered in determining an offender's risk level and shall make the offender subject to disclosure of information to the public at large pursuant to RCW 4.24.550.

(c) If any person required to register pursuant to this section does not have a fixed residence, it is an affirmative defense to the charge of failure to register, that he or she provided written notice to the sheriff of the county where he or she last registered within three business days of ceasing to have a fixed residence and has subsequently complied with the requirements of subsections (4)(a)(vi) or (vii) and (6) of this section. To prevail, the person must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

(7) A sex offender subject to registration requirements under this section who applies to change his or her name under RCW 4.24.130 or any other law shall submit a copy of the application to the county sheriff of the county of the person's residence and to the state patrol not fewer than five days before the entry of an order granting the name change. No sex offender under the requirement to register under this section at the time of application shall be granted an order changing his or her name if the court finds that doing so will interfere with legitimate law enforcement interests, except that no order shall be denied when the name change is requested for religious or legitimate cultural reasons or in recognition of marriage or dissolution of marriage. A sex offender under the requirement to register under this section who receives an order changing his or her name shall submit a copy of the order to the county sheriff of the county of the person's residence and to the state patrol within three business days of the entry of the order.

(8) Except as may otherwise be provided by law, nothing in this section shall impose any liability upon a peace officer, including a county sheriff, or law enforcement agency, for failing to release information authorized under this section. [2017 c 174 § 3; 2015 c 261 § 3; 2011 c 337 § 3. Prior: 2010 c 267 § 2; 2010 c 265 § 1; 2008 c 230 § 1; prior: 2006 c 129 § 2; (2006 c 129 § 1 expired September 1, 2006); 2006 c 128 § 2; (2006 c 128 § 1 expired September 1, 2006); 2006 c 127 § 2; 2006 c 126 § 2; (2006 c 126 § 1 expired September 1, 2006); 2005 c 380 § 1; prior: 2003 c 215 § 1; 2003 c 53 § 68; 2002 c 31 § 1; prior: 2001 c 169 § 1; 2001 c 95 § 2; 2000 c 91 § 2; prior: 1999 sp.s. c 6 § 2; 1999 c 352 § 9; prior: 1998 c 220 § 1; 1998 c 139 § 1; prior: 1997 c 340 § 3; 1997 c 113 § 3; 1996 c 275 § 11; prior: 1995 c 268 § 3; 1995 c 248 § 1; 1995 c 195 § 1; 1994 c 84 § 2; 1991 c 274 § 2; 1990 c 3 § 402.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Intent—1999 sp.s. c 6: "It is the intent of this act to revise the law on registration of sex and kidnapping offenders in response to the case of *State v. Pickett*, Docket number 41562-0-1. The legislature intends that all sex and kidnapping offenders whose history requires them to register shall do so regardless of whether the person has a fixed residence. The lack of a residential address is not to be construed to preclude registration as a sex or kidnapping offender. The legislature intends that persons who lack a residential address shall have an affirmative duty to report to the appropriate county sheriff, based on the level of risk of offending." [1999 sp.s. c 6 § 1.]

Findings—1997 c 113: See note following RCW 4.24.550.

Finding—1996 c 275: See note following RCW 9.94A.505.

Purpose—1995 c 268: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

Intent—1994 c 84: "This act is intended to clarify existing law and is not intended to reflect a substantive change in the law." [1994 c 84 § 1.]

Finding and intent—1991 c 274: "The legislature finds that sex offender registration has assisted law enforcement agencies in protecting their communities. This act is intended to clarify and amend the deadlines for sex offenders to register. This act's clarification or amendment of RCW 9A.44.130 does not relieve the obligation of sex offenders to comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9A.44.130 as that statute exists before July 28, 1991." [1991 c 274 § 1.]

Finding—Policy—1990 c 3 § 402: "The legislature finds that sex offenders often pose a high risk of reoffense, and that law enforcement's efforts to protect their communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sex offenses, are impaired by the lack of information available to law enforcement agencies about convicted sex offenders who live within the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction. Therefore, this state's policy is to assist local law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect their communities by regulating sex offenders by requiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies as provided in RCW 9A.44.130." [1990 c 3 § 401.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.132 Failure to register as sex offender or kidnapping offender. (1) A person commits the crime of failure to register as a sex offender if the person has a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 for a felony sex offense and knowingly fails to comply with any of the requirements of RCW 9A.44.130.

(a) The failure to register as a sex offender pursuant to this subsection is a class C felony if:

(i) It is the person's first conviction for a felony failure to register; or

(ii) The person has previously been convicted of a felony failure to register as a sex offender in this state or pursuant to the laws of another state, or pursuant to federal law.

(b) If a person has been convicted of a felony failure to register as a sex offender in this state or pursuant to the laws of another state, or pursuant to federal law, on two or more prior occasions, the failure to register under this subsection is a class B felony.

(2) A person is guilty of failure to register as a sex offender if the person has a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 for a sex offense other than a felony and knowingly fails to comply with any of the requirements of RCW 9A.44.130. The failure to register as a sex offender under this subsection is a gross misdemeanor.

(3) A person commits the crime of failure to register as a kidnapping offender if the person has a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 for a kidnapping offense and knowingly fails to comply with any of the requirements of RCW 9A.44.130.

(a) If the person has a duty to register for a felony kidnapping offense, the failure to register as a kidnapping offender is a class C felony.

(b) If the person has a duty to register for a kidnapping offense other than a felony, the failure to register as a kidnapping offender is a gross misdemeanor.

(4) Unless relieved of the duty to register pursuant to RCW 9A.44.141 and 9A.44.142, a violation of this section is an ongoing offense for purposes of the statute of limitations under RCW 9A.04.080. [2019 c 443 § 4; 2015 c 261 § 5; 2011 c 337 § 5; 2010 c 267 § 3.]

[Title 9A RCW—page 36]

Short title—Findings—2019 c 443: See notes following RCW 43.43.754.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.135 Address verification. (1) When an offender registers with the county sheriff pursuant to RCW 9A.44.130, the county sheriff shall notify the police chief or town marshal of the jurisdiction in which the offender has registered to live. If the offender registers to live in an unincorporated area of the county, the sheriff shall make reasonable attempts to verify that the offender is residing at the registered address. If the offender registers to live in an incorporated city or town, the police chief or town marshal shall make reasonable attempts to verify that the offender is residing at the registered address. Reasonable attempts include verifying an offender's address pursuant to the grant program established under RCW 36.28A.230. If the sheriff or police chief or town marshal does not participate in the grant program established under RCW 36.28A.230, reasonable attempts require a yearly mailing by certified mail, with return receipt requested, a nonforwardable verification form to the offender at the offender's last registered address sent by the chief law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction where the offender is registered to live. For offenders who have been previously designated sexually violent predators under chapter 71.09 RCW or the equivalent procedure in another jurisdiction, even if the designation has subsequently been removed, this mailing must be sent every ninety days.

The offender must sign the verification form, state on the form whether he or she still resides at the last registered address, and return the form to the chief law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction where the offender is registered to live within ten days after receipt of the form.

(2) The chief law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction where the offender has registered to live shall make reasonable attempts to locate any sex offender who fails to return the verification form or who cannot be located at the registered address.

If the offender fails to return the verification form or the offender is not at the last registered address, the chief law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction where the offender has registered to live shall promptly forward this information to the county sheriff and to the Washington state patrol for inclusion in the central registry of sex offenders.

(3) When an offender notifies the county sheriff of a change to his or her residence address pursuant to RCW 9A.44.130, and the new address is in a different law enforcement jurisdiction, the county sheriff shall notify the police chief or town marshal of the jurisdiction from which the offender has moved.

(4) County sheriffs and police chiefs or town marshals may enter into agreements for the purposes of delegating the authority and obligation to fulfill the requirements of this section. [2010 c 265 § 2; 2000 c 91 § 1; 1999 c 196 § 15; 1998 c 220 § 2; 1995 c 248 § 3.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.138 Attendance, employment of registered sex offenders and kidnapping offenders at schools and institutions of higher education—Notice to designated recipients—Information exempt from disclosure. (1) Upon

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receiving notice from a registered person pursuant to RCW 9A.44.130 that the person will be attending a school enrolling students in grades kindergarten through twelve or an institution of higher education, or will be employed with an institution of higher education, the sheriff must promptly notify the designated recipient of the school or institution of the person's: (a) Name and any aliases used; (b) complete residential address; (c) date and place of birth; (d) place of employment; (e) crime for which convicted; (f) date and place of conviction; (g) photograph; and (h) risk level classification.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, a designated recipient receiving notice under this section must disclose the information received from the sheriff as follows:

(a) If the student is classified as a risk level II or III, the designated recipient shall provide the information received to every teacher of the student and to any other personnel who, in the judgment of the designated recipient, supervises the student or for security purposes should be aware of the student's record;

(b) If the student is classified as a risk level I, the designated recipient shall provide the information received only to personnel who, in the judgment of the designated recipient, for security purposes should be aware of the student's record.

(3) When the designated recipient is the administrator of a school district, the designated recipient must disclose the information to the principal of the school that the registered person will be attending, whether the school is a common school as defined in RCW 28A.150.020 or a school that is the subject of a state-tribal education compact under chapter 28A.715 RCW. The principal must then disclose the information as provided in subsection (2) of this section.

(4) The sheriff shall notify the applicable designated recipient whenever a student's risk level classification is changed or the sheriff is notified of a change in the student's address.

(5) Any information received by school or institution personnel under this section is exempt from disclosure under chapter 42.56 RCW and may not be further disseminated except as provided in RCW 28A.225.330, other statutes or case law, and the family and educational and privacy rights act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232g et seq.

(6) For the purposes of this section, "designated recipient" means: (a) The superintendent of the school district, or his or her designee, of a common school as defined in RCW 28A.150.020 or a school that is the subject of a state-tribal education compact under chapter 28A.715 RCW; (b) the administrator of a charter public school governed by chapter 28A.710 RCW; (c) the administrator of a private school approved under chapter 28A.195 RCW; or (d) the director of the department of public safety at an institution of higher education. [2020 c 167 § 5; 2011 c 337 § 4.]

9A.44.140 Registration of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders—Duty to register. The duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 shall continue for the duration provided in this section.

(1) For a person convicted in this state of a class A felony, or a person convicted of any sex offense or kidnapping offense who has one or more prior convictions for a sex offense or kidnapping offense, the duty to register shall continue indefinitely.

(2) For a person convicted in this state of a class B felony who does not have one or more prior convictions for a sex offense or kidnapping offense, the duty to register shall end fifteen years after the last date of release from confinement, if any, (including full-time residential treatment) pursuant to the conviction, or entry of the judgment and sentence, if the person has spent fifteen consecutive years in the community without being convicted of a disqualifying offense during that time period.

(3) For a person convicted in this state of a class C felony, a violation of RCW 9.68A.090 or 9A.44.096, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit a class C felony, and the person does not have one or more prior convictions for a sex offense or kidnapping offense, the duty to register shall end ten years after the last date of release from confinement, if any, (including full-time residential treatment) pursuant to the conviction, or entry of the judgment and sentence, if the person has spent ten consecutive years in the community without being convicted of a disqualifying offense during that time period.

(4) Except as provided in RCW 9A.44.142, for a person required to register for a federal, tribal, or out-of-state conviction, the duty to register shall continue indefinitely.

(5) For a person who is or has been determined to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW, the duty to register shall continue for the person's lifetime.

(6) Nothing in this section prevents a person from being relieved of the duty to register under RCW 9A.44.142, 9A.44.143, and 13.40.162.

(7) Nothing in RCW 9.94A.637 relating to discharge of an offender shall be construed as operating to relieve the offender of his or her duty to register pursuant to RCW 9A.44.130.

(8) For purposes of determining whether a person has been convicted of more than one sex offense, failure to register as a sex offender or kidnapping offender is not a sex or kidnapping offense.

(9) The provisions of this section and RCW 9A.44.141 through 9A.44.143 apply equally to a person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity under chapter 10.77 RCW of a sex offense or kidnapping offense. [2020 c 249 § 2; 2015 c 261 § 6; 2010 c 267 § 4; 2002 c 25 § 1; 2001 c 170 § 2; 2000 c 91 § 3; 1998 c 220 § 3; 1997 c 113 § 4; 1996 c 275 § 12. Prior: 1995 c 268 § 4; 1995 c 248 § 2; 1995 c 195 § 2; 1991 c 274 § 3; 1990 c 3 § 408.]

Intent—2001 c 170: "The legislature intends to amend the lifetime sex offender registration requirement so that it is narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of the Jacob Wetterling act." [2001 c 170 § 1.]

Findings—1997 c 113: See note following RCW 4.24.550.

Finding—1996 c 275: See note following RCW 9.94A.505.

Purpose—1995 c 268: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

Finding and intent—1991 c 274: See note following RCW 9A.44.130.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.141 Investigation—End of duty to register—Removal from registry—Civil liability. (1) Upon the request of a person who is listed in the Washington state patrol central registry of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders, the county sheriff shall investigate whether a person's duty to register has ended by operation of law pursuant to RCW 9A.44.140.

(a) Using available records, the county sheriff shall verify that the offender has spent the requisite time in the community and has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense.

(b) If the county sheriff determines the person's duty to register has ended by operation of law, the county sheriff shall request the Washington state patrol remove the person's name from the central registry.

(2) Nothing in this subsection prevents a county sheriff from investigating, upon his or her own initiative, whether a person's duty to register has ended by operation of law pursuant to RCW 9A.44.140.

(3)(a) A person who is listed in the central registry as the result of a federal, tribal, or out-of-state conviction may request the county sheriff to investigate whether the person should be removed from the registry if:

(i) A court or other administrative authority in the person's state of conviction has made an individualized determination that the person is not required to register; and

(ii) The person provides proof of relief from registration to the county sheriff.

(b) If the county sheriff determines the person has been relieved of the duty to register in his or her state of conviction, the county sheriff shall request the Washington state patrol remove the person's name from the central registry.

(4) An appointed or elected public official, public employee, or public agency as defined in RCW 4.24.470, or units of local government and its employees, as provided in RCW 36.28A.010, are immune from civil liability for damages for removing or requesting the removal of a person from the central registry of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders or the failure to remove or request removal of a person within the time frames provided in RCW 9A.44.140. [2015 c 261 § 7; 2011 c 337 § 6; 2010 c 267 § 5.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.142 Relief from duty to register—Petition—Exceptions. (1) A person who is required to register under RCW 9A.44.130 may petition the superior court to be relieved of the duty to register:

(a) If the person has a duty to register for a sex offense or kidnapping offense committed when the offender was a juvenile, regardless of whether the conviction was in this state, as provided in RCW 9A.44.143;

(b) If the person is required to register for a conviction in this state and is not prohibited from petitioning for relief from registration under subsection (2) of this section, when the person has spent ten consecutive years in the community without being convicted of a disqualifying offense during that time period; or

(c) If the person is required to register for a federal, tribal, or out-of-state conviction, when the person has spent fifteen consecutive years in the community without being convicted of a disqualifying offense during that time period.

(2)(a) A person may not petition for relief from registration if the person has been:

(i) Determined to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW; or

(ii) Convicted as an adult of a sex offense or kidnapping offense that is a class A felony and that was committed with forcible compulsion on or after June 8, 2000.

(b) Any person who may not be relieved of the duty to register may petition the court to be exempted from any community notification requirements that the person may be subject to fifteen years after the later of the entry of the judgment and sentence or the last date of release from confinement, including full-time residential treatment, pursuant to the conviction, if the person has spent the time in the community without being convicted of a disqualifying offense.

(3) A petition for relief from registration or exemption from notification under this section shall be made to the court in which the petitioner was convicted of the offense that subjects him or her to the duty to register or, in the case of convictions in other states, a foreign country, or a federal, tribal, or military court, to the court in the county where the person is registered at the time the petition is sought. The prosecuting attorney of the county shall be named and served as the respondent in any such petition. The prosecuting attorney must make reasonable efforts to notify the victim via the victim's choice of telephone, letter, or email, if known.

(4)(a) The court may relieve a petitioner of the duty to register only if the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant removal from the central registry of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders.

(b) In determining whether the petitioner is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant removal from the registry, the following factors are provided as guidance to assist the court in making its determination:

(i) The nature of the registrable offense committed including the number of victims and the length of the offense history;

(ii) Any subsequent criminal history;

(iii) The petitioner's compliance with supervision requirements;

(iv) The length of time since the charged incident(s) occurred;

(v) Any input from community corrections officers, law enforcement, or treatment providers;

(vi) Participation in sex offender treatment;

(vii) Participation in other treatment and rehabilitative programs;

(viii) The offender's stability in employment and housing;

(ix) The offender's community and personal support system;

(x) Any risk assessments or evaluations prepared by a qualified professional;

(xi) Any updated polygraph examination;

(xii) Any input of the victim;

(xiii) Any other factors the court may consider relevant.

(5) If a person is relieved of the duty to register pursuant to this section, the relief of registration does not constitute a certificate of rehabilitation, or the equivalent of a certificate of rehabilitation, for the purposes of restoration of firearm possession under RCW 9.41.040. [2017 c 86 § 1; 2015 c 261 § 8; 2011 c 337 § 7; 2010 c 267 § 6.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.143 Relief from duty to register for sex offense or kidnapping offense committed when offender was a juvenile and who has not been determined to be a sexually

violent predator—Petition—Exception. (1) An offender having a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 for a sex offense or kidnapping offense committed when the offender was a juvenile, and who has not been determined to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW may petition the superior court to be relieved of that duty as provided in this section.

(2) For class A sex offenses or kidnapping offenses committed when the petitioner was fifteen years of age or older, the court may relieve the petitioner of the duty to register if:

(a) At least sixty months have passed since the petitioner's adjudication and completion of any term of confinement for the offense giving rise to the duty to register and the petitioner has not been adjudicated or convicted of any additional sex offenses or kidnapping offenses within the sixty months before the petition;

(b) The petitioner has not been adjudicated or convicted of a violation of RCW 9A.44.132 (failure to register) during the sixty months prior to filing the petition; and

(c) The petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant removal from the central registry of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders.

(3) For all other sex offenses or kidnapping offenses committed by a juvenile not included in subsection (2) of this section, the court may relieve the petitioner of the duty to register if:

(a) At least twenty-four months have passed since the petitioner's adjudication and completion of any term of confinement for the offense giving rise to the duty to register and the petitioner has not been adjudicated or convicted of any additional sex offenses or kidnapping offenses within the twenty-four months before the petition;

(b) The petitioner has not been adjudicated or convicted of a violation of RCW 9A.44.132 (failure to register) during the twenty-four months prior to filing the petition; and

(c) The petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant removal from the central registry of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders.

(4) A petition for relief from registration under this section shall be made to the court in which the petitioner was convicted of the offense that subjects him or her to the duty to register or, in the case of convictions in other states, a foreign country, or a federal or military court, to the court in the county in which the juvenile is registered at the time a petition is sought. The prosecuting attorney of the county shall be named and served as the respondent in any such petition. The prosecuting attorney must make reasonable efforts to notify the victim via the victim's choice of telephone, letter, or email, if known.

(5) In determining whether the petitioner is sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant removal from the central registry of sex offenders and kidnapping offenders, the following factors are provided as guidance to assist the court in making its determination, to the extent the factors are applicable considering the age and circumstances of the petitioner:

(a) The nature of the registrable offense committed including the number of victims and the length of the offense history;

(b) Any subsequent criminal history;

(c) The petitioner's compliance with supervision requirements;

(d) The length of time since the charged incident(s) occurred;

(e) Any input from community corrections officers, juvenile parole or probation officers, law enforcement, or treatment providers;

(f) Participation in sex offender treatment;

(g) Participation in other treatment and rehabilitative programs;

(h) The offender's stability in employment and housing;

(i) The offender's community and personal support system;

(j) Any risk assessments or evaluations prepared by a qualified professional;

(k) Any updated polygraph examination;

(l) Any input of the victim;

(m) Any other factors the court may consider relevant.

(6) If a person is relieved of the duty to register pursuant to this section, the relief of registration does not constitute a certificate of rehabilitation, or the equivalent of a certificate of rehabilitation, for the purposes of restoration of firearm possession under RCW 9.41.040.

(7) A juvenile prosecuted and convicted of a sex offense or kidnapping offense as an adult pursuant to RCW 13.40.110 or 13.04.030 may not petition to the superior court under this section and must follow the provisions of RCW 9A.44.142.

(8) An adult prosecuted for an offense committed as a juvenile once the juvenile court has lost jurisdiction due to the passage of time between the date of the offense and the date of filing of charges may petition the superior court under the provisions of this section. [2017 c 86 § 2; 2015 c 261 § 9; 2011 c 338 § 1; 2010 c 267 § 7.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.145 Notification to offenders of changed requirements and ability to petition for relief from registration. (1) The state patrol shall notify:

(a) Registered sex and kidnapping offenders of any change to the registration requirements; and

(b) No less than annually, an offender having a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.143 for a sex offense or kidnapping offense committed when the offender was a juvenile of their ability to petition for relief from registration as provided in RCW 9A.44.140.

(2) For economic efficiency, the state patrol may combine the notices in this section into one notice. [2010 c 267 § 8; 2009 c 210 § 1; 1998 c 139 § 2.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.148 Application of RCW 9A.44.128 through 9A.44.145—Duty to register under law as it existed prior to July 28, 1991. (1) RCW 9A.44.128 through 9A.44.145 apply to offenders who committed their crimes and were adjudicated within the following time frames:

(a) Sex offenders convicted of a sex offense on or after July 28, 1991, for a sex offense committed on or after February 28, 1990;

(b) Kidnapping offenders convicted of a kidnapping offense on or after July 27, 1997, for a kidnapping offense committed on or after July 27, 1997;

(c) Sex offenders who, on or after July 28, 1991, were in the custody or under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections, the department of social and health services, a local division of youth services, or a local jail or juvenile detention facility as the result of a sex offense, regardless of when the sex offense was committed;

(d) Kidnapping offenders who, on or after July 27, 1997, were in the custody or under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections, the department of social and health services, a local division of youth services, or a local jail or juvenile detention facility as the result of a kidnapping offense, regardless of when the kidnapping offense was committed;

(e) Any person who is or has been determined to be a sexually violent predator pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW;

(f) Sex offenders who, on or after July 23, 1995, were in the custody or under the jurisdiction of the United States bureau of prisons, United States courts, United States parole commission, or military parole board as the result of a sex offense, regardless of when the sex offense was committed;

(g) Kidnapping offenders who, on or after July 27, 1997, were in the custody or under the jurisdiction of the United States bureau of prisons, United States courts, United States parole commission, or military parole board as the result of a kidnapping offense, regardless of when the kidnapping offense was committed;

(h) Sex offenders who move to Washington state from another state, tribe, or a foreign country and who were convicted of a sex offense under the laws of this state, another state, a foreign country, tribe, or other federal or military tribunal, regardless of when the sex offense was committed or the conviction occurred;

(i) Kidnapping offenders who move to Washington state from another state, tribe, or a foreign country and who were convicted of a kidnapping offense under the laws of this state, another state, a foreign country, tribe, or other federal or military tribunal, regardless of when the kidnapping offense was committed or the conviction occurred;

(j) Any adult or juvenile found not guilty by reason of insanity under chapter 10.77 RCW of committing a sex offense or of committing a kidnapping offense, regardless of when the offense was committed.

(2) The provisions of this section do not relieve any sex offender of the duty to register under the law as it existed prior to July 28, 1991. [2015 c 261 § 4.]

9A.44.150 Testimony of child by closed-circuit television. (1) On motion of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal proceeding, the court may order that a child under the age of fourteen may testify in a room outside the presence of the defendant and the jury while one-way closed-circuit television equipment simultaneously projects the child's testimony into another room so the defendant and the jury can watch and hear the child testify if:

(a) The testimony will:

(i) Describe an act or attempted act of sexual contact performed with or on the child witness by another person or with or on a child other than the child witness by another person;

(ii) Describe an act or attempted act of physical abuse against the child witness by another person or against a child other than the child witness by another person;

(iii) Describe a violation of RCW 9A.40.100 (trafficking) or any offense identified in chapter 9.68A RCW (sexual exploitation of children); or

(iv) Describe a violent offense as defined by RCW 9.94A.030 committed against a person known by or familiar to the child witness or by a person known by or familiar to the child witness;

(b) The testimony is taken during the criminal proceeding;

(c) The court finds by substantial evidence, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that requiring the child witness to testify in the presence of the defendant will cause the child to suffer serious emotional or mental distress that will prevent the child from reasonably communicating at the trial. If the defendant is excluded from the presence of the child, the jury must also be excluded;

(d) As provided in (a) and (b) of this subsection, the court may allow a child witness to testify in the presence of the defendant but outside the presence of the jury, via closed-circuit television, if the court finds, upon motion and hearing outside the presence of the jury, that the child will suffer serious emotional distress that will prevent the child from reasonably communicating at the trial in front of the jury, or, that although the child may be able to reasonably communicate at trial in front of the jury, the child will suffer serious emotional or mental distress from testifying in front of the jury. If the child is able to communicate in front of the defendant but not the jury the defendant will remain in the room with the child while the jury is excluded from the room;

(e) The court finds that the prosecutor has made all reasonable efforts to prepare the child witness for testifying, including informing the child or the child's parent or guardian about community counseling services, giving court tours, and explaining the trial process. If the prosecutor fails to demonstrate that preparations were implemented or the prosecutor in good faith attempted to implement them, the court shall deny the motion;

(f) The court balances the strength of the state's case without the testimony of the child witness against the defendant's constitutional rights and the degree of infringement of the closed-circuit television procedure on those rights;

(g) The court finds that no less restrictive method of obtaining the testimony exists that can adequately protect the child witness from the serious emotional or mental distress;

(h) When the court allows the child witness to testify outside the presence of the defendant, the defendant can communicate constantly with the defense attorney by electronic transmission and be granted reasonable court recesses during the child's testimony for person-to-person consultation with the defense attorney;

(i) The court can communicate with the attorneys by an audio system so that the court can rule on objections and otherwise control the proceedings;

(j) All parties in the room with the child witness are on camera and can be viewed by all other parties. If viewing all participants is not possible, the court shall describe for the viewers the location of the prosecutor, defense attorney, and other participants in relation to the child;

(k) The court finds that the television equipment is capable of making an accurate reproduction and the operator of the equipment is competent to operate the equipment; and

(l) The court imposes reasonable guidelines upon the parties for conducting the filming to avoid trauma to the child witness or abuse of the procedure for tactical advantage.

The prosecutor, defense attorney, and a neutral and trained victim's advocate, if any, shall always be in the room where the child witness is testifying. The court in the court's discretion depending on the circumstances and whether the jury or defendant or both are excluded from the room where the child is testifying, may remain or may not remain in the room with the child.

(2) During the hearing conducted under subsection (1) of this section to determine whether the child witness may testify outside the presence of the defendant and/or the jury, the court may conduct the observation and examination of the child outside the presence of the defendant if:

(a) The prosecutor alleges and the court concurs that the child witness will be unable to testify in front of the defendant or will suffer severe emotional or mental distress if forced to testify in front of the defendant;

(b) The defendant can observe and hear the child witness by closed-circuit television;

(c) The defendant can communicate constantly with the defense attorney during the examination of the child witness by electronic transmission and be granted reasonable court recesses during the child's examination for person-to-person consultation with the defense attorney; and

(d) The court finds the closed-circuit television is capable of making an accurate reproduction and the operator of the equipment is competent to operate the equipment. Whenever possible, all the parties in the room with the child witness shall be on camera so that the viewers can see all the parties. If viewing all participants is not possible, then the court shall describe for the viewers the location of the prosecutor, defense attorney, and other participants in relation to the child.

(3) The court shall make particularized findings on the record articulating the factors upon which the court based its decision to allow the child witness to testify via closed-circuit television pursuant to this section. The factors the court may consider include, but are not limited to, a consideration of the child's age, physical health, emotional stability, expressions by the child of fear of testifying in open court or in front of the defendant, the relationship of the defendant to the child, and the court's observations of the child's inability to reasonably communicate in front of the defendant or in open court. The court's findings shall identify the impact the factors have upon the child's ability to testify in front of the jury or the defendant or both and the specific nature of the emotional or mental trauma the child would suffer. The court shall determine whether the source of the trauma is the presence of the defendant, the jury, or both, and shall limit the use of the closed-circuit television accordingly.

(4) This section does not apply if the defendant is an attorney pro se unless the defendant has a court-appointed attorney assisting the defendant in the defense.

(5) This section may not preclude the presence of both the child witness and the defendant in the courtroom together for purposes of establishing or challenging the identification

of the defendant when identification is a legitimate issue in the proceeding.

(6) The Washington supreme court may adopt rules of procedure regarding closed-circuit television procedures.

(7) All recorded tapes of testimony produced by closed-circuit television equipment shall be subject to any protective order of the court for the purpose of protecting the privacy of the child witness.

(8) Nothing in this section creates a right of the child witness to a closed-circuit television procedure in lieu of testifying in open court.

(9) The state shall bear the costs of the closed-circuit television procedure.

(10) A child witness may or may not be a victim in the proceeding.

(11) Nothing in this section precludes the court, under other circumstances arising under subsection (1)(a) of this section, from allowing a child to testify outside the presence of the defendant and the jury so long as the testimony is presented in accordance with the standards and procedures required in this section. [2013 c 302 § 9; 2005 c 455 § 1; 1990 c 150 § 2.]

Effective date—2013 c 302: See note following RCW 9.68A.090.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.160 Custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another person:

(a) When:

(i) The victim is a resident of a state, county, or city adult or juvenile correctional facility, including but not limited to jails, prisons, detention centers, or work release facilities, or is under correctional supervision; and

(ii) The perpetrator is an employee or contract personnel of a correctional agency and the perpetrator has, or the victim reasonably believes the perpetrator has, the ability to influence the terms, conditions, length, or fact of incarceration or correctional supervision; or

(b) When the victim is being detained, under arrest[,] or in the custody of a law enforcement officer and the perpetrator is a law enforcement officer.

(2) Consent of the victim is not a defense to a prosecution under this section.

(3) Custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree is a class C felony. [1999 c 45 § 1.]

9A.44.170 Custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree when the person has sexual contact with another person:

(a) When:

(i) The victim is a resident of a state, county, or city adult or juvenile correctional facility, including but not limited to jails, prisons, detention centers, or work release facilities, or is under correctional supervision; and

(ii) The perpetrator is an employee or contract personnel of a correctional agency and the perpetrator has, or the victim reasonably believes the perpetrator has, the ability to influence the terms, conditions, length, or fact of incarceration or correctional supervision; or

(b) When the victim is being detained, under arrest, or in the custody of a law enforcement officer and the perpetrator is a law enforcement officer.

(2) Consent of the victim is not a defense to a prosecution under this section.

(3) Custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor. [1999 c 45 § 2.]

9A.44.180 Custodial sexual misconduct—Defense. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under RCW 9A.44.160 or 9A.44.170, to be proven by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact resulted from forcible compulsion by the other person. [1999 c 45 § 3.]

9A.44.190 Criminal trespass against children—Definitions. As used in this section and RCW 9A.44.193 and 9A.44.196:

(1) "Covered entity" means any public facility or private facility whose primary purpose, at any time, is to provide for the education, care, or recreation of a child or children, including but not limited to community and recreational centers, playgrounds, schools, swimming pools, and state or municipal parks.

(2) "Child" means a person under the age of eighteen, unless the context clearly indicates that the term is otherwise defined in statute.

(3) "Public facility" means a facility operated by a unit of local or state government, or by a nonprofit organization.

(4) "Schools" means public and private schools, but does not include home-based instruction as defined in RCW 28A.225.010.

(5) "Covered offender" means a person required to register under RCW 9A.44.130 who is eighteen years of age or older, who is not under the jurisdiction of the juvenile rehabilitation authority or currently serving a special sex offender disposition alternative, whose risk level classification has been assessed at a risk level II or a risk level III pursuant to RCW 72.09.345, and who, at any time, has been convicted of one or more of the following offenses:

(a) Rape of a child in the first, second, and third degree; child molestation in the first, second, and third degree; indecent liberties against a child under age fifteen; sexual misconduct with a minor in the first and second degree; incest in the first and second degree; luring with sexual motivation; possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct; dealing in depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct; bringing into the state depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct; sexual exploitation of a minor; communicating with a minor for immoral purposes; *patronizing a juvenile prostitute;

(b) Any felony in effect at any time prior to March 20, 2006, that is comparable to an offense listed in (a) of this subsection, including, but not limited to, statutory rape in the first and second degrees [degree] and carnal knowledge;

(c) Any felony offense for which:

(i) There was a finding that the offense was committed with sexual motivation; and

(ii) The victim of the offense was less than sixteen years of age at the time of the offense;

(d) An attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the offenses listed in (a) through (c) of this subsection;

(e) Any conviction from any other jurisdiction which is comparable to any of the offenses listed in (a) through (d) of this subsection. [2006 c 126 § 4; 2006 c 125 § 2.]

*Reviser's note: The term "patronizing a juvenile prostitute" was changed to "commercial sexual abuse of a minor" by 2007 c 368 § 2.

Intent—2006 c 125: "It is the intent of the legislature to give public and private entities that provide services to children the tools necessary to prevent convicted child sex offenders from contacting children when those children are within the legal premises of the covered public and private entities." [2006 c 126 § 3; 2006 c 125 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.193 Criminal trespass against children—Covered entities. (1) An owner, manager, or operator of a covered entity may order a covered offender from the legal premises of a covered entity as provided under this section. To do this, the owner, manager, or operator of a covered entity must first provide the covered offender, or cause the covered offender to be provided, personal service of a written notice that informs the covered offender that:

(a) The covered offender must leave the legal premises of the covered entity and may not return without the written permission of the covered entity; and

(b) If the covered offender refuses to leave the legal premises of the covered entity, or thereafter returns and enters within the legal premises of the covered entity without written permission, the offender may be charged and prosecuted for a felony offense as provided in RCW 9A.44.196.

(2) A covered entity may give written permission of entry and use to a covered offender to enter and remain on the legal premises of the covered entity at particular times and for lawful purposes, including, but not limited to, conducting business, voting, or participating in educational or recreational activities. Any written permission of entry and use of the legal premises of a covered entity must be clearly stated in a written document and must be personally served on the covered offender. If the covered offender violates the conditions of entry and use contained in a written document personally served on the offender by the covered entity, the covered offender may be charged and prosecuted for a felony offense as provided in RCW 9A.44.196.

(3) An owner, employee, or agent of a covered entity shall be immune from civil liability for damages arising from excluding or failing to exclude a covered offender from a covered entity or from imposing or failing to impose conditions of entry and use on a covered offender.

(4) A person provided with written notice from a covered entity under this section may file a petition with the district court alleging that he or she does not meet the definition of "covered offender" in RCW 9A.44.190. The district court must conduct a hearing on the petition within thirty days of the petition being filed. In the hearing on the petition, the person has the burden of proving that he or she is not a covered offender. If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person is not a covered offender, the court shall order the covered entity to rescind the written notice and shall order the covered entity to pay the person's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. [2006 c 126 § 5; 2006 c 125 § 3.]

Intent—Severability—Effective date—2006 c 125: See notes following RCW 9A.44.190.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.196 Criminal trespass against children. (1) A person is guilty of the crime of criminal trespass against children if he or she:

(a) Is a covered offender as defined in RCW 9A.44.190; and

(b)(i) Is personally served with written notice complying with the requirements of RCW 9A.44.193 that excludes the covered offender from the legal premises of the covered entity and remains upon or reenters the legal premises of the covered entity; or

(ii) Is personally served with written notice complying with the requirements of RCW 9A.44.193 that imposes conditions of entry and use on the covered offender and violates the conditions of entry and use.

(2) Criminal trespass against children is a class C felony. [2006 c 126 § 6; 2006 c 125 § 4.]

Intent—Severability—Effective date—2006 c 125: See notes following RCW 9A.44.190.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.210 Court initiated issuance of sexual assault no-contact orders—Terms, conditions, requirements, etc.

(1)(a) When any person charged with or arrested for a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, a violation of RCW 9A.44.096, a violation of RCW 9.68A.090, or a gross misdemeanor that is, under chapter 9A.28 RCW, a criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit an offense that is classified as a sex offense under RCW 9.94A.030, is released from custody before arraignment or trial on bail or personal recognizance, the court authorizing the release may prohibit that person from having any contact with the victim. The jurisdiction authorizing the release shall determine whether that person should be prohibited from having any contact with the victim. If there is no outstanding restraining or protective order prohibiting that person from having contact with the victim, the court authorizing release may issue, by telephone, a sexual assault no-contact order prohibiting the person charged or arrested from having contact with the victim or from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location.

(b) In issuing the order, the court shall consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800.

(c) The sexual assault no-contact order shall also be issued in writing as soon as possible.

(2)(a) At the time of arraignment or whenever a motion is brought to modify the conditions of the defendant's release, the court shall determine whether a sexual assault no-contact order shall be issued or extended. If a sexual assault no-contact order is issued or extended, the court may also include in the conditions of release a requirement that the defendant submit to electronic monitoring. If electronic monitoring is ordered, the court shall specify who shall provide the monitoring services, and the terms under which the monitoring shall be performed. Upon conviction, the court may require as a condition of the sentence that the defendant reimburse the providing agency for the costs of the electronic monitoring.

(b) A sexual assault no-contact order issued by the court in conjunction with criminal charges shall terminate if the defendant is acquitted or the charges are dismissed, unless the victim files an independent action for a sexual assault protection order. If the victim files an independent action for a sexual assault protection order, the order may be continued by the court until a full hearing is conducted pursuant to chapter 7.105 RCW.

(3)(a) The written order releasing the person charged or arrested shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: "Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 7.105 RCW and will subject a violator to arrest. You can be arrested even if any person protected by the order invites or allows you to violate the order's prohibitions. You have the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from violating the order's provisions. Only the court can change the order."

(b) A certified copy of the order shall be provided to the victim at no charge.

(4) If a sexual assault no-contact order has been issued prior to charging, that order shall expire at arraignment or within seventy-two hours if charges are not filed. Such orders need not be entered into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system in this state which is used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants.

(5) Whenever an order prohibiting contact is issued pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state.

(6)(a) When a defendant is found guilty of a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030, any violation of RCW 9A.44.096, or any violation of RCW 9.68A.090, or any gross misdemeanor that is, under chapter 9A.28 RCW, a criminal attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit an offense that is classified as a sex offense under RCW 9.94A.030, and a condition of the sentence restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim, the condition shall be recorded as a sexual assault no-contact order.

(b) The written order entered as a condition of sentencing shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: "Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 7.105 RCW and will subject a violator to arrest. You can be arrested even if any person protected by the order invites or allows you to violate the order's prohibitions. You have the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from violating the order's provisions. Only the court can change the order."

(c) A final sexual assault no-contact order entered in conjunction with a criminal prosecution shall remain in effect for a period of two years following the expiration of any sentence of imprisonment and subsequent period of community supervision, conditional release, probation, or parole.

(d) A certified copy of the order shall be provided to the victim at no charge.

(7) A knowing violation of a court order issued under subsection (1), (2), or (6) of this section is punishable under RCW 7.105.450.

(8) Whenever a sexual assault no-contact order is issued, modified, or terminated under subsection (1), (2), or (6) of this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated under subsection (2) of this section, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2021 c 215 § 164; 2006 c 138 § 16. Formerly RCW 7.90.150.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

9A.44.900 Decodifications and additions to this chapter. RCW 9.79.140, 9.79.150, 9.79.160, 9.79.170 as now or hereafter amended, 9.79.180 as now or hereafter amended, 9.79.190 as now or hereafter amended, 9.79.200 as now or hereafter amended, 9.79.210 as now or hereafter amended, 9.79.220 as now or hereafter amended, 9A.88.020, and 9A.88.100 are each decodified and are each added to Title 9A RCW as a new chapter with the designation chapter 9A.44 RCW. [1979 ex.s. c 244 § 17.]

9A.44.901 Construction—Sections decodified and added to this chapter. The sections decodified by RCW 9A.44.900 and added to Title 9A RCW as a new chapter with the designation chapter 9A.44 RCW shall be construed as part of Title 9A RCW. [1979 ex.s. c 244 § 18.]

9A.44.902 Effective date—1979 ex.s. c 244. This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect on July 1, 1979. [1979 ex.s. c 244 § 19.]

9A.44.903 Section captions—1988 c 145. Section captions as used in this chapter do not constitute any part of the law. [1988 c 145 § 22.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.44.904 Construction—Chapter applicable to state registered domestic partnerships—2009 c 521. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms spouse, marriage, marital, husband, wife, widow, widower, next of kin, and family shall be interpreted as applying equally to state registered domestic partnerships or individuals in state registered domestic partnerships as well as to marital relationships and married persons, and references to dissolution of marriage shall apply equally to state registered domestic partnerships that have been terminated, dissolved, or invalidated, to the

extent that such interpretation does not conflict with federal law. Where necessary to implement chapter 521, Laws of 2009, gender-specific terms such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law shall be construed to be gender neutral, and applicable to individuals in state registered domestic partnerships. [2009 c 521 § 24.]

Chapter 9A.46 RCW HARASSMENT

Sections

9A.46.010	Legislative finding.
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9A.46.040	Court-ordered requirements upon person charged with crime—Violation.
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9A.46.120	Criminal gang intimidation.
9A.46.900	Short title.
9A.46.905	Effective date—1985 c 288.

Harassment: RCW 9A.36.080.

9A.46.010 Legislative finding. The legislature finds that the prevention of serious, personal harassment is an important government objective. Toward that end, this chapter is aimed at making unlawful the repeated invasions of a person's privacy by acts and threats which show a pattern of harassment designed to coerce, intimidate, or humiliate the victim.

The legislature further finds that the protection of such persons from harassment can be accomplished without infringing on constitutionally protected speech or activity. [1985 c 288 § 1.]

9A.46.020 Definition—Penalties. (1) A person is guilty of harassment if:

(a) Without lawful authority, the person knowingly threatens:

(i) To cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or

(ii) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or

(iii) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or

(iv) Maliciously to do any other act which is intended to substantially harm the person threatened or another with respect to his or her physical or mental health or safety; and

(b) The person by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. "Words or conduct" includes, in addition to any other form of communication or conduct, the sending of an electronic communication.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, a person who harasses another is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

(b) A person who harasses another is guilty of a class C felony if any of the following apply: (i) The person has previ-

ously been convicted in this or any other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim or members of the victim's family or household or any person specifically named in a no-contact or no-harassment order; (ii) the person harasses another person under subsection (1)(a)(i) of this section by threatening to kill the person threatened or any other person; (iii) the person harasses a criminal justice participant who is performing his or her official duties at the time the threat is made; or (iv) the person harasses a criminal justice participant because of an action taken or decision made by the criminal justice participant during the performance of his or her official duties. For the purposes of (b)(iii) and (iv) of this subsection, the fear from the threat must be a fear that a reasonable criminal justice participant would have under all the circumstances. Threatening words do not constitute harassment if it is apparent to the criminal justice participant that the person does not have the present and future ability to carry out the threat.

(3) Any criminal justice participant who is a target for threats or harassment prohibited under subsection (2)(b)(iii) or (iv) of this section, and any family members residing with him or her, shall be eligible for the address confidentiality program created under RCW 40.24.030.

(4) For purposes of this section, a criminal justice participant includes any (a) federal, state, or local law enforcement agency employee; (b) federal, state, or local prosecuting attorney or deputy prosecuting attorney; (c) staff member of any adult corrections institution or local adult detention facility; (d) staff member of any juvenile corrections institution or local juvenile detention facility; (e) community corrections officer, probation, or parole officer; (f) member of the indeterminate sentence review board; (g) advocate from a crime victim/witness program; or (h) defense attorney.

(5) The penalties provided in this section for harassment do not preclude the victim from seeking any other remedy otherwise available under law. [2011 c 64 § 1; 2003 c 53 § 69; 1999 c 27 § 2; 1997 c 105 § 1; 1992 c 186 § 2; 1985 c 288 § 2.]

Reviser's note: As to the constitutionality of subsection (1)(a)(iv) of this section, see *State v. Williams*, 144 Wn.2d 197, 26 P.3d 890 (2001).

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Intent—1999 c 27: "It is the intent of chapter 27, Laws of 1999 to clarify that electronic communications are included in the types of conduct and actions that can constitute the crimes of harassment and stalking. It is not the intent of the legislature, by adoption of chapter 27, Laws of 1999, to restrict in any way the types of conduct or actions that can constitute harassment or stalking." [1999 c 27 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.46.030 Place where committed. Any harassment offense committed as set forth in RCW 9A.46.020 or 9A.46.110 may be deemed to have been committed where the conduct occurred or at the place from which the threat or threats were made or at the place where the threats were received. [1992 c 186 § 3; 1985 c 288 § 3.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.46.040 Court-ordered requirements upon person charged with crime—Violation. (1) Because of the likelihood of repeated harassment directed at those who have been victims of harassment in the past, when any defendant

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charged with a crime involving harassment is released from custody before trial on bail or personal recognizance, the court authorizing the release may issue an order pursuant to this chapter and require that the defendant:

(a) Stay away from the home, school, business, or place of employment of the victim or victims of the alleged offense or other location, as shall be specifically named by the court in the order;

(b) Refrain from contacting, intimidating, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the victim or victims of the alleged offense and such other persons, including but not limited to members of the family or household of the victim, as shall be specifically named by the court in the order.

(2) Willful violation of a court order issued under this section or an equivalent local ordinance is a gross misdemeanor. The written order releasing the defendant shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: Violation of this order is a criminal offense under this chapter. A certified copy of the order shall be provided to the victim by the clerk of the court.

(3) If the defendant is charged with the crime of stalking or any other stalking-related offense under RCW 9A.46.060, and the court issues an order protecting the victim, the court shall issue a stalking no-contact order pursuant to RCW 9A.46.055. [2021 c 215 § 108; 2013 c 84 § 27; 2012 c 223 § 1; 2011 c 307 § 4; 1985 c 288 § 4.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

9A.46.050 Arraignment—No-contact order. A defendant who is charged by citation, complaint, or information with an offense involving harassment and not arrested shall appear in court for arraignment in person as soon as practicable, but in no event later than fourteen days after the next day on which court is in session following the issuance of the citation or the filing of the complaint or information. At that appearance, the court shall determine the necessity of imposing a no-contact or no-harassment order, and consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800, or other conditions of pre-trial release according to the procedures established by court rule for preliminary appearance or an arraignment. [1994 sp.s. c 7 § 447; 1985 c 288 § 5.]

Finding—Intent—Severability—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.46.055 Court-initiated stalking no-contact orders. (1)(a) When any person charged with or arrested for stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 or any other stalking-related offense under RCW 9A.46.060 is released from custody before arraignment or trial on bail or personal recognizance, the court authorizing the release may prohibit that person from having any contact with the victim. The jurisdiction authorizing the release shall determine whether that person should be prohibited from having any contact with the victim. If there is no outstanding restraining or protective order prohibiting that person from having contact with the victim, and the victim does not qualify for a domestic violence protection order under chapter 7.105 RCW, the court authorizing release may issue, by telephone, a stalking no-contact order prohibiting the person charged or arrested from having contact with

the victim or from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location.

(b) In issuing the order, the court shall consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800.

(c) The stalking no-contact order shall also be issued in writing as soon as possible.

(2)(a) At the time of arraignment or whenever a motion is brought to modify the conditions of the defendant's release, the court shall determine whether a stalking no-contact order shall be issued or extended. If a stalking no-contact order is issued or extended, the court may also include in the conditions of release a requirement that the defendant submit to electronic monitoring, including real-time global positioning system monitoring with victim notification. If electronic monitoring is ordered, the court shall specify who shall provide the monitoring services, and the terms under which the monitoring shall be performed. Upon conviction, the court may require as a condition of the sentence that the defendant reimburse the providing agency for the costs of the electronic monitoring, including costs relating to real-time global positioning system monitoring with victim notification.

(b) A stalking no-contact order issued by the court in conjunction with criminal charges shall terminate if the defendant is acquitted or the charges are dismissed, unless the victim files an independent action for a stalking protection order. If the victim files an independent action for a civil stalking protection order, the order may be continued by the court until a full hearing is conducted pursuant to chapter 7.105 RCW.

(3)(a) The written order releasing the person charged or arrested shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: "Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 7.105 RCW and will subject a violator to arrest. You can be arrested even if any person protected by the order invites or allows you to violate the order's prohibitions. You have the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from violating the order's provisions. Only the court can change the order."

(b) A certified copy of the order shall be provided to the victim at no charge.

(4) If a stalking no-contact order has been issued prior to charging, that order shall expire at arraignment or within seventy-two hours if charges are not filed.

(5) Whenever an order prohibiting contact is issued pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year unless a different expiration date is specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state.

(6)(a) When a defendant is found guilty of stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 or any other stalking-related offense under RCW 9A.46.060 and a condition of the sentence restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim, and the victim does not qualify for a domestic vio-

lence protection order under chapter 7.105 RCW, the condition shall be recorded as a stalking no-contact order.

(b) The written order entered as a condition of sentencing shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: "Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 7.105 RCW and will subject a violator to arrest. You can be arrested even if any person protected by the order invites or allows you to violate the order's prohibitions. You have the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from violating the order's provisions. Only the court can change the order."

(c) A final stalking no-contact order entered in conjunction with a criminal prosecution shall remain in effect for a period of five years from the date of entry.

(d) A certified copy of the order shall be provided to the victim at no charge.

(7) A knowing violation of a court order issued under subsection (1), (2), or (6) of this section is punishable under RCW 7.105.450.

(8) Whenever a stalking no-contact order is issued, modified, or terminated under subsection (1), (2), or (6) of this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year unless a different expiration date is specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated under subsection (2) of this section, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2021 c 215 § 165; 2013 c 84 § 16. Formerly RCW 7.92.160.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

9A.46.060 Crimes included in harassment. As used in this chapter, "harassment" may include but is not limited to any of the following crimes:

- (1) Harassment (RCW 9A.46.020);
- (2) Hate crime (RCW 9A.36.080);
- (3) Telephone harassment (RCW 9.61.230);
- (4) Assault in the first degree (RCW 9A.36.011);
- (5) Assault of a child in the first degree (RCW 9A.36.120);
- (6) Assault in the second degree (RCW 9A.36.021);
- (7) Assault of a child in the second degree (RCW 9A.36.130);
- (8) Assault in the fourth degree (RCW 9A.36.041);
- (9) Reckless endangerment (RCW 9A.36.050);
- (10) Extortion in the first degree (RCW 9A.56.120);
- (11) Extortion in the second degree (RCW 9A.56.130);
- (12) Coercion (RCW 9A.36.070);
- (13) Burglary in the first degree (RCW 9A.52.020);
- (14) Burglary in the second degree (RCW 9A.52.030);
- (15) Criminal trespass in the first degree (RCW 9A.52.070);

(16) Criminal trespass in the second degree (RCW 9A.52.080);

(17) Malicious mischief in the first degree (RCW 9A.48.070);

(18) Malicious mischief in the second degree (RCW 9A.48.080);

(19) Malicious mischief in the third degree (RCW 9A.48.090);

(20) Kidnapping in the first degree (RCW 9A.40.020);

(21) Kidnapping in the second degree (RCW 9A.40.030);

(22) Unlawful imprisonment (RCW 9A.40.040);

(23) Rape in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.040);

(24) Rape in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.050);

(25) Rape in the third degree (RCW 9A.44.060);

(26) Indecent liberties (RCW 9A.44.100);

(27) Rape of a child in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.073);

(28) Rape of a child in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.076);

(29) Rape of a child in the third degree (RCW 9A.44.079);

(30) Child molestation in the first degree (RCW 9A.44.083);

(31) Child molestation in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.086);

(32) Child molestation in the third degree (RCW 9A.44.089);

(33) Stalking (RCW 9A.46.110);

(34) Cyber harassment (RCW 9A.90.120);

(35) Residential burglary (RCW 9A.52.025);

(36) Violation of a temporary, permanent, or final protective order issued pursuant to chapter 9A.44, 9A.46, 10.99, or 26.09 RCW or any of the former chapters 7.90, 10.14, and 26.50 RCW, or violation of a domestic violence protection order, sexual assault protection order, or antiharassment protection order issued under chapter 7.105 RCW;

(37) Unlawful discharge of a laser in the first degree (RCW 9A.49.020); and

(38) Unlawful discharge of a laser in the second degree (RCW 9A.49.030). [2022 c 231 § 15; (2022 c 231 § 14 expired July 1, 2022); 2021 c 215 § 109; 2019 c 271 § 8; 2006 c 138 § 21; 2004 c 94 § 4; 1999 c 180 § 7; 1997 c 338 § 52. Prior: 1994 c 271 § 802; 1994 c 121 § 2; prior: 1992 c 186 § 4; 1992 c 145 § 12; 1988 c 145 § 15; 1985 c 288 § 6.]

Effective date—2022 c 231 §§ 8, 9, 11, 13, and 15: See note following RCW 7.105.010.

Expiration date—2022 c 231 §§ 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 17: See note following RCW 9.94A.030.

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

Finding—Evaluation—Report—1997 c 338: See note following RCW 13.40.0357.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.46.070 Enforcement of orders restricting contact.

Any law enforcement agency in this state may enforce this chapter as it relates to orders restricting the defendants' abil-

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ity to have contact with the victim or others. [1985 c 288 § 7.]

9A.46.080 Order restricting contact—Violation. The victim shall be informed by local law enforcement agencies or the prosecuting attorney of the final disposition of the case in which the victim is involved. If a defendant is found guilty of a crime of harassment and a condition of the sentence restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim or witnesses, the condition shall be recorded and a written certified copy of that order shall be provided to the victim or witnesses by the clerk of the court. Willful violation of a court order issued under this section or an equivalent local ordinance is a gross misdemeanor. The written order shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 9A.46 RCW and will subject a violator to arrest. [2012 c 223 § 2; 2011 c 307 § 5; 1985 c 288 § 8.]

9A.46.085 Stalking no-contact orders—Appearance before magistrate required. (1) A defendant arrested for stalking as defined by RCW 9A.46.110 shall be required to appear in person before a magistrate within one judicial day after the arrest.

(2) At the time of appearance provided in subsection (1) of this section the court shall determine the necessity of imposing a stalking no-contact order under this chapter.

(3) Appearances required pursuant to this section are mandatory and cannot be waived.

(4) The stalking no-contact order shall be issued and entered with the appropriate law enforcement agency pursuant to the procedures outlined in this chapter. [2021 c 215 § 110; 2013 c 84 § 28.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

9A.46.090 Nonliability of peace officer. A peace officer shall not be held liable in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause, enforcement in good faith of a court order, or any other action or omission in good faith under this chapter arising from an alleged incident of harassment brought by any party to the incident. [1985 c 288 § 9.]

9A.46.100 "Convicted," time when. As used in RCW 9.61.230, *9.61.260, 9A.46.020, or 9A.46.110, a person has been "convicted" at such time as a plea of guilty has been accepted or a verdict of guilty has been filed, notwithstanding the pendency of any future proceedings including but not limited to sentencing, posttrial motions, and appeals. [2004 c 94 § 5; 1992 c 186 § 5; 1985 c 288 § 10.]

***Reviser's note:** RCW 9.61.260 was recodified as RCW 9A.90.120 pursuant to 2022 c 231 § 4.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.46.110 Stalking. (1) A person commits the crime of stalking if, without lawful authority and under circumstances not amounting to a felony attempt of another crime:

(a) He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and

(b) The person being harassed or followed is placed in fear that the stalker intends to injure the person, another per-

son, or property of the person or of another person. The feeling of fear must be one that a reasonable person in the same situation would experience under all the circumstances; and

(c) The stalker either:

(i) Intends to frighten, intimidate, or harass the person; or

(ii) Knows or reasonably should know that the person is afraid, intimidated, or harassed even if the stalker did not intend to place the person in fear or intimidate or harass the person.

(2)(a) It is not a defense to the crime of stalking under subsection (1)(c)(i) of this section that the stalker was not given actual notice that the person did not want the stalker to contact or follow the person; and

(b) It is not a defense to the crime of stalking under subsection (1)(c)(ii) of this section that the stalker did not intend to frighten, intimidate, or harass the person.

(3) It shall be a defense to the crime of stalking that the defendant is a licensed private investigator acting within the capacity of his or her license as provided by chapter 18.165 RCW.

(4) Attempts to contact or follow the person after being given actual notice that the person does not want to be contacted or followed constitutes prima facie evidence that the stalker intends to intimidate or harass the person. "Contact" includes, in addition to any other form of contact or communication, the sending of an electronic communication to the person.

(5)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, a person who stalks another person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

(b) A person who stalks another is guilty of a class B felony if any of the following applies: (i) The stalker has previously been convicted in this state or any other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim or members of the victim's family or household or any person specifically named in a protective order; (ii) the stalking violates any protective order protecting the person being stalked; (iii) the stalker has previously been convicted of a gross misdemeanor or felony stalking offense under this section for stalking another person; (iv) the stalker was armed with a deadly weapon, as defined in RCW 9.94A.825, while stalking the person; (v)(A) the stalker's victim is or was a law enforcement officer; judge; juror; attorney; victim advocate; legislator; community corrections' officer; an employee, contract staff person, or volunteer of a correctional agency; court employee, court clerk, or courthouse facilitator; or an employee of the child protective, child welfare, or adult protective services division within the department of social and health services; and (B) the stalker stalked the victim to retaliate against the victim for an act the victim performed during the course of official duties or to influence the victim's performance of official duties; or (vi) the stalker's victim is a current, former, or prospective witness in an adjudicative proceeding, and the stalker stalked the victim to retaliate against the victim as a result of the victim's testimony or potential testimony.

(6) As used in this section:

(a) "Correctional agency" means a person working for the department of natural resources in a correctional setting or any state, county, or municipally operated agency with the authority to direct the release of a person serving a sentence

or term of confinement and includes but is not limited to the department of corrections, the indeterminate sentence review board, and the department of social and health services.

(b) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. "Course of conduct" includes, in addition to any other form of communication, contact, or conduct, the sending of an electronic communication, but does not include constitutionally protected free speech. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of conduct."

(c) "Follows" means deliberately maintaining visual or physical proximity to a specific person over a period of time. A finding that the alleged stalker repeatedly and deliberately appears at the person's home, school, place of employment, business, or any other location to maintain visual or physical proximity to the person is sufficient to find that the alleged stalker follows the person. It is not necessary to establish that the alleged stalker follows the person while in transit from one location to another.

(d) "Harasses" means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child.

(e) "Protective order" means any temporary or permanent court order prohibiting or limiting violence against, harassment of, contact or communication with, or physical proximity to another person.

(f) "Repeatedly" means on two or more separate occasions. [2021 c 215 § 111; 2013 c 84 § 29; 2007 c 201 § 1; 2006 c 95 § 3; 2003 c 53 § 70. Prior: 1999 c 143 § 35; 1999 c 27 § 3; 1994 c 271 § 801; 1992 c 186 § 1.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

Findings—Intent—2006 c 95: See note following RCW 74.04.790.

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Intent—1999 c 27: See note following RCW 9A.46.020.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.46.120 Criminal gang intimidation. A person commits the offense of criminal gang intimidation if the person threatens another person with bodily injury because the other person refuses to join or has attempted to withdraw from a gang, as defined in RCW 28A.600.455, if the person who threatens the victim or the victim attends or is registered in a public or alternative school. Criminal gang intimidation is a class C felony. [1997 c 266 § 3.]

Findings—Intent—Severability—1997 c 266: See notes following RCW 28A.600.455.

9A.46.900 Short title. This act shall be known as the anti-harassment act of 1985. [1985 c 288 § 12.]

9A.46.905 Effective date—1985 c 288. This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect May 1, 1985. [1985 c 288 § 15.]

Chapter 9A.48 RCW

ARSON, RECKLESS BURNING, AND MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

Sections

9A.48.010	Definitions.
9A.48.020	Arson in the first degree.
9A.48.030	Arson in the second degree.
9A.48.040	Reckless burning in the first degree.
9A.48.050	Reckless burning in the second degree.
9A.48.060	Reckless burning—Defense.
9A.48.070	Malicious mischief in the first degree.
9A.48.080	Malicious mischief in the second degree.
9A.48.090	Malicious mischief in the third degree.
9A.48.100	Malicious mischief—"Physical damage" defined.
9A.48.105	Criminal street gang tagging and graffiti.
9A.48.110	Defacing a state monument.
9A.48.120	Civil disorder training.

Explosives: Chapter 70.74 RCW.

9A.48.010 Definitions. (1) For the purpose of this chapter, unless the context indicates otherwise:

(a) "Building" has the definition in RCW 9A.04.110(5), and where a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall not be treated as a separate building;

(b) "Damages", in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any charring, scorching, burning, or breaking, or agricultural or industrial sabotage, and shall include any diminution in the value of any property as a consequence of an act;

(c) "Property of another" means property in which the actor possesses anything less than exclusive ownership.

(2) To constitute arson it is not necessary that a person other than the actor has ownership in the building or structure damaged or set on fire. [2002 c 32 § 1; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 6; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.010.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.48.020 Arson in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously:

(a) Causes a fire or explosion which is manifestly dangerous to any human life, including firefighters; or

(b) Causes a fire or explosion which damages a dwelling; or

(c) Causes a fire or explosion in any building in which there shall be at the time a human being who is not a participant in the crime; or

(d) Causes a fire or explosion on property valued at ten thousand dollars or more with intent to collect insurance proceeds.

(2) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony. [2007 c 218 § 63; 1981 c 203 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.020.]

Intent—Finding—2007 c 218: See note following RCW 41.08.020.

9A.48.030 Arson in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree if he or she knowingly (2022 Ed.)

and maliciously causes a fire or explosion which damages a building, or any structure or erection appurtenant to or joining any building, or any wharf, dock, machine, engine, automobile, or other motor vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, bridge, or trestle, or hay, grain, crop, or timber, whether cut or standing or any range land, or pasture land, or any fence, or any lumber, shingle, or other timber products, or any property.

(2) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 366; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.030.]

9A.48.040 Reckless burning in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of reckless burning in the first degree if he or she recklessly damages a building or other structure or any vehicle, railway car, aircraft, or watercraft or any hay, grain, crop, or timber whether cut or standing, by knowingly causing a fire or explosion.

(2) Reckless burning in the first degree is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 367; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.040.]

9A.48.050 Reckless burning in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of reckless burning in the second degree if he or she knowingly causes a fire or explosion, whether on his or her own property or that of another, and thereby recklessly places a building or other structure, or any vehicle, railway car, aircraft, or watercraft, or any hay, grain, crop or timber, whether cut or standing, in danger of destruction or damage.

(2) Reckless burning in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 368; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.050.]

9A.48.060 Reckless burning—Defense. In any prosecution for the crime of reckless burning in the first or second degrees, it shall be a defense if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that:

(a) No person other than the defendant had a possessory, or pecuniary interest in the damaged or endangered property, or if other persons had such an interest, all of them consented to the defendant's conduct; and

(b) The defendant's sole intent was to destroy or damage the property for a lawful purpose. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.060.]

9A.48.070 Malicious mischief in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously:

(a) Causes physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding five thousand dollars;

(b) Causes an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by physically damaging or tampering with an emergency vehicle or property of the state, a political subdivision thereof, or a public utility or mode of public transportation, power, or communication;

(c) Causes an impairment of the safety, efficiency, or operation of an aircraft by physically damaging or tampering with the aircraft or aircraft equipment, fuel, lubricant, or parts; or

(d) Causes an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by, without lawful authority, physically damaging, destroying, or removing an official ballot deposit box or ballot drop box or, without lawful authority, damag-

ing, destroying, removing, or tampering with the contents thereof.

(2) Malicious mischief in the first degree is a class B felony. [2017 c 283 § 1; 2009 c 431 § 4; 1983 1st ex.s. c 4 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.070.]

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.48.080 Malicious mischief in the second degree.

(1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the second degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously:

(a) Causes physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding seven hundred fifty dollars;

(b) Creates a substantial risk of interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public, by physically damaging or tampering with an emergency vehicle or property of the state, a political subdivision thereof, or a public utility or mode of public transportation, power, or communication; or

(c) Creates a substantial risk of interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by, without lawful authority, physically damaging, destroying, or removing an official ballot deposit box or ballot drop box or, without lawful authority, damaging, destroying, removing, or tampering with the contents thereof.

(2) Malicious mischief in the second degree is a class C felony. [2017 c 283 § 2; 2009 c 431 § 5; 1994 c 261 § 17; 1979 c 145 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.080.]

Finding—Intent—1994 c 261: See note following RCW 16.52.011.

Action by owner of stolen livestock: RCW 4.24.320.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.48.090 Malicious mischief in the third degree.

(1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the third degree if he or she:

(a) Knowingly and maliciously causes physical damage to the property of another, under circumstances not amounting to malicious mischief in the first or second degree; or

(b) Writes, paints, or draws any inscription, figure, or mark of any type on any public or private building or other structure or any real or personal property owned by any other person unless the person has obtained the express permission of the owner or operator of the property, under circumstances not amounting to malicious mischief in the first or second degree.

(2) Malicious mischief in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2009 c 431 § 6; 2003 c 53 § 71; 1996 c 35 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.090.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.48.100 Malicious mischief—"Physical damage" defined. For the purposes of RCW 9A.48.070 through 9A.48.090 inclusive:

(1) "Physical damage," in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include the total or partial alteration, damage, obliteration, or erasure of records, information, data, computer programs, or their computer representations, which are

recorded for use in computers or the impairment, interruption, or interference with the use of such records, information, data, or computer programs, or the impairment, interruption, or interference with the use of any computer or services provided by computers. "Physical damage" also includes any diminution in the value of any property as the consequence of an act and the cost to repair any physical damage;

(2) If more than one item of property is physically damaged as a result of a common scheme or plan by a person and the physical damage to the property would, when considered separately, constitute mischief in the third degree because of value, then the value of the damages may be aggregated in one count. If the sum of the value of all the physical damages exceeds two hundred fifty dollars, the defendant may be charged with and convicted of malicious mischief in the second degree. [2013 c 322 § 1; 1984 c 273 § 4; 1981 c 260 § 2. Prior: 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 11; 1979 c 145 § 3; 1977 ex.s. c 174 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.48.100.]

Action by owner of stolen livestock: RCW 4.24.320.

Computer trespass: RCW 9A.90.040 and 9A.90.050.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.48.105 Criminal street gang tagging and graffiti.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal street gang tagging and graffiti if he or she commits malicious mischief in the third degree under RCW 9A.48.090(1)(b) and he or she:

(a) Has multiple current convictions for malicious mischief in the third degree offenses under RCW 9A.48.090(1)(b); or

(b) Has previously been convicted for a malicious mischief in the third degree offense under RCW 9A.48.090(1)(b) or a comparable offense under a municipal code provision of any city or town; and

(c) The current offense or one of the current offenses is a "criminal street gang-related offense" as defined in RCW 9.94A.030.

(2) Criminal street gang tagging and graffiti is a gross misdemeanor offense. [2008 c 276 § 306.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.48.110 Defacing a state monument. (1) A person is guilty of defacing a state monument if he or she knowingly defaces a monument or memorial on the state capitol campus or other state property.

(2) Defacing a state monument is a misdemeanor. [1995 c 66 § 1.]

9A.48.120 Civil disorder training. (1) A person is guilty of civil disorder training if he or she teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any device or technique capable of causing significant bodily injury or death to persons, knowing, or having reason to know or intending that same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder.

(2) Civil disorder training is a class B felony.

(3) Nothing in this section makes unlawful any act of any law enforcement officer that is performed in the lawful performance of his or her official duties.

(4) Nothing in this section makes unlawful any act of firearms training, target shooting, or other firearms activity,

so long as it is not done for the purpose of furthering a civil disorder.

(5) For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Civil disorder" means any public disturbance involving acts of violence that is intended to cause an immediate danger of, or to result in, significant injury to property or the person of any other individual.

(b) "Law enforcement officer" means any law enforcement officer as defined in RCW 9A.76.020(2) including members of the Washington national guard, as defined in RCW 38.04.010. [2008 c 206 § 1; 2002 c 340 § 1.]

Chapter 9A.49 RCW LASERS

Sections

9A.49.001	Findings.
9A.49.010	Definitions.
9A.49.020	Unlawful discharge of a laser in the first degree.
9A.49.030	Unlawful discharge of a laser in the second degree.
9A.49.040	Civil infraction, when.
9A.49.050	Exclusions.

9A.49.001 Findings. The legislature finds that lasers are becoming both less expensive and more accessible in our technologically advanced society. Laser devices are being used by individuals in a manner so as to intimidate and harass. This creates an especially serious problem for law enforcement officers who reasonably believe they are the target of a laser sighting device on a firearm. Additionally, emergency service providers, service providers, and others who operate aircraft or motor vehicles may be negatively affected to the point of jeopardizing their safety as well as the safety of others. In order to address the misuse of lasers, the legislature hereby finds it necessary to criminalize the discharge of lasers under certain circumstances. [1999 c 180 § 1.]

9A.49.010 Definitions. The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) "Aircraft" means any contrivance known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in air.

(2) "Laser" means any device designed or used to amplify electromagnetic radiation by simulated [stimulated] emission which is visible to the human eye.

(3) "Laser sighting system or device" means any system or device which is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and which emits a laser light beam that is used by the shooter to assist in the sight alignment of that firearm. [1999 c 180 § 2.]

9A.49.020 Unlawful discharge of a laser in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of unlawful discharge of a laser in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously discharges a laser, under circumstances not amounting to malicious mischief in the first degree:

(a) At a law enforcement officer or other employee of a law enforcement agency who is performing his or her official duties in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his or her authority, and in a manner that would support that officer's or employee's reasonable belief that he or she is targeted with a laser sighting device or system; or

(b) At a law enforcement officer or other employee of a law enforcement agency who is performing his or her official duties, causing an impairment of the safety or operation of a law enforcement vehicle or causing an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by negatively affecting the officer or employee; or

(c) At a pilot, causing an impairment of the safety or operation of an aircraft or causing an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by negatively affecting the pilot; or

(d) At a firefighter or other employee of a fire department, county fire marshal's office, county fire prevention bureau, or fire protection district who is performing his or her official duties, causing an impairment of the safety or operation of an emergency vehicle or causing an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by negatively affecting the firefighter or employee; or

(e) At a transit operator or driver of a public or private transit company while that person is performing his or her official duties, causing an impairment of the safety or operation of a transit vehicle or causing an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by negatively affecting the operator or driver; or

(f) At a school bus driver employed by a school district or private company while the driver is performing his or her official duties, causing an impairment of the safety or operation of a school bus or causing an interruption or impairment of service by negatively affecting the bus driver.

(2) Except as provided in RCW 9A.49.040, unlawful discharge of a laser in the first degree is a class C felony. [1999 c 180 § 3.]

9A.49.030 Unlawful discharge of a laser in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of unlawful discharge of a laser in the second degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously discharges a laser, under circumstances not amounting to unlawful discharge of a laser in the first degree or malicious mischief in the first or second degree:

(a) At a person, not described in RCW 9A.49.020(1) (a) through (f), who is operating a motor vehicle at the time, causing an impairment of the safety or operation of a motor vehicle by negatively affecting the driver; or

(b) At a person described in RCW 9A.49.020(1) (b) through (f), causing a substantial risk of an impairment or interruption as described in RCW 9A.49.020(1) (b) through (f); or

(c) At a person in order to intimidate or threaten that person.

(2) Except as provided in RCW 9A.49.040, unlawful discharge of a laser in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor. [1999 c 180 § 4.]

9A.49.040 Civil infraction, when. Unlawful discharge of a laser in the first degree or second degree is a civil infraction if committed by a juvenile who has not before committed either offense. The monetary penalty imposed upon a juvenile may not exceed one hundred dollars. [1999 c 180 § 5.]

9A.49.050 Exclusions. This chapter does not apply to the conduct of a laser development activity by or on behalf of the United States armed forces. [1999 c 180 § 6.]

Chapter 9A.50 RCW
INTERFERENCE WITH HEALTH CARE
FACILITIES OR PROVIDERS

Sections

9A.50.005	Finding.
9A.50.010	Definitions.
9A.50.020	Interference with health care facility.
9A.50.030	Penalty.
9A.50.040	Civil remedies.
9A.50.050	Civil damages.
9A.50.060	Informational picketing.
9A.50.070	Protection of health care patients and providers.
9A.50.900	Construction.
9A.50.902	Effective date—1993 c 128.

9A.50.005 Finding. The legislature finds that seeking or obtaining health care is fundamental to public health and safety. [1993 c 128 § 1.]

9A.50.010 Definitions. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter.

(1) "Health care facility" means a facility that provides health care services directly to patients, including but not limited to, a hospital, clinic, health care provider's office, health maintenance organization, diagnostic or treatment center, neuropsychiatric or mental health facility, hospice, or nursing home.

(2) "Health care provider" has the same meaning as defined in RCW 7.70.020 (1) and (2), and also means an officer, director, employee, or agent of a health care facility who sues or testifies regarding matters within the scope of his or her employment.

(3) "Aggrieved" means:

(a) A person, physically present at the health care facility when the prohibited actions occur, whose access is or is about to be obstructed or impeded;

(b) A person, physically present at the health care facility when the prohibited actions occur, whose care is or is about to be disrupted;

(c) The health care facility, its employees, or agents;

(d) The owner of the health care facility or the building or property upon which the health care facility is located. [1993 c 128 § 2.]

9A.50.020 Interference with health care facility. It is unlawful for a person except as otherwise protected by state or federal law, alone or in concert with others, to willfully or recklessly interfere with access to or from a health care facility or willfully or recklessly disrupt the normal functioning of such facility by:

(1) Physically obstructing or impeding the free passage of a person seeking to enter or depart from the facility or from the common areas of the real property upon which the facility is located;

(2) Making noise that unreasonably disturbs the peace within the facility;

(3) Trespassing on the facility or the common areas of the real property upon which the facility is located;

(4) Telephoning the facility repeatedly, or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or her control to be used for such purpose; or

(5) Threatening to inflict injury on the owners, agents, patients, employees, or property of the facility or knowingly permitting any telephone under his or her control to be used for such purpose. [1993 c 128 § 3.]

9A.50.030 Penalty. (1) A violation of RCW 9A.50.020 is a gross misdemeanor. A person convicted of violating RCW 9A.50.020 shall be punished as follows:

(a) For a first offense, a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars and a jail term of not less than twenty-four consecutive hours;

(b) For a second offense, a fine of not less than five hundred dollars and a jail term of not less than seven consecutive days; and

(c) For a third or subsequent offense, a fine of not less than one thousand dollars and a jail term of not less than thirty consecutive days.

(2) The fines imposed by this section apply to adult offenders only. [2015 c 265 § 17; 1993 c 128 § 4.]

Finding—Intent—2015 c 265: See note following RCW 13.50.010.

9A.50.040 Civil remedies. (1) A person or health care facility aggrieved by the actions prohibited by RCW 9A.50.020 may seek civil damages from those who committed the prohibited acts and those acting in concert with them. A plaintiff in an action brought under this chapter shall not recover more than his or her actual damages and additional sums authorized in RCW 9A.50.050. Once a plaintiff recovers his or her actual damages and any additional sums authorized under this chapter, additional damages shall not be recovered. A person does not have to be criminally convicted of violating RCW 9A.50.020 to be held civilly liable under this section. It is not necessary to prove actual damages to recover the additional sums authorized under RCW 9A.50.050, costs, and attorneys' fees. The prevailing party is entitled to recover costs and attorneys' fees.

(2) The superior courts of this state shall have authority to grant temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin violations of this chapter.

In appropriate circumstances, any superior court having personal jurisdiction over one or more defendants may issue injunctive relief that shall have binding effect on the original defendants and persons acting in concert with the original defendants, in any county in the state.

Due to the nature of the harm involved, injunctive relief may be issued without bond in the discretion of the court, notwithstanding any other requirement imposed by statute.

The state and its political subdivisions shall cooperate in the enforcement of court injunctions that seek to protect against acts prohibited by this chapter. [1993 c 128 § 6.]

9A.50.050 Civil damages. In a civil action brought under this chapter, an individual plaintiff aggrieved by the actions prohibited by RCW 9A.50.020 may be entitled to recover up to five hundred dollars for each day that the actions occurred, or up to five thousand dollars for each day that the actions occurred if the plaintiff aggrieved by the actions prohibited under RCW 9A.50.020 is a health care facility. [1993 c 128 § 7.]

9A.50.060 Informational picketing. Nothing in RCW 9A.50.020 shall prohibit either lawful picketing or other publicity for the purpose of providing the public with information. [1993 c 128 § 8.]

9A.50.070 Protection of health care patients and providers. A court having jurisdiction over a criminal or civil proceeding under this chapter shall take all steps reasonably necessary to safeguard the individual privacy and prevent harassment of a health care patient or health care provider who is a party or witness in a proceeding, including granting protective orders and orders in limine. [1993 c 128 § 9.]

9A.50.900 Construction. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the right to seek other available criminal or civil remedies. The remedies provided in this chapter are cumulative, not exclusive. [1993 c 128 § 11.]

9A.50.902 Effective date—1993 c 128. This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect immediately [April 26, 1993]. [1993 c 128 § 14.]

Chapter 9A.52 RCW BURGLARY AND TRESPASS

Sections

9A.52.010	Definitions.
9A.52.020	Burglary in the first degree.
9A.52.025	Residential burglary.
9A.52.030	Burglary in the second degree.
9A.52.040	Inference of intent.
9A.52.050	Other crime in committing burglary punishable.
9A.52.060	Making or having burglar tools.
9A.52.070	Criminal trespass in the first degree.
9A.52.080	Criminal trespass in the second degree.
9A.52.090	Criminal trespass—Defenses.
9A.52.095	Vehicle prowling in the first degree.
9A.52.100	Vehicle prowling in the second degree.
9A.52.105	Removal of unauthorized persons—Declaration—Liability—Rights.
9A.52.115	Removal of unauthorized persons—Declaration form—Penalty for false swearing.

9A.52.010 Definitions. The following definitions apply in this chapter:

(1) "Enter." The word "enter" when constituting an element or part of a crime, shall include the entrance of the person, or the insertion of any part of his or her body, or any instrument or weapon held in his or her hand and used or intended to be used to threaten or intimidate a person or to detach or remove property.

(2) "Enters or remains unlawfully." A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when he or she is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain.

A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of a building which is not open to the public. A person who enters or remains upon unimproved and apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, does so with license and privilege unless notice against trespass is personally communicated to him or

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her by the owner of the land or some other authorized person, or unless notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner. Land that is used for commercial aquaculture or for growing an agricultural crop or crops, other than timber, is not unimproved and apparently unused land if a crop or any other sign of cultivation is clearly visible or if notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner. Similarly, a field fenced in any manner is not unimproved and apparently unused land. A license or privilege to enter or remain on improved and apparently used land that is open to the public at particular times, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner to exclude intruders, is not a license or privilege to enter or remain on the land at other times if notice of prohibited times of entry is posted in a conspicuous manner.

(3) "Premises" includes any building, dwelling, structure used for commercial aquaculture, or any real property. [2016 c 164 § 12. Prior: 2011 c 336 § 369; 2004 c 69 § 1; 1985 c 289 § 1; prior: 1984 c 273 § 5; 1984 c 49 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.010.]

Findings—Intent—Short title—2016 c 164: See RCW 9A.90.010 and 9A.90.020.

9A.52.020 Burglary in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building and if, in entering or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, the actor or another participant in the crime (a) is armed with a deadly weapon, or (b) assaults any person.

(2) Burglary in the first degree is a class A felony. [1996 c 15 § 1; 1995 c 129 § 9 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.020.]

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

9A.52.025 Residential burglary. (1) A person is guilty of residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle.

(2) Residential burglary is a class B felony. In establishing sentencing guidelines and disposition standards, residential burglary is to be considered a more serious offense than second degree burglary. [2011 1st sp.s. c 40 § 38; 1989 2nd ex.s. c 1 § 1; 1989 c 412 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.52.030 Burglary in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling.

(2) Burglary in the second degree is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 370; 1989 2nd ex.s. c 1 § 2; 1989 c 412 § 2; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 7; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.030.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.52.040 Inference of intent. In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such

entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.040.]

9A.52.050 Other crime in committing burglary punishable. Every person who, in the commission of a burglary shall commit any other crime, may be punished therefor as well as for the burglary, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.050.]

9A.52.060 Making or having burglar tools. (1) Every person who shall make or mend or cause to be made or mended, or have in his or her possession, any engine, machine, tool, false key, pick lock, bit, nippers, or implement adapted, designed, or commonly used for the commission of burglary under circumstances evincing an intent to use or employ, or allow the same to be used or employed in the commission of a burglary, or knowing that the same is intended to be so used, shall be guilty of making or having burglar tools.

(2) Making or having burglar tools is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 371; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.060.]

9A.52.070 Criminal trespass in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building.

(2) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 372; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 12; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.070.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.52.080 Criminal trespass in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree if he or she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises of another under circumstances not constituting criminal trespass in the first degree.

(2) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 373; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 13; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.080.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.52.090 Criminal trespass—Defenses. In any prosecution under RCW 9A.52.070 and 9A.52.080, it is a defense that:

(1) A building involved in an offense under RCW 9A.52.070 was abandoned; or

(2) The premises were at the time open to members of the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises; or

(3) The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him or her to enter or remain; or

(4) The actor was attempting to serve legal process which includes any document required or allowed to be served upon persons or property, by any statute, rule, ordinance, regulation, or court order, excluding delivery by the mails of the United States. This defense applies only if the actor did not enter into a private residence or other building not open to the public and the entry onto the premises was reasonable and necessary for service of the legal process.

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[2011 c 336 § 374; 1986 c 219 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.090.]

9A.52.095 Vehicle prowling in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of vehicle prowling in the first degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a motor home, as defined in RCW 46.04.305, or in a vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail which has a cabin equipped with permanently installed sleeping quarters or cooking facilities.

(2) Vehicle prowling in the first degree is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 375; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 13.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.52.100 Vehicle prowling in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of vehicle prowling in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a vehicle other than a motor home, as defined in RCW 46.04.305, or a vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail which has a cabin equipped with permanently installed sleeping quarters or cooking facilities.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, vehicle prowling in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor.

(3) Vehicle prowling in the second degree is a class C felony upon a third or subsequent conviction of vehicle prowling in the second degree. A third or subsequent conviction means that a person has been previously convicted at least two separate occasions of the crime of vehicle prowling in the second degree.

(4) Multiple counts of vehicle prowling (a) charged in the same charging document do not count as separate offenses for the purposes of charging as a felony based on previous convictions for vehicle prowling in the second degree and (b) based on the same date of occurrence do not count as separate offenses for the purposes of charging as a felony based on previous convictions for vehicle prowling in the second degree. [2013 c 267 § 1; 2011 c 336 § 376; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 14; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.52.100.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.52.105 Removal of unauthorized persons—Declaration—Liability—Rights. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section and upon the receipt of a declaration signed under penalty of perjury, in the form prescribed in RCW 9A.52.115, declaring the truth of all of the required elements set forth in subsection (4) of this section, a peace officer shall have the authority to:

(a) Remove the person or persons from the premises, with or without arresting the person or persons; and

(b) Order the person or persons to remain off the premises or be subject to arrest for criminal trespass.

(2) Only a peace officer having probable cause to believe that a person is guilty of criminal trespass under RCW 9A.52.070 for knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a building considered residential real property, as defined in RCW 61.24.005, has the authority and discretion to make an arrest or exclude anyone under penalty of criminal trespass.

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(3) While a peace officer can take into account a declaration from the property owner signed under penalty of perjury containing all of the required elements and in the form prescribed in RCW 9A.52.115, the peace officer must provide the occupant or occupants with a reasonable opportunity to secure and present any credible evidence provided by the person or persons on the premises, which the peace officer must consider, showing that the person or persons are tenants, legal occupants, or the guests or invitees of tenants or legal occupants.

(4) The declaration must include the following elements:

(a) That the declarant is the owner of the premises or the authorized agent of the owner of the premises;

(b) That an unauthorized person or persons have entered and are remaining unlawfully on the premises;

(c) That the person or persons were not authorized to enter or remain;

(d) That the person or persons are not a tenant or tenants and have not been a tenant or tenants, or a homeowner or homeowners who have been on title, within the last twelve months on the property;

(e) That the declarant has demanded that the unauthorized person or persons vacate the premises but they have not done so;

(f) That the premises were not abandoned at the time the unauthorized person or persons entered;

(g) That the premises were not open to members of the public at the time the unauthorized person or persons entered;

(h) That the declarant understands that a person or persons removed from the premises pursuant to this section may bring a cause of action under RCW 4.24.355 against the declarant for any false statements made in the declaration, and that as a result of such action the declarant may be held liable for actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees;

(i) That the declarant understands and acknowledges the prohibitions in RCW 59.18.230 and 59.18.290 against taking or detaining an occupant's personal property or removing or excluding an occupant from a dwelling unit or rental premises without an authorizing court order; and

(j) That the declarant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless law enforcement for its actions or omissions made in good faith pursuant to the declaration.

(5) Neither the peace officer nor his or her law enforcement agency shall be held liable for actions or omissions made in good faith under this section.

(6) This section may not be construed to in any way limit rights under RCW 61.24.060 or to allow a peace officer to remove or exclude an occupant who is entitled to occupy a dwelling unit under a rental agreement or the occupant's guests or invitees. [2017 c 284 § 1.]

9A.52.115 Removal of unauthorized persons—Declaration form—Penalty for false swearing. The owner of premises, or his or her authorized agent, may initiate the investigation and request the removal of an unauthorized person or persons from the premises by providing to law enforcement a declaration containing all of the following required elements and in substantially the following form:

(2022 Ed.)

REQUEST TO REMOVE TRESPASSER(S) FORM

The undersigned owner, or authorized agent of the owner, of the premises located at hereby represents and declares under the penalty of perjury that (initial each box):

(1) [] The declarant is the owner of the premises or the authorized agent of the owner of the premises;

(2) [] An unauthorized person or persons have entered and are remaining unlawfully on the premises;

(3) [] The person or persons were not authorized to enter or remain;

(4) [] The person or persons are not a tenant or tenants and have not been a tenant or tenants, or a homeowner or homeowners who have been on title, within the last twelve months on the property;

(5) [] The declarant has demanded that the unauthorized person or persons vacate the premises but they have not done so;

(6) [] The premises were not abandoned at the time the unauthorized person or persons entered;

(7) [] The premises were not open to members of the public at the time the unauthorized person or persons entered;

(8) [] The declarant understands that a person or persons removed from the premises pursuant to RCW 9A.52.105 may bring a cause of action under RCW 4.24.355 against the declarant for any false statements made in this declaration, and that as a result of such action the declarant may be held liable for actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees;

(9) [] The declarant understands and acknowledges the prohibitions in RCW 59.18.230 and 59.18.290 against taking or detaining an occupant's personal property or removing or excluding an occupant from a dwelling unit or rental premises without an authorizing court order;

(10) [] The declarant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless law enforcement for its actions or omissions made in good faith pursuant to this declaration; and

(11) [] Additional Optional Explanatory Comments:

.....
.....

A declarant of premises who falsely swears on a declaration provided under this section may be guilty of false swearing under RCW 9A.72.040 or of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant under RCW 9A.76.175, both of which are gross misdemeanors. [2017 c 284 § 2.]

**Chapter 9A.56 RCW
THEFT AND ROBBERY**

Sections

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- 9A.56.020 Theft—Definition, defense.
- 9A.56.030 Theft in the first degree.
- 9A.56.040 Theft in the second degree.
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Pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers: RCW 19.60.066.

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Public officer misappropriating funds: RCW 42.20.070, 42.20.090.

Removing native flora from state lands or highways: RCW 47.40.080.

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Search and seizures: Chapter 10.79 RCW.

Stealing, receiving railroad property: RCW 81.60.080.

Stolen property, restoration, sale does not divest rights, duty of officer: RCW 10.79.050.

Sufficiency of indictment or information alleging crime of larceny: RCW 10.37.110.

9A.56.010 Definitions. The following definitions are applicable in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Access device" means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used alone or in conjunction with another access device to obtain money, goods, services, or anything else of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument;

(2) "Appropriate lost or misdelivered property or services" means obtaining or exerting control over the property or services of another which the actor knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under a mistake as to identity of the recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property;

(3) "Beverage crate" means a plastic or metal box-like container used by a manufacturer or distributor in the transportation or distribution of individually packaged beverages to retail outlets, and affixed with language stating "property of," "owned by," or other markings or words identifying ownership;

(4) "By color or aid of deception" means that the deception operated to bring about the obtaining of the property or services; it is not necessary that deception be the sole means of obtaining the property or services;

(5) "Deception" occurs when an actor knowingly:

(a) Creates or confirms another's false impression which the actor knows to be false; or

(b) Fails to correct another's impression which the actor previously has created or confirmed; or

(c) Prevents another from acquiring information material to the disposition of the property involved; or

(d) Transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether that impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of official record; or

(e) Promises performance which the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed;

(6) "Deprive" in addition to its common meaning means to make unauthorized use or an unauthorized copy of records, information, data, trade secrets, or computer programs;

(7) "Mail," in addition to its common meaning, means any letter, postal card, package, bag, or other item that is addressed to a specific address for delivery by the United States postal service or any commercial carrier performing the function of delivering similar items to residences or businesses, provided the mail:

(a)(i) Is addressed with a specific person's name, family name, or company, business, or corporation name on the outside of the item of mail or on the contents inside; and

(ii) Is not addressed to a generic unnamed occupant or resident of the address without an identifiable person, family, or company, business, or corporation name on the outside of the item of mail or on the contents inside; and

(b) Has been left for collection or delivery in any letter box, mailbox, mail receptacle, or other authorized depository for mail, or given to a mail carrier, or left with any private business that provides mailboxes or mail addresses for customers or when left in a similar location for collection or delivery by any commercial carrier; or

(c) Is in transit with a postal service, mail carrier, letter carrier, commercial carrier, or that is at or in a postal vehicle, postal station, mailbox, postal airplane, transit station, or similar location of a commercial carrier; or

(d) Has been delivered to the intended address, but has not been received by the intended addressee.

Mail, for purposes of chapter 164, Laws of 2011, does not include magazines, catalogs, direct mail inserts, newsletters, advertising circulars, or any mail that is considered third-class mail by the United States postal service;

(8) "Mailbox," in addition to its common meaning, means any authorized depository or receptacle of mail for the United States postal service or authorized depository for a commercial carrier that provides services to the general public, including any address to which mail is or can be addressed, or a place where the United States postal service

or equivalent commercial carrier delivers mail to its addressee;

(9) "Merchandise pallet" means a wood or plastic carrier designed and manufactured as an item on which products can be placed before or during transport to retail outlets, manufacturers, or contractors, and affixed with language stating "property of . . .," "owned by . . .," or other markings or words identifying ownership;

(10) "Obtain control over" in addition to its common meaning, means:

(a) In relation to property, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer to the obtainer or another of a legally recognized interest in the property; or

(b) In relation to labor or service, to secure performance thereof for the benefits of the obtainer or another;

(11) "Owner" means a person, other than the actor, who has possession of or any other interest in the property or services involved, and without whose consent the actor has no authority to exert control over the property or services;

(12) "Parking area" means a parking lot or other property provided by retailers for use by a customer for parking an automobile or other vehicle;

(13) "Receive" includes, but is not limited to, acquiring title, possession, control, or a security interest, or any other interest in the property;

(14) "Received by the intended addressee" means that the addressee, owner of the delivery mailbox, or authorized agent has removed the delivered mail from its delivery mailbox;

(15) "Services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional services, transportation services, electronic computer services, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment, the supplying of equipment for use, and the supplying of commodities of a public utility nature such as gas, electricity, steam, and water;

(16) "Shopping cart" means a basket mounted on wheels or similar container generally used in a retail establishment by a customer for the purpose of transporting goods of any kind;

(17) "Stolen" means obtained by theft, robbery, or extortion;

(18) "Subscription television service" means cable or encrypted video and related audio and data services intended for viewing on a home television by authorized members of the public only, who have agreed to pay a fee for the service. Subscription services include but are not limited to those video services presently delivered by coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, terrestrial microwave, television broadcast, and satellite transmission;

(19) "Telecommunication device" means (a) any type of instrument, device, machine, or equipment that is capable of transmitting or receiving telephonic or electronic communications; or (b) any part of such an instrument, device, machine, or equipment, or any computer circuit, computer chip, electronic mechanism, or other component, that is capable of facilitating the transmission or reception of telephonic or electronic communications;

(20) "Telecommunication service" includes any service other than subscription television service provided for a charge or compensation to facilitate the transmission, trans-

fer, or reception of a telephonic communication or an electronic communication;

(21) Value. (a) "Value" means the market value of the property or services at the time and in the approximate area of the criminal act.

(b) Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, written instruments, except those having a readily ascertained market value, shall be evaluated as follows:

(i) The value of an instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a check, draft, or promissory note, shall be deemed the amount due or collectible thereon or thereby, that figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any portion thereof which has been satisfied;

(ii) The value of a ticket or equivalent instrument which evidences a right to receive transportation, entertainment, or other service shall be deemed the price stated thereon, if any; and if no price is stated thereon, the value shall be deemed the price of such ticket or equivalent instrument which the issuer charged the general public;

(iii) The value of any other instrument that creates, releases, discharges, or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege, or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument.

(c) Except as provided in RCW 9A.56.340(4) and 9A.56.350(4), whenever any series of transactions which constitute theft, would, when considered separately, constitute theft in the third degree because of value, and said series of transactions are a part of a criminal episode or a common scheme or plan, then the transactions may be aggregated in one count and the sum of the value of all said transactions shall be the value considered in determining the degree of theft involved.

For purposes of this subsection, "criminal episode" means a series of thefts committed by the same person from one or more mercantile establishments on three or more occasions within a five-day period.

(d) Whenever any person is charged with possessing stolen property and such person has unlawfully in his possession at the same time the stolen property of more than one person, then the stolen property possessed may be aggregated in one count and the sum of the value of all said stolen property shall be the value considered in determining the degree of theft involved. Thefts committed by the same person in different counties that have been aggregated in one county may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the thefts occurred.

(e) Property or services having value that cannot be ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth above shall be deemed to be of a value not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars;

(22) "Vulnerable adult" includes a person eighteen years of age or older who:

(a) Is functionally, mentally, or physically unable to care for himself or herself; or

(b) Is suffering from a cognitive impairment other than voluntary intoxication;

(23) "Wrongfully obtains" or "exerts unauthorized control" means:

(a) To take the property or services of another;

(b) Having any property or services in one's possession, custody or control as bailee, factor, lessee, pledgee, renter, servant, attorney, agent, employee, trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or officer of any person, estate, association, or corporation, or as a public officer, or person authorized by agreement or competent authority to take or hold such possession, custody, or control, to secrete, withhold, or appropriate the same to his or her own use or to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto; or

(c) Having any property or services in one's possession, custody, or control as partner, to secrete, withhold, or appropriate the same to his or her use or to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto, where the use is unauthorized by the partnership agreement. [2017 c 266 § 7; 2011 c 164 § 2; 2006 c 277 § 4; 2002 c 97 § 1; 1999 c 143 § 36; 1998 c 236 § 1; 1997 c 346 § 2; 1995 c 92 § 1; 1987 c 140 § 1; 1986 c 257 § 2; 1985 c 382 § 1; 1984 c 273 § 6; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 8; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.010.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: See note following RCW 9A.42.020.

Intent—2011 c 164: "It is important to the citizens of this state to have confidence in the security of the mail. Mail contains personal information, medical records, and financial documents. Theft of mail has become a serious problem in our state because mail is a key source of information for identity thieves. Currently, there is no law that adequately addresses the seriousness of this crime. This act is intended to accurately recognize the seriousness of taking personal, medical, or financial identifying information and compromising the integrity of our mail system." [2011 c 164 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.020 Theft—Definition, defense. (1) "Theft" means:

(a) To wrongfully obtain or exert unauthorized control over the property or services of another or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services; or

(b) By color or aid of deception to obtain control over the property or services of another or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services; or

(c) To appropriate lost or misdelivered property or services of another, or the value thereof, with intent to deprive him or her of such property or services.

(2) In any prosecution for theft, it shall be a sufficient defense that:

(a) The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable; or

(b) The property was merchandise pallets that were received by a pallet recycler or repairer in the ordinary course of its business. [2004 c 122 § 1; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 9; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.020.]

Civil action for shoplifting by adults, minors: RCW 4.24.230.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.030 Theft in the first degree. (1) Except as provided in RCW 9A.56.400, a person is guilty of theft in the first degree if he or she commits theft of:

(a) Property or services which exceed(s) five thousand dollars in value other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010;

(b) Property of any value, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle, taken from the person of another;

(c) A search and rescue dog, as defined in RCW 9.91.175, while the search and rescue dog is on duty; or

(d) Commercial metal property, nonferrous metal property, or private metal property, as those terms are defined in RCW 19.290.010, and the costs of the damage to the owner's property exceed five thousand dollars in value.

(2) Theft in the first degree is a class B felony. [2017 c 266 § 10; 2013 c 322 § 2; 2012 c 233 § 2; 2009 c 431 § 7; 2007 c 199 § 3; 2005 c 212 § 2; 1995 c 129 § 11 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.030.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: See note following RCW 9A.42.020.

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

Civil action for shoplifting by adults, minors: RCW 4.24.230.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.040 Theft in the second degree. (1) Except as provided in RCW 9A.56.400, a person is guilty of theft in the second degree if he or she commits theft of:

(a) Property or services which exceed(s) seven hundred fifty dollars in value but does not exceed five thousand dollars in value, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle;

(b) A public record, writing, or instrument kept, filed, or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant;

(c) Commercial metal property, nonferrous metal property, or private metal property, as those terms are defined in RCW 19.290.010, and the costs of the damage to the owner's property exceed seven hundred fifty dollars but does not exceed five thousand dollars in value; or

(d) An access device.

(2) Theft in the second degree is a class C felony. [2017 c 266 § 11; 2013 c 322 § 3; 2012 c 233 § 3; 2009 c 431 § 8; 2007 c 199 § 4; 1995 c 129 § 12 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1994 sp.s. c 7 § 433; 1987 c 140 § 2; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 15; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.040.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: See note following RCW 9A.42.020.

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

Finding—Intent—Severability—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.

Civil action for shoplifting by adults, minors: RCW 4.24.230.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.050 Theft in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of theft in the third degree if he or she commits theft of property or services which (a) does not exceed seven hundred fifty dollars in value, or (b) includes ten or more merchandise pallets, or ten or more beverage crates, or a combination of ten or more merchandise pallets and beverage crates.

(2) Theft in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2009 c 431 § 9; 1998 c 236 § 4; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.050.]

Civil action for shoplifting by adults, minors: RCW 4.24.230.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.060 Unlawful issuance of checks or drafts. (1) Any person who shall with intent to defraud, make, or draw, or utter, or deliver to another person any check, or draft, on a bank or other depository for the payment of money, knowing at the time of such drawing, or delivery, that he or she has not sufficient funds in, or credit with the bank or other depository, to meet the check or draft, in full upon its presentation, is guilty of unlawful issuance of bank check. The word "credit" as used herein shall be construed to mean an arrangement or understanding with the bank or other depository for the payment of such check or draft, and the uttering or delivery of such a check or draft to another person without such fund or credit to meet the same shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud.

(2) Any person who shall with intent to defraud, make, or draw, or utter, or deliver to another person any check, or draft on a bank or other depository for the payment of money and who issues a stop-payment order directing the bank or depository on which the check is drawn not to honor the check, and who fails to make payment of money in the amount of the check or draft or otherwise arrange a settlement agreed upon by the holder of the check within twenty days of issuing the check or draft is guilty of unlawful issuance of a bank check.

(3) When any series of transactions which constitute unlawful issuance of a bank check would, when considered separately, constitute unlawful issuance of a bank check in an amount of seven hundred fifty dollars or less because of value, and the series of transactions are a part of a common scheme or plan, the transactions may be aggregated in one count and the sum of the value of all of the transactions shall be the value considered in determining whether the unlawful issuance of a bank check is to be punished as a class C felony or a gross misdemeanor.

(4) Unlawful issuance of a bank check in an amount greater than seven hundred fifty dollars is a class C felony.

(5) Unlawful issuance of a bank check in an amount of seven hundred fifty dollars or less is a gross misdemeanor and shall be punished as follows:

(a) The court shall order the defendant to make full restitution;

(b) The defendant need not be imprisoned, but the court shall impose a fine of up to one thousand one hundred twenty-five dollars for adult offenders. Of the fine imposed, at least three hundred seventy-five dollars or an amount equal to one hundred fifty percent of the amount of the bank check, whichever is greater, shall not be suspended or deferred. Upon conviction for a second offense within any twelve-month period, the court may not suspend or defer any portion of the fine. [2015 c 265 § 18; 2009 c 431 § 10; 1982 c 138 § 1; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 14; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.060.]

Finding—Intent—2015 c 265: See note following RCW 13.50.010.

Maintenance by state treasurer of accounts in amount less than all warrants outstanding not a violation of RCW 9A.56.060(1): RCW 43.08.135.

(2022 Ed.)

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.063 Making or possessing motor vehicle theft tools. (1) Any person who makes or mends, or causes to be made or mended, uses, or has in his or her possession any motor vehicle theft tool, that is adapted, designed, or commonly used for the commission of motor vehicle related theft, under circumstances evincing an intent to use or employ, or allow the same to be used or employed, in the commission of motor vehicle theft, or knowing that the same is intended to be so used, is guilty of making or having motor vehicle theft tools.

(2) For the purpose of this section, motor vehicle theft tool includes, but is not limited to, the following: Slim jim, false master key, master purpose key, altered or shaved key, trial or jiggler key, slide hammer, lock puller, picklock, bit, nipper, any other implement shown by facts and circumstances that is intended to be used in the commission of a motor vehicle related theft, or knowing that the same is intended to be so used.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

(a) "False master" or "master key" is any key or other device made or altered to fit locks or ignitions of multiple vehicles, or vehicles other than that for which the key was originally manufactured.

(b) "Altered or shaved key" is any key so altered, by cutting, filing, or other means, to fit multiple vehicles or vehicles other than the vehicles for which the key was originally manufactured.

(c) "Trial keys" or "jiggler keys" are keys or sets designed or altered to manipulate a vehicle locking mechanism other than the lock for which the key was originally manufactured.

(4) Making or having motor vehicle theft tools is a gross misdemeanor. [2007 c 199 § 18.]

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

9A.56.065 Theft of motor vehicle. (1) A person is guilty of theft of a motor vehicle if he or she commits theft of a motor vehicle.

(2) Theft of a motor vehicle is a class B felony. [2007 c 199 § 2.]

Findings—Intent—2007 c 199: "(1) The legislature finds that:

(a) Automobiles are an essential part of our everyday lives. The west coast is the only region of the United States with an increase of over three percent in motor vehicle thefts over the last several years. The family car is a priority of most individuals and families. The family car is typically the second largest investment a person has next to the home, so when a car is stolen, it causes a significant loss and inconvenience to people, imposes financial hardship, and negatively impacts their work, school, and personal activities. Appropriate and meaningful penalties that are proportionate to the crime committed must be imposed on those who steal motor vehicles;

(b) In Washington, more than one car is stolen every eleven minutes, one hundred thirty-eight cars are stolen every day, someone's car has a one in one hundred seventy-nine chance of being stolen, and more vehicles were stolen in 2005 than in any other previous year. Since 1994, auto theft has increased over fifty-five percent, while other property crimes like burglary are on the decline or holding steady. The national crime insurance bureau reports that Seattle and Tacoma ranked in the top ten places for the most auto thefts, ninth and tenth respectively, in 2004. In 2005, over fifty thousand auto thefts were reported costing Washington citizens more than three hundred twenty-five million dollars in higher insurance rates and lost vehicles. Nearly

eighty percent of these crimes occurred in the central Puget Sound region consisting of the heavily populated areas of King, Pierce, and Snohomish counties;

(c) Law enforcement has determined that auto theft, along with all the grief it causes the immediate victims, is linked more and more to offenders engaged in other crimes. Many stolen vehicles are used by criminals involved in such crimes as robbery, burglary, and assault. In addition, many people who are stopped in stolen vehicles are found to possess the personal identification of other persons, or to possess methamphetamine, precursors to methamphetamine, or equipment used to cook methamphetamine;

(d) Juveniles account for over half of the reported auto thefts with many of these thefts being their first criminal offense. It is critical that they, along with first time adult offenders, are appropriately punished for their crimes. However, it is also important that first time offenders who qualify receive appropriate counseling treatment for associated problems that may have contributed to the commission of the crime, such as drugs, alcohol, and anger management; and

(e) A coordinated and concentrated enforcement mechanism is critical to an effective statewide offensive against motor vehicle theft. Such a system provides for better communications between and among law enforcement agencies, more efficient implementation of efforts to discover, track, and arrest auto thieves, quicker recovery, and the return of stolen vehicles, saving millions of dollars in potential loss to victims and their insurers.

(2) It is the intent of this act to deter motor vehicle theft through a statewide cooperative effort by combating motor vehicle theft through tough laws, supporting law enforcement activities, improving enforcement and administration, effective prosecution, public awareness, and meaningful treatment for first time offenders where appropriate. It is also the intent of the legislature to ensure that adequate funding is provided to implement this act in order for real, observable reductions in the number of auto thefts in Washington state." [2007 c 199 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.068 Possession of stolen vehicle. (1) A person is guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle if he or she possess [possesses] a stolen motor vehicle.

(2) Possession of a stolen motor vehicle is a class B felony. [2007 c 199 § 5.]

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

9A.56.070 Taking motor vehicle without permission in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of taking a motor vehicle without permission in the first degree if he or she, without the permission of the owner or person entitled to possession, intentionally takes or drives away an automobile or motor vehicle, whether propelled by steam, electricity, or internal combustion engine, that is the property of another, and he or she:

(a) Alters the motor vehicle for the purpose of changing its appearance or primary identification, including obscuring, removing, or changing the manufacturer's serial number or the vehicle identification number plates;

(b) Removes, or participates in the removal of, parts from the motor vehicle with the intent to sell the parts;

(c) Exports, or attempts to export, the motor vehicle across state lines or out of the United States for profit;

(d) Intends to sell the motor vehicle; or

(e) Is engaged in a conspiracy and the central object of the conspiratorial agreement is the theft of motor vehicles for sale to others for profit or is engaged in a conspiracy and has solicited a juvenile to participate in the theft of a motor vehicle.

(2) Taking a motor vehicle without permission in the first degree is a class B felony. [2007 c 199 § 16; 2003 c 53 § 72; 2002 c 324 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.070.]

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.075 Taking motor vehicle without permission in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of taking a motor vehicle without permission in the second degree if he or she, without the permission of the owner or person entitled to possession, intentionally takes or drives away any automobile or motor vehicle, whether propelled by steam, electricity, or internal combustion engine, that is the property of another, or he or she voluntarily rides in or upon the automobile or motor vehicle with knowledge of the fact that the automobile or motor vehicle was unlawfully taken.

(2) Taking a motor vehicle without permission in the second degree is a class C felony. [2003 c 53 § 73.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

9A.56.078 Motor vehicle crimes—Civil action. (1) A person who is deprived of his or her motor vehicle because of a violation of RCW 9A.56.030, 9A.56.040, 9A.56.070, or 9A.56.075 may file an action in superior court against the perpetrator for the recovery of actual damages, limited to the value of any damage to the vehicle and any property stolen from the vehicle, civil damages of up to five thousand dollars, and the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, service of any summons or other process under this section shall be by personal service.

(b)(i) If the defendant cannot be found after a due and diligent search, the defendant's violation of RCW 9A.56.030, 9A.56.040, 9A.56.070, or 9A.56.075 shall be deemed to constitute an appointment by the defendant of the secretary of state of the state of Washington to be his or her true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful summons and processes against him or her under this section. The plaintiff shall perform the service allowed under this subsection (2)(b)(i) by leaving two copies of the summons or other process with the secretary of state or at the secretary of state's office. Service in this manner constitutes sufficient and valid personal service upon the defendant.

(ii) After performing service under (b)(i) of this subsection, the plaintiff shall promptly send notice of service under (b)(i) of this subsection and a copy of the summons or process to the defendant by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to the defendant's last known address. After complying with this subsection (2)(b)(ii), the plaintiff shall file the following with the secretary of state to be attached to the summons or process filed under (b)(i) of this subsection:

(A) An affidavit from the plaintiff attesting to compliance with (b)(ii) of this subsection; and

(B) An affidavit from the plaintiff's attorney that he or she has, with due diligence, attempted to serve personal process upon the defendant at all addresses known to him or her and listing the addresses at which he or she attempted to personally serve the defendant. However, if the defendant's endorsed return receipt is received, then the affidavit need

only show that the defendant received personal service by mail.

(iii) The secretary of state shall send, by prepaid mail, a copy of the summons or process received under (b)(i) of this subsection to the defendant's address, if known. The secretary of state shall keep a record that shows the day of service of all summons and processes made under (b)(i) of this subsection.

(iv) The court in which an action is brought under this section may order continuances as may be necessary to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to defend the action.

(v) The secretary of state may charge a fee for his or her services under (b) of this subsection. The fee shall be part of the costs of suit that may be awarded to the plaintiff.

(3) The department of licensing shall suspend the driver's license or driving privilege of a defendant until any monetary obligation imposed under subsection (1) of this section is paid in full, unless the defendant has entered into a payment plan under subsection (4) of this section.

(4) If the court determines that a person is not able to pay a monetary obligation made under subsection (1) of this section in full, the court may enter into a payment plan with the person. If the person fails to meet the obligations of the payment plan, the court may modify or revoke the plan and order the defendant to pay the obligation in full. If the court revokes the plan, it shall notify the department of licensing and the department of licensing shall suspend the driver's license or driving privilege of the defendant until the monetary obligation is paid in full.

(5) The court shall notify the department of licensing when the monetary obligation of a defendant whose license is suspended under this section is paid in full. [2007 c 393 § 1.]

9A.56.080 Theft of livestock in the first degree. (1)

Every person who, with intent to sell or exchange and to deprive or defraud the lawful owner thereof, willfully takes, leads, or transports away, conceals, withholds, slaughters, or otherwise appropriates any horse, mule, cow, heifer, bull, steer, swine, goat, or sheep is guilty of theft of livestock in the first degree.

(2) Theft of livestock in the first degree is a class B felony. [2005 c 419 § 1; 2003 c 53 § 74; 1986 c 257 § 32; 1977 ex.s. c 174 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.080.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Action by owner of damaged or stolen livestock: RCW 4.24.320.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.083 Theft of livestock in the second degree. (1)

A person who commits what would otherwise be theft of livestock in the first degree but without intent to sell or exchange, and for the person's own use only, is guilty of theft of livestock in the second degree.

(2) Theft of livestock in the second degree is a class C felony. [2003 c 53 § 75.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

9A.56.085 Minimum fine for theft of livestock. (1)

Whenever an adult offender is convicted of a violation of RCW 9A.56.080 or 9A.56.083, the convicting court shall

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order the person to pay the amount of two thousand dollars for each animal killed or possessed.

(2) For the purpose of this section, the term "convicted" includes a plea of guilty, a finding of guilt regardless of whether the imposition of the sentence is deferred or any part of the penalty is suspended, or the levying of a fine.

(3) If two or more persons are convicted of any violation of this section, the amount required under this section shall be imposed upon them jointly and severally.

(4) The fine in this section shall be imposed in addition to and regardless of any penalty, including fines or costs, that is provided for any violation of this section. The amount imposed by this section shall be included by the court in any pronouncement of sentence and may not be suspended, waived, modified, or deferred in any respect. Nothing in this section may be construed to abridge or alter alternative rights of action or remedies in equity or under common law or statutory law, criminal or civil.

(5) A defaulted payment or any installment payment may be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of orders of the court or collection of a fine or costs, including vacation of a deferral of sentencing or of a suspension of sentence.

(6) The two thousand dollars additional penalty shall be remitted by the county treasurer to the state treasurer as provided under RCW 10.82.070. [2015 c 265 § 19; 2003 c 53 § 76; 1989 c 131 § 1.]

Finding—Intent—2015 c 265: See note following RCW 13.50.010.

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

9A.56.096 Theft of rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property. (1)

A person who, with intent to deprive the owner or owner's agent, wrongfully obtains, or exerts unauthorized control over, or by color or aid of deception gains control of personal property that is rented, leased, or loaned by written agreement to the person, is guilty of theft of rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property.

(2) The finder of fact may presume intent to deprive if the finder of fact finds either of the following:

(a) That the person who rented or leased the property failed to return or make arrangements acceptable to the owner of the property or the owner's agent to return the property to the owner or the owner's agent within seventy-two hours after receipt of proper notice following the due date of the rental, lease, lease-purchase, or loan agreement; or

(b) That the renter, lessee, or borrower presented identification to the owner or the owner's agent that was materially false, fictitious, or not current with respect to name, address, place of employment, or other appropriate items.

(3) As used in subsection (2) of this section, "proper notice" consists of a written demand by the owner or the owner's agent made after the due date of the rental, lease, lease-purchase, or loan period, mailed by certified or registered mail to the renter, lessee, or borrower at: (a) The address the renter, lessee, or borrower gave when the contract was made; or (b) the renter, lessee, or borrower's last known address if later furnished in writing by the renter, lessee, borrower, or the agent of the renter, lessee, or borrower.

(4) The replacement value of the property obtained must be utilized in determining the amount involved in the theft of rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property.

(5)(a) Theft of rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property is a class B felony if the rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property is valued at five thousand dollars or more.

(b) Theft of rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property is a class C felony if the rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property is valued at seven hundred fifty dollars or more but less than five thousand dollars.

(c) Theft of rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property is a gross misdemeanor if the rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property is valued at less than seven hundred fifty dollars.

(6) The crime of theft of rental, leased, lease-purchased, or loaned property may be deemed to have been committed either at the physical location where the written agreement for the rental, lease, lease-purchase, or loan of the property was executed under subsection (1) of this section, or at the address where proper notice may be mailed to the renter, lessee, or borrower under subsection (3) of this section.

(7) This section applies to rental agreements that provide that the renter may return the property any time within the rental period and pay only for the time the renter actually retained the property, in addition to any minimum rental fee, to lease agreements, to lease-purchase agreements as defined under RCW 63.19.010, and to vehicles loaned to prospective purchasers borrowing a vehicle by written agreement from a motor vehicle dealer licensed under chapter 46.70 RCW. This section does not apply to rental or leasing of real property under the residential landlord-tenant act, chapter 59.18 RCW. [2012 c 30 § 1; 2009 c 431 § 11; 2007 c 199 § 17; 2003 c 53 § 77; 1997 c 346 § 1.]

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.100 Theft and larceny equated. All offenses defined as larcenies outside of this title shall be treated as thefts as provided in this title. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.100.]

9A.56.110 Extortion—Definition. "Extortion" means knowingly to obtain or attempt to obtain by threat property or services of the owner, and specifically includes sexual favors. [1999 c 143 § 37; 1983 1st ex.s. c 4 § 2; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 10. Prior: 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.110.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.120 Extortion in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of extortion in the first degree if he or she commits extortion by means of a threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(27) (a), (b), or (c).

(2) Extortion in the first degree is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 377; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.120.]

*Reviser's note: RCW 9A.04.110 was amended by 2011 c 166 § 2, changing subsection (27) to subsection (28).

9A.56.130 Extortion in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he or she commits extortion by means of a wrongful threat as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(28) (d) through (j).

(2) In any prosecution under this section based on a threat to accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against any person, it is a defense that the actor reasonably believed the threatened criminal charge to be true and that his or her sole purpose was to compel or induce the person threatened to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened criminal charge.

(3) Extortion in the second degree is a class C felony. [2018 c 22 § 5; 2002 c 47 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.130.]

Explanatory statement—2018 c 22: See note following RCW 1.20.051.

Intent—2002 c 47: "The legislature intends to revise the crime of extortion in the second degree in response to the holding in *State v. Pauling*, 108 Wn. App. 445 (2001), by adding a requirement that the threat required for conviction of the offense be wrongful." [2002 c 47 § 1.]

9A.56.140 Possessing stolen property—Definition—Presumption. (1) "Possessing stolen property" means knowingly to receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto.

(2) The fact that the person who stole the property has not been convicted, apprehended, or identified is not a defense to a charge of possessing stolen property.

(3) When a person has in his or her possession, or under his or her control, stolen access devices issued in the names of two or more persons, or ten or more stolen merchandise pallets, or ten or more stolen beverage crates, or a combination of ten or more stolen merchandise pallets and beverage crates, as defined under RCW 9A.56.010, he or she is presumed to know that they are stolen.

(4) The presumption in subsection (3) of this section is rebuttable by evidence raising a reasonable inference that the possession of such stolen access devices, merchandise pallets, or beverage crates was without knowledge that they were stolen.

(5) In any prosecution for possessing stolen property, it is a sufficient defense that the property was merchandise pallets that were received by a pallet recycler or repairer in the ordinary course of its business. [2004 c 122 § 2; 1998 c 236 § 3; 1987 c 140 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.140.]

9A.56.150 Possessing stolen property in the first degree—Other than firearm or motor vehicle. (1) A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the first degree if he or she possesses stolen property, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9A.41.010 or a motor vehicle, which exceeds five thousand dollars in value.

(2) Possessing stolen property in the first degree is a class B felony. [2009 c 431 § 12; 2007 c 199 § 6; 1995 c 129 § 14 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.150.]

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.160 Possessing stolen property in the second degree—Other than firearm or motor vehicle. (1) A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second degree if:

(a) He or she possesses stolen property, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle, which exceeds seven hundred fifty dollars in value but does not exceed five thousand dollars in value; or

(b) He or she possesses a stolen public record, writing or instrument kept, filed, or deposited according to law; or

(c) He or she possesses a stolen access device.

(2) Possessing stolen property in the second degree is a class C felony. [2009 c 431 § 13; 2007 c 199 § 7; 1995 c 129 § 15 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1994 sp.s. c 7 § 434; 1987 c 140 § 4; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.160.]

Findings—Intent—Short title—2007 c 199: See notes following RCW 9A.56.065.

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

Finding—Intent—Severability—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.170 Possessing stolen property in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the third degree if he or she possesses (a) stolen property which does not exceed seven hundred fifty dollars in value, or (b) ten or more stolen merchandise pallets, or ten or more stolen beverage crates, or a combination of ten or more stolen merchandise pallets and beverage crates.

(2) Possessing stolen property in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2009 c 431 § 14; 1998 c 236 § 2; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.170.]

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.180 Obscuring the identity of a machine. (1) A person is guilty of obscuring the identity of a machine if he or she knowingly:

(a) Obscures the manufacturer's serial number or any other distinguishing identification number or mark upon any vehicle, machine, engine, apparatus, appliance, or other device with intent to render it unidentifiable; or

(b) Possesses a vehicle, machine, engine, apparatus, appliance, or other device held for sale knowing that the serial number or other identification number or mark has been obscured.

(2) "Obscure" means to remove, deface, cover, alter, destroy, or otherwise render unidentifiable.

(3) Obscuring the identity of a machine is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 378; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 11; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.180.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

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9A.56.190 Robbery—Definition. A person commits robbery when he or she unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his or her property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear. [2011 c 336 § 379; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.190.]

9A.56.200 Robbery in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if:

(a) In the commission of a robbery or of immediate flight therefrom, he or she:

(i) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or

(ii) Displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon; or

(iii) Inflicts bodily injury; or

(b) He or she commits a robbery within and against a financial institution as defined in RCW 7.88.010 or 35.38.060.

(2) Robbery in the first degree is a class A felony. [2002 c 85 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.200.]

9A.56.210 Robbery in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree if he or she commits robbery.

(2) Robbery in the second degree is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 380; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.56.210.]

9A.56.220 Theft of subscription television services. (1) A person is guilty of theft of subscription television services if, with intent to avoid payment of the lawful charge of a subscription television service, he or she:

(a) Obtains or attempts to obtain subscription television service from a subscription television service company by trick, artifice, deception, use of a device or decoder, or other fraudulent means without authority from the company providing the service;

(b) Assists or instructs a person in obtaining or attempting to obtain subscription television service without authority of the company providing the service;

(c) Makes or maintains a connection or connections, whether physical, electrical, mechanical, acoustical, or by other means, with cables, wires, components, or other devices used for the distribution of subscription television services without authority from the company providing the services;

(d) Makes or maintains a modification or alteration to a device installed with the authorization of a subscription television service company for the purpose of interception or receiving a program or other service carried by the company that the person is not authorized by the company to receive; or

(e) Possesses without authority a device designed in whole or in part to receive subscription television services

offered for sale by the subscription television service company, regardless of whether the program or services are encoded, filtered, scrambled, or otherwise made unintelligible, or to perform or facilitate the performance of any other acts set out in (a) through (d) of this subsection for the reception of subscription television services without authority.

(2) Theft of subscription television services is a gross misdemeanor. [1995 c 92 § 2; 1989 c 11 § 1; 1985 c 430 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.230 Unlawful sale of subscription television services. (1) A person is guilty of unlawful sale of subscription television services if, with intent to avoid payment or to facilitate the avoidance of payment of the lawful charge for any subscription television service, he or she, without authorization from the subscription television service company:

(a) Publishes or advertises for sale a plan for a device that is designed in whole or in part to receive subscription television or services offered for sale by the subscription television service company, regardless of whether the programming or services are encoded, filtered, scrambled, or otherwise made unintelligible;

(b) Advertises for sale or lease a device or kit for a device designed in whole or in part to receive subscription television services offered for sale by the subscription television service company, regardless of whether the programming or services are encoded, filtered, scrambled, or otherwise made unintelligible; or

(c) Manufactures, imports into the state of Washington, distributes, sells, leases, or offers for sale or lease a device, plan, or kit for a device designed in whole or in part to receive subscription television services offered for sale by the subscription television service company, regardless of whether the programming or services are encoded, filtered, scrambled, or otherwise made unintelligible.

(2) Unlawful sale of subscription television services is a class C felony. [1995 c 92 § 3; 1985 c 430 § 2.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.240 Forfeiture and disposal of device used to commit violation. Upon conviction of theft or unlawful sale of cable television services and upon motion and hearing, the court shall order the forfeiture of any decoder, descrambler, or other device used in committing the violation of RCW 9A.56.220 or 9A.56.230 as contraband and dispose of it at the court's discretion. [1985 c 430 § 3.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.250 Civil cause of action. (1) In addition to the criminal penalties provided in RCW 9A.56.220 and 9A.56.230, there is created a civil cause of action for theft of subscription television services and for unlawful sale of subscription television services.

(2) A person who sustains injury to his or her person, business, or property by an act described in RCW 9A.56.220 or 9A.56.230 may file an action in superior court for recovery of damages and the costs of the suit, including reasonable investigative and attorneys' fees and costs.

(3) Upon finding a violation of RCW 9A.56.220 or 9A.56.230, in addition to the remedies described in this sec-

tion, the court may impose a civil penalty not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars.

(4) The superior court may grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain violations of RCW 9A.56.220 and 9A.56.230. [1995 c 92 § 4; 1985 c 430 § 4.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.260 Connection of channel converter. No person may be charged with theft under RCW 9A.56.220 or subject to a civil cause of action under RCW 9A.56.250 for connecting a nondecoding or nondescrambling channel frequency converter, which includes cable-ready television sets, video recorders, or similar equipment, to a cable system. [1985 c 430 § 5.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.262 Theft of telecommunication services. (1) A person is guilty of theft of telecommunication services if he or she knowingly and with intent to avoid payment:

(a) Uses a telecommunication device to obtain telecommunication services without having entered into a prior agreement with a telecommunication service provider to pay for the telecommunication services; or

(b) Possesses a telecommunication device.

(2) Theft of telecommunication services is a class C felony. [1995 c 92 § 6.]

Telecommunications crime: Chapter 9.26A RCW.

9A.56.264 Unlawful manufacture of telecommunication device. (1) A person is guilty of unlawful manufacture of a telecommunication device if he or she knowingly and with intent to avoid payment or to facilitate avoidance of payment:

(a) Manufactures, produces, or assembles a telecommunication device;

(b) Modifies, alters, programs, or reprograms a telecommunication device to be capable of acquiring or of facilitating the acquisition of telecommunication service without the consent of the telecommunication service provider; or

(c) Writes, creates, or modifies a computer program that he or she knows is thereby capable of being used to manufacture a telecommunication device.

(2) Unlawful manufacture of a telecommunication device is a class C felony. [1995 c 92 § 7.]

Telecommunications crime: Chapter 9.26A RCW.

9A.56.266 Unlawful sale of telecommunication device. (1) A person is guilty of unlawful sale of a telecommunication device if he or she sells, leases, exchanges, or offers to sell, lease, or exchange:

(a) A telecommunication device, knowing that the purchaser, lessee, or recipient, or a third person, intends to use the device to avoid payment or to facilitate avoidance of payment for telecommunication services; or

(b) Any material, including data, computer software, or other information and equipment, knowing that the purchaser, lessee, or recipient, or a third person, intends to use the material to avoid payment or to facilitate avoidance of payment for telecommunication services.

(2) Unlawful sale of a telecommunication device is a class C felony. [1995 c 92 § 8.]

Telecommunications crime: Chapter 9.26A RCW.

9A.56.268 Civil cause of action. (1) In addition to the criminal penalties provided in RCW 9A.56.262 through 9A.56.266, there is created a civil cause of action for theft of telecommunication services, for unlawful manufacture of a telecommunication device, and for unlawful sale of a telecommunication device.

(2) A person who sustains injury to his or her person, business, or property by an act described in RCW 9A.56.262, 9A.56.264, or 9A.56.266 may file an action in superior court for recovery of damages and the costs of the suit, including reasonable investigative and attorneys' fees and costs.

(3) Upon finding a violation of 9A.56.262, 9A.56.264, or 9A.56.266, in addition to the remedies described in this section, the court may impose a civil penalty not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars.

(4) The superior court may grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain violations of RCW 9A.56.262 through 9A.56.266. [1995 c 92 § 9.]

Telecommunications crime: Chapter 9.26A RCW.

9A.56.270 Shopping cart theft. (1) It is unlawful to do any of the following acts, if a shopping cart has a permanently affixed sign as provided in subsection (2) of this section:

(a) To remove a shopping cart from the parking area of a retail establishment with the intent to deprive the owner of the shopping cart the use of the cart; or

(b) To be in possession of any shopping cart that has been removed from the parking area of a retail establishment with the intent to deprive the owner of the shopping cart the use of the cart.

(2) This section shall apply only when a shopping cart: (a) Has a sign permanently affixed to it that identifies the owner of the cart or the retailer, or both; (b) notifies the public of the procedure to be utilized for authorized removal of the cart from the premises; (c) notifies the public that the unauthorized removal of the cart from the premises or parking area of the retail establishment, or the unauthorized possession of the cart, is unlawful; and (d) lists a telephone number or address for returning carts removed from the premises or parking area to the owner or retailer.

(3) Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor. [1985 c 382 § 2.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.280 Credit, debit cards, checks, etc.—Definitions. As used in RCW 9A.56.280, 9A.56.290, 9A.60.020, 9A.56.320, and 9A.56.330, unless the context requires otherwise:

(1) "Cardholder" means a person to whom a credit card or payment card is issued or a person who otherwise is authorized to use a credit card or payment card.

(2) "Check" means a negotiable instrument that meets the definition of "check" under RCW 62A.3-104 or a blank form instrument that would meet the definition of "check" under RCW 62A.3-104 if it were completed and signed.

(3) "Credit card" means a card, plate, booklet, credit card number, credit card account number, or other identifying symbol, instrument, or device that can be used to pay for, or to obtain on credit, goods or services.

(4) "Credit card or payment card transaction" means a sale or other transaction in which a credit card or payment card is used to pay for, or to obtain on credit, goods or services.

(5) "Credit card or payment card transaction record" means a record or evidence of a credit card or payment card transaction, including, without limitation, a paper, sales draft, instrument, or other writing and an electronic or magnetic transmission or record.

(6) "Debit card" means a card used to obtain goods or services by a transaction that debits the cardholder's account, rather than extending credit.

(7) "Financial information" means financial information as defined in RCW 9.35.005.

(8) "Financial institution" means a bank, trust company, mutual savings bank, savings and loan association, or credit union authorized under state or federal law to do business and accept deposits in Washington.

(9) "Means of identification" means means of identification as defined in RCW 9.35.005.

(10) "Merchant" means an owner or operator of any retail mercantile establishment or any agent, employee, lessee, consignee, officer, director, franchisee, or independent contractor of such owner or operator. "Merchant" also means a person who receives from an authorized user, a payment card or information from a payment card, or what the person believes to be a payment card or information from a payment card, as the instrument for obtaining, purchasing, or receiving goods, services, money, or anything else of value from the person.

(11) "Payment card" means a credit card, charge card, debit card, stored value card, or any card that is issued to an authorized card user and that allows the user to obtain goods, services, money, or anything else of value from a merchant.

(12) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, trust, or unincorporated association, but does not include a financial institution or its authorized employees, representatives, or agents.

(13) "Personal identification" means any driver's license, passport, or identification card actually or purportedly issued by any federal, state, local or foreign governmental entity; any credit card or debit card; or any employee identification card actually or purportedly issued by any employer, public or private, including but not limited to a badge or identification or access card.

(14) "Reencoder" means an electronic device that places encoded information from a payment card onto a different payment card.

(15) "Scanning device" means a scanner, reader, or any other electronic device that is used to access, read, scan, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily or permanently, information encoded on a payment card. [2003 c 119 § 3; 2003 c 52 § 1; 1993 c 484 § 1.]

Reviser's note: This section was amended by 2003 c 52 § 1 and by 2003 c 119 § 3, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).

9A.56.290 Credit, payment cards—Unlawful factoring of transactions. (1) A person commits the crime of unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction if the person:

(a) Uses a scanning device to access, read, obtain, memorize, or store, temporarily or permanently, information encoded on a payment card without the permission of the authorized user of the payment card or with the intent to defraud the authorized user, another person, or a financial institution;

(b) Uses a reencoder to place information encoded on a payment card onto a different card without the permission of the authorized issuer of the card from which the information is being reencoded or with the intent to defraud the authorized user, another person, or a financial institution;

(c) Presents to or deposits with, or causes another to present to or deposit with, a financial institution for payment a credit card or payment card transaction record that is not the result of a credit card or payment card transaction between the cardholder and the person;

(d) Employs, solicits, or otherwise causes a merchant or an employee, representative, or agent of a merchant to present to or deposit with a financial institution for payment a credit card or payment card transaction record that is not the result of a credit card or payment card transaction between the cardholder and the merchant; or

(e) Employs, solicits, or otherwise causes another to become a merchant for purposes of engaging in conduct made unlawful by this section.

(2) Normal transactions conducted by or through airline reporting corporation-appointed travel agents or cruise-only travel agents recognized by passenger cruise lines are not considered factoring for the purposes of this section.

(3) In a proceeding under this section that is related to an identity theft under RCW 9.35.020, the crime will be considered to have been committed in any locality where the person whose means of identification or financial information was appropriated resides, or in which any part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in that locality.

(4)(a) Unlawful factoring of a credit card or payment card transaction is a class C felony.

(b) A second or subsequent violation of subsection (1) of this section is a class B felony. [2003 c 119 § 4; 2003 c 52 § 2; 1993 c 484 § 2.]

Reviser's note: This section was amended by 2003 c 52 § 2 and by 2003 c 119 § 4, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).

9A.56.300 Theft of a firearm. (1) A person is guilty of theft of a firearm if he or she commits a theft of any firearm.

(2) This section applies regardless of the value of the firearm taken in the theft.

(3) Each firearm taken in the theft under this section is a separate offense.

(4) The definition of "theft" and the defense allowed against the prosecution for theft under RCW 9A.56.020 shall apply to the crime of theft of a firearm.

(5) As used in this section, "firearm" means any firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010.

(6) Theft of a firearm is a class B felony. [1995 c 129 § 10 (Initiative Measure No. 159); 1994 sp.s. c 7 § 432.]

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

Finding—Intent—Severability—1994 sp.s. c 7: See notes following RCW 43.70.540.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.310 Possessing a stolen firearm. (1) A person is guilty of possessing a stolen firearm if he or she possesses, carries, delivers, sells, or is in control of a stolen firearm.

(2) This section applies regardless of the stolen firearm's value.

(3) Each stolen firearm possessed under this section is a separate offense.

(4) The definition of "possessing stolen property" and the defense allowed against the prosecution for possessing stolen property under RCW 9A.56.140 shall apply to the crime of possessing a stolen firearm.

(5) As used in this section, "firearm" means any firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010.

(6) Possessing a stolen firearm is a class B felony. [1995 c 129 § 13 (Initiative Measure No. 159).]

Findings and intent—Short title—Severability—Captions not law—1995 c 129: See notes following RCW 9.94A.510.

9A.56.320 Financial fraud—Unlawful possession, production of instruments of. (1) A person is guilty of unlawful production of payment instruments if he or she prints or produces a check or other payment instrument in the name of a person or entity, or with the routing number or account number of a person or entity, without the permission of the person or entity to manufacture or reproduce such payment instrument with such name, routing number, or account number.

(2)(a) A person is guilty of unlawful possession of payment instruments if he or she possesses two or more checks or other payment instruments, alone or in combination:

(i) In the name of a person or entity, or with the routing number or account number of a person or entity, without the permission of the person or entity to possess such payment instrument, and with intent either to deprive the person of possession of such payment instrument or to commit theft, forgery, or identity theft; or

(ii) In the name of a fictitious person or entity, or with a fictitious routing number or account number of a person or entity, with intent to use the payment instruments to commit theft, forgery, or identity theft.

(b) (a)(i) of this subsection does not apply to:

(i) A person or financial institution that has lawful possession of a check, which is endorsed to that person or financial institution; and

(ii) A person or financial institution that processes checks for a lawful business purpose.

(3) A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a personal identification device if the person possesses a personal identification device with intent to use such device to commit theft, forgery, or identity theft. "Personal identification device" includes any machine or instrument whose purpose is to manufacture or print any driver's license or identification card issued by any state or the federal government, or any

employee identification issued by any employer, public or private, including but not limited to badges and identification cards, or any credit or debit card.

(4) A person is guilty of unlawful possession of fictitious identification if the person possesses a personal identification card with a fictitious person's identification with intent to use such identification card to commit theft, forgery, or identity theft, when the possession does not amount to a violation of RCW 9.35.020.

(5) A person is guilty of unlawful possession of instruments of financial fraud if the person possesses a check-making machine, equipment, or software, with intent to use or distribute checks for purposes of defrauding an account holder, business, financial institution, or any other person or organization.

(6) This section does not apply to:

(a) A person, business, or other entity, that has lawful possession of a check, which is endorsed to that person, business, or other entity;

(b) A financial institution or other entity that processes checks for a lawful business purpose;

(c) A person engaged in a lawful business who obtains another person's personal identification in the ordinary course of that lawful business;

(d) A person who obtains another person's personal identification for the sole purpose of misrepresenting his or her age; and

(e) A law enforcement agency that produces or displays counterfeit credit or debit cards, checks or other payment instruments, or personal identification devices for investigative or educational purposes.

(7) In a proceeding under this section that is related to an identity theft under RCW 9.35.020, the crime will be considered to have been committed in any locality where the person whose means of identification or financial information was appropriated resides, or in which any part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in that locality.

(8) A violation of this section is a class C felony. [2003 c 119 § 1.]

9A.56.330 Possession of another's identification. (1)

A person is guilty of possession of another's identification if the person knowingly possesses personal identification bearing another person's identity, when the person possessing the personal identification does not have the other person's permission to possess it, and when the possession does not amount to a violation of RCW 9.35.020.

(2) This section does not apply to:

(a) A person who obtains, by means other than theft, another person's personal identification for the sole purpose of misrepresenting his or her age;

(b) A person engaged in a lawful business who obtains another person's personal identification in the ordinary course of business;

(c) A person who finds another person's lost personal identification, does not intend to deprive the other person of the personal identification or to use it to commit a crime, and takes reasonably prompt steps to return it to its owner; and

(d) A law enforcement agency that produces or displays counterfeit credit or debit cards, checks or other payment

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instruments, or personal identification for investigative or educational purposes.

(3) In a proceeding under this section that is related to an identity theft under RCW 9.35.020, the crime will be considered to have been committed in any locality where the person whose means of identification or financial information was appropriated resides, or in which any part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in that locality.

(4) A violation of this section is a gross misdemeanor. [2003 c 119 § 2.]

9A.56.340 Theft with the intent to resell. (1) A person is guilty of theft with the intent to resell if he or she commits theft of property with a value of at least two hundred fifty dollars from a mercantile establishment with the intent to resell the property for monetary or other gain.

(2) The person is guilty of theft with the intent to resell in the first degree if the property has a value of one thousand five hundred dollars or more. Theft with the intent to resell in the first degree is a class B felony.

(3) The person is guilty of theft with the intent to resell in the second degree if the property has a value of at least two hundred fifty dollars, but less than one thousand five hundred dollars. Theft with the intent to resell in the second degree is a class C felony.

(4) For purposes of this section, a series of thefts committed by the same person from one or more mercantile establishments over a period of one hundred eighty days may be aggregated in one count and the sum of the value of all the property shall be the value considered in determining the degree of the theft with the intent to resell involved. Thefts committed by the same person in different counties that have been aggregated in one county may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the thefts occurred. [2006 c 277 § 1.]

9A.56.350 Organized retail theft. (1) A person is guilty of organized retail theft if he or she:

(a) Commits theft of property with a value of at least seven hundred fifty dollars from a mercantile establishment with an accomplice;

(b) Possesses stolen property, as defined in RCW 9A.56.140, with a value of at least seven hundred fifty dollars from a mercantile establishment with an accomplice;

(c) Commits theft of property with a cumulative value of at least seven hundred fifty dollars from one or more mercantile establishments within a period of up to one hundred eighty days; or

(d) Commits theft of property with a cumulative value of at least seven hundred fifty dollars from a mercantile establishment with no less than six accomplices and makes or sends at least one electronic communication seeking participation in the theft in the course of planning or commission of the theft. For the purposes of this subsection, "electronic communication" has the same meaning as defined in *RCW 9.61.260(5).

(2) A person is guilty of organized retail theft in the first degree if the property stolen or possessed has a value of five thousand dollars or more. Organized retail theft in the first degree is a class B felony.

(3) A person is guilty of organized retail theft in the second degree if the property stolen or possessed has a value of at least seven hundred fifty dollars, but less than five thousand dollars. Organized retail theft in the second degree is a class C felony.

(4) For purposes of this section, a series of thefts committed by the same person from one or more mercantile establishments over a period of one hundred eighty days may be aggregated in one count and the sum of the value of all the property shall be the value considered in determining the degree of the organized retail theft involved. Theft committed by the same person in different counties that have been aggregated in one county may be prosecuted in any county in which any one of the thefts occurred. For purposes of subsection (1)(d) of this section, thefts committed by the principal and accomplices may be aggregated into one count and the value of all the property shall be the value considered in determining the degree of organized retail theft involved.

(5) The mercantile establishment or establishments whose property is alleged to have been stolen may request that the charge be aggregated with other thefts of property about which the mercantile establishment or establishments is aware. In the event a request to aggregate the prosecution is declined, the mercantile establishment or establishments shall be promptly advised by the prosecuting jurisdiction making the decision to decline aggregating the prosecution of the decision and the reasons for such decision. [2017 c 329 § 1; 2009 c 431 § 15; 2006 c 277 § 2.]

***Reviser's note:** RCW 9A.56.260 was recodified as RCW 9A.90.120 pursuant to 2022 c 231 § 4 and amended by 2022 c 231 § 1, changing subsection (5) to subsection (8).

Property crime database, liability: RCW 4.24.340.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.56.360 Retail theft with special circumstances.

(1) A person commits retail theft with special circumstances if he or she commits theft of property from a mercantile establishment with one of the following special circumstances:

(a) To facilitate the theft, the person leaves the mercantile establishment through a designated emergency exit;

(b) The person was, at the time of the theft, in possession of an item, article, implement, or device used, under circumstances evincing an intent to use or employ, or designed to overcome security systems including, but not limited to, lined bags or tag removers; or

(c) The person committed theft at three or more separate and distinct mercantile establishments within a one hundred eighty-day period.

(2) A person is guilty of retail theft with special circumstances in the first degree if the theft involved constitutes theft in the first degree. Retail theft with special circumstances in the first degree is a class B felony.

(3) A person is guilty of retail theft with special circumstances in the second degree if the theft involved constitutes theft in the second degree. Retail theft with special circumstances in the second degree is a class C felony.

(4) A person is guilty of retail theft with special circumstances in the third degree if the theft involved constitutes theft in the third degree. Retail theft with special circumstances in the third degree is a class C felony.

(5) For the purposes of this section, "special circumstances" means the particular aggravating circumstances described in subsection (1)(a) through (c) of this section.

(6)(a) A series of thefts committed by the same person from one or more mercantile establishments over a period of one hundred eighty days may be aggregated in one count and the sum of the value of all the property shall be the value considered in determining the degree of the retail theft with special circumstances involved. Theft committed by the same person in different counties that have been aggregated in one county may be prosecuted in any county in which any one of the thefts occurred. In no case may an aggregated series of thefts, or a single theft that has been aggregated in one county, be prosecuted in more than one county.

(b) The mercantile establishment or establishments whose property is alleged to have been stolen may request that the charge be aggregated with other thefts of property about which the mercantile establishment or establishments is aware. In the event a request to aggregate the prosecution is declined, the mercantile establishment or establishments shall be promptly advised by the prosecuting jurisdiction making the decision to decline aggregating the prosecution of the decision and the reasons for the decision. [2017 c 224 § 1; 2013 c 153 § 1; 2006 c 277 § 3.]

Effective date—2013 c 153: "This act takes effect January 1, 2014." [2013 c 153 § 3.]

9A.56.370 Mail theft. (1) A person is guilty of mail theft if he or she: (a) Commits theft of mail addressed to three or more different addresses; and (b) commits theft of a minimum of ten separate pieces of mail.

(2) Each set of ten separate pieces of stolen mail addressed to three or more different mailboxes constitutes a separate and distinct crime and may be punished accordingly.

(3) Mail theft is a class C felony. [2011 c 164 § 3.]

Intent—2011 c 164: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.

9A.56.380 Possession of stolen mail. (1) A person is guilty of possession of stolen mail if he or she: (a) Possesses stolen mail addressed to three or more different mailboxes; and (b) possesses a minimum of ten separate pieces of stolen mail.

(2) "Possesses stolen mail" means to knowingly receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen mail knowing that it has been stolen, and to withhold or appropriate to the use of any person other than the true owner, or the person to whom the mail is addressed.

(3) The fact that the person who stole the mail has not been convicted, apprehended, or identified is not a defense to the charge of possessing stolen mail.

(4) Each set of ten separate pieces of stolen mail addressed to three or more different mailboxes constitutes a separate and distinct crime and may be punished accordingly.

(5) Possession of stolen mail is a class C felony. [2011 c 164 § 4.]

Intent—2011 c 164: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.

9A.56.390 Mail theft—Possession of stolen mail—Commission of other crime. Every person who, in the commission of mail theft or possession of stolen mail, shall commit any other crime, may be punished therefor as well as for

the mail theft or possession of stolen mail, and may be prosecuted for each crime separately. [2011 c 164 § 5.]

Intent—2011 c 164: See note following RCW 9A.56.010.

9A.56.400 Theft from a vulnerable adult in the first degree—Theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree. (1)(a) A person is guilty of theft from a vulnerable adult in the first degree if he or she commits theft of property or services that exceed(s) five thousand dollars in value, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010, of a vulnerable adult. The defendant must have known or should have known that the victim was a vulnerable adult.

(b) Theft from a vulnerable adult in the first degree is a class B felony.

(2)(a) A person is guilty of theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree if he or she commits theft of property or services that exceed(s) seven hundred fifty dollars in value but does not exceed five thousand dollars in value, other than a firearm as defined in RCW 9.41.010 or a motor vehicle, of a vulnerable adult. The defendant must have known or should have known that the victim was a vulnerable adult.

(b) Theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree is a class C felony. [2017 c 266 § 6.]

Finding—Intent—2017 c 266: See note following RCW 9A.42.020.

9A.56.410 Metal property deception. (1) It is a gross misdemeanor under chapter 9A.20 RCW for:

(a) Any person to deliberately remove, alter, or obliterate any manufacturer's make, model, or serial number, personal identification number, or identifying marks engraved or etched upon an item of private metal property, nonferrous metal property, or commercial metal property in order to deceive a scrap metal business;

(b) Any scrap metal business to enter into a transaction to purchase or receive any private metal property, nonferrous metal property, or commercial metal property where the manufacturer's make, model, or serial number, personal identification number, or identifying marks engraved or etched upon the property have been deliberately and conspicuously removed, altered, or obliterated;

(c) Any person to knowingly make, cause, or allow to be made any false entry or misstatement of any material matter in any book, record, or writing required to be kept under this chapter;

(d) Any scrap metal business to enter into a transaction to purchase or receive private metal property, nonferrous metal property, or commercial metal property from any person under the age of 18 years or any person who is discernibly under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs;

(e) Any scrap metal business to enter into a transaction to purchase or receive private metal property, nonferrous metal property, or commercial metal property with anyone whom the scrap metal business has been informed by a law enforcement agency to have been convicted of a crime involving drugs, burglary, robbery, theft, or possession of or receiving stolen property, manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to deliver methamphetamine, or possession of ephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, pseudoephedrine or any of its salts or isomers or salts of isomers, or anhydrous ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine within the past four years whether the per-

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son is acting in his or her own behalf or as the agent of another;

(f) Any person to sign the declaration required under RCW 19.290.020 knowing that the private metal property or nonferrous metal property subject to the transaction is stolen. The signature of a person on the declaration required under RCW 19.290.020 constitutes evidence of intent to defraud a scrap metal business if that person is found to have known that the private metal property or nonferrous metal property subject to the transaction was stolen;

(g) Any scrap metal business to possess private metal property or commercial metal property that was not lawfully purchased or received under the requirements of this chapter;

(h) Any scrap metal business to engage in a series of transactions valued at less than \$30 with the same seller for the purposes of avoiding the requirements of RCW 19.290.030(4); or

(i) Any person to knowingly make a false or fictitious oral or written statement or to furnish or exhibit any false, fictitious, or misrepresented identification, with the intent to deceive a scrap metal business as to the actual seller of the scrap metal.

(2) Notwithstanding any fines imposed as part of the sentence under this section, each offense is punishable by a \$1,000 fine per catalytic converter, 10 percent of which shall be directed to the no-buy list database program in RCW 43.43.885, and the remainder shall be directed to the Washington association of sheriffs and police chiefs solely for grants issued under RCW 36.28A.240.

(3)(a) Facilitating the offer of used catalytic converters for sale without first verifying proof of ownership of the catalytic converter, or failing to retain verified records of ownership of used catalytic converters offered for sale for at least two years, is an unfair or deceptive act or practice or unfair method of competition in the conduct of trade or commerce for purposes of the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW.

(b) All damages awarded to the state of Washington under chapter 19.86 RCW shall be distributed as follows:

(i) Ninety percent to the grant and training program in RCW 36.28A.240; and

(ii) Ten percent to the no-buy list database program in RCW 43.43.885. [2022 c 221 § 5; 2013 c 322 § 10; 2008 c 233 § 7; 2007 c 377 § 7. Formerly RCW 19.290.070.]

Effective date—2022 c 221 §§ 5-7: "Sections 5 through 7 of this act take effect July 1, 2022." [2022 c 221 § 13.]

Findings—Intent—2022 c 221: See note following RCW 19.290.020.

Chapter 9A.58 RCW IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS

Sections

9A.58.005	Findings.
9A.58.010	Definitions.
9A.58.020	Possessing, or reading or capturing, information contained on another person's identification document—Exceptions.
9A.58.030	Violation—Consumer protection act.

9A.58.005 Findings. The legislature finds that:

(1) Washington state recognizes the importance of protecting its citizens from unwanted wireless surveillance.

(2) Enhanced drivers' licenses and enhanced identicards are intended to facilitate efficient travel at land and sea borders between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, not to facilitate the profiling and tracking of individuals.

(3) Easy access to the information found on enhanced drivers' licenses and enhanced identicards could facilitate the commission of other unwanted offenses, such as identity theft. [2008 c 200 § 1.]

9A.58.010 Definitions. The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) "Enhanced driver's license" means a driver's license that is issued under RCW 46.20.202.

(2) "Enhanced identicard" means an identicard that is issued under RCW 46.20.202.

(3) "Identification document" means an enhanced driver's license or an enhanced identicard.

(4) "Radio frequency identification" means a technology that uses radio waves to transmit data remotely to readers.

(5) "Reader" means a scanning device that is capable of using radio waves to communicate with an identification document and read the data transmitted by the identification document.

(6) "Remotely" means that no physical contact between the identification document and a reader is necessary in order to transmit data using radio waves.

(7) "Unique personal identifier number" means a randomly assigned string of numbers or symbols issued by the department of licensing that is encoded on an identification document and is intended to be read remotely by a reader to identify the identification document that has been issued to a particular individual. [2008 c 200 § 2.]

9A.58.020 Possessing, or reading or capturing, information contained on another person's identification document—Exceptions. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a person is guilty of a class C felony if the person intentionally possesses, or reads or captures remotely using radio waves, information contained on another person's identification document, including the unique personal identifier number encoded on the identification document, without that person's express knowledge or consent.

(2) This section does not apply to:

(a) A person or entity that reads an identification document to facilitate border crossing;

(b) A person or entity that reads a person's identification document in the course of an act of good faith security research, experimentation, or scientific inquiry including, but not limited to, activities useful in identifying and analyzing security flaws and vulnerabilities; or

(c) A person or entity that unintentionally reads an identification document remotely in the course of operating its own radio frequency identification system, provided that the inadvertently received information:

(i) Is not disclosed to any other party;

(ii) Is not used for any purpose; and

(iii) Is not stored or is promptly destroyed. [2008 c 200 § 3.]

9A.58.030 Violation—Consumer protection act. The legislature finds that the practices covered by this chapter are matters vitally affecting the public interest for the purpose of applying chapter 19.86 RCW. A violation of this chapter is not reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business and is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair method of competition for the purpose of applying chapter 19.86 RCW. [2008 c 200 § 4.]

Chapter 9A.60 RCW FRAUD

Sections

9A.60.010	Definitions.
9A.60.020	Forgery.
9A.60.030	Obtaining a signature by deception or duress.
9A.60.040	Criminal impersonation in the first degree.
9A.60.045	Criminal impersonation in the second degree.
9A.60.050	False certification.
9A.60.060	Fraudulent creation or revocation of a mental health advance directive.
9A.60.070	False academic credentials—Unlawful issuance or use—Definitions—Penalties.
9A.60.080	Impersonating a census taker.
<i>Ballots, forgery: RCW 29A.84.410.</i>	
<i>Cigarette tax stamps, forgery: RCW 82.24.100.</i>	
<i>False representations: Chapter 9.38 RCW.</i>	
<i>Food, drugs, and cosmetics act: Chapter 69.04 RCW.</i>	
<i>Forest products, forgery of brands or marks: RCW 76.36.110, 76.36.120.</i>	
<i>Forged instruments, tools for making, search and seizure: RCW 10.79.015.</i>	
<i>Forgery: RCW 9A.60.020.</i>	
<i>Frauds and swindles: Chapter 9.45 RCW.</i>	
<i>Honey act: RCW 69.28.180.</i>	
<i>Misdescription of instrument forged immaterial: RCW 10.37.080.</i>	
<i>Mutual savings bank, falsification: RCW 32.04.100.</i>	
<i>Obtaining employment by forged recommendation: RCW 49.44.040.</i>	
<i>Offering forged instrument for filing: RCW 40.16.030.</i>	
<i>Optometry certificates falsification: RCW 18.53.140, 18.53.150.</i>	
<i>Osteopathy license falsification: RCW 18.57.160.</i>	
<i>Public bonds, forgery: Chapter 39.44 RCW.</i>	
<i>Public works, falsification of records, etc.: RCW 39.04.110, 39.12.050.</i>	

9A.60.010 Definitions. The following definitions and the definitions of RCW 9A.56.010 are applicable in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Complete written instrument" means one which is fully drawn with respect to every essential feature thereof;

(2) "Incomplete written instrument" means one which contains some matter by way of content or authentication but which requires additional matter in order to render it a complete written instrument;

(3) To "falsely alter" a written instrument means to change, without authorization by anyone entitled to grant it, a written instrument, whether complete or incomplete, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter, transposition of matter, or in any other manner;

(4) To "falsely complete" a written instrument means to transform an incomplete written instrument into a complete one by adding or inserting matter, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it;

(5) To "falsely make" a written instrument means to make or draw a complete or incomplete written instrument

which purports to be authentic, but which is not authentic either because the ostensible maker is fictitious or because, if real, he or she did not authorize the making or drawing thereof;

(6) "Forged instrument" means a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed, or altered;

(7) "Written instrument" means: (a) Any paper, document, or other instrument containing written or printed matter or its equivalent; or (b) any access device, token, stamp, seal, badge, trademark, or other evidence or symbol of value, right, privilege, or identification. [2011 c 336 § 381; 1999 c 143 § 38; 1987 c 140 § 5; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 12; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.60.010.]

Reviser's note: The definitions in this section have been alphabetized pursuant to RCW 1.08.015(2)(k).

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.60.020 Forgery. (1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to injure or defraud:

(a) He or she falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument or;

(b) He or she possesses, utters, offers, disposes of, or puts off as true a written instrument which he or she knows to be forged.

(2) In a proceeding under this section that is related to an identity theft under RCW 9.35.020, the crime will be considered to have been committed in any locality where the person whose means of identification or financial information was appropriated resides, or in which any part of the offense took place, regardless of whether the defendant was ever actually in that locality.

(3) Forgery is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 382; 2003 c 119 § 5; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 13; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.60.020.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.60.030 Obtaining a signature by deception or duress. (1) A person is guilty of obtaining a signature by deception or duress if by deception or duress and with intent to defraud or deprive he or she causes another person to sign or execute a written instrument.

(2) Obtaining a signature by deception or duress is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 383; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 14; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.60.030.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.60.040 Criminal impersonation in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of criminal impersonation in the first degree if the person:

(a) Assumes a false identity and does an act in his or her assumed character with intent to defraud another or for any other unlawful purpose; or

(b) Pretends to be a representative of some person or organization or a public servant and does an act in his or her pretended capacity with intent to defraud another or for any other unlawful purpose.

(2) Criminal impersonation in the first degree is a class C felony. [2004 c 11 § 1; 2003 c 53 § 78; 1993 c 457 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.60.040.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

(2022 Ed.)

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.60.045 Criminal impersonation in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of criminal impersonation in the second degree if the person:

(a)(i) Claims to be a law enforcement officer or creates an impression that he or she is a law enforcement officer; and

(ii) Under circumstances not amounting to criminal impersonation in the first degree, does an act with intent to convey the impression that he or she is acting in an official capacity and a reasonable person would believe the person is a law enforcement officer; or

(b) Falsely assumes the identity of a veteran or active duty member of the armed forces of the United States with intent to defraud for the purpose of personal gain or to facilitate any unlawful activity.

(2) Criminal impersonation in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2004 c 124 § 1; 2004 c 11 § 2; 2003 c 53 § 79.]

Reviser's note: This section was amended by 2004 c 11 § 2 and by 2004 c 124 § 1, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.60.050 False certification. (1) A person is guilty of false certification, if, being an officer authorized to take a proof or acknowledgment of an instrument which by law may be recorded, he or she knowingly certifies falsely that the execution of such instrument was acknowledged by any party thereto or that the execution thereof was proved.

(2) A person is guilty of false certification, if, being a notarial officer making a certification authorized by RCW 42.45.020(3), he or she knowingly certifies falsely that a tangible copy of an electronic record is an accurate copy of the electronic record.

(3) False certification is a gross misdemeanor. [2019 c 154 § 7; 2011 c 336 § 384; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 15; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.60.050.]

Effective date—2019 c 154: See note following RCW 42.45.280.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.60.060 Fraudulent creation or revocation of a mental health advance directive. (1) For purposes of this section "mental health advance directive" means a written document that is a "mental health advance directive" as defined in RCW 71.32.020.

(2) A person is guilty of fraudulent creation or revocation of a mental health advance directive if he or she knowingly:

(a) Makes, completes, alters, or revokes the mental health advance directive of another without the principal's consent;

(b) Utters, offers, or puts off as true a mental health advance directive that he or she knows to be forged; or

(c) Obtains or prevents the signature of a principal or witness to a mental health advance directive by deception or duress.

(3) Fraudulent creation or revocation of a mental health advance directive is a class C felony. [2003 c 283 § 31.]

9A.60.070 False academic credentials—Unlawful issuance or use—Definitions—Penalties. (1) A person is guilty of issuing a false academic credential if the person knowingly:

(a) Grants or awards a false academic credential or offers to grant or award a false academic credential in violation of this section;

(b) Represents that a credit earned or granted by the person in violation of this section can be applied toward a credential offered by another person;

(c) Grants or offers to grant a credit for which a representation as described in (b) of this subsection is made; or

(d) Solicits another person to seek a credential or to earn a credit the person knows is offered in violation of this section.

(2) A person is guilty of knowingly using a false academic credential if the person knowingly uses a false academic credential or falsely claims to have a credential issued by an institution of higher education that is accredited by an accrediting association recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council:

(a) In a written or oral advertisement or other promotion of a business; or

(b) With the intent to:

(i) Obtain employment;

(ii) Obtain a license or certificate to practice a trade, profession, or occupation;

(iii) Obtain a promotion, compensation or other benefit, or an increase in compensation or other benefit, in employment or in the practice of a trade, profession, or occupation;

(iv) Obtain admission to an educational program in this state; or

(v) Gain a position in government with authority over another person, regardless of whether the person receives compensation for the position.

(3) The definitions in this subsection apply throughout this section and RCW 28B.85.220.

(a) "False academic credential" means a document that provides evidence or demonstrates completion of an academic or professional course of instruction beyond the secondary level that results in the attainment of an academic certificate, degree, or rank, and that is not issued by a person or entity that: (i) Is an entity accredited by an agency recognized as such by rule of the student achievement council or has the international equivalents of such accreditation; or (ii) is an entity authorized as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iii) is an entity exempt from the requirements of authorization as a degree-granting institution by the student achievement council; or (iv) is an entity that has been granted a waiver by the student achievement council from the requirements of authorization by the council. Such documents include, but are not limited to, academic certificates, degrees, coursework, degree credits, transcripts, or certification of completion of a degree.

(b) "Grant" means award, bestow, confer, convey, sell, or give.

(c) "Offer," in addition to its usual meanings, means advertise, publicize, or solicit.

(d) "Operate" includes but is not limited to the following:

(i) Offering courses in person, by correspondence, or by electronic media at or to any Washington location for degree credit;

(ii) Granting or offering to grant degrees in Washington;

(iii) Maintaining or advertising a Washington location, mailing address, computer server, or telephone number, for any purpose, other than for contact with the institution's former students for any legitimate purpose related to the students having attended the institution.

(4) Issuing a false academic credential is a class C felony.

(5) Knowingly using a false academic credential is a gross misdemeanor. [2012 c 229 § 501; 2006 c 234 § 2.]

Effective date—2012 c 229 §§ 101, 117, 401, 402, 501 through 594, 601 through 609, 701 through 708, 801 through 821, 902, and 904: See note following RCW 28B.77.005.

9A.60.080 Impersonating a census taker. (1) A person is guilty of impersonating a census taker if the person falsely represents that he or she is a census taker with the intent to:

(a) Interfere with the operation of the census;

(b) Obtain information; or

(c) Obtain consent to enter a private dwelling.

(2) Impersonating a census taker is a gross misdemeanor. [2020 c 34 § 2.]

Effective date—2020 c 34: See note following RCW 43.62.060.

Chapter 9A.61 RCW DEFRAUDING A PUBLIC UTILITY

Sections

9A.61.010	Definitions.
9A.61.020	Defrauding a public utility.
9A.61.030	Defrauding a public utility in the first degree.
9A.61.040	Defrauding a public utility in the second degree.
9A.61.050	Defrauding a public utility in the third degree.
9A.61.060	Restitution and costs.
9A.61.070	Damages not precluded.

9A.61.010 Definitions. The definitions set forth in this section apply throughout this chapter.

(1) "Customer" means the person in whose name a utility service is provided.

(2) "Divert" means to change the intended course or path of electricity, gas, or water without the authorization or consent of the utility.

(3) "Person" means an individual, partnership, firm, association, or corporation or government agency.

(4) "Reconnection" means the commencement of utility service to a customer or other person after service has been lawfully disconnected by the utility.

(5) "Tamper" means to rearrange, injure, alter, interfere with, or otherwise prevent from performing the normal or customary function.

(6) "Utility" means an electrical company, gas company, or water company as those terms are defined in RCW 80.04.010, and includes an electrical, gas, or water system operated by a public agency.

(7) "Utility service" means the provision of electricity, gas, water, or any other service or commodity furnished by the utility for compensation. [1989 c 109 § 1.]

9A.61.020 Defrauding a public utility. "Defrauding a public utility" means to commit, authorize, solicit, aid, abet, or attempt to:

(1) Divert, or cause to be diverted, utility services by any means whatsoever;

(2) Make, or cause to be made, a connection or reconnection with property owned or used by the utility to provide utility service without the authorization or consent of the utility;

(3) Prevent a utility meter or other device used in determining the charge for utility services from accurately performing its measuring function by tampering or by any other means;

(4) Tamper with property owned or used by the utility to provide utility services; or

(5) Use or receive the direct benefit of all or a portion of the utility service with knowledge of, or reason to believe that, the diversion, tampering, or unauthorized connection existed at the time of the use or that the use or receipt was without the authorization or consent of the utility. [1989 c 109 § 2.]

9A.61.030 Defrauding a public utility in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of defrauding a public utility in the first degree if:

(a) The utility service diverted or used exceeds one thousand five hundred dollars in value; or

(b) Tampering has occurred in furtherance of other criminal activity.

(2) Defrauding a public utility in the first degree is a class B felony. [1989 c 109 § 3.]

9A.61.040 Defrauding a public utility in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of defrauding a public utility in the second degree if the utility service diverted or used exceeds five hundred dollars in value.

(2) Defrauding a public utility in the second degree is a class C felony. [1989 c 109 § 4.]

9A.61.050 Defrauding a public utility in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of defrauding a public utility in the third degree if:

(a) The utility service diverted or used is five hundred dollars or less in value; or

(b) A connection or reconnection has occurred without authorization or consent of the utility.

(2) Defrauding a public utility in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor. [1989 c 109 § 5.]

9A.61.060 Restitution and costs. In any prosecution under this section, the court may require restitution from the defendant as provided by chapter 9A.20 RCW, plus court costs plus the costs incurred by the utility on account of the bypassing, tampering, or unauthorized reconnection, including but not limited to costs and expenses for investigation, disconnection, reconnection, service calls, and expert witnesses. [1989 c 109 § 6.]

9A.61.070 Damages not precluded. Restitution ordered or fines imposed under this chapter do not preclude a

utility from collecting damages under RCW 80.28.240 to which it may be entitled. [1989 c 109 § 7.]

Chapter 9A.64 RCW FAMILY OFFENSES

Sections

9A.64.010	Bigamy.
9A.64.020	Incest.
9A.64.030	Child selling—Child buying.

9A.64.010 Bigamy. (1) A person is guilty of bigamy if he or she intentionally marries or purports to marry another person when either person has a living spouse.

(2) In any prosecution under this section, it is a defense that at the time of the subsequent marriage or purported marriage:

(a) The actor reasonably believed that the prior spouse was dead; or

(b) A court had entered a judgment purporting to terminate or annul any prior disqualifying marriage and the actor did not know that such judgment was invalid; or

(c) The actor reasonably believed that he or she was legally eligible to marry.

(3) The limitation imposed by RCW 9A.04.080 on commencing a prosecution for bigamy does not begin to run until the death of the prior or subsequent spouse of the actor or until a court enters a judgment terminating or annulling the prior or subsequent marriage.

(4) Bigamy is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 385; 1986 c 257 § 14; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.64.010.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.64.020 Incest. (1)(a) A person is guilty of incest in the first degree if he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a person whom he or she knows to be related to him or her, either legitimately or illegitimately, as an ancestor, descendant, brother, or sister of either the whole or the half blood.

(b) Incest in the first degree is a class B felony.

(2)(a) A person is guilty of incest in the second degree if he or she engages in sexual contact with a person whom he or she knows to be related to him or her, either legitimately or illegitimately, as an ancestor, descendant, brother, or sister of either the whole or the half blood.

(b) Incest in the second degree is a class C felony.

(3) As used in this section:

(a) "Descendant" includes stepchildren and adopted children under eighteen years of age;

(b) "Sexual contact" has the same meaning as in RCW 9A.44.010; and

(c) "Sexual intercourse" has the same meaning as in RCW 9A.44.010. [2003 c 53 § 80; 1999 c 143 § 39; 1985 c 53 § 1; 1982 c 129 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.64.020.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.64.030 Child selling—Child buying. (1) It is unlawful for any person to sell or purchase a minor child.

(2) A transaction shall not be a purchase or sale under subsection (1) of this section if any of the following exists:

(a) The transaction is between the parents of the minor child; or

(b) The transaction is between a person receiving or to receive the child and an agency recognized under RCW 26.33.020; or

(c) The transaction is between the person receiving or to receive the child and a state agency or other governmental agency; or

(d) The transaction is pursuant to chapter 26.34 RCW; or

(e) The transaction is pursuant to court order; or

(f) The only consideration paid by the person receiving or to receive the child is intended to pay for the prenatal hospital or medical expenses involved in the birth of the child, or attorneys' fees and court costs involved in effectuating transfer of child custody.

(3)(a) Child selling is a class C felony.

(b) Child buying is a class C felony. [2003 c 53 § 81; 1985 c 7 § 3; 1980 c 85 § 3.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

Chapter 9A.68 RCW

BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE

Sections

9A.68.010	Bribery.
9A.68.020	Requesting unlawful compensation.
9A.68.030	Receiving or granting unlawful compensation.
9A.68.040	Trading in public office.
9A.68.050	Trading in special influence.
9A.68.060	Commercial bribery.

Banks and trust companies, misconduct by employees: RCW 30A.12.110.

Baseball, bribery and illegal practices: Chapter 67.04 RCW.

Bribery or corrupt solicitation: State Constitution Art. 2 § 30.

Bribery or corruption offender as witness: RCW 9.18.080.

Cities and towns, commission form, misconduct of officers and employees: RCW 35.17.150.

County officers, misconduct: RCW 36.18.160, 36.18.170.

Elections, bribery or coercion: Chapter 29A.84 RCW.

Employees, corrupt influencing, grafting by: RCW 49.44.060.

Insurance, fraud and unfair practices: Chapter 48.30 RCW.

Labor representative bribery: RCW 49.44.020, 49.44.030.

Misconduct in signing a petition: RCW 9.44.080.

Public officers, misconduct: Chapter 42.20 RCW.

School officials, grafting: RCW 28A.635.050.

Wages, rebating by employers: RCW 49.52.050, 49.52.090.

9A.68.010 Bribery. (1) A person is guilty of bribery if:

(a) With the intent to secure a particular result in a particular matter involving the exercise of the public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action in his or her official capacity, he or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon such public servant; or

(b) Being a public servant, he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that his or her vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of discretion, or other action as a public servant will be used to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in a particular matter.

(2) It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the public servant sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the desired way, whether because he or she had not yet assumed office, lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.

(3) Bribery is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 386; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.68.010.]

9A.68.020 Requesting unlawful compensation. (1) A public servant is guilty of requesting unlawful compensation if he or she requests a pecuniary benefit for the performance of an official action knowing that he or she is required to perform that action without compensation or at a level of compensation lower than that requested.

(2) Requesting unlawful compensation is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 387; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.68.020.]

9A.68.030 Receiving or granting unlawful compensation. (1) A person is guilty of receiving or granting unlawful compensation if:

(a) Being a public servant, he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept compensation for advice or other assistance in preparing a bill, contract, claim, or transaction regarding which he or she knows he or she is likely to have an official discretion to exercise; or

(b) He or she knowingly offers, pays, or agrees to pay compensation to a public servant for advice or other assistance in preparing or promoting a bill, contract, claim, or other transaction regarding which the public servant is likely to have an official discretion to exercise.

(2) Receiving or granting unlawful compensation is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 388; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.68.030.]

9A.68.040 Trading in public office. (1) A person is guilty of trading in public office if:

(a) He or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a public servant pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such actor will or may be appointed to a public office; or

(b) Being a public servant, he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit from another person pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such person will or may be appointed to a public office.

(2) Trading in public office is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 389; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.68.040.]

9A.68.050 Trading in special influence. (1) A person is guilty of trading in special influence if:

(a) He or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon another person pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such other person will offer or confer a benefit upon a public servant or procure another to do so with intent thereby to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in a particular matter; or

(b) He or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that he or she will offer or confer a benefit upon a public servant or procure another to do so with intent thereby to secure or attempt to secure a particular result in a particular matter.

(2) Trading in special influence is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 390; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.68.050.]

9A.68.060 Commercial bribery. (1) For purposes of this section:

(a) "Claimant" means a person who has or is believed by an actor to have an insurance claim.

(b) "Service provider" means a person who directly or indirectly provides, advertises, or otherwise claims to provide services.

(c) "Services" means health care services, motor vehicle body or other motor vehicle repair, and preparing, processing, presenting, or negotiating an insurance claim.

(d) "Trusted person" means:

(i) An agent, employee, or partner of another;

(ii) An administrator, executor, conservator, guardian, receiver, or trustee of a person or an estate, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity;

(iii) An accountant, appraiser, attorney, physician, or other professional adviser;

(iv) An officer or director of a corporation, or any other person who participates in the affairs of a corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association; or

(v) An arbitrator, mediator, or other purportedly disinterested adjudicator or referee.

(2) A person is guilty of commercial bribery if:

(a) He or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer a pecuniary benefit directly or indirectly upon a trusted person under a request, agreement, or understanding that the trusted person will violate a duty of fidelity or trust arising from his or her position as a trusted person;

(b) Being a trusted person, he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept a pecuniary benefit for himself, herself, or another under a request, agreement, or understanding that he or she will violate a duty of fidelity or trust arising from his or her position as a trusted person; or

(c) Being an employee or agent of an insurer, he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept a pecuniary benefit for himself or herself, or a person other than the insurer, under a request, agreement, or understanding that he or she will or a threat that he or she will not refer or induce claimants to have services performed by a service provider.

(3) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the person sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the desired way, whether because the person had not yet assumed his or her position, lacked authority, or for any other reason.

(4) Commercial bribery is a class B felony. [2001 c 224 § 2. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 29.]

Purpose—2001 c 224: "The purpose of this act is to respond to *State v. Thomas*, 103 Wn. App. 800, by reenacting and ranking, without changes, the law relating to the crime of commercial bribery, enacted as sections 29 and 37(5), chapter 285, Laws of 1995." [2001 c 224 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

Chapter 9A.72 RCW

PERJURY AND INTERFERENCE WITH OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Sections

9A.72.010 Definitions.

(2022 Ed.)

9A.72.020	Perjury in the first degree.
9A.72.030	Perjury in the second degree.
9A.72.040	False swearing.
9A.72.050	Perjury and false swearing—Inconsistent statements—Degree of crime.
9A.72.060	Perjury and false swearing—Retraction.
9A.72.070	Perjury and false swearing—Irregularities no defense.
9A.72.080	Statement of what one does not know to be true.
9A.72.090	Bribing a witness.
9A.72.100	Bribe receiving by a witness.
9A.72.110	Intimidating a witness.
9A.72.120	Tampering with a witness.
9A.72.130	Intimidating a juror.
9A.72.140	Jury tampering.
9A.72.150	Tampering with physical evidence.
9A.72.160	Intimidating a judge.

Committal of witness committing perjury: RCW 9.72.090.

9A.72.010 Definitions. The following definitions are applicable in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Materially false statement" means any false statement oral or written, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, which could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding;

(2) "Oath" includes an affirmation and every other mode authorized by law of attesting to the truth of that which is stated; in this chapter, written statements shall be treated as if made under oath if:

(a) The statement was made on or pursuant to instructions on an official form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable;

(b) The statement recites that it was made under oath, the declarant was aware of such recitation at the time he or she made the statement, intended that the statement should be represented as a sworn statement, and the statement was in fact so represented by its delivery or utterance with the signed jurat of an officer authorized to administer oaths appended thereto; or

(c) It is a statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, made within or outside the state of Washington, which is declared to be true under penalty of perjury as provided in chapter 5.50 RCW.

(3) An oath is "required or authorized by law" when the use of the oath is specifically provided for by statute or regulatory provision or when the oath is administered by a person authorized by state or federal law to administer oaths;

(4) "Official proceeding" means a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency or official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or depositions;

(5) "Juror" means any person who is a member of any jury, including a grand jury, impaneled by any court of this state or by any public servant authorized by law to impanel a jury; the term juror also includes any person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror;

(6) "Testimony" includes oral or written statements, documents, or any other material that may be offered by a witness in an official proceeding. [2019 c 232 § 10; 2001 c 171 § 2. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 30; 1981 c 187 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.010.]

Purpose—2001 c 171: "The purpose of this act is to respond to *State v. Thomas*, 103 Wn. App. 800, by reenacting, without changes, legislation relating to the crime of perjury, as amended in sections 30 and 31, chapter 285, Laws of 1995." [2001 c 171 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.72.020 Perjury in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree if in any official proceeding he or she makes a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law.

(2) Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of this crime, and the actor's mistaken belief that his or her statement was not material is not a defense to a prosecution under this section.

(3) Perjury in the first degree is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 391; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.020.]

9A.72.030 Perjury in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of perjury in the second degree if, in an examination under oath under the terms of a contract of insurance, or with intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his or her duty, he or she makes a materially false statement, which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law.

(2) Perjury in the second degree is a class C felony. [2001 c 171 § 3. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 31; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.030.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 171: See notes following RCW 9A.72.010.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.72.040 False swearing. (1) A person is guilty of false swearing if he or she makes a false statement, which he or she knows to be false, under an oath required or authorized by law.

(2) False swearing is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 392; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.040.]

9A.72.050 Perjury and false swearing—Inconsistent statements—Degree of crime. (1) Where, in the course of one or more official proceedings, a person makes inconsistent material statements under oath, the prosecution may proceed by setting forth the inconsistent statements in a single count alleging in the alternative that one or the other was false and known by the defendant to be false. In such case it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove which material statement was false but only that one or the other was false and known by the defendant to be false.

(2) The highest offense of which a person may be convicted in such an instance as set forth in subsection (1) of this section shall be determined by hypothetically assuming each statement to be false. If perjury of different degrees would be established by the making of the two statements, the person may only be convicted of the lesser degree. If perjury or false swearing would be established by the making of the two statements, the person may only be convicted of false swearing. For purposes of this section, no corroboration shall be required of either inconsistent statement. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.050.]

9A.72.060 Perjury and false swearing—Retraction. No person shall be convicted of perjury or false swearing if he or she retracts his or her false statement in the course of the same proceeding in which it was made, if in fact he or she

does so before it becomes manifest that the falsification is or will be exposed and before the falsification substantially affects the proceeding. Statements made in separate hearings at separate stages of the same trial, administrative, or other official proceeding shall be treated as if made in the course of the same proceeding. [2011 c 336 § 393; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 16; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.060.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.72.070 Perjury and false swearing—Irregularities no defense. It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury or false swearing:

(1) That the oath was administered or taken in an irregular manner; or

(2) That the person administering the oath lacked authority to do so, if the taking of the oath was required or authorized by law. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.070.]

9A.72.080 Statement of what one does not know to be true. Every unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is equivalent to a statement of that which he or she knows to be false. [2011 c 336 § 394; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.080.]

9A.72.090 Bribing a witness. (1) A person is guilty of bribing a witness if he or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon a witness or a person he or she has reason to believe is about to be called as a witness in any official proceeding or upon a person whom he or she has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child, with intent to:

(a) Influence the testimony of that person; or

(b) Induce that person to avoid legal process summoning him or her to testify; or

(c) Induce that person to absent himself or herself from an official proceeding to which he or she has been legally summoned; or

(d) Induce that person to refrain from reporting information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child.

(2) Bribing a witness is a class B felony. [1994 c 271 § 202; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 16; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.090.]

Finding—1994 c 271: "The legislature finds that witness intimidation and witness tampering serve to thwart both the effective prosecution of criminal conduct in the state of Washington and resolution of child dependencies.

Further, the legislature finds that intimidating persons who have information pertaining to a future proceeding serves to prevent both the bringing of a charge and prosecution of such future proceeding. The legislature finds that the period before a crime or child abuse or neglect is reported is when a victim is most vulnerable to influence, both from the defendant or from people acting on behalf of the defendant and a time when the defendant is most able to threaten, bribe, and/or persuade potential witnesses to leave the jurisdiction or withhold information from law enforcement agencies.

The legislature moreover finds that a criminal defendant's admonishment or demand to a witness to "drop the charges" is intimidating to witnesses or other persons with information relevant to a criminal proceeding.

The legislature finds, therefore, that tampering with and/or intimidating witnesses or other persons with information relevant to a present or future criminal or child dependency proceeding are grave offenses which adversely impact the state's ability to promote public safety and prosecute criminal behavior." [1994 c 271 § 201.]

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.72.100 Bribe receiving by a witness. (1) A witness or a person who has reason to believe he or she is about to be called as a witness in any official proceeding or that he or she may have information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child is guilty of bribe receiving by a witness if he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that:

- (a) The person's testimony will thereby be influenced; or
- (b) The person will attempt to avoid legal process summoning him or her to testify; or
- (c) The person will attempt to absent himself or herself from an official proceeding to which he or she has been legally summoned; or
- (d) The person will not report information he or she has relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child.

(2) Bribe receiving by a witness is a class B felony. [1994 c 271 § 203; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 17; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.100.]

Finding—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.72.090.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.72.110 Intimidating a witness. (1) A person is guilty of intimidating a witness if a person, by use of a threat against a current or prospective witness, attempts to:

- (a) Influence the testimony of that person;
- (b) Induce that person to elude legal process summoning him or her to testify;
- (c) Induce that person to absent himself or herself from such proceedings; or
- (d) Induce that person not to report the information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child, not to have the crime or the abuse or neglect of a minor child prosecuted, or not to give truthful or complete information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child.

(2) A person also is guilty of intimidating a witness if the person directs a threat to a former witness because of the witness's role in an official proceeding.

(3) As used in this section:

- (a) "Threat" means:
 - (i) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or
 - (ii) Threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(27).
- (b) "Current or prospective witness" means:
 - (i) A person endorsed as a witness in an official proceeding;
 - (ii) A person whom the actor believes may be called as a witness in any official proceeding; or
 - (iii) A person whom the actor has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child.
- (c) "Former witness" means:
 - (i) A person who testified in an official proceeding;

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(ii) A person who was endorsed as a witness in an official proceeding;

(iii) A person whom the actor knew or believed may have been called as a witness if a hearing or trial had been held; or

(iv) A person whom the actor knew or believed may have provided information related to a criminal investigation or an investigation into the abuse or neglect of a minor child.

(4) Intimidating a witness is a class B felony.

(5) For purposes of this section, each instance of an attempt to intimidate a witness constitutes a separate offense. [2011 c 165 § 2; 1997 c 29 § 1; 1994 c 271 § 204; 1985 c 327 § 2; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 18; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.110.]

***Reviser's note:** RCW 9A.04.110 was amended by 2011 c 166 § 2, changing subsection (27) to subsection (28).

Intent—2011 c 165: "In response to *State v. Hall*, 168 Wn.2d 726 (2010), the legislature intends to clarify that each instance of an attempt to intimidate or tamper with a witness constitutes a separate violation for purposes of determining the unit of prosecution under the statutes governing tampering with a witness and intimidating a witness." [2011 c 165 § 1.]

Finding—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.72.090.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.72.120 Tampering with a witness. (1) A person is guilty of tampering with a witness if he or she attempts to induce a witness or person he or she has reason to believe is about to be called as a witness in any official proceeding or a person whom he or she has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child to:

- (a) Testify falsely or, without right or privilege to do so, to withhold any testimony; or
- (b) Absent himself or herself from such proceedings; or
- (c) Withhold from a law enforcement agency information which he or she has relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child to the agency.

(2) Tampering with a witness is a class C felony.

(3) For purposes of this section, each instance of an attempt to tamper with a witness constitutes a separate offense. [2011 c 165 § 3; 1994 c 271 § 205; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 19; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.120.]

Intent—2011 c 165: See note following RCW 9A.72.110.

Finding—1994 c 271: See note following RCW 9A.72.090.

Purpose—Severability—1994 c 271: See notes following RCW 9A.28.020.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.72.130 Intimidating a juror. (1) A person is guilty of intimidating a juror if a person directs a threat to a former juror because of the juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other official action as a juror, or if, by use of a threat, he or she attempts to influence a juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other official action as a juror.

(2) "Threat" as used in this section means:

(a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or

(b) Threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110.

(3) Intimidating a juror is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 395; 1985 c 327 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.130.]

9A.72.140 Jury tampering. (1) A person is guilty of jury tampering if with intent to influence a juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other official action in a case, he or she attempts to communicate directly or indirectly with a juror other than as part of the proceedings in the trial of the case.

(2) Jury tampering is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 396; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.140.]

9A.72.150 Tampering with physical evidence. (1) A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence if, having reason to believe that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or authority, he or she:

(a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence with intent to impair its appearance, character, or availability in such pending or prospective official proceeding; or

(b) Knowingly presents or offers any false physical evidence.

(2) "Physical evidence" as used in this section includes any article, object, document, record, or other thing of physical substance.

(3) Tampering with physical evidence is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 397; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.72.150.]

9A.72.160 Intimidating a judge. (1) A person is guilty of intimidating a judge if a person directs a threat to a judge because of a ruling or decision of the judge in any official proceeding, or if by use of a threat directed to a judge, a person attempts to influence a ruling or decision of the judge in any official proceeding.

(2) "Threat" as used in this section means:

(a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or

(b) Threats as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25).

(3) Intimidating a judge is a class B felony. [1985 c 327 § 1.]

*Reviser's note: RCW 9A.04.110 was amended by 2005 c 458 § 3, changing subsection (25) to subsection (26); was subsequently amended by 2007 c 79 § 3, changing subsection (26) to subsection (27); and was subsequently amended by 2011 c 166 § 2, changing subsection (27) to subsection (28).

Chapter 9A.76 RCW

OBSTRUCTING GOVERNMENTAL OPERATION

Sections

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Withholding knowledge of felony: RCW 9.69.100.

9A.76.010 Definitions. The following definitions are applicable in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Contraband" means any article or thing which a person confined in a detention facility or a secure facility under chapter 71.09 RCW is prohibited from obtaining or possessing by statute, rule, regulation, or order of a court;

(2) "Custody" means restraint pursuant to a lawful arrest or an order of a court, or any period of service on a work crew: PROVIDED, That custody pursuant to chapter 13.34 RCW and RCW *74.13.020 and 74.13.031 and chapter 13.32A RCW shall not be deemed custody for purposes of this chapter;

(3) "Detention facility" means any place used for the confinement of a person (a) arrested for, charged with or convicted of an offense, or (b) charged with being or adjudicated to be a juvenile offender as defined in RCW 13.40.020 as now existing or hereafter amended, or (c) held for extradition or as a material witness, or (d) otherwise confined pursuant to an order of a court, except an order under chapter 13.34 RCW or chapter 13.32A RCW, or (e) in any work release, furlough, or other such facility or program;

(4) "Uncontrollable circumstances" means an act of nature such as a flood, earthquake, or fire, or a medical condition that requires immediate hospitalization or treatment, or an act of a human being such as an automobile accident or threats of death, forcible sexual attack, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future for which there is no time for a complaint to the authorities and no time or opportunity to resort to the courts. [2013 c 43 § 1. Prior: 2009 c 549 § 1003; 2001 c 264 § 4; 1991 c 181 § 6; 1979 c 155 § 35; 1977 ex.s. c 291 § 53; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.010.]

*Reviser's note: RCW 74.13.020 no longer refers to "custody."

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.020 Obstructing a law enforcement officer. (1) A person is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer if the person willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.

(2) "Law enforcement officer" means any general authority, limited authority, or specially commissioned Washington peace officer or federal peace officer as those terms are defined in RCW 10.93.020, and other public offi-

cers who are responsible for enforcement of fire, building, zoning, and life and safety codes.

(3) Obstructing a law enforcement officer is a gross misdemeanor. [2001 c 308 § 3. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 33; 1994 c 196 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.020.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 308: See notes following RCW 9A.76.175.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.023 Disarming a law enforcement or corrections officer. (1) A person is guilty of disarming a law enforcement officer if with intent to interfere with the performance of the officer's duties the person knowingly removes a firearm or weapon from the person of a law enforcement officer or corrections officer or deprives a law enforcement officer or corrections officer of the use of a firearm or weapon, when the officer is acting within the scope of the officer's duties, does not consent to the removal, and the person has reasonable cause to know or knows that the individual is a law enforcement or corrections officer.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, disarming a law enforcement or corrections officer is a class C felony.

(b) Disarming a law enforcement or corrections officer is a class B felony if the firearm involved is discharged when the person removes the firearm. [2003 c 53 § 82; 1998 c 252 § 1.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

9A.76.025 Disarming a law enforcement or corrections officer—Commission of another crime. A person who commits another crime during the commission of the crime of disarming a law enforcement or corrections officer may be punished for the other crime as well as for disarming a law enforcement officer and may be prosecuted separately for each crime. [1998 c 252 § 2.]

9A.76.027 Law enforcement or corrections officer engaged in criminal conduct. RCW 9A.76.023 and 9A.76.025 do not apply when the law enforcement officer or corrections officer is engaged in criminal conduct. [1998 c 252 § 3.]

9A.76.030 Refusing to summon aid for a peace officer. (1) A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer.

(2) Refusing to summon aid for a peace officer is a misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 398; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.030.]

9A.76.040 Resisting arrest. (1) A person is guilty of resisting arrest if he or she intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer from lawfully arresting him or her.

(2) Resisting arrest is a misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 399; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.040.]

9A.76.050 Rendering criminal assistance—Definition of term. As used in RCW 9A.76.070, 9A.76.080, and

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9A.76.090, a person "renders criminal assistance" if, with intent to prevent, hinder, or delay the apprehension or prosecution of another person who he or she knows has committed a crime or juvenile offense or is being sought by law enforcement officials for the commission of a crime or juvenile offense or has escaped from a detention facility, he or she:

(1) Harbors or conceals such person; or

(2) Warns such person of impending discovery or apprehension; or

(3) Provides such person with money, transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding discovery or apprehension; or

(4) Prevents or obstructs, by use of force, deception, or threat, anyone from performing an act that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person; or

(5) Conceals, alters, or destroys any physical evidence that might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person; or

(6) Provides such person with a weapon. [2011 c 336 § 400; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 20; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.050.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.060 Relative defined. As used in RCW 9A.76.070 and 9A.76.080, "relative" means a person:

(1) Who is related as husband or wife, brother or sister, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, stepchild or step-parent to the person to whom criminal assistance is rendered; and

(2) Who does not render criminal assistance to another person in one or more of the means defined in subsections (4), (5), or (6) of RCW 9A.76.050. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.060.]

9A.76.070 Rendering criminal assistance in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of rendering criminal assistance in the first degree if he or she renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed or is being sought for murder in the first degree or any class A felony or equivalent juvenile offense.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, rendering criminal assistance in the first degree is a class B felony.

(b) Rendering criminal assistance in the first degree is a gross misdemeanor if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor is a relative as defined in RCW 9A.76.060 and under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. [2010 c 255 § 1; 2003 c 53 § 83; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 21; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.070.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.080 Rendering criminal assistance in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of rendering criminal assistance in the second degree if he or she renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed or is being sought for a class B or class C felony or an equivalent juvenile offense or to someone being sought for violation of parole, probation, or community supervision.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, rendering criminal assistance in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor.

(b) Rendering criminal assistance in the second degree is a misdemeanor if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor is a relative as defined in RCW 9A.76.060. [2003 c 53 § 84; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 22; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.080.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.090 Rendering criminal assistance in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of rendering criminal assistance in the third degree if he or she renders criminal assistance to a person who has committed a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor.

(2) Rendering criminal assistance in the third degree is a misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 401; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.090.]

9A.76.100 Compounding. (1) A person is guilty of compounding if:

(a) He or she requests, accepts, or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit pursuant to an agreement or understanding that he or she will refrain from initiating a prosecution for a crime; or

(b) He or she confers, or offers or agrees to confer, any pecuniary benefit upon another pursuant to an agreement or understanding that such other person will refrain from initiating a prosecution for a crime.

(2) In any prosecution under this section, it is a defense if established by a preponderance of the evidence that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the defendant reasonably believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused by the crime.

(3) Compounding is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 402; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.100.]

9A.76.110 Escape in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of escape in the first degree if he or she knowingly escapes from custody or a detention facility while being detained pursuant to a conviction of a felony or an equivalent juvenile offense.

(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from remaining in custody or in the detention facility or from returning to custody or to the detention facility, and that the person did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to remain or return, and that the person returned to custody or the detention facility as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.

(3) Escape in the first degree is a class B felony. [2001 c 264 § 1; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 23; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.110.]

Term of escaped prisoner recaptured: RCW 9.31.090.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.115 Sexually violent predator escape. (1) A person is guilty of sexually violent predator escape if:

(a) Having been found to be a sexually violent predator and confined to the special commitment center or another secure facility under court order, the person escapes from the secure facility;

(b) Having been found to be a sexually violent predator and being under an order of conditional release, the person leaves or remains absent from the state of Washington without prior court authorization; or

(c) Having been found to be a sexually violent predator and being under an order of conditional release, the person: (i) Without authorization, leaves or remains absent from his or her residence, place of employment, educational institution, or authorized outing; (ii) tampers with his or her electronic monitoring device or removes it without authorization; or (iii) escapes from his or her escort.

(2) Sexually violent predator escape is a class A felony with a minimum sentence of sixty months, and shall be sentenced under RCW 9.94A.507. [2009 c 28 § 32; 2001 2nd sp.s. c 12 § 360; 2001 c 287 § 1.]

Intent—Severability—Effective dates—2001 2nd sp.s. c 12: See notes following RCW 71.09.250.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.120 Escape in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of escape in the second degree if:

(a) He or she knowingly escapes from a detention facility; or

(b) Having been charged with a felony or an equivalent juvenile offense, he or she knowingly escapes from custody; or

(c) Having been committed under chapter 10.77 RCW for a sex, violent, or felony harassment offense and being under an order of conditional release, he or she knowingly leaves or remains absent from the state of Washington without prior court authorization.

(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from remaining in custody or in the detention facility or from returning to custody or to the detention facility, and that the person did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to remain or return, and that the person returned to custody or the detention facility as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.

(3) Escape in the second degree is a class C felony. [2001 c 287 § 2; 2001 c 264 § 2; 1995 c 216 § 15; 1982 1st ex.s. c 47 § 24; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.120.]

Reviser's note: This section was amended by 2001 c 264 § 2 and by 2001 c 287 § 2, each without reference to the other. Both amendments are incorporated in the publication of this section under RCW 1.12.025(2). For rule of construction, see RCW 1.12.025(1).

Term of escaped prisoner recaptured: RCW 9.31.090.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.130 Escape in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of escape in the third degree if he or she:

(a) Escapes from custody; or

(b) Knowingly violates the terms of an electronic monitoring program.

(2) Escape in the third degree is a misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.

(3)(a) If the person has one prior conviction for escape in the third degree, escape in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor.

(b) If the person has two or more prior convictions for escape in the third degree, escape in the third degree is a class C felony. [2015 c 287 § 11; 2011 c 336 § 403; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.130.]

Term of escaped prisoner recaptured: RCW 9.31.090.

9A.76.140 Introducing contraband in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of introducing contraband in the first degree if he or she knowingly provides any deadly weapon to any person confined in a detention facility or secure facility under chapter 71.09 RCW.

(2) Introducing contraband in the first degree is a class B felony. [2013 c 43 § 3; 2011 c 336 § 404; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.140.]

9A.76.150 Introducing contraband in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of introducing contraband in the second degree if he or she knowingly and unlawfully provides contraband to any person confined in a detention facility or secure facility under chapter 71.09 RCW with the intent that such contraband be of assistance in an escape or in the commission of a crime.

(2) Introducing contraband in the second degree is a class C felony. [2013 c 43 § 4; 2011 c 336 § 405; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.150.]

9A.76.160 Introducing contraband in the third degree. (1) A person is guilty of introducing contraband in the third degree if he or she knowingly and unlawfully provides contraband to any person confined in a detention facility or secure facility under chapter 71.09 RCW.

(2)(a) This section does not apply to an attorney representing a client confined in a secure facility under chapter 71.09 RCW for the purposes of bringing discovery or other legal materials to assist the client in the civil commitment process under chapter 71.09 RCW; PROVIDED, That:

(i) The attorney must be present when the materials are being reviewed or handled by the client; and

(ii) The attorney must take the materials and any and all copies of the materials when leaving the secure facility.

(3) Introducing contraband in the third degree is a misdemeanor. [2013 c 43 § 5; 2011 c 336 § 406; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.160.]

9A.76.170 Bail jumping. (1) A person is guilty of bail jumping if he or she:

(a) Is released by court order or admitted to bail, has received written notice of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance for trial before any court of this state, and fails to appear for trial as required; or

(b)(i) Is held for, charged with, or convicted of a violent offense or sex offense, as those terms are defined in RCW 9.94A.030, is released by court order or admitted to bail, has received written notice of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state or of the requirement to report to a correctional facility for service of sentence, and fails to appear or fails to surrender for service of sentence as required; and

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(ii)(A) Within thirty days of the issuance of a warrant for failure to appear or surrender, does not make a motion with the court to quash the warrant, and if a motion is made under this subsection, he or she does not appear before the court with respect to the motion; or

(B) Has had a prior warrant issued based on a prior incident of failure to appear or surrender for the present cause for which he or she is being held or charged or has been convicted.

(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from appearing or surrendering, and that the person did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances by negligently disregarding the requirement to appear or surrender, and that the person appeared or surrendered as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.

(3) Bail jumping is:

(a) A class A felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of murder in the first degree;

(b) A class B felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a class A felony other than murder in the first degree;

(c) A class C felony if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a class B or class C felony; or

(d) A misdemeanor if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor. [2020 c 19 § 1; 2001 c 264 § 3; 1983 1st ex.s. c 4 § 3; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.170.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.175 Making a false or misleading statement to a public servant. A person who knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. "Material statement" means a written or oral statement reasonably likely to be relied upon by a public servant in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties. [2001 c 308 § 2. Prior: 1995 c 285 § 32.]

Purpose—2001 c 308: "The purpose of this act is to respond to *State v. Thomas*, 103 Wn. App. 800, by reenacting, without changes, the law prohibiting materially false or misleading statements to public servants, enacted as sections 32 and 33, chapter 285, Laws of 1995." [2001 c 308 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.76.177 Amber alert—Making a false or misleading statement to a public servant. (1) A person who, with the intent of causing an activation of the voluntary broadcast notification system commonly known as the "Amber alert," or as the same system may otherwise be known, which is used to notify the public of abducted children, knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant that a child has been abducted and which statement causes an activation, is guilty of a class C felony.

(2) "Material statement" means a written or oral statement reasonably likely to be relied upon by a public servant in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties. [2008 c 91 § 1.]

9A.76.180 Intimidating a public servant. (1) A person is guilty of intimidating a public servant if, by use of a threat, he or she attempts to influence a public servant's vote, opinion, decision, or other official action as a public servant.

(2) For purposes of this section "public servant" shall not include jurors.

(3) "Threat" as used in this section means:

(a) To communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent immediately to use force against any person who is present at the time; or

(b) Threats as defined in RCW 9A.04.110.

(4) Intimidating a public servant is a class B felony. [2011 c 336 § 407; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.76.180.]

9A.76.190 Failure to appear or surrender—Affirmative defense—Penalty. (1)(a) A person is guilty of failure to appear or surrender if he or she is released by court order or admitted to bail, has received written notice of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state or of the requirement to report to a correctional facility for service of sentence, and fails to appear or fails to surrender for service of sentence as required; and

(b)(i) Within thirty days of the issuance of a warrant for failure to appear or surrender, does not make a motion with the court to quash the warrant, and if a motion is made under this subsection, he or she does not appear before the court with respect to the motion; or

(ii) Has had a prior warrant issued based on a prior incident of failure to appear or surrender for the present cause for which he or she is being held or charged or has been convicted.

(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person from appearing or surrendering, that the person did not contribute to the creation of such circumstances by negligently disregarding the requirement to appear or surrender, and that the person appeared or surrendered as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.

(3) Failure to appear or surrender is:

(a) A gross misdemeanor if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a felony; or

(b) A misdemeanor if the person was held for, charged with, or convicted of a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor. [2020 c 19 § 2.]

9A.76.200 Harming a police dog, accelerant detection dog, or police horse—Penalty. (1) A person is guilty of harming a police dog, accelerant detection dog, or police horse, if he or she maliciously injures, disables, shoots, or kills by any means any dog or horse that the person knows or has reason to know to be a police dog or accelerant detection dog, as defined in RCW 4.24.410, or police horse, as defined in subsection (2) of this section, whether or not the dog or horse is actually engaged in police or accelerant detection work at the time of the injury.

(2) "Police horse" means any horse used or kept for use by a law enforcement officer in discharging any legal duty or power of his or her office.

(3) Harming a police dog, accelerant detection dog, or police horse is a class C felony.

(4)(a) In addition to the criminal penalty provided in this section for harming a police dog:

(i) The court may impose a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars for harming a police dog.

(ii) The court shall impose a civil penalty of at least five thousand dollars and may increase the penalty up to a maximum of ten thousand dollars for killing a police dog.

(b) Moneys collected must be distributed to the jurisdiction that owns the police dog. [2012 c 94 § 2; 2003 c 269 § 1; 1993 c 180 § 2; 1989 c 26 § 2; 1982 c 22 § 2.]

9A.76.900 Construction—Chapter applicable to state registered domestic partnerships—2009 c 521. For the purposes of this chapter, the terms spouse, marriage, marital, husband, wife, widow, widower, next of kin, and family shall be interpreted as applying equally to state registered domestic partnerships or individuals in state registered domestic partnerships as well as to marital relationships and married persons, and references to dissolution of marriage shall apply equally to state registered domestic partnerships that have been terminated, dissolved, or invalidated, to the extent that such interpretation does not conflict with federal law. Where necessary to implement chapter 521, Laws of 2009, gender-specific terms such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law shall be construed to be gender neutral, and applicable to individuals in state registered domestic partnerships. [2009 c 521 § 25.]

Chapter 9A.80 RCW ABUSE OF OFFICE

Sections

9A.80.010 Official misconduct.

9A.80.010 Official misconduct. (1) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit or to deprive another person of a lawful right or privilege:

(a) He or she intentionally commits an unauthorized act under color of law; or

(b) He or she intentionally refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him or her by law.

(2) Official misconduct is a gross misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 408; 1975-'76 2nd ex.s. c 38 § 17; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.80.010.]

Failure of duty by public officers: RCW 42.20.100.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

Chapter 9A.82 RCW CRIMINAL PROFITEERING ACT

Sections

9A.82.001 Short title.

9A.82.010 Definitions.

9A.82.020 Extortionate extension of credit.

9A.82.030 Advancing money or property to be used for extortionate credit.

9A.82.040 Use of extortionate means to collect extensions of credit.

9A.82.045 Collection of unlawful debt.

9A.82.050 Trafficking in stolen property in the first degree.

9A.82.055 Trafficking in stolen property in the second degree.

9A.82.060 Leading organized crime.

9A.82.070 Influencing outcome of sporting event.

9A.82.080 Use of proceeds of criminal profiteering—Controlling enterprise or realty—Conspiracy or attempt.

9A.82.085 Bars on certain prosecutions.

9A.82.090 Orders restraining criminal profiteering—When issued.

9A.82.100 Remedies and procedures.

9A.82.110 County antiprofitteering revolving funds.

9A.82.120 Criminal profiteering lien—Authority, procedures.

9A.82.130	Criminal profiteering lien—Trustee of real property.
9A.82.140	Criminal profiteering lien—Procedures after notice.
9A.82.150	Criminal profiteering lien—Conveyance of property by trustee, liability.
9A.82.160	Criminal profiteering lien—Trustee's failure to comply, evasion of procedures or lien.
9A.82.170	Financial institution records—Inspection and copying—Wrongful disclosure.
9A.82.901	Effective date—1984 c 270 as amended by 1985 c 455.
9A.82.902	Effective date—1985 c 455.

Special narcotics enforcement unit: RCW 43.43.655.

9A.82.001 Short title. This chapter shall be known as the criminal profiteering act. [2001 c 222 § 2. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 1.]

Purpose—2001 c 222: "The purpose of this act is to respond to *State v. Thomas*, 103 Wn. App. 800, by reenacting, without substantive changes, the Washington laws relating to criminal profiteering, and the sentencing level ranking for criminal profiteering crimes as they existed prior to December 21, 2000." [2001 c 222 § 1.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.82.010 Definitions. Unless the context requires the contrary, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter.

(1)(a) "Beneficial interest" means:

(i) The interest of a person as a beneficiary under a trust established under Title 11 RCW in which the trustee for the trust holds legal or record title to real property;

(ii) The interest of a person as a beneficiary under any other trust arrangement under which a trustee holds legal or record title to real property for the benefit of the beneficiary; or

(iii) The interest of a person under any other form of express fiduciary arrangement under which one person holds legal or record title to real property for the benefit of the other person.

(b) "Beneficial interest" does not include the interest of a stockholder in a corporation or the interest of a partner in a general partnership or limited partnership.

(c) A beneficial interest is considered to be located where the real property owned by the trustee is located.

(2) "Control" means the possession of a sufficient interest to permit substantial direction over the affairs of an enterprise.

(3) "Creditor" means a person making an extension of credit or a person claiming by, under, or through a person making an extension of credit.

(4) "Criminal profiteering" means any act, including any anticipatory or completed offense, committed for financial gain, that is chargeable or indictable under the laws of the state in which the act occurred and, if the act occurred in a state other than this state, would be chargeable or indictable under the laws of this state had the act occurred in this state and punishable as a felony and by imprisonment for more than one year, regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted, as any of the following:

(a) Murder, as defined in RCW 9A.32.030 and 9A.32.050;

(b) Robbery, as defined in RCW 9A.56.200 and 9A.56.210;

(c) Kidnapping, as defined in RCW 9A.40.020 and 9A.40.030;

(d) Forgery, as defined in RCW 9A.60.020 and 9A.60.030;

(e) Theft, as defined in RCW 9A.56.030, 9A.56.040, 9A.56.060, 9A.56.080, and 9A.56.083;

(f) Unlawful sale of subscription television services, as defined in RCW 9A.56.230;

(g) Theft of telecommunication services or unlawful manufacture of a telecommunication device, as defined in RCW 9A.56.262 and 9A.56.264;

(h) Child selling or child buying, as defined in RCW 9A.64.030;

(i) Bribery, as defined in RCW 9A.68.010, 9A.68.020, 9A.68.040, and 9A.68.050;

(j) Gambling, as defined in RCW 9.46.220 and 9.46.215 and 9.46.217;

(k) Extortion, as defined in RCW 9A.56.120 and 9A.56.130;

(l) Unlawful production of payment instruments, unlawful possession of payment instruments, unlawful possession of a personal identification device, unlawful possession of fictitious identification, or unlawful possession of instruments of financial fraud, as defined in RCW 9A.56.320;

(m) Extortionate extension of credit, as defined in RCW 9A.82.020;

(n) Advancing money for use in an extortionate extension of credit, as defined in RCW 9A.82.030;

(o) Collection of an extortionate extension of credit, as defined in RCW 9A.82.040;

(p) Collection of an unlawful debt, as defined in RCW 9A.82.045;

(q) Delivery or manufacture of controlled substances or possession with intent to deliver or manufacture controlled substances under chapter 69.50 RCW;

(r) Trafficking in stolen property, as defined in RCW 9A.82.050;

(s) Leading organized crime, as defined in RCW 9A.82.060;

(t) Money laundering, as defined in RCW 9A.83.020;

(u) Obstructing criminal investigations or prosecutions in violation of RCW 9A.72.090, 9A.72.100, 9A.72.110, 9A.72.120, 9A.72.130, 9A.76.070, or 9A.76.180;

(v) Fraud in the purchase or sale of securities, as defined in RCW 21.20.010;

(w) Promoting pornography, as defined in RCW 9.68.140;

(x) Sexual exploitation of children, as defined in RCW 9.68A.040, 9.68A.050, and 9.68A.060;

(y) Promoting prostitution, as defined in RCW 9A.88.070 and 9A.88.080;

(z) Arson, as defined in RCW 9A.48.020 and 9A.48.030;

(aa) Assault, as defined in RCW 9A.36.011 and 9A.36.021;

(bb) Assault of a child, as defined in RCW 9A.36.120 and 9A.36.130;

(cc) A pattern of equity skimming, as defined in RCW 61.34.020;

(dd) Commercial telephone solicitation in violation of RCW 19.158.040(1);

(ee) Trafficking in insurance claims, as defined in RCW 48.30A.015;

(ff) Unlawful practice of law, as defined in RCW 2.48.180;

(gg) Commercial bribery, as defined in RCW 9A.68.060;

(hh) Health care false claims, as defined in RCW 48.80.030;

(ii) Unlicensed practice of a profession or business, as defined in RCW 18.130.190(7);

(jj) Improperly obtaining financial information, as defined in RCW 9.35.010;

(kk) Identity theft, as defined in RCW 9.35.020;

(ll) Unlawful shipment of cigarettes in violation of *RCW 70.155.105(6) (a) or (b);

(mm) Unlawful shipment of cigarettes in violation of RCW 82.24.110(2);

(nn) Unauthorized sale or procurement of telephone records in violation of RCW 9.26A.140;

(oo) Theft with the intent to resell, as defined in RCW 9A.56.340;

(pp) Organized retail theft, as defined in RCW 9A.56.350;

(qq) Mortgage fraud, as defined in RCW 19.144.080;

(rr) Commercial sexual abuse of a minor, as defined in RCW 9.68A.100;

(ss) Promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor, as defined in RCW 9.68A.101; or

(tt) Trafficking, as defined in RCW 9A.40.100, promoting travel for commercial sexual abuse of a minor, as defined in RCW 9.68A.102, and permitting commercial sexual abuse of a minor, as defined in RCW 9.68A.103.

(5) "Dealer in property" means a person who buys and sells property as a business.

(6) "Debtor" means a person to whom an extension of credit is made or a person who guarantees the repayment of an extension of credit or in any manner undertakes to indemnify the creditor against loss resulting from the failure of a person to whom an extension is made to repay the same.

(7) "Documentary material" means any book, paper, document, writing, drawing, graph, chart, photograph, phonograph record, magnetic tape, computer printout, other data compilation from which information can be obtained or from which information can be translated into usable form, or other tangible item.

(8) "Enterprise" includes any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, or other profit or nonprofit legal entity, and includes any union, association, or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and both illicit and licit enterprises and governmental and nongovernmental entities.

(9) "Extortionate extension of credit" means an extension of credit with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time the extension is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.

(10) "Extortionate means" means the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any person.

(11) "Financial institution" means any bank, trust company, savings and loan association, savings bank, mutual sav-

ings bank, credit union, or loan company under the jurisdiction of the state or an agency of the United States.

(12) "Pattern of criminal profiteering activity" means engaging in at least three acts of criminal profiteering, one of which occurred after July 1, 1985, and the last of which occurred within five years, excluding any period of imprisonment, after the commission of the earliest act of criminal profiteering. In order to constitute a pattern, the three acts must have the same or similar intent, results, accomplices, principals, victims, or methods of commission, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to the same enterprise, and must not be isolated events. However, in any civil proceedings brought pursuant to RCW 9A.82.100 by any person other than the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney in which one or more acts of fraud in the purchase or sale of securities are asserted as acts of criminal profiteering activity, it is a condition to civil liability under RCW 9A.82.100 that the defendant has been convicted in a criminal proceeding of fraud in the purchase or sale of securities under RCW 21.20.400 or under the laws of another state or of the United States requiring the same elements of proof, but such conviction need not relate to any act or acts asserted as acts of criminal profiteering activity in such civil action under RCW 9A.82.100.

(13) "Real property" means any real property or interest in real property, including but not limited to a land sale contract, lease, or mortgage of real property.

(14) "Records" means any book, paper, writing, record, computer program, or other material.

(15) "Repayment of an extension of credit" means the repayment, satisfaction, or discharge in whole or in part of a debt or claim, acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, resulting from or in connection with that extension of credit.

(16) "Stolen property" means property that has been obtained by theft, robbery, or extortion.

(17) "To collect an extension of credit" means to induce in any way a person to make repayment thereof.

(18) "To extend credit" means to make or renew a loan or to enter into an agreement, tacit or express, whereby the repayment or satisfaction of a debt or claim, whether acknowledged or disputed, valid or invalid, and however arising, may or shall be deferred.

(19) "Traffic" means to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of stolen property to another person, or to buy, receive, possess, or obtain control of stolen property, with intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of the property to another person.

(20)(a) "Trustee" means:

(i) A person acting as a trustee under a trust established under Title 11 RCW in which the trustee holds legal or record title to real property;

(ii) A person who holds legal or record title to real property in which another person has a beneficial interest; or

(iii) A successor trustee to a person who is a trustee under (a)(i) or (ii) of this subsection.

(b) "Trustee" does not mean a person appointed or acting as:

(i) A personal representative under Title 11 RCW;

(ii) A trustee of any testamentary trust;

(iii) A trustee of any indenture of trust under which a bond is issued; or

(iv) A trustee under a deed of trust.

(21) "Unlawful debt" means any money or other thing of value constituting principal or interest of a debt that is legally unenforceable in the state in full or in part because the debt was incurred or contracted:

(a) In violation of any one of the following:

(i) Chapter 67.16 RCW relating to horse racing;

(ii) Chapter 9.46 RCW relating to gambling;

(b) In a gambling activity in violation of federal law; or

(c) In connection with the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate that is at least twice the permitted rate under the applicable state or federal law relating to usury. [2013 c 302 § 10; 2012 c 139 § 1; 2008 c 108 § 24. Prior: 2006 c 277 § 5; 2006 c 193 § 2; prior: 2003 c 119 § 6; 2003 c 113 § 3; 2003 c 53 § 85; prior: 2001 c 222 § 3; 2001 c 217 § 11; prior: 1999 c 143 § 40; prior: 1995 c 285 § 34; 1995 c 92 § 5; 1994 c 218 § 17; prior: 1992 c 210 § 6; 1992 c 145 § 13; 1989 c 20 § 17; 1988 c 33 § 5; 1986 c 78 § 1; 1985 c 455 § 2; 1984 c 270 § 1.]

*Reviser's note: RCW 70.155.105 was repealed by 2009 c 278 § 3.

Effective date—2013 c 302: See note following RCW 9.68A.090.

Findings—2008 c 108: See RCW 19.144.005.

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.82.020 Extortionate extension of credit. (1) A person who knowingly makes an extortionate extension of credit is guilty of a class B felony.

(2) In a prosecution under this section, if it is shown that all of the following factors are present in connection with the extension of credit, there is prima facie evidence that the extension of credit was extortionate:

(a) The repayment of the extension of credit, or the performance of any promise given in consideration thereof, would be unenforceable at the time the extension of credit was made through civil judicial processes against the debtor in the county in which the debtor, if a natural person, resided or in every county in which the debtor, if other than a natural person, was incorporated or qualified to do business.

(b) The extension of credit was made at a rate of interest in excess of an annual rate of forty-five percent calculated according to the actuarial method of allocating payments made on a debt between principal and interest, pursuant to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated interest and the balance is applied to the unpaid principal.

(c) The creditor intended the debtor to believe that failure to comply with the terms of the extension of credit would be enforced by extortionate means.

(d) Upon the making of the extension of credit, the total of the extensions of credit by the creditor to the debtor then outstanding, including any unpaid interest or similar charges, exceeded one hundred dollars. [2001 c 222 § 4. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 3; 1984 c 270 § 2.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.030 Advancing money or property to be used for extortionate credit. A person who advances money or

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property, whether as a gift, loan, investment, or pursuant to a partnership or profit-sharing agreement or otherwise, to any person, with the knowledge that it is the intention of that person to use the money or property so advanced, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of making extortionate extensions of credit, is guilty of a class B felony. [2001 c 222 § 5. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 4; 1984 c 270 § 3.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.040 Use of extortionate means to collect extensions of credit. A person who knowingly participates in any way in the use of any extortionate means to collect or attempt to collect any extensions of credit or to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof, is guilty of a class B felony. [2001 c 222 § 6. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 5; 1984 c 270 § 4.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.045 Collection of unlawful debt. It is unlawful for any person knowingly to collect any unlawful debt. A violation of this section is a class C felony. [2001 c 222 § 7. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 6.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.050 Trafficking in stolen property in the first degree. (1) A person who knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property for sale to others, or who knowingly traffics in stolen property, is guilty of trafficking in stolen property in the first degree.

(2) Trafficking in stolen property in the first degree is a class B felony. [2003 c 53 § 86; 2001 c 222 § 8. Prior: 1984 c 270 § 5.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.055 Trafficking in stolen property in the second degree. (1) A person who recklessly traffics in stolen property is guilty of trafficking in stolen property in the second degree.

(2) Trafficking in stolen property in the second degree is a class C felony. [2003 c 53 § 87.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

9A.82.060 Leading organized crime. (1) A person commits the offense of leading organized crime by:

(a) Intentionally organizing, managing, directing, supervising, or financing any three or more persons with the intent to engage in a pattern of criminal profiteering activity; or

(b) Intentionally inciting or inducing others to engage in violence or intimidation with the intent to further or promote the accomplishment of a pattern of criminal profiteering activity.

(2)(a) Leading organized crime as defined in subsection (1)(a) of this section is a class A felony.

(b) Leading organized crime as defined in subsection (1)(b) of this section is a class B felony. [2003 c 53 § 88; 2001 c 222 § 9. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 7; 1984 c 270 § 6.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.070 Influencing outcome of sporting event.

Whoever knowingly gives, promises, or offers to any professional or amateur baseball, football, hockey, polo, tennis, horse race, or basketball player or boxer or any player or referee or other official who participates or expects to participate in any professional or amateur game or sport, or to any manager, coach, or trainer of any team or participant or prospective participant in any such game, contest, or sport, any benefit with intent to influence the person to lose or try to lose or cause to be lost or to limit the person's or person's team's margin of victory or defeat, or in the case of a referee or other official to affect the decisions or the performance of the official's duties in any way, in a baseball, football, hockey, or basketball game, boxing, tennis, horse race, or polo match, or any professional or amateur sport or game, in which the player or participant or referee or other official is taking part or expects to take part, or has any duty or connection therewith, is guilty of a class C felony. [2001 c 222 § 10. Prior: 1984 c 270 § 7.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.080 Use of proceeds of criminal profiteering—Controlling enterprise or realty—Conspiracy or attempt.

(1)(a) It is unlawful for a person who has knowingly received any of the proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of criminal profiteering activity to use or invest, whether directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in, real property or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise.

(b) A violation of this subsection is a class B felony.

(2)(a) It is unlawful for a person knowingly to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or real property through a pattern of criminal profiteering activity.

(b) A violation of this subsection is a class B felony.

(3)(a) It is unlawful for a person knowingly to conspire or attempt to violate subsection (1) or (2) of this section.

(b) A violation of this subsection is a class C felony. [2003 c 53 § 89; 2001 c 222 § 11. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 8; 1984 c 270 § 8.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.085 Bars on certain prosecutions. In a criminal prosecution alleging a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080, the state is barred from joining any offense other than the offenses alleged to be part of the pattern of criminal profiteering activity. When a defendant has been tried crimi-

nally for a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080, the state is barred from subsequently charging the defendant with an offense that was alleged to be part of the pattern of criminal profiteering activity for which he or she was tried. [2001 c 222 § 12. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 9.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.090 Orders restraining criminal profiteering—When issued.

During the pendency of any criminal case charging a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, the superior court may, in addition to its other powers, issue an order pursuant to RCW 9A.82.100 (2) or (3). Upon conviction of a person for a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, the superior court may, in addition to its other powers of disposition, issue an order pursuant to RCW 9A.82.100. [2003 c 267 § 5; 2001 c 222 § 13. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 10; 1984 c 270 § 9.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.100 Remedies and procedures. (1)(a) A person who sustains injury to his or her person, business, or property by an act of criminal profiteering that is part of a pattern of criminal profiteering activity, or by an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, or by a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080 may file an action in superior court for the recovery of damages and the costs of the suit, including reasonable investigative and attorney's fees.

(b) The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file an action: (i) On behalf of those persons injured or, respectively, on behalf of the state or county if the entity has sustained damages, or (ii) to prevent, restrain, or remedy a pattern of criminal profiteering activity, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, or a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080.

(c) An action for damages filed by or on behalf of an injured person, the state, or the county shall be for the recovery of damages and the costs of the suit, including reasonable investigative and attorney's fees.

(d) In an action filed to prevent, restrain, or remedy a pattern of criminal profiteering activity, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, or a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080, the court, upon proof of the violation, may impose a civil penalty not exceeding two hundred fifty thousand dollars, in addition to awarding the cost of the suit, including reasonable investigative and attorney's fees.

(2) The superior court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, and remedy a pattern of criminal profiteering, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, or a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080 after making provision for the rights of all innocent persons affected by the violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate orders.

(3) Prior to a determination of liability, orders issued under subsection (2) of this section may include, but are not limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfac-

tory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture, or other restraints pursuant to this section as the court deems proper. The orders may also include attachment, receivership, or injunctive relief in regard to personal or real property pursuant to Title 7 RCW. In shaping the reach or scope of receivership, attachment, or injunctive relief, the superior court shall provide for the protection of bona fide interests in property, including community property, of persons who were not involved in the violation of this chapter, except to the extent that such interests or property were acquired or used in such a way as to be subject to forfeiture under RCW 9A.82.100(4)(f).

(4) Following a determination of liability, orders may include, but are not limited to:

(a) Ordering any person to divest himself or herself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise.

(b) Imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect the laws of this state, to the extent the Constitutions of the United States and this state permit.

(c) Ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.

(d) Ordering the payment of actual damages sustained to those persons injured by a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, or an act of criminal profiteering that is part of a pattern of criminal profiteering, and in the court's discretion, increasing the payment to an amount not exceeding three times the actual damages sustained.

(e) Ordering the payment of all costs and expenses of the prosecution and investigation of a pattern of criminal profiteering, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, activity or a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080, civil and criminal, incurred by the state or county, including any costs of defense provided at public expense, as appropriate to the state general fund or the antiprofitteering revolving fund of the county.

(f) Ordering forfeiture first as restitution to any person damaged by an act of criminal profiteering that is part of a pattern of criminal profiteering, or by an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, then to the state general fund or antiprofitteering revolving fund of the county, as appropriate, to the extent not already ordered to be paid in other damages, of the following:

(i) Any property or other interest acquired or maintained in violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080 to the extent of the investment of funds, and any appreciation or income attributable to the investment, from a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080.

(ii) Any property, contractual right, or claim against property used to influence any enterprise that a person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080.

(iii) All proceeds traceable to or derived from an offense included in the pattern of criminal profiteering activity, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101,

or 9A.88.070, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, and other things of value significantly used or intended to be used significantly to facilitate commission of the offense.

(g) Ordering payment to the state general fund or anti-profitteering revolving fund of the county, as appropriate, of an amount equal to the gain a person has acquired or maintained through an offense included in the definition of criminal profiteering.

(5) In addition to or in lieu of an action under this section, the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file an action for forfeiture to the state general fund or anti-profitteering revolving fund of the county, as appropriate, to the extent not already ordered paid pursuant to this section, of the following:

(a) Any interest acquired or maintained by a person in violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080 to the extent of the investment of funds obtained from a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080 and any appreciation or income attributable to the investment.

(b) Any property, contractual right, or claim against property used to influence any enterprise that a person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080.

(c) All proceeds traceable to or derived from an offense included in the pattern of criminal profiteering activity, or an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, and other things of value significantly used or intended to be used significantly to facilitate the commission of the offense.

(6) A defendant convicted in any criminal proceeding is precluded in any civil proceeding from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense proven in the criminal trial in which the defendant was convicted. For the purposes of this subsection, a conviction shall be deemed to have occurred upon a verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, notwithstanding the fact that appellate review of the conviction and sentence has been or may be sought. If a subsequent reversal of the conviction occurs, any judgment that was based upon that conviction may be reopened upon motion of the defendant.

(7) The initiation of civil proceedings under this section shall be commenced within three years after discovery of the pattern of criminal profiteering activity or after the pattern should reasonably have been discovered or, in the case of an offense that is defined in RCW 9A.40.100, within three years after the final disposition of any criminal charges relating to the offense, whichever is later.

(8) The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may, in a civil action brought pursuant to this section, file with the clerk of the superior court a certificate stating that the case is of special public importance. A copy of that certificate shall be furnished immediately by the clerk to the presiding chief judge of the superior court in which the action is pending and, upon receipt of the copy, the judge shall immediately designate a judge to hear and determine the action. The judge so designated shall promptly assign the action for hearing, participate in the hearings and determination, and cause the action to be expedited.

(9) The standard of proof in actions brought pursuant to this section is the preponderance of the evidence test.

(10) A person other than the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney who files an action under this section shall serve notice and one copy of the pleading on the attorney general within thirty days after the action is filed with the superior court. The notice shall identify the action, the person, and the person's attorney. Service of the notice does not limit or otherwise affect the right of the state to maintain an action under this section or intervene in a pending action nor does it authorize the person to name the state or the attorney general as a party to the action.

(11) Except in cases filed by a county prosecuting attorney, the attorney general may, upon timely application, intervene in any civil action or proceeding brought under this section if the attorney general certifies that in the attorney general's opinion the action is of special public importance. Upon intervention, the attorney general may assert any available claim and is entitled to the same relief as if the attorney general had instituted a separate action.

(12) In addition to the attorney general's right to intervene as a party in any action under this section, the attorney general may appear as amicus curiae in any proceeding in which a claim under this section has been asserted or in which a court is interpreting RCW 9A.82.010, 9A.82.080, 9A.82.090, 9A.82.110, or 9A.82.120, or this section.

(13) A private civil action under this section does not limit any other civil or criminal action under this chapter or any other provision. Private civil remedies provided under this section are supplemental and not mutually exclusive.

(14) Upon motion by the defendant, the court may authorize the sale or transfer of assets subject to an order or lien authorized by this chapter for the purpose of paying actual attorney's fees and costs of defense. The motion shall specify the assets for which sale or transfer is sought and shall be accompanied by the defendant's sworn statement that the defendant has no other assets available for such purposes. No order authorizing such sale or transfer may be entered unless the court finds that the assets involved are not subject to possible forfeiture under RCW 9A.82.100(4)(f). Prior to disposition of the motion, the court shall notify the state of the assets sought to be sold or transferred and shall hear argument on the issue of whether the assets are subject to forfeiture under RCW 9A.82.100(4)(f). Such a motion may be made from time to time and shall be heard by the court on an expedited basis.

(15) In an action brought under subsection (1)(a) and (b)(i) of this section, either party has the right to a jury trial. [2012 c 139 § 2; 2003 c 267 § 6; 2001 c 222 § 14. Prior: 1989 c 271 § 111; 1985 c 455 § 11; 1984 c 270 § 10.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.82.110 County antiprofitteering revolving funds.

(1) In an action brought by the attorney general on behalf of the state under RCW 9A.82.100(1)(b)(i) in which the state prevails, any payments ordered in excess of the actual damages sustained shall be deposited in the crime victims' compensation account provided in RCW 7.68.045.

(2)(a) The county legislative authority may establish an antiprofitteering revolving fund to be administered by the county prosecuting attorney under the conditions and for the purposes provided by this subsection. Disbursements from the fund shall be on authorization of the county prosecuting attorney. No appropriation is required for disbursements.

(b) Any prosecution and investigation costs, including attorney's fees, recovered for the state by the county prosecuting attorney as a result of enforcement of civil and criminal statutes pertaining to any offense included in the definition of criminal profiteering, whether by final judgment, settlement, or otherwise, shall be deposited, as directed by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the fund established by this subsection. In an action brought by a prosecuting attorney on behalf of the county under RCW 9A.82.100(1)(b)(i) in which the county prevails, any payments ordered in excess of the actual damages sustained shall be deposited in the crime victims' compensation account provided in RCW 7.68.045.

(c) The county legislative authority may prescribe a maximum level of moneys in the antiprofitteering revolving fund. Moneys exceeding the prescribed maximum shall be transferred to the county current expense fund.

(d) The moneys in the fund shall be used by the county prosecuting attorney for the investigation and prosecution of any offense, within the jurisdiction of the county prosecuting attorney, included in the definition of criminal profiteering, including civil enforcement.

(e) If a county has not established an antiprofitteering revolving fund, any payments or forfeitures ordered to the county under this chapter shall be deposited to the county current expense fund. [2010 c 122 § 4; 2009 c 479 § 11; 2001 c 222 § 15. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 12; 1984 c 270 § 11.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.82.120 Criminal profiteering lien—Authority, procedures. (1) The state, upon filing a criminal action under RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080 or for an offense defined in RCW 9A.40.100, or a civil action under RCW 9A.82.100, may file in accordance with this section a criminal profiteering lien. A filing fee or other charge is not required for filing a criminal profiteering lien.

(2) A criminal profiteering lien shall be signed by the attorney general or the county prosecuting attorney representing the state in the action and shall set forth the following information:

(a) The name of the defendant whose property or other interests are to be subject to the lien;

(b) In the discretion of the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney filing the lien, any aliases or fictitious names of the defendant named in the lien;

(c) If known to the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney filing the lien, the present residence or principal place of business of the person named in the lien;

(d) A reference to the proceeding pursuant to which the lien is filed, including the name of the court, the title of the action, and the court's file number for the proceeding;

(e) The name and address of the attorney representing the state in the proceeding pursuant to which the lien is filed;

(f) A statement that the notice is being filed pursuant to this section;

(g) The amount that the state claims in the action or, with respect to property or other interests that the state has requested forfeiture to the state or county, a description of the property or interests sought to be paid or forfeited;

(h) If known to the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney filing the lien, a description of property that is subject to forfeiture to the state or property in which the defendant has an interest that is available to satisfy a judgment entered in favor of the state; and

(i) Such other information as the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney filing the lien deems appropriate.

(3) The attorney general or the county prosecuting attorney filing the lien may amend a lien filed under this section at any time by filing an amended criminal profiteering lien in accordance with this section that identifies the prior lien amended.

(4) The attorney general or the county prosecuting attorney filing the lien shall, as soon as practical after filing a criminal profiteering lien, furnish to any person named in the lien a notice of the filing of the lien. Failure to furnish notice under this subsection does not invalidate or otherwise affect a criminal profiteering lien filed in accordance with this section.

(5)(a) A criminal profiteering lien is perfected against interests in personal property in the same manner as a security interest in like property pursuant to RCW 62A.9A-301 through 62A.9A-316 or as otherwise required to perfect a security interest in like property under applicable law. In the case of perfection by filing, the state shall file, in lieu of a financing statement in the form prescribed by RCW 62A.9A-502, a notice of lien in substantially the following form:

NOTICE OF LIEN

Pursuant to RCW 9A.82.120, the state of Washington claims a criminal profiteering lien on all real and personal property of:

Name:
Address:
.....
State of Washington
.....
By (authorized signature)

On receipt of such a notice from the state, a filing officer shall, without payment of filing fee, file and index the notice as if it were a financing statement naming the state as secured party and the defendant as debtor.

(b) A criminal profiteering lien is perfected against interests in real property by filing the lien in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded. The filing officer shall file and index the criminal profiteering lien, without payment of a filing fee, in the same manner as a mortgage.

(6) The filing of a criminal profiteering lien in accordance with this section creates a lien in favor of the state in:

(a) Any interest of the defendant, in real property situated in the county in which the lien is filed, then maintained, or thereafter acquired in the name of the defendant identified in the lien;

(b) Any interest of the defendant, in personal property situated in this state, then maintained or thereafter acquired in the name of the defendant identified in the lien; and

(c) Any property identified in the lien to the extent of the defendant's interest therein.

(7) The lien created in favor of the state in accordance with this section, when filed or otherwise perfected as provided in subsection (5) of this section, has, with respect to any of the property described in subsection (6) of this section, the same priority determined pursuant to the laws of this state as a mortgage or security interest given for value (but not a purchase money security interest) and perfected in the same manner with respect to such property; except that any lien perfected pursuant to Title 60 RCW by any person who, in the ordinary course of his or her business, furnishes labor, services, or materials, or rents, leases, or otherwise supplies equipment, without knowledge of the criminal profiteering lien, is superior to the criminal profiteering lien.

(8) Upon entry of judgment in favor of the state, the state may proceed to execute thereon as in the case of any other judgment, except that in order to preserve the state's lien priority as provided in this section the state shall, in addition to such other notice as is required by law, give at least thirty days' notice of the execution to any person possessing at the time the notice is given, an interest recorded subsequent to the date the state's lien was perfected.

(9) Upon the entry of a final judgment in favor of the state providing for forfeiture of property to the state, the title of the state to the property:

(a) In the case of real property or a beneficial interest in real property, relates back to the date of filing the criminal profiteering lien or, if no criminal profiteering lien is filed, then to the date of recording of the final judgment or the abstract thereof; or

(b) In the case of personal property or a beneficial interest in personal property, relates back to the date the personal property was seized by the state, or the date of filing of a criminal profiteering lien in accordance with this section, whichever is earlier, but if the property was not seized and no criminal profiteering lien was filed then to the date the final judgment was filed with the department of licensing and, if the personal property is an aircraft, with the federal aviation administration.

(10) This section does not limit the right of the state to obtain any order or injunction, receivership, writ, attachment, garnishment, or other remedy authorized under RCW 9A.82.100 or appropriate to protect the interests of the state or available under other applicable law.

(11) In a civil or criminal action under this chapter, the superior court shall provide for the protection of bona fide interests in property, including community property, subject to liens of persons who were not involved in the violation of this chapter, except to the extent that such interests or property were acquired or used in such a way as to be subject to forfeiture pursuant to RCW 9A.82.100(4)(f). [2003 c 267 § 7; 2001 c 222 § 16. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 13; 1984 c 270 § 12.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.130 Criminal profiteering lien—Trustee of real property. (1) A trustee who is personally served in the manner provided for service of legal process with written notice that a lien notice has been recorded or a civil proceeding or criminal proceeding has been instituted under this chapter against any person for whom the trustee holds legal or record title to real property, shall immediately furnish to the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney the following:

(a) The name and address of the person, as known to the trustee;

(b) To the extent known to the trustee, the name and address of all other persons for whose benefit the trustee holds title to the real property; and

(c) If requested by the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney, a copy of the trust agreement or other instrument under which the trustee holds legal or record title to the real property.

(2) The recording of a lien notice shall not constitute a lien on the record title to real property owned by a trustee at the time of recording except to the extent that trustee is named in and served with the lien notice as provided in subsection (1) of this section. The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may bring a civil proceeding in superior court against the trustee to recover from the trustee the amounts set forth in RCW 9A.82.150. In addition to amounts recovered under RCW 9A.82.150, the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney also may recover its investigative costs and attorneys' fees.

(3) The recording of a lien notice does not affect the use to which real property or a beneficial interest owned by the person named in the lien notice may be put or the right of the person to receive any avails, rents, or other proceeds resulting from the use and ownership except the sale of the property, until a judgment of forfeiture is entered.

(4) This section does not apply to any conveyance by a trustee under a court order unless the court order is entered in an action between the trustee and the beneficiary.

(5) Notwithstanding that a trustee is served with notice as provided in subsection (1) of this section, this section does not apply to a conveyance by a trustee required under the terms of any trust agreement in effect before service of such notice on the trustee. [2001 c 222 § 17. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 14; 1984 c 270 § 13.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.140 Criminal profiteering lien—Procedures after notice. (1) The term of a lien notice shall be six years from the date the lien notice is recorded. If a renewal lien notice is filed by the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney, the term of the renewal lien notice shall be for six years from the date the renewal lien notice is recorded. The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney is entitled to only one renewal of the lien notice.

(2) The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney filing the lien notice may release in whole or in part any lien notice or may release any specific property or beneficial

interest from the lien notice upon such terms and conditions as the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney considers appropriate and shall release any lien upon the dismissal of the action which is the basis of the lien or satisfaction of the judgment of the court in the action or other final disposition of the claim evidenced by the lien. A release of a lien notice executed by the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney shall be recorded in the official records in which the lien notice covering that property was recorded. No charge or fee may be imposed for recording any release of a lien notice.

(3)(a) A person named in the lien notice may move the court in which the civil proceeding giving rise to the lien notice is pending for an order extinguishing the lien notice.

(b) Upon the motion of a person under (a) of this subsection, the court immediately shall enter an order setting a date for hearing, which shall be not less than five nor more than ten days after the motion is filed. The order and a copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney general or county prosecuting attorney within three days after the entry of the court's order. At the hearing, the court shall take evidence on the issue of whether any property or beneficial interest owned by the person is covered by the lien notice or otherwise subject to forfeiture under RCW 9A.82.120. If the person shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the lien notice is not applicable to the person or that any property or beneficial interest owned by the person is not subject to forfeiture under RCW 9A.82.120, the court shall enter a judgment extinguishing the lien notice or releasing the property or beneficial interest from the lien notice.

(c) The court may enter an order releasing from the lien notice any specific real property or beneficial interest if, at the time the lien notice is recorded, there is pending an arms length sale of the real property or beneficial interest in which the parties are under no undue compulsion to sell or buy and are able, willing, and reasonably well informed and the sale is for the fair market value of the real property or beneficial interest and the recording of the lien notice prevents the sale of the property or interest. The proceeds resulting from the sale of the real property or beneficial interest shall be deposited with the court, subject to the further order of the court.

(d) At any time after filing of a lien, the court may release from the lien any property upon application by the defendant and posting of security equal to the value of the property to be released. [2001 c 222 § 18. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 15; 1984 c 270 § 14.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.150 Criminal profiteering lien—Conveyance of property by trustee, liability. (1) If a trustee conveys title to real property for which, at the time of the conveyance, the trustee has been personally served with notice as provided in RCW 9A.82.130(1) of a lien under this chapter, the trustee shall be liable to the state for the greater of:

(a) The amount of proceeds received by the person named in the lien notice as a result of the conveyance;

(b) The amount of proceeds received by the trustee as a result of the conveyance and distributed by the trustee to the person named in the lien notice; or

(c) The fair market value of the interest of the person named in the lien notice in the real property so conveyed.

(2) If the trustee conveys the real property for which a lien notice has been served on the trustee at the time of the conveyance and holds the proceeds that would otherwise be paid or distributed to the beneficiary or at the direction of the beneficiary or beneficiary's designee, the trustee's liability shall not exceed the amount of the proceeds so held so long as the trustee continues to hold the proceeds. [2001 c 222 § 19. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 16; 1984 c 270 § 15.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.160 Criminal profiteering lien—Trustee's failure to comply, evasion of procedures or lien. (1) A trustee who knowingly fails to comply with RCW 9A.82.130(1) is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

(2) A trustee who conveys title to real property after service of the notice as provided in RCW 9A.82.130(1) with the intent to evade the provisions of RCW 9A.82.100 or 9A.82.120 with respect to such property is guilty of a class C felony. [2003 c 53 § 90; 2001 c 222 § 20. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 17; 1984 c 270 § 16.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.170 Financial institution records—Inspection and copying—Wrongful disclosure. (1) Upon request of the attorney general or prosecuting attorney, a subpoena for the production of records of a financial institution may be signed and issued by a superior court judge if there is reason to believe that an act of criminal profiteering or a violation of RCW 9A.82.060 or 9A.82.080 has occurred or is occurring and that the records sought will materially aid in the investigation of such activity or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information that will do so. The subpoena shall be served on the financial institution as in civil actions. The court may, upon motion timely made and in any event before the time specified for compliance with the subpoena, condition compliance upon advancement by the attorney general or prosecuting attorney of the reasonable costs of producing the records specified in the subpoena.

(2) A response to a subpoena issued under this section is sufficient if a copy or printout, duly authenticated by an officer of the financial institution as a true and correct copy or printout of its records, is provided, unless otherwise provided in the subpoena for good cause shown.

(3) Except as provided in this subsection, a financial institution served with a subpoena under this section shall not disclose to the customer the fact that a subpoena seeking records relating to the customer has been served. A judge of the superior court may order the attorney general, prosecuting attorney, or financial institution to advise the financial institution's customer of the subpoena. Unless ordered to do so by the court, disclosure of the subpoena by the financial institution or any of its employees to the customer is a misdemeanor.

(4) A financial institution shall be reimbursed in an amount set by the court for reasonable costs incurred in providing information pursuant to this section.

(2022 Ed.)

(5) This section does not preclude the use of other legally authorized means of obtaining records, nor preclude the assertion of any legally recognized privileges.

(6) Disclosure by the attorney general, county prosecuting attorney, or any peace officer or other person designated by the attorney general or the county prosecuting attorney, of information obtained under this section, except in the proper discharge of official duties, is punishable as a misdemeanor.

(7) Upon filing of any civil or criminal action, the non-disclosure requirements of any subpoena or order under this section shall terminate, and the attorney general or prosecuting attorney filing the action shall provide to the defendant copies of all subpoenas or other orders issued under this section.

(8) A financial institution shall not be civilly liable for harm resulting from its compliance with the provisions of this chapter. [2001 c 222 § 21. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 18; 1984 c 270 § 17.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.901 Effective date—1984 c 270 as amended by 1985 c 455. Sections 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, chapter 270, Laws of 1984 as amended by sections 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 of this 1985 act shall take effect on July 1, 1986, and the remainder of chapter 270, Laws of 1984 shall take effect on July 1, 1985. [2001 c 222 § 23. Prior: 1985 c 455 § 20; 1984 c 270 § 21.]

Purpose—Effective date—2001 c 222: See notes following RCW 9A.82.001.

9A.82.902 Effective date—1985 c 455. With the exception of sections 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 of this act, this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, the support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect July 1, 1985. [1985 c 455 § 21.]

Chapter 9A.83 RCW MONEY LAUNDERING

Sections

9A.83.010	Definitions.
9A.83.020	Money laundering.
9A.83.030	Seizure and forfeiture.
9A.83.040	Release from liability.

9A.83.010 Definitions. The definitions set forth in this section apply throughout this chapter.

(1) "Conducts a financial transaction" includes initiating, concluding, or participating in a financial transaction.

(2) "Financial institution" means a bank, savings bank, credit union, or savings and loan institution.

(3) "Financial transaction" means a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, transmission, delivery, trade, deposit, withdrawal, payment, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, extension of credit, or any other acquisition or disposition of property, by whatever means effected.

(4) "Knows the property is proceeds of specified unlawful activity" means believing based upon the representation of a law enforcement officer or his or her agent, or knowing

that the property is proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of specified unlawful activity.

(5) "Proceeds" means any interest in property directly or indirectly acquired through or derived from an act or omission, and any fruits of this interest, in whatever form.

(6) "Property" means anything of value, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible.

(7) "Specified unlawful activity" means an offense committed in this state that is a class A or B felony under Washington law or that is listed as "criminal profiteering" in RCW 9A.82.010, or an offense committed in any other state that is punishable under the laws of that state by more than one year in prison, or an offense that is punishable under federal law by more than one year in prison. [1999 c 143 § 41; 1992 c 210 § 1.]

9A.83.020 Money laundering. (1) A person is guilty of money laundering when that person conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity and:

(a) Knows the property is proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

(b) Knows that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds, and acts recklessly as to whether the property is proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

(c) Knows that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under federal law.

(2) In consideration of the constitutional right to counsel afforded by the Fifth and Sixth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 22 of the Constitution of Washington, an additional proof requirement is imposed when a case involves a licensed attorney who accepts a fee for representing a client in an actual criminal investigation or proceeding. In these situations, the prosecution is required to prove that the attorney accepted proceeds of specified unlawful activity with intent:

(a) To conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds, knowing the property is proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

(b) To avoid a transaction reporting requirement under federal law.

The proof required by this subsection is in addition to the requirements contained in subsection (1) of this section.

(3) An additional proof requirement is imposed when a case involves a financial institution and one or more of its employees. In these situations, the prosecution is required to prove that proceeds of specified unlawful activity were accepted with intent:

(a) To conceal or disguised [disguise] the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds, knowing the property is proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or

(b) To avoid a transaction reporting requirement under federal law.

The proof required by this subsection is in addition to the requirements contained in subsection (1) of this section.

(4) Money laundering is a class B felony.

(5) A person who violates this section is also liable for a civil penalty of twice the value of the proceeds involved in

the financial transaction and for the costs of the suit, including reasonable investigative and attorneys' fees.

(6) Proceedings under this chapter shall be in addition to any other criminal penalties, civil penalties, or forfeitures authorized under state law. [1992 c 210 § 2.]

9A.83.030 Seizure and forfeiture. (1) Proceeds traceable to or derived from specified unlawful activity or a violation of RCW 9A.83.020 are subject to seizure and forfeiture. The attorney general or county prosecuting attorney may file a civil action for the forfeiture of proceeds. Unless otherwise provided for under this section, no property rights exist in these proceeds. All right, title, and interest in the proceeds shall vest in the governmental entity of which the seizing law enforcement agency is a part upon commission of the act or omission giving rise to forfeiture under this section.

(2) Real or personal property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any law enforcement officer of this state upon process issued by a superior court that has jurisdiction over the property. Any agency seizing real property shall file a lis pendens concerning the property. Real property seized under this section shall not be transferred or otherwise conveyed until ninety days after seizure or until a judgment of forfeiture is entered, whichever is later. Real property seized under this section may be transferred or conveyed to any person or entity who acquires title by foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure of a security interest. Seizure of personal property without process may be made if:

(a) The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant issued pursuant to RCW 69.50.502; or

(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding based upon this chapter.

(3) A seizure under subsection (2) of this section commences proceedings for forfeiture. The law enforcement agency under whose authority the seizure was made shall cause notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture of the seized proceeds to be served within fifteen days after the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person who has a known right or interest therein, including a community property interest. Service of notice of seizure of real property shall be made according to the rules of civil procedure. However, the state may not obtain a default judgment with respect to real property against a party who is served by substituted service absent an affidavit stating that a good faith effort has been made to ascertain if the defaulted party is incarcerated within the state, and that there is no present basis to believe that the party is incarcerated within the state. The notice of seizure in other cases may be served by any method authorized by law or court rule including but not limited to service by certified mail with return receipt requested. Service by mail is complete upon mailing within the fifteen-day period after the seizure.

(4) If no person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of the property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the property seized shall be deemed forfeited. The community property interest in real property of a

person whose spouse or domestic partner committed a violation giving rise to seizure of the real property may not be forfeited if the person did not participate in the violation.

(5) If a person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of property within forty-five days of the seizure in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right. The provisions of RCW 69.50.505(5) shall apply to any such hearing. The seizing law enforcement agency shall promptly return property to the claimant upon the direction of the administrative law judge or court.

(6) Disposition of forfeited property shall be made in the manner provided for in RCW 69.50.505 (8) through (10) and (14) or 9.46.231 (6) through (8) and (10). [2020 c 62 § 1; 2008 c 6 § 630; 2001 c 168 § 2; 1992 c 210 § 3.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.83.040 Release from liability. No liability is imposed by this chapter upon any authorized state, county, or municipal officer engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, or upon any person who reasonably believes that he or she is acting at the direction of such officer and that the officer is acting in the lawful performance of his or her duties. [2011 c 336 § 409; 1992 c 210 § 4.]

Chapter 9A.84 RCW PUBLIC DISTURBANCE

Sections

9A.84.010	Criminal mischief.
9A.84.020	Failure to disperse.
9A.84.030	Disorderly conduct.
9A.84.040	False reporting.

9A.84.010 Criminal mischief. (1) A person is guilty of the crime of criminal mischief if, acting with three or more other persons, he or she knowingly and unlawfully uses or threatens to use force, or in any way participates in the use of such force, against any other person or against property.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, the crime of criminal mischief is a gross misdemeanor.

(b) The crime of criminal mischief is a class C felony if the actor is armed with a deadly weapon. [2013 c 20 § 1; 2003 c 53 § 91; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.84.010.]

Effective date—2013 c 20: "This act takes effect January 1, 2014." [2013 c 20 § 3.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

9A.84.020 Failure to disperse. (1) A person is guilty of failure to disperse if:

(a) He or she congregates with a group of three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or substantial harm to property; and

(b) He or she refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law.

(2) Failure to disperse is a misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 410; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.84.020.]

(2022 Ed.)

9A.84.030 Disorderly conduct. (1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if the person:

(a) Uses abusive language and thereby intentionally creates a risk of assault;

(b) Intentionally disrupts any lawful assembly or meeting of persons without lawful authority;

(c) Intentionally obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic without lawful authority; or

(d)(i) Intentionally engages in fighting or in tumultuous conduct or makes unreasonable noise, within five hundred feet of:

(A) The location where a funeral or burial is being performed;

(B) A funeral home during the viewing of a deceased person;

(C) A funeral procession, if the person described in this subsection (1)(d) knows that the funeral procession is taking place; or

(D) A building in which a funeral or memorial service is being conducted; and

(ii) Knows that the activity adversely affects the funeral, burial, viewing, funeral procession, or memorial service.

(2) Disorderly conduct is a misdemeanor. [2007 c 2 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.84.030.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.84.040 False reporting. (1) A person commits false reporting if, with knowledge that the information reported, conveyed, or circulated is false, he or she initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence knowing that such false report is likely to cause: Evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or transportation facility; public inconvenience or alarm; or an emergency response.

(2)(a) A person is guilty of false reporting in the first degree if the report was made with reckless disregard for the safety of others, the false reporting caused an emergency response, and death is sustained by any person as a proximate result of an emergency response. False reporting in the first degree is a class B felony.

(b) A person is guilty of false reporting in the second degree if the report was made with reckless disregard for the safety of others, the false reporting caused an emergency response, and substantial bodily harm is sustained by any person as a proximate result of an emergency response. False reporting in the second degree is a class C felony.

(c) A person is guilty of false reporting in the third degree if he or she commits false reporting under circumstances not constituting false reporting in the first or second degree. False reporting in the third degree is a gross misdemeanor.

(3) Any criminal offense committed under this section may be deemed to have been committed either at the place from which the false report was made, at the place where the false report was received by law enforcement, or at the place where an evacuation, public inconvenience or alarm, or emergency response occurred.

(4) Where a case is legally sufficient to charge a person under the age of eighteen with the crime of false reporting and the alleged offense is the offender's first violation of this section, the prosecutor may divert the case.

(5) For the purposes of this section, "emergency response" means any action to protect life, health, or property by:

(a) A peace officer or law enforcement agency of the United States, the state, or a political subdivision of the state; or

(b) An agency of the United States, the state, or a political subdivision of the state, or a private not-for-profit organization that provides fire, rescue, or emergency medical services.

(6) Nothing in this section will be construed to: (a) Impose liability on a person who contacts law enforcement for the purpose of, or in connection with, the reporting of unlawful conduct; (b) conflict with Title 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 of the communication decency act; or (c) conflict with Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 of the civil rights act. [2020 c 344 § 2; 2011 c 336 § 411; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.84.040.]

Finding—2020 c 344: "The legislature recognizes that false reporting laws criminalize the knowingly false reporting of certain occurrences that are likely to cause unwarranted evacuations, public inconvenience, or alarm. Recently, however, false reporting and the 911 system have been weaponized, resulting in serious dangers and even lost lives. The term "swatting" describes the false reporting of an emergency with the goal of having a police unit or special weapons and tactics team deployed. The reckless act of swatting, often motivated by the perpetrator's bias towards protected classes, has caused death and trauma in some cases. As such, the legislature finds that a gross misdemeanor is insufficient as a legal response and hereby create[s] felony false reporting punishments when the false reporting leads to injury or death." [2020 c 344 § 1.]

Chapter 9A.86 RCW DISCLOSING INTIMATE IMAGES

Sections

9A.86.010 Disclosing intimate images.
9A.86.020 Intimate images—Forfeiture by minors.

9A.86.010 Disclosing intimate images. (1) A person commits the crime of disclosing intimate images when the person knowingly discloses an intimate image of another person and the person disclosing the image:

(a) Obtained it under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private;

(b) Knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure; and

(c) Knows or reasonably should know that disclosure would cause harm to the depicted person.

(2) A person who is under the age of eighteen is not guilty of the crime of disclosing intimate images unless the person:

(a) Intentionally and maliciously disclosed an intimate image of another person;

(b) Obtained it under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and

(c) Knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure.

(3) This section does not apply to:

(a) Images involving voluntary exposure in public or commercial settings; or

(b) Disclosures made in the public interest including, but not limited to, the reporting of unlawful conduct, or the law-

ful and common practices of law enforcement, criminal reporting, legal proceedings, or medical treatment.

(4) This section does not impose liability upon the following entities solely as a result of content provided by another person:

(a) An interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(f)(2);

(b) A mobile telecommunications service provider, as defined in RCW 82.04.065; or

(c) A telecommunications network or broadband provider.

(5) It shall be an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the defendant is a family member of a minor and did not intend any harm or harassment in disclosing the images of the minor to other family or friends of the defendant. This affirmative defense shall not apply to matters defined under RCW 9.68A.011.

(6) For purposes of this section:

(a) "Disclosing" includes transferring, publishing, or disseminating, as well as making a digital depiction available for distribution or downloading through the facilities of a telecommunications network or through any other means of transferring computer programs or data to a computer;

(b) "Intimate image" means any photograph, motion picture film, videotape, digital image, or any other recording or transmission of another person who is identifiable from the image itself or from information displayed with or otherwise connected to the image, and that was taken in a private setting, is not a matter of public concern, and depicts:

(i) Sexual activity, including sexual intercourse as defined in RCW 9A.44.010 and masturbation; or

(ii) A person's intimate body parts, whether nude or visible through less than opaque clothing, including the genitals, pubic area, anus, or postpubescent female nipple.

(7) The crime of disclosing intimate images:

(a) Is a gross misdemeanor on the first offense; or

(b) Is a class C felony if the defendant has one or more prior convictions for disclosing intimate images.

(8) Nothing in this section is construed to:

(a) Alter or negate any rights, obligations, or immunities of an interactive service provider under 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230; or

(b) Limit or preclude a plaintiff from securing or recovering any other available remedy. [2016 c 91 § 1; 2015 2nd sp.s. c 7 § 1.]

9A.86.020 Intimate images—Forfeiture by minors.

A minor who possesses any image of any other minor which constitutes an intimate image as defined in RCW 9A.86.010 forfeits any right to continued possession of the image and any court exercising jurisdiction over such image shall order forfeiture of the image. [2019 c 128 § 10.]

Short title—2019 c 128: See note following RCW 13.40.660.

Chapter 9A.88 RCW INDECENT EXPOSURE—PROSTITUTION

Sections

9A.88.010 Indecent exposure.
9A.88.030 Prostitution.

- 9A.88.040 Prosecution for prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030—Affirmative defense.
- 9A.88.050 Prostitution—Sex of parties immaterial—No defense.
- 9A.88.060 Promoting prostitution—Definitions.
- 9A.88.070 Promoting prostitution in the first degree.
- 9A.88.080 Promoting prostitution in the second degree.
- 9A.88.085 Promoting travel for prostitution.
- 9A.88.090 Permitting prostitution.
- 9A.88.110 Patronizing a prostitute.
- 9A.88.120 Additional fee assessments.
- 9A.88.130 Additional requirements.
- 9A.88.140 Vehicle impoundment—Fees—Fines.
- 9A.88.150 Seizure and forfeiture.
- 9A.88.160 Promoting prostitution in the first degree, second degree—Court appearance—No-contact orders—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system.
- 9A.88.170 Promoting prostitution in the first degree, second degree—Court may prohibit defendant's contact with victim—No-contact orders—Issuance, termination, modification—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system.
- 9A.88.180 Promoting prostitution in the first degree, second degree—Condition of sentence restricting contact—No-contact orders—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system.
- 9A.88.190 Enforcement of rules restricting contact.
- 9A.88.200 Emergency assistance—Criminal immunity.

Obscenity: Chapter 9.68 RCW.

9A.88.010 Indecent exposure. (1) A person is guilty of indecent exposure if he or she intentionally makes any open and obscene exposure of his or her person or the person of another knowing that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable affront or alarm. The act of breastfeeding or expressing breast milk is not indecent exposure.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) and (c) of this subsection, indecent exposure is a misdemeanor.

(b) Indecent exposure is a gross misdemeanor on the first offense if the person exposes himself or herself to a person under the age of fourteen years.

(c) Indecent exposure is a class C felony if the person has previously been convicted under this section or of a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. [2003 c 53 § 92; 2001 c 88 § 2; 1990 c 3 § 904; 1987 c 277 § 1; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.010.]

Intent—Effective date—2003 c 53: See notes following RCW 2.48.180.

Acknowledgment—Declaration—Findings—2001 c 88: See note following RCW 43.70.640.

9A.88.030 Prostitution. (Effective until January 1, 2024.) (1) A person is guilty of prostitution if such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.

(2) For purposes of this section, "sexual conduct" means "sexual intercourse" or "sexual contact," both as defined in chapter 9A.44 RCW.

(3) Prostitution is a misdemeanor. [1988 c 145 § 16; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 15; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.030.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.88.030 Prostitution. (Effective January 1, 2024.) (1) A person age eighteen or older is guilty of prostitution if such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.

(2) For purposes of this section, "sexual conduct" means "sexual intercourse" or "sexual contact," both as defined in chapter 9A.44 RCW.

(2022 Ed.)

(3) Prostitution is a misdemeanor. [2020 c 331 § 4; 1988 c 145 § 16; 1979 ex.s. c 244 § 15; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.030.]

Effective date—2020 c 331 §§ 4, 5, and 6: "Sections 4, 5, and 6 of this act take effect January 1, 2024." [2020 c 331 § 12.]

Finding—2020 c 331: See note following RCW 7.68.380.

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.88.040 Prosecution for prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030—Affirmative defense. In any prosecution for prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030, it is an affirmative defense that the actor committed the offense as a result of being a victim of trafficking, RCW 9A.40.100, promoting prostitution in the first degree, RCW 9A.88.070, or trafficking in persons under the trafficking victims protection act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 7101 et seq. Documentation that the actor is named as a current victim in an information or the investigative records upon which a conviction is obtained for trafficking, promoting prostitution in the first degree, or trafficking in persons shall create a presumption that the person's participation in prostitution was a result of having been a victim of trafficking, promoting prostitution in the first degree, or trafficking in persons. [2012 c 142 § 1.]

9A.88.050 Prostitution—Sex of parties immaterial—No defense. In any prosecution for prostitution, the sex of the two parties or prospective parties to the sexual conduct engaged in, contemplated, or solicited is immaterial, and it is no defense that:

(1) Such persons were of the same sex; or

(2) The person who received, agreed to receive, or solicited a fee was a male and the person who paid or agreed or offered to pay such fee was female. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.050.]

9A.88.060 Promoting prostitution—Definitions. The following definitions are applicable in RCW 9A.88.070 through 9A.88.090:

(1) "Advances prostitution." A person "advances prostitution" if, acting other than as a prostitute or as a customer thereof, he or she causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, procures or solicits customers for prostitution, provides persons or premises for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid, or facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.

(2) "Profits from prostitution." A person "profits from prostitution" if, acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services, he or she accepts or receives money or anything of value pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any person whereby he or she participates or is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity. [2017 c 231 § 5; 2011 c 336 § 412; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.060.]

Finding—2017 c 231: See note following RCW 9A.04.080.

9A.88.070 Promoting prostitution in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree if he or she knowingly advances prostitution:

(a) By compelling a person by threat or force to engage in prostitution or profits from prostitution which results from such threat or force; or

(b) By compelling a person with a mental incapacity or developmental disability that renders the person incapable of consent to engage in prostitution or profits from prostitution that results from such compulsion.

(2) Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a class B felony. [2012 c 141 § 1; 2007 c 368 § 13; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.070.]

9A.88.080 Promoting prostitution in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the second degree if he or she knowingly:

(a) Profits from prostitution; or

(b) Advances prostitution.

(2) Promoting prostitution in the second degree is a class C felony. [2011 c 336 § 413; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.080.]

9A.88.085 Promoting travel for prostitution. (1) A person commits the offense of promoting travel for prostitution if the person knowingly sells or offers to sell travel services that include or facilitate travel for the purpose of engaging in what would be patronizing a prostitute or promoting prostitution, if occurring in the state.

(2) For purposes of this section, "travel services" has the same meaning as defined in RCW 19.138.021.

(3) Promoting travel for prostitution is a class C felony. [2006 c 250 § 2.]

Finding—2006 c 250: "The legislature finds that the sex industry has rapidly expanded over the past several decades. It involves sexual exploitation of persons, predominantly women and girls, including activities relating to prostitution, pornography, sex tourism, and other commercial sexual services. Prostitution and related activities contribute to the trafficking in persons, as does sex tourism. Therefore, discouraging sex tourism is key to reducing the demand for sex trafficking.

While prostitution is illegal in developing nations that are the primary destination of sex tourism, sex tourism is a major component of the local economy. The laws target female workers rather than the male customers, and economic opportunities for females are limited. Developed nations create the demand for sex tourism, yet often fail to criminalize the practice, or the existing laws fail to specifically target the sellers of travel who organize, facilitate, and promote sex tourism." [2006 c 250 § 1.]

9A.88.090 Permitting prostitution. (1) A person is guilty of permitting prostitution if, having possession or control of premises which he or she knows are being used for prostitution purposes, he or she fails without lawful excuse to make reasonable effort to halt or abate such use.

(2) Permitting prostitution is a misdemeanor. [2011 c 336 § 414; 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.88.090.]

9A.88.110 Patronizing a prostitute. (1) A person is guilty of patronizing a prostitute if:

(a) Pursuant to a prior understanding, he or she pays a fee to another person as compensation for such person or a third person having engaged in sexual conduct with him or her; or

(b) He or she pays or agrees to pay a fee to another person pursuant to an understanding that in return therefor such person will engage in sexual conduct with him or her; or

(c) He or she solicits or requests another person to engage in sexual conduct with him or her in return for a fee.

(2) The crime of patronizing a prostitute may be committed in more than one location. The crime is deemed to have been committed in any location in which the defendant commits any act under subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section that constitutes part of the crime. A person who sends a communication to patronize a prostitute is considered to have committed the crime both at the place from which the contact was made pursuant to subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section and where the communication is received, provided that this section must be construed to prohibit anyone from being prosecuted twice for substantially the same crime.

(3) For purposes of this section, "sexual conduct" has the meaning given in RCW 9A.88.030.

(4) Patronizing a prostitute is a misdemeanor. [2017 c 232 § 1; 1988 c 146 § 4.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.88.120 Additional fee assessments. (1)(a) In addition to penalties set forth in RCW 9A.88.010 and 9A.88.030, an adult offender who is either convicted or given a deferred sentence or a deferred prosecution or who has entered into a statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement as a result of an arrest for violating RCW 9A.88.010, 9A.88.030, or comparable county or municipal ordinances shall be assessed a fifty dollar fee.

(b) In addition to penalties set forth in RCW 9A.88.090, an adult offender who is either convicted or given a deferred sentence or a deferred prosecution or who has entered into a statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement as a result of an arrest for violating RCW 9A.88.090 or comparable county or municipal ordinances shall be assessed a fee in the amount of:

(i) One thousand five hundred dollars if the defendant has no prior convictions, deferred sentences, deferred prosecutions, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreements for this offense;

(ii) Two thousand five hundred dollars if the defendant has one prior conviction, deferred sentence, deferred prosecution, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement for this offense; and

(iii) Five thousand dollars if the defendant has two or more prior convictions, deferred sentences, deferred prosecutions, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreements for this offense.

(c) In addition to penalties set forth in RCW 9A.88.110, a person who is either convicted or given a deferred sentence or a deferred prosecution or who has entered into a statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement as a result of an arrest for violating RCW 9A.88.110 or a comparable county or municipal ordinance shall be assessed a fee in the amount of:

(i) One thousand five hundred dollars if the defendant has no prior convictions, deferred sentences, deferred prosecutions, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreements for this offense;

(ii) Two thousand five hundred dollars if the defendant has one prior conviction, deferred sentence, deferred prosecution, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement for this offense; and

(iii) Five thousand dollars if the defendant has two or more prior convictions, deferred sentences, deferred prosecutions, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreements for this offense.

(d) In addition to penalties set forth in RCW 9A.88.070 and 9A.88.080, a person who is either convicted or given a deferred sentence or a deferred prosecution or who has entered into a statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement as a result of an arrest for violating RCW 9A.88.070, 9A.88.080, or comparable county or municipal ordinances shall be assessed a fee in the amount of:

(i) Three thousand dollars if the defendant has no prior convictions, deferred sentences, deferred prosecutions, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreements for this offense;

(ii) Six thousand dollars if the defendant has one prior conviction, deferred sentence, deferred prosecution, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement for this offense; and

(iii) Ten thousand dollars if the defendant has two or more prior convictions, deferred sentences, deferred prosecutions, or statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreements for this offense.

(2) The court shall not reduce, waive, or suspend payment of all or part of the assessed fee in this section unless it finds, on the record, that the offender does not have the ability to pay the fee in which case it may reduce the fee by an amount up to two-thirds of the maximum allowable fee.

(a) A superior court may, as described in RCW 9.94A.760, set a sum that the offender is required to pay on a monthly basis towards satisfying the fee imposed in this section.

(b) A district or municipal court may enter into a payment plan with the defendant, in which the fee assessed in this section is paid through scheduled periodic payments. The court may assess the defendant a reasonable fee for administrative services related to the operation of the payment plan.

(3) Fees assessed under this section shall be collected by the clerk of the court and remitted to the treasurer of the county where the offense occurred for deposit in the county general fund, except in cases in which the offense occurred in a city or town that provides for its own law enforcement, in which case these amounts shall be remitted to the treasurer of the city or town for deposit in the general fund of the city or town. Revenue from the fees must be used for local efforts to reduce the commercial sale of sex including, but not limited to, increasing enforcement of commercial sex laws.

(a) At least fifty percent of the revenue from fees imposed under this section must be spent on prevention, including education programs for offenders, such as john school, and rehabilitative services for victims, such as mental health and substance abuse counseling, parenting skills, training, housing relief, education, vocational training, drop-in centers, and employment counseling.

(b) Two percent of the revenue from fees imposed under this section shall be remitted quarterly to the department of commerce, together with a report detailing the fees assessed, the revenue received, and how that revenue was spent.

(c) Revenues from these fees are not subject to the distribution requirements under RCW 3.50.100, 3.62.020, 3.62.040, 10.82.070, or 35.20.220.

(4) For the purposes of this section:

(a) "Statutory or nonstatutory diversion agreement" means an agreement under RCW 13.40.080 or any written agreement between a person accused of an offense listed in subsection (1) of this section and a court, county, or city pros-

ecutor, or designee thereof, whereby the person agrees to fulfill certain conditions in lieu of prosecution.

(b) "Deferred sentence" means a sentence that will not be carried out if the defendant meets certain requirements, such as complying with the conditions of probation. [2015 c 265 § 20; 2013 c 121 § 5; 2012 c 134 § 3; 2007 c 368 § 12; 1995 c 353 § 13.]

Finding—Intent—2015 c 265: See note following RCW 13.50.010.

Intent—Finding—2013 c 121: See note following RCW 43.280.091.

9A.88.130 Additional requirements. (1) When sentencing or imposing conditions on a person convicted of, or receiving a deferred sentence or deferred prosecution for, violating RCW 9A.88.110 or 9.68A.100, the court must impose a requirement that the offender:

(a) Not be subsequently arrested for patronizing a prostitute or commercial sexual abuse of a minor;

(b) Remain outside the geographical area, prescribed by the court, in which the person was arrested for violating RCW 9A.88.110 or 9.68A.100, unless such a requirement would interfere with the person's legitimate employment or residence or otherwise be infeasible; and

(c) Fulfill the terms of a program, if a first-time offender, designated by the sentencing court, designed to educate offenders about the negative costs of prostitution.

(2) This requirement is in addition to the penalties set forth in RCW 9A.88.110, 9A.88.120, and 9.68A.100. [2012 c 136 § 2; 1999 c 327 § 2.]

Findings—Intent—1999 c 327: "The legislature finds that most law enforcement effort to prevent prostitution is directed at punishing prostitutes. The legislature also finds that many patrons of prostitutes use motor vehicles in order to obtain the services of prostitutes and that successful prevention of prostitution involves efforts to curtail the demand for services offered by prostitutes. It is the intent of the legislature to decrease the demand for prostitution services and thereby eliminate the economic foundation for the prostitution industry. It is also the intent of the legislature to eliminate traffic congestion and other concerns to neighborhoods and business areas caused by patrons cruising in motor vehicles in areas of high prostitution activity." [1999 c 327 § 1.]

9A.88.140 Vehicle impoundment—Fees—Fines.

(1)(a) Upon an arrest for a suspected violation of patronizing a prostitute, promoting prostitution in the first degree, promoting prostitution in the second degree, promoting travel for prostitution, the arresting law enforcement officer may impound the person's vehicle if (i) the motor vehicle was used in the commission of the crime; (ii) the person arrested is the owner of the vehicle or the vehicle is a rental car as defined in RCW 46.04.465; and (iii) either (A) the person arrested has previously been convicted of one of the offenses listed in this subsection or (B) the offense was committed within an area designated under (b) of this subsection.

(b) A local governing authority may designate areas within which vehicles are subject to impoundment under this section regardless of whether the person arrested has previously been convicted of any of the offenses listed in (a) of this subsection.

(i) The designation must be based on evidence indicating that the area has a disproportionately higher number of arrests for the offenses listed in (a) of this subsection as compared to other areas within the same jurisdiction.

(ii) The local governing authority shall post signs at the boundaries of the designated area to indicate that the area has been designated under this subsection.

(2) Upon an arrest for a suspected violation of commercial sexual abuse of a minor, promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor, or promoting travel for commercial sexual abuse of a minor, the arresting law enforcement officer shall impound the person's vehicle if (a) the motor vehicle was used in the commission of the crime; and (b) the person arrested is the owner of the vehicle or the vehicle is a rental car as defined in RCW 46.04.465.

(3) Impoundments performed under this section shall be in accordance with chapter 46.55 RCW and the impoundment order must clearly state "prostitution hold."

(4)(a) Prior to redeeming the impounded vehicle, and in addition to all applicable impoundment, towing, and storage fees paid to the towing company under chapter 46.55 RCW, an adult owner of an impounded vehicle must pay a fine to the impounding agency. The fine shall be five hundred dollars for the offenses specified in subsection (1) of this section, or two thousand five hundred dollars for the offenses specified in subsection (2) of this section.

(b) Upon receipt of the fine paid under (a) of this subsection, the impounding agency shall issue a written receipt to the owner of the impounded vehicle.

(c) Fines assessed under this section shall be collected by the clerk of the court and remitted to the treasurer of the county where the offense occurred for deposit in the county general fund, except in cases in which the offense occurred in a city or town that provides for its own law enforcement, in which case these amounts shall be remitted to the treasurer of the city or town for deposit in the general fund of the city or town. Revenue from the fines must be used for local efforts to reduce the commercial sale of sex including, but not limited to, increasing enforcement of commercial sex laws.

(i) At least fifty percent of the revenue from fines imposed under this section must be spent on prevention, including education programs for offenders, such as john school, and rehabilitative services for victims, such as mental health and substance abuse counseling, parenting skills, training, housing relief, education, vocational training, drop-in centers, and employment counseling.

(ii) Two percent of the revenue from fines imposed under this section shall be remitted quarterly to the department of commerce, together with a report detailing the fees assessed, the revenue received, and how that revenue was spent.

(iii) Revenues from these fees are not subject to the distribution requirements under RCW 3.50.100, 3.62.020, 3.62.040, 10.82.070, or 35.20.220.

(5)(a) In order to redeem a vehicle impounded under this section, the owner must provide the towing company with the written receipt issued under subsection (4)(b) of this section.

(b) The written receipt issued under subsection (4)(b) of this section authorizes the towing company to release the impounded vehicle upon payment of all impoundment, towing, and storage fees.

(c) A towing company that relies on a forged receipt to release a vehicle impounded under this section is not liable to the impounding authority for any unpaid fine under subsection (4)(a) of this section.

(6)(a) In any proceeding under chapter 46.55 RCW to contest the validity of an impoundment under this section where the claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to a full refund of the impoundment, towing, and storage fees paid under chapter 46.55 RCW and the five hundred dollar fine paid under subsection (4) of this section.

(b) If the person is found not guilty at trial for a crime listed under subsection (1) of this section, the person is entitled to a full refund of the impoundment, towing, and storage fees paid under chapter 46.55 RCW and the fine paid under subsection (4) of this section.

(c) All refunds made under this section shall be paid by the impounding agency.

(d) Prior to receiving any refund under this section, the claimant must provide proof of payment. [2015 c 265 § 21; 2013 c 121 § 6; 2010 c 289 § 12; 2009 c 387 § 1; 2007 c 368 § 8; 1999 c 327 § 3.]

Finding—Intent—2015 c 265: See note following RCW 13.50.010.

Intent—Finding—2013 c 121: See note following RCW 43.280.091.

Findings—Intent—1999 c 327: See note following RCW 9A.88.130.

9A.88.150 Seizure and forfeiture. (1) The following are subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right exists in them:

(a) Any property or other interest acquired or maintained in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070 to the extent of the investment of funds, and any appreciation or income attributable to the investment, from a violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070;

(b) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, in any manner to facilitate a violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, except that:

(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier is subject to forfeiture under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance is a consenting party or privy to a violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070;

(ii) No conveyance is subject to forfeiture under this section by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent;

(iii) A forfeiture of a conveyance encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if the secured party neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission; and

(iv) When the owner of a conveyance has been arrested for a violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, the conveyance in which the person is arrested may not be subject to forfeiture unless it is seized or process is issued for its seizure within ten days of the owner's arrest;

(c) Any property, contractual right, or claim against property used to influence any enterprise that a person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070;

(d) All proceeds traceable to or derived from an offense defined in RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070 and all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, and other things

of value significantly used or intended to be used significantly to facilitate commission of the offense;

(e) All books, records, and research products and materials, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070;

(f) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other tangible or intangible property of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, all tangible or intangible personal property, proceeds, or assets acquired in whole or in part with proceeds traceable to an exchange or series of exchanges in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070. A forfeiture of money, negotiable instruments, securities, or other tangible or intangible property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if, at the time the security interest was created, the secured party neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission. No personal property may be forfeited under this subsection (1)(f), to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission, which that owner establishes was committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent; and

(g) All real property, including any right, title, and interest in the whole of any lot or tract of land, and any appurtenances or improvements which are being used with the knowledge of the owner for a violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, or which have been acquired in whole or in part with proceeds traceable to an exchange or series of exchanges in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070, if a substantial nexus exists between the violation and the real property. However:

(i) No property may be forfeited pursuant to this subsection (1)(g), to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent;

(ii) A forfeiture of real property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if the secured party, at the time the security interest was created, neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission.

(2) Real or personal property subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by any law enforcement officer of this state upon process issued by any superior court having jurisdiction over the property. Seizure of real property shall include the filing of a lis pendens by the seizing agency. Real property seized under this section shall not be transferred or otherwise conveyed until ninety days after seizure or until a judgment of forfeiture is entered, whichever is later: PROVIDED, That real property seized under this section may be transferred or conveyed to any person or entity who acquires title by foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure of a security interest. Seizure of personal property without process may be made if:

(a) The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant;

(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding; or

(c) The law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the property was used or is intended to be used in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070.

(3) In the event of seizure pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, proceedings for forfeiture shall be deemed commenced by the seizure. The law enforcement agency under whose authority the seizure was made shall cause notice to be served within fifteen days following the seizure on the owner of the property seized and the person in charge thereof and any person having any known right or interest therein, including any community property interest, of the seizure and intended forfeiture of the seized property. Service of notice of seizure of real property shall be made according to the rules of civil procedure. However, the state may not obtain a default judgment with respect to real property against a party who is served by substituted service absent an affidavit stating that a good faith effort has been made to ascertain if the defaulted party is incarcerated within the state, and that there is no present basis to believe that the party is incarcerated within the state. Notice of seizure in the case of property subject to a security interest that has been perfected by filing a financing statement, or a certificate of title, shall be made by service upon the secured party or the secured party's assignee at the address shown on the financing statement or the certificate of title. The notice of seizure in other cases may be served by any method authorized by law or court rule including, but not limited to, service by certified mail with return receipt requested. Service by mail shall be deemed complete upon mailing within the fifteen day period following the seizure.

(4) If no person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of items specified in subsection (1) of this section within forty-five days of the service of notice from the seizing agency in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the item seized shall be deemed forfeited. The community property interest in real property of a person whose spouse or domestic partner committed a violation giving rise to seizure of the real property may not be forfeited if the person did not participate in the violation.

(5) If any person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of items specified in subsection (1) of this section within forty-five days of the service of notice from the seizing agency in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right. The notice of claim may be served by any method authorized by law or court rule including, but not limited to, service by first-class mail. Service by mail shall be deemed complete upon mailing within the forty-five day period following service of the notice of seizure in the case of personal property and within the ninety day period following service of the notice of seizure in the case of real property. The hearing shall be before the chief law enforcement officer of the seizing agency or the chief law enforcement officer's designee, except where the seizing agency is a state agency as

defined in RCW 34.12.020(4), the hearing shall be before the chief law enforcement officer of the seizing agency or an administrative law judge appointed under chapter 34.12 RCW, except that any person asserting a claim or right may remove the matter to a court of competent jurisdiction. Removal of any matter involving personal property may only be accomplished according to the rules of civil procedure. The person seeking removal of the matter must serve process against the state, county, political subdivision, or municipality that operates the seizing agency, and any other party of interest, in accordance with RCW 4.28.080 or 4.92.020, within forty-five days after the person seeking removal has notified the seizing law enforcement agency of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession. The court to which the matter is to be removed shall be the district court when the aggregate value of personal property is within the jurisdictional limit set forth in RCW 3.66.020. A hearing before the seizing agency and any appeal therefrom shall be under Title 34 RCW. In all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.

The seizing law enforcement agency shall promptly return the article or articles to the claimant upon a determination by the administrative law judge or court that the claimant is the present lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to possession thereof of items specified in subsection (1) of this section.

(6) In any proceeding to forfeit property under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees reasonably incurred by the claimant. In addition, in a court hearing between two or more claimants to the article or articles involved, the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment for costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

(7) When property is forfeited under this chapter, the seizing law enforcement agency may:

(a) Retain it for official use or upon application by any law enforcement agency of this state release the property to that agency for the exclusive use of enforcing this chapter or chapter 9.68A RCW;

(b) Sell that which is not required to be destroyed by law and which is not harmful to the public; or

(c) Request the appropriate sheriff or director of public safety to take custody of the property and remove it for disposition in accordance with law.

(8)(a) When property is forfeited, the seizing agency shall keep a record indicating the identity of the prior owner, if known, a description of the property, the disposition of the property, the value of the property at the time of seizure, and the amount of proceeds realized from disposition of the property.

(b) Each seizing agency shall retain records of forfeited property for at least seven years.

(c) Each seizing agency shall file a report including a copy of the records of forfeited property with the state treasurer each calendar quarter.

(d) The quarterly report need not include a record of forfeited property that is still being held for use as evidence during the investigation or prosecution of a case or during the appeal from a conviction.

(9)(a) By January 31st of each year, each seizing agency shall remit to the state an amount equal to ten percent of the net proceeds of any property forfeited during the preceding calendar year. Money remitted shall be deposited in the prostitution prevention and intervention account under RCW 43.63A.740.

(b) The net proceeds of forfeited property is the value of the forfeitable interest in the property after deducting the cost of satisfying any bona fide security interest to which the property is subject at the time of seizure; and in the case of sold property, after deducting the cost of sale, including reasonable fees or commissions paid to independent selling agents, and the cost of any valid landlord's claim for damages under subsection (12) of this section.

(c) The value of sold forfeited property is the sale price. The value of destroyed property and retained firearms or illegal property is zero.

(10) Net proceeds not required to be remitted to the state shall be used for payment of all proper expenses of the investigation leading to the seizure, including any money delivered to the subject of the investigation by the law enforcement agency, and of the proceedings for forfeiture and sale, including expenses of seizure, maintenance of custody, advertising, actual costs of the prosecuting or city attorney, and court costs. Money remaining after payment of these expenses shall be retained by the seizing law enforcement agency for the exclusive use of enforcing the provisions of this chapter or chapter 9.68A RCW.

(11) Upon the entry of an order of forfeiture of real property, the court shall forward a copy of the order to the assessor of the county in which the property is located. Orders for the forfeiture of real property shall be entered by the superior court, subject to court rules. Such an order shall be filed by the seizing agency in the county auditor's records in the county in which the real property is located.

(12) A landlord may assert a claim against proceeds from the sale of assets seized and forfeited under subsection (9) of this section, only if:

(a) A law enforcement officer, while acting in his or her official capacity, directly caused damage to the complaining landlord's property while executing a search of a tenant's residence;

(b) The landlord has applied any funds remaining in the tenant's deposit, to which the landlord has a right under chapter 59.18 RCW, to cover the damage directly caused by a law enforcement officer prior to asserting a claim under the provisions of this section:

(i) Only if the funds applied under (b) of this subsection are insufficient to satisfy the damage directly caused by a law enforcement officer, may the landlord seek compensation for the damage by filing a claim against the governmental entity under whose authority the law enforcement agency operates within thirty days after the search;

(ii) Only if the governmental entity denies or fails to respond to the landlord's claim within sixty days of the date of filing, may the landlord collect damages under this subsection by filing within thirty days of denial or the expiration of the sixty day period, whichever occurs first, a claim with the seizing law enforcement agency. The seizing law enforcement agency must notify the landlord of the status of the claim by the end of the thirty day period. Nothing in this sec-

tion requires the claim to be paid by the end of the sixty day or thirty day period; and

(c) For any claim filed under (b) of this subsection, the law enforcement agency shall pay the claim unless the agency provides substantial proof that the landlord either:

(i) Knew or consented to actions of the tenant in violation of RCW 9.68A.100, 9.68A.101, or 9A.88.070; or

(ii) Failed to respond to a notification of the illegal activity, provided by a law enforcement agency under RCW 59.18.075, within seven days of receipt of notification of the illegal activity.

(13) The landlord's claim for damages under subsection (12) of this section may not include a claim for loss of business and is limited to:

(a) Damage to tangible property and clean-up costs;

(b) The lesser of the cost of repair or fair market value of the damage directly caused by a law enforcement officer;

(c) The proceeds from the sale of the specific tenant's property seized and forfeited under subsection (9) of this section; and

(d) The proceeds available after the seizing law enforcement agency satisfies any bona fide security interest in the tenant's property and costs related to sale of the tenant's property as provided by subsection (12) of this section.

(14) Subsections (12) and (13) of this section do not limit any other rights a landlord may have against a tenant to collect for damages. However, if a law enforcement agency satisfies a landlord's claim under subsection (12) of this section, the rights the landlord has against the tenant for damages directly caused by a law enforcement officer under the terms of the landlord and tenant's contract are subrogated to the law enforcement agency. [2022 c 162 § 5; 2014 c 188 § 4; 2012 c 140 § 1.]

Effective date—2022 c 162: See note following RCW 69.50.505.

9A.88.160 Promoting prostitution in the first degree, second degree—Court appearance—No-contact orders—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system. (1) A defendant who is charged by citation, complaint, or information with an offense involving promoting prostitution in the first degree as described in RCW 9A.88.070 or promoting prostitution in the second degree as described in RCW 9A.88.080 and not arrested shall appear in court for arraignment or initial appearance in person as soon as practicable, but in no event later than fourteen days after the defendant is served with the citation, complaint, or information. At that appearance, the court shall determine the necessity of imposing or extending a no-contact order, and consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800 or other conditions of pretrial release according to the procedures established by court rule for preliminary appearance or an arraignment.

(2) Whenever a no-contact order is issued under this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-

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based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2017 c 230 § 5.]

9A.88.170 Promoting prostitution in the first degree, second degree—Court may prohibit defendant's contact with victim—No-contact orders—Issuance, termination, modification—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system. (1) Because of the likelihood of repeated harassment and intimidation directed at those who have been victims of promoting prostitution in the first degree under RCW 9A.88.070 or promoting prostitution in the second degree under RCW 9A.88.080, before any defendant charged with or arrested, for a crime involving promoting prostitution is released from custody, or at any time the case remains unresolved, the court may prohibit that person from having any contact with the victim whether directly or through third parties. If there is no outstanding restraining or protective order prohibiting that person from having contact with the victim, the court may issue, by telephone, a no-contact order prohibiting the person charged or arrested from having contact with the victim or from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location. The court may also consider the provisions of RCW 9.41.800 or other conditions of pretrial release according to the procedures established by court rule for preliminary appearance or an arraignment.

(2) At the time of arraignment, the court shall determine whether a no-contact order shall be issued or extended. So long as the court finds probable cause, the court may issue or extend a no-contact order. The no-contact order shall terminate if the defendant is acquitted or the charges are dismissed.

(3)(a) Willful violation of a court order issued under this section is punishable under RCW 7.105.450.

(b) The written order shall contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 7.105 RCW and the violator is subject to arrest; any assault, drive-by shooting, or reckless endangerment that is a violation of this order is a felony.

(4) Upon a motion with notice to all parties and after a hearing, the court may terminate or modify the terms of an existing no-contact order, including terms entered pursuant to RCW 9.41.800 related to firearms or other dangerous weapons or to concealed pistol licenses.

(5)(a) A defendant's motion to terminate or modify a no-contact order must include a declaration setting forth facts supporting the requested order for termination or modification. The court shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the declarations. If the court finds that the defendant established adequate cause, the court shall set a date for hearing the defendant's motion.

(b) The court may terminate or modify the terms of a no-contact order, including terms entered pursuant to RCW 9.41.800 related to firearms or other dangerous weapons or to concealed pistol licenses, if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a material

change in circumstances such that the defendant is not likely to engage in or attempt to engage in physical or nonphysical contact with the victim if the order is terminated or modified. The victim bears no burden of proving that he or she has a current reasonable fear of harm by the defendant.

(c) A defendant may file a motion to terminate or modify pursuant to this section no more than once in every twelve-month period that the order is in effect, starting from the date of the order and continuing through any renewal.

(6) Whenever a no-contact order is issued, modified, or terminated under this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2021 c 215 § 112; 2017 c 230 § 7.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

9A.88.180 Promoting prostitution in the first degree, second degree—Condition of sentence restricting contact—No-contact orders—Entry of order into computer-based criminal intelligence information system. (1) If a defendant is found guilty of the crime of promoting prostitution in the first degree under RCW 9A.88.070 or promoting prostitution in the second degree under RCW 9A.88.080, and a condition of the sentence restricts the defendant's ability to have contact with the victim or witnesses, the condition must be recorded and a written certified copy of that order must be provided to the victim or witnesses by the clerk of the court. Willful violation of a court order issued under this section is punishable under RCW 7.105.450. The written order must contain the court's directives and shall bear the legend: Violation of this order is a criminal offense under chapter 7.105 RCW and the violator is subject to arrest; any assault, drive-by shooting, or reckless endangerment that is a violation of this order is a felony.

(2) Whenever a no-contact order is issued under this section, the clerk of the court shall forward a copy of the order on or before the next judicial day to the appropriate law enforcement agency specified in the order. Upon receipt of the copy of the order, the law enforcement agency shall enter the order for one year or until the expiration date specified on the order into any computer-based criminal intelligence information system available in this state used by law enforcement agencies to list outstanding warrants. Entry into the computer-based criminal intelligence information system constitutes notice to all law enforcement agencies of the existence of the order. The order is fully enforceable in any jurisdiction in the state. Upon receipt of notice that an order has been terminated, the law enforcement agency shall remove the order

from the computer-based criminal intelligence information system. [2021 c 215 § 113; 2017 c 230 § 8.]

Effective date—2022 c 268; 2021 c 215: See note following RCW 7.105.900.

9A.88.190 Enforcement of rules restricting contact. Any general authority Washington peace officer as defined in RCW 10.93.020 in this state may enforce this chapter as it relates to orders restricting the defendants' ability to have contact with the victim or others. [2017 c 230 § 6.]

9A.88.200 Emergency assistance—Criminal immunity. (1) A person acting in good faith who seeks emergency assistance for a victim of an offense included in subsection (4) of this section may not be charged or prosecuted for prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030, or an equivalent municipal ordinance, if the evidence for the charge of prostitution was obtained as a result of the person seeking emergency assistance.

(2) A person who is a victim of an offense included in subsection (4) of this section and is seeking emergency assistance on account of the offense may not be charged or prosecuted for prostitution under RCW 9A.88.030, or an equivalent municipal ordinance, if the evidence for the charge of prostitution was obtained as a result of the need for emergency assistance.

(3) The protection in this section from prosecution for prostitution is not grounds for suppression of evidence in other criminal charges.

(4) A victim of one of the following offenses, or a person seeking emergency assistance on his or her behalf, qualifies for immunity from prostitution charges as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section:

- (a) Any violent offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030;
 - (b) Assault in the third degree under RCW 9A.36.031;
 - (c) Assault in the fourth degree under RCW 9A.36.041, or an equivalent municipal ordinance;
 - (d) Rape in the third degree under RCW 9A.44.060.
- [2019 c 114 § 1.]

Chapter 9A.90 RCW WASHINGTON CYBERCRIME ACT

Sections

9A.90.010	Findings—Intent—2016 c 164.
9A.90.020	Short title—2016 c 164.
9A.90.030	Definitions.
9A.90.040	Computer trespass in the first degree.
9A.90.050	Computer trespass in the second degree.
9A.90.060	Electronic data service interference.
9A.90.070	Spoofing.
9A.90.080	Electronic data tampering in the first degree.
9A.90.090	Electronic data tampering in the second degree.
9A.90.100	Electronic data theft.
9A.90.110	Commission of other crime.
9A.90.120	Cyber harassment.
9A.90.130	Cyberstalking.

9A.90.010 Findings—Intent—2016 c 164. The legislature finds that the rapid pace of technological change and information computerization in the digital age generates a never ending sequence of anxiety inducing reports highlighting how the latest device or innovation is being used to harm consumers. The legislature finds that this generates an ongoing

ing pattern of legislation being proposed to regulate each new technology. The legislature finds that a more systemic approach is needed to better protect consumers and address these rapidly advancing technologies. The legislature finds that the application of traditional criminal enforcement measures that apply long-standing concepts of trespass, fraud, and theft to activities in the electronic frontier has not provided the essential clarity, certainty, and predictability that regulators, entrepreneurs, and innovators need. The legislature finds that an integrated, comprehensive methodology, rather than a piecemeal approach, will provide significant economic development benefits by providing certainty to the innovation community about the actions and activities that are prohibited. Therefore, the legislature intends to create a new chapter of crimes to the criminal code to punish and deter misuse or abuse of technology, rather than the perceived threats of individual technologies. This new chapter of crimes has been developed from an existing and proven system of computer security threat modeling known as the STRIDE system.

The legislature intends to strike a balance between public safety and civil liberties in the digital world, including creating sufficient space for white hat security research and whistleblowers. The state whistleblower and public record laws prevent this act from being used to hide any deleterious actions by government officials under the guise of security. Furthermore, this act is not intended to criminalize activity solely on the basis that it violates any terms of service.

The purpose of the Washington cybercrime act is to provide prosecutors the twenty-first century tools they need to combat twenty-first century crimes. [2016 c 164 § 1.]

9A.90.020 Short title—2016 c 164. This act may be known and cited as the Washington cybercrime act. [2016 c 164 § 2.]

9A.90.030 Definitions. The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) "Access" means to gain entry to, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of electronic data, data network, or data system, including via electronic means.

(2) "Cybercrime" includes crimes of this chapter.

(3) "Data" means a digital representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, data software, data programs, or instructions that are being prepared or have been prepared in a formalized manner and are intended for use in a data network, data program, data services, or data system.

(4) "Data network" means any system that provides digital communications between one or more data systems or other digital input/output devices including, but not limited to, display terminals, remote systems, mobile devices, and printers.

(5) "Data program" means an ordered set of electronic data representing coded instructions or statements that when executed by a computer causes the device to process electronic data.

(6) "Data services" includes data processing, storage functions, internet services, email services, electronic message services, website access, internet-based electronic gam-

ing services, and other similar system, network, or internet-based services.

(7) "Data system" means an electronic device or collection of electronic devices, including support devices one or more of which contain data programs, input data, and output data, and that performs functions including, but not limited to, logic, arithmetic, data storage and retrieval, communication, and control. This term does not include calculators that are not programmable and incapable of being used in conjunction with external files.

(8) "Electronic tracking device" means an electronic device that permits a person to remotely determine or monitor the position and movement of another person, vehicle, device, or other personal possession. As used in this definition, "electronic device" includes computer code or other digital instructions that once installed on a digital device, allows a person to remotely track the position of that device.

(9) "Identifying information" means information that, alone or in combination, is linked or linkable to a trusted entity that would be reasonably expected to request or provide credentials to access a targeted data system or network. It includes, but is not limited to, recognizable names, addresses, telephone numbers, logos, HTML links, email addresses, registered domain names, reserved IP addresses, user names, social media profiles, cryptographic keys, and biometric identifiers.

(10) "Malware" means any set of data instructions that are designed, without authorization and with malicious intent, to disrupt computer operations, gather sensitive information, or gain access to private computer systems. "Malware" does not include software that installs security updates, removes malware, or causes unintentional harm due to some deficiency. It includes, but is not limited to, a group of data instructions commonly called viruses or worms, that are self-replicating or self-propagating and are designed to infect other data programs or data, consume data resources, modify, destroy, record, or transmit data, or in some other fashion usurp the normal operation of the data, data system, or data network.

(11) "White hat security research" means accessing a data program, service, or system solely for purposes of good faith testing, investigation, identification, and/or correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where such activity is carried out, and where the information derived from the activity is used, primarily to promote security or safety.

(12) "Without authorization" means to knowingly circumvent technological access barriers to a data system in order to obtain information without the express or implied permission of the owner, where such technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include white hat security research or circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer. The term "without the express or implied permission" does not include access in violation of a duty, agreement, or contractual obligation, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an internet service provider, internet website, or employer. The term "circumvent technological access barriers" may include unauthorized elevation of privileges, such as allowing a normal user to execute code as administrator, or allowing a

remote person without any privileges to run code. [2022 c 231 § 2; 2016 c 164 § 3.]

9A.90.040 Computer trespass in the first degree. (1)

A person is guilty of computer trespass in the first degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains access to a computer system or electronic database of another; and

(a) The access is made with the intent to commit another crime in violation of a state law not included in this chapter; or

(b) The violation involves a computer or database maintained by a government agency.

(2) Computer trespass in the first degree is a class C felony. [2016 c 164 § 4.]

9A.90.050 Computer trespass in the second degree.

(1) A person is guilty of computer trespass in the second degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains access to a computer system or electronic database of another under circumstances not constituting the offense in the first degree.

(2) Computer trespass in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2016 c 164 § 5.]

9A.90.060 Electronic data service interference. (1) A

person is guilty of electronic data service interference if the person maliciously and without authorization causes the transmission of data, data program, or other electronic command that intentionally interrupts or suspends access to or use of a data network or data service.

(2) Electronic data service interference is a class C felony. [2016 c 164 § 6.]

9A.90.070 Spoofing. (1) A person is guilty of spoofing

if he or she, without authorization, knowingly initiates the transmission, display, or receipt of the identifying information of another organization or person for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access to electronic data, a data system, or a data network, and with the intent to commit another crime in violation of a state law not included in this chapter.

(2) Spoofing is a gross misdemeanor. [2016 c 164 § 7.]

9A.90.080 Electronic data tampering in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of electronic data tampering in the first degree if he or she maliciously and without authorization:

(a)(i) Alters data as it transmits between two data systems over an open or unsecure network; or

(ii) Introduces any malware into any electronic data, data system, or data network; and

(b)(i) Doing so is for the purpose of devising or executing any scheme to defraud, deceive, or extort, or commit any other crime in violation of a state law not included in this chapter, or of wrongfully controlling, gaining access to, or obtaining money, property, or electronic data; or

(ii) The electronic data, data system, or data network is maintained by a governmental [government] agency.

(2) Electronic data tampering in the first degree is a class C felony. [2016 c 164 § 8.]

9A.90.090 Electronic data tampering in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of electronic data tampering in the second degree if he or she maliciously and without authorization:

(a) Alters data as it transmits between two data systems over an open or unsecure network under circumstances not constituting the offense in the first degree; or

(b) Introduces any malware into any electronic data, data system, or data network under circumstances not constituting the offense in the first degree.

(2) Electronic data tampering in the second degree is a gross misdemeanor. [2016 c 164 § 9.]

9A.90.100 Electronic data theft. (1) A person is guilty of electronic data theft if he or she intentionally, without authorization, and without reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has such authorization, obtains any electronic data with the intent to:

(a) Devise or execute any scheme to defraud, deceive, extort, or commit any other crime in violation of a state law not included in this chapter; or

(b) Wrongfully control, gain access to, or obtain money, property, or electronic data.

(2) Electronic data theft is a class C felony. [2016 c 164 § 10.]

9A.90.110 Commission of other crime. A person who, in the commission of a crime under this chapter, commits any other crime may be punished for that other crime as well as for the crime under this chapter and may be prosecuted for each crime separately. [2016 c 164 § 11.]

9A.90.120 Cyber harassment. (1) A person is guilty of cyber harassment if the person, with intent to harass or intimidate any other person, and under circumstances not constituting telephone harassment, makes an electronic communication to that person or a third party and the communication:

(a)(i) Uses any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or obscene words, images, or language, or suggests the commission of any lewd or lascivious act;

(ii) Is made anonymously or repeatedly;

(iii) Contains a threat to inflict bodily injury immediately or in the future on the person threatened or to any other person; or

(iv) Contains a threat to damage, immediately or in the future, the property of the person threatened or of any other person; and

(b) With respect to any offense committed under the circumstances identified in (a)(iii) or (iv) of this subsection:

(i) Would cause a reasonable person, with knowledge of the sender's history, to suffer emotional distress or to fear for the safety of the person threatened; or

(ii) Reasonably caused the threatened person to suffer emotional distress or fear for the threatened person's safety.

(2)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, cyber harassment is a gross misdemeanor.

(b) A person who commits cyber harassment is guilty of a class C felony if any of the following apply:

(i) The person has previously been convicted in this or any other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim or members of the vic-

tim's family or household or any person specifically named in a no-contact or no-harassment order;

(ii) The person cyber harasses another person under subsection (1)(a)(iii) of this section by threatening to kill the person threatened or any other person;

(iii) The person cyber harasses a criminal justice participant or election official who is performing the participant's official duties or election official's official duties at the time the communication is made;

(iv) The person cyber harasses a criminal justice participant or election official because of an action taken or decision made by the criminal justice participant or election official during the performance of the participant's official duties or election official's official duties; or

(v) The person commits cyber harassment in violation of any protective order protecting the victim.

(3) Any criminal justice participant or election official who is a target for threats or harassment prohibited under subsection (2)(b)(iii) or (iv) of this section, and any family members residing with the participant or election official, shall be eligible for the address confidentiality program created under RCW 40.24.030.

(4) For purposes of this section, a criminal justice participant includes any:

(a) Federal, state, or municipal court judge;

(b) Federal, state, or municipal court staff;

(c) Federal, state, or local law enforcement agency employee;

(d) Federal, state, or local prosecuting attorney or deputy prosecuting attorney;

(e) Staff member of any adult corrections institution or local adult detention facility;

(f) Staff member of any juvenile corrections institution or local juvenile detention facility;

(g) Community corrections officer, probation officer, or parole officer;

(h) Member of the indeterminate sentence review board;

(i) Advocate from a crime victim/witness program; or

(j) Defense attorney.

(5) For the purposes of this section, an election official includes any staff member of the office of the secretary of state or staff member of a county auditor's office, regardless of whether the member is employed on a temporary or part-time basis, whose duties relate to voter registration or the processing of votes as provided in Title 29A RCW.

(6) The penalties provided in this section for cyber harassment do not preclude the victim from seeking any other remedy otherwise available under law.

(7) Any offense committed under this section may be deemed to have been committed either at the place from which the communication was made or at the place where the communication was received.

(8) For purposes of this section, "electronic communication" means the transmission of information by wire, radio, optical cable, electromagnetic, or other similar means. "Electronic communication" includes, but is not limited to, email, internet-based communications, pager service, and electronic text messaging. [2022 c 231 § 1; 2004 c 94 § 1. Formerly RCW 9.61.260.]

Additional notes found at www.leg.wa.gov

9A.90.130 Cyberstalking. (1) A person commits the crime of cyberstalking if, without lawful authority and under circumstances not amounting to a felony attempt of another crime:

(a) The person knowingly and without consent:

(i) Installs or monitors an electronic tracking device with the intent to track the location of another person; or

(ii) Causes an electronic tracking device to be installed, placed, or used with the intent to track the location of another person; and

(b)(i) The person knows or reasonably should know that knowledge of the installation or monitoring of the tracking device would cause the other person reasonable fear;

(ii) The person has notice that the other person does not want to be contacted or monitored by him or her; or

(iii) The other person has a protective order in effect protecting him or her from the person.

(2)(a) It is not a defense to the crime of cyberstalking that the person was not given actual notice that the other person did not want the person to contact or monitor him or her; and

(b) It is not a defense to the crime of cyberstalking that the person did not intend to frighten, intimidate, or harass the other person.

(3)(a) Except as provided in (b) of this subsection, a person who cyberstalks another person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

(b) A person who cyberstalks another person is guilty of a class C felony if any of the following applies:

(i) The person has previously been convicted in this state or any other state of any crime of harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, of the same victim or members of the victim's family or household or any person specifically named in a protective order;

(ii) There is a protective order in effect protecting the victim from contact with the person;

(iii) The person has previously been convicted of a gross misdemeanor or felony stalking offense for stalking another person;

(iv) The person has previously been convicted of a gross misdemeanor or felony cyberstalking offense for cyberstalking another person;

(v)(A) The victim is or was a law enforcement officer; judge; juror; attorney; victim advocate; legislator; community corrections officer; employee, contract staff person, or volunteer of a correctional agency; court employee, court clerk, or courthouse facilitator; or employee of the child protective, child welfare, or adult protective services division within the department of social and health services; and

(B) The person cyberstalked the victim to retaliate against the victim for an act the victim performed during the course of official duties or to influence the victim's performance of official duties; or

(vi) The victim is a current, former, or prospective witness in an adjudicative proceeding, and the person cyberstalked the victim to retaliate against the victim as a result of the victim's testimony or potential testimony.

(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to the installation, placement, or use of an electronic tracking device by any of the following:

(a) A law enforcement officer, judicial officer, probation or parole officer, or other public employee when any such

person is engaged in the lawful performance of official duties and in accordance with state or federal law;

(b) The installation, placement, or use of an electronic tracking device authorized by an order of a state or federal court;

(c) A legal guardian for a disabled adult or a legally authorized individual or organization designated to provide protective services to a disabled adult when the electronic tracking device is installed, placed, or used to track the location of the disabled adult for which the person is a legal guardian or the individual or organization is designated to provide protective services;

(d) A parent or legal guardian of a minor when the electronic tracking device is installed, placed, or used to track the location of that minor unless the parent or legal guardian is subject to a court order that orders the parent or legal guardian not to assault, threaten, harass, follow, or contact that minor;

(e) An employer, school, or other organization, who owns the device on which the tracking device is installed and provides the device to a person for use in connection with the person's involvement with the employer, school, or other organization and the use of the device is limited to recovering lost or stolen items; or

(f) The owner of fleet vehicles, when tracking such vehicles. For the purposes of this section, "fleet vehicle" means any of the following:

(i) One or more motor vehicles owned by a single entity and operated by employees or agents of the entity for business or government purposes;

(ii) Motor vehicles held for lease or rental to the general public; or

(iii) Motor vehicles held for sale, or used as demonstrators, test vehicles, or loaner vehicles, by motor vehicle dealers. [2022 c 231 § 3.]

Chapter 9A.98 RCW LAWS REPEALED

Sections

9A.98.010 Acts or parts of acts repealed.

9A.98.020 Savings clause.

9A.98.010 Acts or parts of acts repealed. See 1975 1st ex.s. c 260 s 9A.92.010.

9A.98.020 Savings clause. The laws repealed by RCW 9A.98.010 are repealed except with respect to rights and duties which matured, penalties which were incurred, and proceedings which were begun before July 1, 1976. [1975 1st ex.s. c 260 § 9A.92.020.]